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ABSTRACT
This dissertation proposes that militaries in developing states are usually deeply divided
internally on domestic social, economic, and political issues. Contrary to the way the military
is often portrayed, there is no single "military mind." Neither, however, are internal military
divisions primarily idiosyncratic. Differences in composition and sociology endow different
military services and branches with distinct domestic preferences. High-tech military
organizations are more likely to support liberal socio-economic positions, while troop-
oriented ones often embrace integral nationalism - a statist vision of development aimed at
unifying the state by reducing economic and social differences.
These propositions are tested against the history of armies and navies in Thailand, China, and
Indonesia since 1945, as well as additional evidence from Latin American, European, and
other Asian states. The case studies examine coups, counter-coups, military-sponsored
"mass" movements, and legislative battles involving uniformed officers. The historical
evidence confirms the theory. Military services often take opposite sides in domestic
disputes, with naval officers consistently backing more liberal socio-economic positions than
their army colleagues, especially those from the infantry branch. The balance of power
between contending military actors frequently determines national political trajectories for
decades at a stretch.
These patterns of divided military involvement in politics carry critical implications for
international security. The political leaders who emerge victorious from domestic battles
often secure their military flank by giving substantial control over strategy and force planning
to uniformed allies. Domestic politics, then, frequently have a decisive impact on strategic
planning and produces policies that the consideration of external threats alone would not
suggest.
Thesis Supervisor: Barry R. Posen
Title: Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Do military officers in developing states tend to have homogenous and unified political views
that set them apart from those of civilians? Or are militaries more frequently internally
divided on domestic issues? Is there, in other words, a single and distinctive military mind
with regard to domestic policy? If the answer to this last question is "no," is it possible to
find patterns? Do certain types of officers favor particular types of domestic ideologies or
policies? Or are the differences between officers idiosyncratic? Finally, what effect do
divided militaries and their involvement in politics have on political outcomes and military
policy?
The answers to these questions bear on a number of larger policy-related and
theoretical issues. They impinge, for example, on whether or how the United States can, in its
"war on terror," engage with military officials in developing states without undermining
liberal political, economic, and social values. For liberal reformers in the developing world,
the answers to these questions are critical for evaluating the advisability of various types of
strategies for controlling the military. Is it generally possible, for example, to find allies
within the military to balance hostile elements, or will the military be largely united in its
opposition? If liberal leaders do seek to build pro-reform coalitions within the military, where
should they look for allies? In the longer term, is it possible to shift the political values of the
military as a whole? For strategic analysts, meanwhile, questions about the relative unity of
the military bear on the interpretation of military strategy and force structure. Do shifts in
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military strategy necessary imply a changed perception of the external threat, or should
domestic political events receive equal attention as possible causal explanations?
This thesis does not definitively answer all of these questions. But it does answer a
critical subset of them, and in so doing, sheds additional light on the remainder. The thesis
focuses most explicitly on four questions: (1) Do officers from different military services and
branches have different domestic (economic, social, and political) preferences? (2) If they do,
what are those preferences and how can they be explained? (3) What effects do these intra-
military differences have on politics and political outcomes? And (4) what impact does the
military's divided involvement in politics have on the types of military force structures and
strategies chosen by political winners?
To assess these questions, this thesis examines the record of armies and navies in the
politics of Thailand, China, and Indonesia. Contrary to the way the military officer corps is
frequently treated, I find that officers do not tend to be unified in their domestic political
thinking. They are, rather, frequently deeply divided. Most major political struggles in these
states have not pitted "the military" against "the civilians," but rather contending civil-
military coalitions against one another. And the political leaders that emerge victorious in
these contests frequently reward their military partners by giving them first priority in military
resource allocation and pride of place in establishing military strategy and doctrine.
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The findings suggest that the United States can engage more with militaries in the
developing world without undermining liberal values, but only if it tailors its engagement
appropriately. Liberal leaders in the developing world, for their part, can generally find
military allies to balance hostile ones. And sudden shifts in military strategy - even including
those accompanied by sudden buildups of military equipment of one type or another - do not
necessarily imply changed perceptions of the external threat (much less actual changes).
Before proceeding to summarize the dissertation's findings and implications in greater detail,
I will first stipulate the specific propositions tested and methods used to guide the
investigation.
Theory and Methods
THESIS: CIVIL-MILITARY COALITIONS AND STRATEGY
This dissertation tests the following thesis: Differences in composition and organization give
different military services, branches, and functional groups distinct domestic preferences. In
general, the more "technical" the organization, the more liberal its socio-economic
preferences; the more "troop-oriented" the organization, the more prone toward integral
nationalism - a vision of the common good based on equitable income distribution and state-
led economic growth.' Crises that threaten the economic or political survival of major groups
'Conceptually speaking, I would define "technical" organizations as those in which officers spend relatively
more of their time addressing mechanical or analytical problems and relatively less time managing people.
"Troop-oriented units organizations would be the reverse. I operationalize this based on the relative per capita
capitalization of the organization. The more technical the organization, the higher its per capita capitalization
will be. Although general staffs and some other "technical" organizations do not work primarily with machines
(like air forces might be said to do), the technical nature of the analytical problems with which they deal will be
reflected in high personnel costs (per capita), as well as relatively high spending on the telecommunications
infrastructure that supports them.
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in society and draw into the question the legitimacy of the state's political structures will lead
military organizations to form or be drawn into coalitions with like-minded civilian groups.
After the resolution of those crises, the military partners of the winning coalition will be given
broad authority over the definition of national military policy. The logic of the thesis is
presented in an arrow diagram in figure 1.1.
SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES OF INVESTIGATION
In order to assess the thesis systematically and make clear predictions, the thesis' scope is
limited in three ways.
First, as suggested above, I restrict the scope of this thesis to events in the developing
world. Although intra-military differences may also be evident in developed states,
they are likely to be less pronounced than in developing ones. 2 Moreover, political
circumstances in developing states will make the political views of military officers
more important.3
* Second, in order to facilitate clear theory testing, predictions about the domestic
preferences of military organizations are limited to those concerning two services,
armies and navies. Some assessment is also made of groups within each of those
services. The causal explanations offered to justify the thesis' predictions should
nevertheless apply to those parts of the military not explicitly treated.4
2 Reflecting the situations in developing and developed militaries, the difference between the per capita
capitalization of the services is generally considerably smaller - though still noticeable - in the militaries of
latter than it is in the former.
3 The military is more likely to be drawn into politics when there is general disagreement within the state over
the fundamental legitimacy of political structures and practices. Developing states are significantly more prone
to such disagreement than developed ones. There is a high correlation between national wealth and democratic
governance, as there is between wealth and the propensity of militaries to intervene in politics. There are, of
course, exceptions. Elements of the French army, for example, attempted a coup d'etat in 1961. It is worth
noting that in that instance, intra-military differences had a critical impact on the course of the revolt. Air and
naval elements, both of which opposed the coup, blocked the passage of rebellious troops from Algeria, the
center of army dissent, to the French mainland.
4 In general, I would expect air force officers to view domestic issues much as naval officers do. Navies were
selected over air forces as the focus of comparison for two reasons. First, the air force's military capabilities are
more specialized and less well rounded - at least for domestic missions - than are the navy's. Navies, even in
12
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Third, the discussion of domestic preferences is largely restricted to two competing
socio-economic ideologies: integral nationalism and liberal nationalism. These are
ideal types and do not represent all of the possible combinations or permutations of
political, economic, and social belief-systems that might be encountered.
Nevertheless, they capture the essential choices that confront leaders in most
developing states: To what extent should the state attempt to guide the economy and
regulate social activity, and to what extent should it depend on markets and free
society?
Note that although these ideologies may be related to the question of elections and
electoral democracy, they do not correspond neatly with them. The possibility that
one service supports electoral democracy is considered but rejected in Chapter 2 as
overly simplistic at best and wrong at worst. For the sake of full disclosure, I do
believe that values liberal economic and social orders are more consistent with
electoral democracy than are those associated with integral nationalism. Full
participation in today's globalized economy demands transparency and accountability
and therefore tends to support democratic governance. But the association between
liberal economics and democratic governance is not absolute, and each case must be
evaluated on its merits.
developing states, generally include ground, air, and sea components. Air forces, on the other hand, usually have
minimal if any ground and sea components. Hence, even if their preferences differed, the tactical situation may
not often allow air force officers to act on their preferences. Second, aircraft are of modern origin and, even in
the militaries of the great powers, air forces were confined within army air corps until long after that. Air forces
are, in other words, of much more recent origin than navies. Until recently, the senior officer corps of many air
forces had been educated in army academies and should therefore be expected to hold world views less divergent
from their army classmates. We should, however, expect to find the political values of air force officers
converge with those of the navy within two or three decades of their institutional independence from the army.
13
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PREDICTIONS
Four specific predictions are tested:
(1) Navies will support liberal nationalist positions, whereas armies will frequently
support integral nationalist ones.
Integral nationalism posits that sustainable economic, social, and political
development depends on national unity and that national unity, in turn, requires
development be balanced across regions and that incomes be relatively evenly
distributed - conditions requiring a high level of state intervention in the
economy and society. Liberal nationalism, in contrast, believes that market
forces with minimal government intervention best deliver sustainable
development.
Note that the labels used here (integral and integral nationalist) represent
worldviews, rather than self-conscious ideologies. In other words, individual
officers do not identify themselves as "integral nationalist" or "liberal
nationalist." But their actions and rhetoric (both written and spoken) will
reflect the domestic priorities and values outlined above.
The domestic preferences of officers from both services are driven primarily, if
largely indirectly, by the types of capital used by each. Naval officers, even in
developing states, work with high-tech equipment and relatively skilled
enlisted personnel. Their service thrives when the coastal, urban economy
does well. Naval officers therefore favor the relatively open economic policies
that tend to favor those parts of the economy.
For armies in the developing world, soldiers are the organizations' primary
capital, and soldiers in these states are generally conscripted from their
nations' rural (and therefore interior) social base. Anything that causes serious
dislocation or hardship in the rural economy is likely to affect morale and
cohesion at the unit level. Army officers will, therefore, favor state-led
developmental strategies that offer to protect disadvantaged (especially rural)
parts of the population and economy while growing the economy.
Differences in the social and educational background of the officers
themselves, as well as in how they are socialized early in their careers will, for
a variety of reasons, reinforce the preferences discussed above.
(2) Because navies are more homogenous than armies (for example, in terms of
the educational and experiential background of their officers), navies will tend
to be more internally unified in their domestic preferences than armies. But
although armies are frequently divided in terms of their domestic preferences,
15
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they will almost invariably contain elements sympathetic to integral nationalist
positions.
(3) When politics becomes highly polarized, armies and navies will form or be
drawn into coalitions with like-minded civilian groups - armies with civilian
integral nationalists and navies with other liberal elements (most notably, with
members of the upper-middle class). Relatively strong naval forces will, all
things being equal, make liberal victories in domestic political battles more
likely.
(4) The leaders of winning coalitions will, in order to protect their position against
counterattack, promote their military partners to top military posts. That, in
turn, will enable the winning coalition's military partners to advance their own
organizational interests. Hence, victories by liberals are likely to see the rise of
naval forces and strategies, while victories by integral nationalist coalitions
will result in the strengthening of continental forces.
CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The above predictions are derived in part from the empirical evidence in Latin America as
well as from principles associated with organization theory and other work on the domestic
sources of grand strategy. Given their empirical bases in Latin American cases, testing should
ideally be - and is - conducted on a different set of cases. 5 This thesis tests the above
predictions against the post-World War II record of three East Asian states: Thailand, China,
and Indonesia. The three Asian cases selected provide substantial variation in several aspects:
the specific nature of their regime type, the historical origins of their military institutions, and
s There is disagreement on the necessity of using different data sets to generate and test theories. King,
Keohane, and Verba argue for its necessity. Gary King, Robert 0. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Van Evera argues since the researcher will almost always start with some knowledge of his cases, having one or
two data sets is largely irrelevant. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 45. My position here is simply that demonstrating the utility of the
theory in two regions (even if only briefly in the case of Latin America) provides additional support for the
theory.
16
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their strategic situations. These variations allow the theory to be tested under a variety of
domestic and international circumstances.
I examine several political crises in each state, all pitting integral and liberal
nationalists against one another in struggles for control of the state. A total of eight cases are
examined. For each, I code the domestic choices available to the military actors as either
liberal or integral nationalist; determine which of these options was chosen by each of the
services; and examine why and how military strategies and force structures changed (if they
did) after the resolution of the crisis. Wherever possible, the services' logic behind their
political-economic choices is examined and analyzed.6 Where direct evidence of motivation
is missing, the choices themselves are assessed as either consistent with liberal nationalism or
integral nationalism, and whatever circumstantial evidence might suggest values or
motivations is summarized.7 For each case, I consider two alternative theories. First, a theory
based on the services' material or parochial interests - in contrast to the more highly
articulated logic suggested by my own theory - is evaluated as a competing explanation for
the services' domestic preferences. And second, a threat based theory for strategic change is
considered as an alternative explanation for strategic change. Ultimately, I find that although
6 For the most part, this is more possible in the more recent cases than in the earlier cases, where English
language source material is sparse. The early Chinese case is an exception, since I was able to use Chinese
language materials.
7 Process tracing is employed in these cases and in several cases yields critical clues. On process tracing, see
Alexander L. George and Timothy J. Mckeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision
Making," Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985). King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 226-28. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students
of Political Science, 64-67.
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some aspects of the cases are consistent with the competitor theories, the evidence provides
substantially stronger support for the civil-military coalition theory.
Empirical Findings
Post-World War II East Asian domestic politics has been characterized by three "waves": a
brief period of experimentation with liberal politics during the late 1940s and early 1950s; a
shift to state-led integral nationalist government during the late 1950s and 1960s; and a liberal
revival beginning in the 1980s.8 Although this characterization fits the region's non-
communist states - including, among others, Thailand and Indonesia - more obviously than
its communist ones, even China experienced analogous relative shifts in its ruling ideology.
Political and economic moderates (closer to the liberal end of the political-economic spectrum
than their rivals) held sway during the 1950s and again after 1978; Mao Zedong and the Gang
of Four (all of whom were closer to the integral nationalist ideal) dominated during the
interim.
The evidence from these cases provides strong support for the predictions associated
with my thesis. Naval officers supported liberal economic, social, and domestic systems, both
in the immediate postwar period and again during the 1980s and 1990s, and they resisted the
transition to integral nationalist rule during the intervening period. Although armies were
frequently divided, their officers provided the most important backing for integral nationalist
8 On the general subject of historical political waves, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okl.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). On waves
in East Asia over the postwar period, see Mingxin Pei, "The Fall and Rise of Democracy in East Asia," in
Democracy in East Asia, ed. Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
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rulers during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and many of their officers subsequently resisted
liberal economic and political reform. In each case, new civilian elites promoted their own
supporters within the military, resulting in the rise of naval leaders, forces, and doctrines
during the postwar period, the demise of those forces and doctrines during the 1960s and
1970s, and the reemergence of naval strength since the 1980s.
THAILAND
Since 1932, the Thai navy has been closely associated with the nation's liberal leadership -
sometimes at great material cost to its own short-term interests. The army has been divided:
line officers, who dominated the army from 1947 to 1980, backed integral nationalist
programs, while general staff and technical officers opposing them. Naval fortunes have risen
and fallen with the tides of liberalism.
OVERTHROWING NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1938-47. In 1938, the army's General
Phibun Songgram established a national socialist state (consistent with integral nationalism)
in Thailand and aligned the state with Imperial Japan. Immediately following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, prominent prewar liberal parliamentary leaders organized a resistance
movement against Phibun's regime. The navy's high command formed a core element of that
opposition. General Phibun was overthrown in 1944, and the nation's new liberal leaders
were quick to reward the navy. Between 1944 and 1946, naval budgets increased by 50
percent, while the army's was reduced by 40 percent.
19
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RESISTANCE TO MILITARY RULE, 1947-73. In 1947 midlevel army officers
overthrew the freely elected government. The navy then launched three countercoup
attempts, all of which failed. After the failure of the third in 195 I, army leaders
"restructured" the navy, stripping it of combat aircraft, armor, police functions, and most of
its marine corps. Suspicious of both "big" capitalists and parliamentary democracy (the two
of which they believed were linked), army officers established an integral nationalist state. In
place of liberal freedoms, they promoted the idea of "balanced" development - i.e.,
development under which the gap between regions, ethnic groups, and social classes would
narrow rather than widen. The navy, however, continued to cooperate with liberals in
parliament until its abolition in 1958.
LIBERALISM'S FALSE START, 1973-80. In October 1973, student protesters
demanded that the military government step down. Some army elements attempted
suppression, while the navy, air force, and other army elements backed the students. With the
threat of civil war, the king intervened to oust the nation's army rulers. The new prime
minister appointed the navy's commander as supreme commander and, later, minister of
defense. Between 1973 and 1976, well-organized student groups became more radical and
threatened both the nation's capitalist economic system, as well as the new civilian leaders'
ability to govern effectively. Naval leaders, with the strong support of Thailand's middle
class, led a joint-service group of senior officers in overthrowing civilian rule. Unlike past
coup leaders, however, this group quickly promulgated a new constitution and Thailand then
made a slow but steady transition to democracy.
20
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This case supports the proposition that when a system of electoral democracy appears
inconsistent with the preservation of liberal economic values, the navy will frequently choose
free markets over political democracy. It also supports the proposition that the navy will
almost invariably be aligned with the middle class, especially the upper middle class, whether
or not the latter supports democracy at any particular point in time. As the events below
illustrates, the navy, as well as the middle class, swung once again to liberal politics after the
imminent threat to liberal economic values has passed.
LIBERAL TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION, 1980-2002. The navy worked with
pro-business Democrat Party and army general staff officers to defend the new transitional
regime against threats by hardline army line officers. Naval officers were promoted to top
positions in the military hierarchy (including supreme commander), and the government
approved contracts for a major expansion of the navy's fleet. In 1991 army officers
succeeded in overthrowing civilian government. The following year, however, protesters
again demanded an end to military rule. When army units fired on protesters in May 1992,
the navy shielded protesters from attack by the army and paramilitaries. After the restoration
of democratic rule, parliament approved new contracts for naval hardware, as well as new
military doctrines emphasizing the importance of sea power.
CHINA
In China the struggle between Communist Party moderates, who would allow room for
individual economic and social difference, and hard-line leftists, who would eliminate such
differences, mirrored the conflict between liberals and integral nationalists (respectively) in
21
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other East Asian states. The navy was closely associated with political moderates during the
1950s and early 1960s and was purged by leftists within the Party during the Cultural
Revolution (1966-1976). After the Cultural Revolution, the navy, in contrast to much of the
army, provided strong and unified political support to Deng Xiaoping and his effort to
implement policies of reform and opening.
FROM LIBERATION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1953-1976). For much of
the first part of this period, Party moderates, who were relatively liberal in the Chinese
context, were largely in control of domestic policy. Military policy was in the hands of
technocrats, strongly backed by the civilian moderates. The navy prospered, establishing its
first destroyer squadron in 1954 and launching its first domestically produced destroyer in
1956. And the navy's leadership, unlike many army commanders, enthusiastically embraced
the call for reconciliation with intellectuals (i.e., college educated individuals) and even
former members of the Nationalist government.
In 1966 Mao and leftist hardliners launched the Cultural Revolution and purged Party
moderates. The radicals who ascended to power intensely distrusted the navy for both its lack
of political correctness and its close ties with political moderates. The radicals limited the
navy's access to resources, closed most of its schools, encouraged the lower ranks to report on
their superiors, and reassigned officers from the army to establish a shadow command within
the navy. But the navy's professional leadership remained hostile to the leftists' program.
And its senior officers took a prominent role in the showdown with, and arrest of, the Gang of
Four in 1976.
22
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THE NAVY BACKS REFORM AND OPENING, 1978-92. The army was thoroughly
divided after the end of the Cultural Revolution, and many of its officers fiercely opposed the
program of liberal economic and social reform undertaken by Deng Xiaoping. The navy, on
the other hand, was united in support of it. In the mid- 1980s, for example, naval officers were
prominent in the defense of opening China's coastal cities to foreigners and foreign
investment, while many in the army were sharply critical of the social consequences of that
opening. Naval officers were promoted to top positions in the military and even Communist
Party hierarchy, and they used those positions to defend Deng and his program from political
attack. Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s military resource allocation saw a
relative shift away from the army and towards the navy.
INDONESIA
The Indonesian navy enjoyed privileged access to resources during the Sukarno period,
experienced a troubled relationship with Suharto between 1967 and 1998, and firmly backed
students and the middle class in their calls for liberal reform in 1998 and 1999. The effects of
domestic politics on military strategy have created what, from a realist perspective, appears to
be a strategic riddle. The army maintained unquestioned first priority throughout the 1980s
and most of the 1990s, even after the defeat of most separatist movements and the rise of
other regional navies. After 1998, the navy became dominant, despite the reemergence of
separatism and the improvement of Indonesia's relationship with China and other regional
states.
23
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THE NAVY FROM INDEPENDENCE TO SUHARTO, 1949-1978. Indonesia's army and
navy shared common military and domestic views in the immediate post-independence
period. They began to diverge, however, during the late 1950s. Technically oriented Dutch-
trained officers remained in control of the navy. In the army, however, Japanese-trained
officers, who came from less-prosperous families, gained the upper hand. Many of these
officers believed that developmental work should be the military's top priority.
The army, against strong protest from the navy, removed Sukarno from power in
1967, and the new president, General Suharto, adopted explicitly integral nationalist policies.
Military strategy was adjusted to emphasize economic and social development. The new
doctrine of "total people's defense" called, among other things, for one sergeant and one
assistant to be stationed in every one of Indonesia's villages and for an expansion of the
army's civil action program. The navy resisted participation in Suharto's integral nationalist
programs. It soon found itself with reduced access to funds, and by 1984 its fleet had been
reduced to less than one third of its 1966 size.
THE NAVY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS, 1978-2002. In response to economic problems
(specifically declining state revenues from oil exports) Suharto lifted some restrictions on the
economy and society during the mid- and late 1980s. Much to the chagrin of Indonesia's
small but growing middle class, however, he clamped down again during the early 1990s. In
May 1998, student protests and a hostile populace convinced Suharto to resign in favor of
Vice President B.J. Habibie. The Democratic Party, a liberal and largely middle class party,
demanded that new parliamentary elections be held before the selection of a new president,
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and protests continued. Army commanders threatened protesters with a Tiananmen-like
crackdown. The navy's representatives in parliament, on the other hand, defected en masse
from the ruling party (Golkar) to the Democrats. In November 1998, paramilitary units
backed by the army, fired on students. The navy then deployed marines to march with and
protect the party's supporters. Habibie stepped down shortly thereafter, and the new president
chose a naval officer as commander of the military, the first non-army officer ever appointed
to the post.
SUMMARY
In each of the above cases, naval officers proved significantly more supportive of liberal
policies, especially economic ones, than most of their army counterparts. Although armies
were, unlike navies, generally divided on domestic issues, officers who favored integral
nationalist policies have dominated army hierarchies for much of the period since World War
II. In many instances, naval and army units mobilized to confront one another over domestic
issues, and in several cases, confrontations resulted in skirmishes or even more significant
fighting. Apart from the provision of blunt force, military allies in domestic coalitions
performed a variety of other services. They provided intelligence on rivals, served as patriotic
banners to prove the nationalism of their political allies, and offered direct political support in
their capacity as parliamentary or party members. Shifts in doctrine have followed close on
the heels of major political crises. Integral nationalist victories have presaged the primacy of
armies and continental strategies (even in archipelagic states), while liberal victories have'
brought maritime strategies (even in continental states).
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Theoretical and Policy Implications
This thesis has both broad and specific implications for the collective understanding of
organization theory, civil-military relations, and grand strategy.
There is no single, uniform "military mind." But neither are differences in the
political values of military officers idiosyncratically determined. The lack of unifonnity -
and the existence of officers sympathetic to liberal policy - suggests that liberal reformers in
developing states should generally be able to find allies within the military. The search for
military allies will of course compete with other demands for the attention of leaders already
busy trying to consolidate their hold and overhaul the domestic system. But the existence of
patterns implies that, with an understanding of what those patterns are, finding military allies
will be easier than might otherwise be imagined. Liberal leaders are likely to find supporters
within the military's high-tech services and branches, and those supporters, in turn, will
frequently mobilize their organizations in defense of liberal change or consolidation.
This thesis suggests that the structure, composition, and mission of organizations have
a major impact on their culture and values. This finding does not necessarily imply that it is
impossible to influence the political values of military organizations by direct methods, such
as adjustments to their academic curriculum. But it does suggest that it should also be
possible to influence the political values of military organizations by manipulating their
structure and composition. And under many circumstances, this approach may be politically
or practically more expedient than the more direct approach. Modernizing the army,
26
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streamlining it, replacing conscription with volunteer soldiers, and eliminating territorial-
oriented defense structures will tend to diminish patrimonial, integral nationalist sentiment.
And many of these changes will be welcomed by much, if not all, of the army's senior
leadership. A direct attempt to influence the officers' formal political doctrines, on the other
hand, may be regarded as a direct challenge to the military's institutional autonomy.
These findings suggest, by extension, that United States can engage with the militaries
of developing states without undermining liberal values, but only if it does so judiciously and
with an understanding of how military structure and organization affects values. The United
States should consider targeting its engagement with those elements most likely to be
sympathetic to liberal causes. And it should use its military aid budgets to encourage the
kinds of structural changes mentioned above: the reduction of conscription, upgrading
equipment, and phasing out territorial organization.
Finally the thesis suggests that analysts seeking to understand shifts military strategies
in developing states should examine domestic political circumstances as well as external
events or ambitions as potential explanations. 9 In the context of developing states in Asia, the
thesis supports a central conclusion drawn by Jack Snyder from his study of historical
9 Currently, there is little literature on the specific relationship between politics and grand strategy in these states.
This deficiency in the literature is particularly curious, given both the understanding that domestic politics
should play a major role in determining the grand strategies of these states and the nature of the direct and
indirect threats to American security interests today (i.e., largely emanating from developing states). There are
exceptions. On Asia see, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessons
from Thailand (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing, 1987). See also the works in the Alagappa's edited
volume: Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998). For a treatment of Middle Eastern cases, see James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its
Practice and Consequence in the Middle East," International Security 24, no. 2 (1999).
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European cases: State leaders in rapidly evolving states frequently bend all aspects of national
policy to balance against pressing threats to their regime - whether those threats are domestic
or internal. The thesis shows that efforts to balance against military elements that threaten the
regime often have a decisive impact on force structures and military strategy. What has been
explained as a competitively motivated naval arms buildup in East Asia over the last fifteen
years, for example, should more accurately be described as the military by-product of political
liberalization across the region and its associated military politics. l°
Chapter Outline
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 (Literature Review) first summarizes
existing statements on differences in the army and navy's domestic preferences and behavior,
finds that existing works are not supported by events in Latin America (where the secondary
source literature is particularly rich), and proposes an alternative argument. It then reviews
the more general literature on civil-military relations, organization theory, and domestic
sources of grand strategy and comments on where this thesis' approach borrows from existing
work or differs from it. Chapter 3 (Theory) establishes the thesis' predictions and
methodology in more detail. Chapters 4-6 each examine the historical record of a single state.
Each of these chapters is divided into a discussion of two or more cases. Chapter 7
o1 For works that treat the naval buildup as largely driven by threat and insecurity see Paul Mann, "Arms Races
Likely When Asia Recovers," Aviation Week and Space Technology 156, no. 9 (2002). Richard K. Betts,
"Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," International Security 18,
no. 3 (1993/94); Paul Dibb, "Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads," Naval TWar College Review 54, no. 1
(2001); Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993).
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(Conclusions) summarizes the results of the eight cases, discusses the theoretical and policy
implications of this work, and highlights areas for future research.
29
Chapter 1: Introduction
30
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Conceptually, this thesis has two components: one that examines the domestic preferences of
military services, and one that looks at the effects of those preferences on coalitional conflict,
domestic outcomes, and national military and strategic policy. (See figure 2. 1.) This
discussion of the existing literature is therefore divided into a review of work most relevant to
each of these components. In the first instance, I address the literature on civil-military
relations; in the second, I treat works on domestic sources of grand strategy. In each case, I
highlight the areas from which I have borrowed, as well as those areas where I diverge from
existing approaches.
The specific lens used in this thesis to examine more general questions about service
preferences and coalitional politics - and the specific propositions tested in the case studies -
focuses on army-navy differences and the involvement of both in politics. Before moving on
to the general literature review outlined above, therefore, I offer an assessment of the existing
literature on the role of navies in politics. I address two specific questions. First, is the navy
more pro-democratic than the army? Second, can the navy be a competitive 'player' in
domestic political or military struggles? These questions merit separate and extended
discussion for two reasons. First, as I explain below, the currently accepted answers to these
questions, which suggest that no generalizations can be made, partly explain the larger lack of
recent efforts to generalize about the political predilections of all types of military
Chapter 2: Literature Review
organizations. A second and related reason is that, as a near ideal type technical service,
patterns that prove true for the navy should apply, to one degree or another, to other technical
military services and branches.
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Navies in Politics
Although many authors have touched on the political role of navies in case studies of
individual countries, there has been little if any attempt in the recent past to treat the subject
systematically in a comparative fashion." This omission neglects an area that should provide
good leverage on a number of larger questions in the field of civil-military relations. For
example, the lack of systematic comparison forgoes opportunities to study the effects of
organizational variables on the military's domestic values while holding national political and
cultural variables constant.
This window on civil-military relations has not been left closed without reason. Two
analytical judgments explain this gap in the literature. The first is that early conceptions of
the navy as pro-democratic proved unsustainable during the mid-20th century. Navies took
inconsistent positions on democratic rule. Consequently, the motivation to study navies in
politics lagged. In the second instance, many analysts have ruled that navies do not have the
military capacity to be significant domestic political actors. Hence, regardless of their
domestic preferences, navies would not prove worthy of study. But as I show below,
plausible generalizations about the domestic preferences of navies can be made, and the navy
can be - and frequently is - a powerful force in domestic political disputes.
" Individual works that devote substantial space to comparing armies and navies in individual cases include:
Kyoshi Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon (Tokyo: Chukoshinsho, 1981). Jonathan Steinberg, Tirpitz and the Birth of the
German Battle Fleet (London: MacDonald and Co., 1968). William W. Cormack, Revolution and Political
Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Other sources that
discuss differences more briefly are cited throughout this chapter.
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THE NAVY AND DEMOCRACY
Probably the longest-standing hypothesis about the services in politics is that naval forces
favor the development of constitutional, democratic rule, while armies have inherently
antidemocratic tendencies. This idea, in its simplest form, is found in the 4th century work of
Aristotle:
"Where the territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is favorable
ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy.... [I]t is only men of
large means who can afford to breed and keep horses.... Light armed troops
and the navy are wholly on the side of democracy." 12
In 1906, during a period when military technology and organization were more comparable to
our contemporary era, Otto Hintze advanced a similar argument:
"Land forces are a kind of organization that permeates the whole body of the
state and gives it a military cast.... Sea power lacks all feudal vestiges. To an
eminent degree it serves the interests of trade and industry. Its place is with
the modem forces in life, simply by virtue of the vital importance that
technology and capital have in its development. Sea power is allied with
progressive forces, whereas land forces are tied to conservative tendencies."' 3
Echoing Hintze's commentary, students of British history have also highlighted the role that
military format - especially the reliance on a large navy and a small professional army - has
played in preserving English liberties. Even through the 19th century, many in the English
parliament distrusted their own army, preferring to fund a "safer" naval establishment.'4
12 As quoted in Samuel E. Finer, "State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in The
Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1975), 84.
13 Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in The Historical Essays of Otto
Hintze, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 214.
14 Hew Strachan, The politics of the British Army (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997).
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The apparent credibility of the idea that navies tend to serve as a bulwark for
democracy, however, was destroyed by a series of naval-led coups d'etat in the Southern
Cone of Latin America from the 1950s to the 1970s. Naval officers either executed or played
leading roles in antidemocratic coups d'etat in Brazil in 1954, 1955, 1961, and 1964; in
Argentina in 1962 (twice), 1963, and 1976; and in Chile in 1973. Although the navy had
support from army elements in many of these cases, it was, according to the secondary source
literature, the most committed element in all of these instances. Moreover, in a majority of
these cases, part or all of the army remained loyal to the government. Given this history,
Latin American navies gained a reputation as being, in direct contradiction of Hintze's earlier
argument, "less progressive" than armies. 5 But Latin American navies have also, on many
other occasions, either defended democracy against military threats or championed the
restoration of electoral democracy where it had been suspended. 16 Given the apparent
inconsistency in naval positions, it is perhaps not surprising that several scholars of civil-
military relations have treated navies as just another military faction pursuing its own interests
without regard to ideology or domestic program.17
15 John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1964),
237. Bruce W. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military (Westport,
Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 63.
16 The Argentine navy led or participated prominently in countercoups (against military rulers) in 1944, 1945,
and 1955. And in Brazil, the navy stood (unsuccessfully) against an army coup in 1937 and participated
(successfully) in an effort to oust two military-led governments, once in 1945 and once during the 1970s. And
during the 1980s, the Brazilian navy was more active in supporting a return to the barracks than was the army.
17 Despite some discussion of service and branch differences, both Finer and Farcau conclude that neither armies
nor navies have consistent ideologies. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the
Military, 53-86. Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall
Mall Press, 1962), 290.
36
Chapter 2: Literature Review
But a reexamination of the secondary literature on civil-military relations in Latin
America and elsewhere points in another direction: Navies appear to have taken a consistent
stand on questions relating to the economic and social organization of the state - even if they
have not taken a consistent position on the issue of electoral democracy. Specifically, they
have backed leaders with liberal economic and social agendas (i.e., those who support market
economics, free trade, private property, and private freedoms), and they have opposed integral
nationalists. Armies tend to be deeply divided, but almost inevitably, some elements (and
sometimes most) of that service will favor integral nationalist leaders and positions. These
patterns of service preferences apply whether the government is democratically elected or
holding power by authoritarian means.
Here, I illustrate that observation with brief summaries of the navy's post-World War
II political involvement in several Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Venezuela) and several other cases (Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Imperial
Japan). While not systematic or detailed enough to represent a test of the above propositions
in their own right these summaries provide sufficient bases for formulating predictions that
can be tested against more a more detailed treatment of other cases.
In Argentina during the 1940s and early 1950s, the navy opposed Juan Peron and other
populist army officers who seized power in a 1943 coup d'etat. Peron's government instituted
state-led import substitution industrialization programs, nationalized much of Argentina's
private industry, and organized social groups in hierarchical corporatist organizations. Peron
himself was fond of saying that "Mussolini was the greatest man of our times, but he made
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some disastrous mistakes," and Peron's "Decalogue of Workers' Rights" mimicked the
Fascist Carta del Lavoro.' 8 The navy took a prominent role in abortive countercoups designed
to remove Peron in February 1944, October 1945, and June 1955. A final effort in September
1955 succeeded. Having ostensibly defended electoral democracy against Juan Peron, the
navy then proceeded for the next two decades to intervene against "Peronistas" - who were,
in these cases, democratically elected proponents of policies originally instituted by Peron.
Both before and after Peron's fall, the army was divided, with many officers sympathetic to
his pro-labor position and state-led development programs. 19
In Brazil too the navy opposed a populist army leader (Getulio Vargas), who captured
power in a coup d'etat and established a neo-fascist corporatist order (the Estado Novo or
New State) in 1937. Having been unseated by a conservative coalition in 1945, Vargas was
elected to the presidency five years later. But the Brazilian navy contested his return,
regardless of its constitutional basis. And after the navy's meddling pushed Vargas to suicide
in 1950, the navy continued to intervene against the elected heirs to Vargas' ideas. In 1964
Joao Goulart, a Social Democrat and Vargas' former minister of labor, won the presidency in
a landslide. The navy revolted and, together with two of the army's field armies, defeated two
other field armies that had remained loyal to the president. Goulart was ousted and the
18 David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact (Berkeley, Ca.:
University of California, 1993), 145.
19 On Argentina, see Marvin Goldwert, Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1972). Edwin Lieuwen, Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in
Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist
Movement, Its History and Its Impact. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the .Military in Politics.
Guillermo O'Donnell, "Permanent Crisis and the Failure to Create a Democratic Regime: Argentina, 1955-66,"
in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, ed. Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978).
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military assumed direct control of the state. By the mid-I 970s, however, after the Social
Democrats had been thoroughly suppressed (and after the army's dominant duro faction had
demonstrated its economic nationalist tendencies), the navy threw its support behind the more
liberal Sorbonne army faction and its calls for a withdrawal to the barracks.20
In Chile the navy, having been courted by civilian business groups, spearheaded the
successful effort to oust the socialist president, Salvador Allende in 1973. Army units
ultimately participated in the coup, and the army's General Augusto Pinochet led the junta
afterwards. But the navy conducted the coup's early planning and was far more united and
aggressive in its opposition to Allende. 2 '
Events in Venezuela in April 2002 displayed a similar pattern. In November 2001,
senior naval officers began conspiring with prominent business groups and some dissident
army elements to overthrow of President Hugo-Chavez, an outspoken populist and former
colonel in the paratroop corps. After his election in 1998, Chavez, attacking the existing
constitution as "oligarchic," had pushed through a referendum establishing a new one.
Among other provisions, Chavez' new constitution tightened the national grip on industry and
20 On the Brazilian case, see Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America. Lieuwen, Generals versus
Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of
the Military. Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1988). Robert Hayes, The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporatist Mystique
(Tampe, Arizona: Arizona State University Press, 1989).
21 On Pinochet's role, see Pinochet initially hung back and refused to take the lead. Mary Helen Spooner,
Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1994).
Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years ofSalvador Allende (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1985). Pamela Constable
and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1991). On the role of business and the middle class, see also Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator," The New Yorker,
October 19 1998.
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guaranteeing state pensions for all The navy-backed anti-Chavez coup, launched on April
11, 2002, was ultimately unsuccessful, but the rebels did succeed in temporarily installing the
president of the chamber of commerce, Pedro Carmona, as the president of the nation.
Carmona promptly selected senior naval officers to fill two key cabinet posts.2 2
Non-Latin American historical cases also demonstrate that navies defend liberal
economic and social policies against more nationalist policies in those areas - even if they do
not necessarily defend democracy. In the oldest case considered here, many French naval
officers welcomed the early liberal phase of the French Revolution of 1789. But even the
purged rump of its officer corps opposed the radical Jacobin turn in 1792, and in 1793 a third
of the French fleet defected to England at Toulon.23 The army, in contrast, proved loyal to the
Jacobins after a less thorough purge of its officers, and it crushed revolts both near Toulon
and in the Vendee. In Germany between 1870 and 1918, senior naval officers refused to even
discuss a pro-Imperial putsch and overthrowing parliament - a scenario widely and frequently
discussed by army officers. In late 1918, however, with pro-socialist sentiment running high
throughout the country, Admiral Alfred Tirpitz threw in the navy's lot with Eric Ludendorff
22 On the coup in Venezuela, see Scott Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and
President Were Old Rivals", Washington Post, April 21 2002. Juan Forero, "In Venezuela, Chavez Starts
Shuffling Disloyal Officers", New York Times, April 19 2002; "Venezuela: President Carmona Appoints New
Cabinet", Globovision Television, April 12 2002, in FBIS-LAP-2002-0413. "Deposed Venezuelan President
Moved to Naval Base", RNE Radio, April 13 2002, in FBIS-EUP-2002-0413. Juan Forero, "Venezuela's
President vs. Military: Is Breach Widening?" New York Times, March 19 2002.
23 Cormack, Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794. T. C. W. Blanning, The French
Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802, Modern wars (London: Arnold, 1996); Ernest Harold Jenkins, .4 history of the
French navy, from its beginnings to the present day ([London]: Macdonald & Jane's, 1973), 196-200.
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to impose direct military rule.24 And in Japan the naval ministry resisted the army's more
radical proposals to nationalize the economy and took significantly firmer measures against
military terror - including the February 1936 coup attempt. Senior naval officers enjoyed a
rapport with liberal parliamentary parties not shared with their army counterparts. 25
A review of qualitative descriptions of navies in politics (as opposed to the event-
driven investigation above) reveals two things. First, words such as "democratic,"
"conservative," and "progressive" are - not surprisingly - used inconsistently in the literature,
adding to the sense many have that it is impossible to generalize about service preferences.
But second, if one looks more closely at the descriptions of naval preferences in individual
cases, their context, and their economic as opposed to political content, clear patterns emerge.
Navies defend market economics, private property, and individual rights, while armies push
more actively for social equity and state leadership over the economy and society.
24 On German naval liberalism during the 19th century, see Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and
Foreign Policy (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1997); Steinberg, Tirpitz and the Birth of the
German Battle Fleet. On the German army, see Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945
(London: Oxford University Press, 1955). On the 1918 coup, see Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the
Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
25 There are no adequate English-language works on the politics of the pre-war Japanese navy. For the best
Japanese treatment - and one of the best treatments on naval politics in any country, see Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon.
For a popular translated treatment of some of these themes, see Agawa Hiryuki, The Reluctant Admiral:
Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979). See also Oide Hisashi, Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa
Saiko no Kaigun Taisho (Tokyo: Tokuma Bunsho, 1993). Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankokai, Inoue Shigeyoshi
(Tokyo: Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankokai, 1982). Oide Hisashi, Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun
Taisho.
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Examples of such qualitative descriptions reveal both truths:
* Edwin Lieuwen writes of the Argentine military "The Navy's democratic
traditions, albeit of the classical Greek, privileged-class type, conflicted with
Peron's [and the army's] proletarian oriented authoritarianism." 2 6
* Ikeda Kyoshi reports on the prewar Japanese case that, "In contrast to the
army, which was made up largely of farmers and had a 'democratic' if militant
character, stood naval 'liberalism."' The navy's ideology was, he argues
"cosmopolitan, without roots in the realities of Japanese politics."2 7
* John Johnson remarks that "Brazilians are sure, and with some reason, that the
navy is the most aristocratic of the three services and that the army 'represents
the country better and is more progressive-minded.'" 2 8
* Scott Wilson says the Venezuelan navy today is "urban" and "conservative,"
while the army is "rural" and "socialist." In an interview, Venezuelan naval
admiral and former national security advisor, Carlos Molina, says simply: "I
am the middle class." 29
* Writing about Germany during the late 19th century, Jonathan Steinberg states:
"That the German Navy was a child of German liberalism and the Revolution
of 1848 is simply a fact." He calls it "the most thoroughly bourgeois, liberal
institution in the country."30
Whether or not the navy is described as "aristocratic" (in Argentina or Brazil) or
"bourgeois" (in Germany or Venezuela), or whether it is described as "liberal" (in Germany
or Japan) or "conservative" (in Venezuela), these navies are all connected -- in attitude,
politics, and, frequently, family origin - to those elements that dominate the internationally
competitive segments of the economy. Whether or not navies are said to be "democratic" or
26 Lieuwen, Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America, 15.
27 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, 28.
28 Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, 237.
29 Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and President Were Old Rivals".
30 Steinberg, Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet, 36, 46.
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"progressive" depends on the author's perspective (and the circumstances of the individual
case). For those who define "democracy" as support for relatively equal political access by
workers and peasants, and "progress" as economic, social, or political gains by those groups,
the navy is frequently neither democratic nor progressive. However, for those who define
"democratic" as supportive of systems that protect individual liberties (including the right to
utilize private wealth in the electoral system to pursue political goals), and "progressive" as
supportive of science, industry, and trade, the navy is both democratic and progressive. This
thesis avoids most of these semantic difficulties by defining the specific policy content of
adjectives or descriptors associated with ideology and outlook - definitions that are presented
in Chapter 3 (Theory).
THE NAVY'S DOMESTIC POWER
A second preliminary question about navies and politics is whether the navy has sufficient
power to play a major political role. Some analysts answer this question in the negative.
Bruce Farcau, for example, writes that "The navy and the air force generally have very little
of the applicable fighting force, usually determined in terms of the number of trained
infantrymen on hand, which would relate to a coup d'etat...."31 Morris Janowitz similarly
writes that infantry battalions "can be deployed in uban centers or in rural areas" and are "in
essence a form of super-police.... Naval units, by contrast, are much less effective for
domestic political objectives."3 2 If the contention that navies are non-players in domestic
31 Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military, 64.
32 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964), 33.
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politics were true, the political preferences of navies would be of little consequence. They
could not act on their preferences, and they would hardly make attractive allies for civilian
groups seeking military partners in domestic political struggles.
But the evidence suggests that the navy is a potent domestic force. Although
individual circumstances vary, navies tend to possess three primary organizational strengths
and one weakness in domestic political struggles. The navy's strengths include the quality
and variety of military assets it can employ, the relative unity and coherence of its officer
corps (especially in comparison with the army), and its status as a relatively autonomous
organization that is, nevertheless, part of the military establishment. Its weakness lies, as
Farcau suggests, in the small size of its infantry forces.
These strengths and weaknesses interact in different ways to shape the navy's relative
power in four different types of political-military scenarios. These contingencies include
coups d'etat (and the defense against coups); civil wars (and coups that turn into civil wars);
support for efforts by national political leaders (whether civilian or military) to control the
leadership and direction of the military as a whole; and policing activities, especially large-
scale efforts required by authoritarian political rule. The navy's strengths make it a
significant player - frequently the equal of the army and sometimes stronger - in the first
three situations. In the fourth, the navy's weakness in personnel strength limits its
effectiveness.
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COUPS D'ETAT. The lack of large infantry forces is not a major obstacle to either the
navy's ability to launch coups or, especially, deter others from doing the same. Because of
the need for secrecy, most military coups are carried out by relatively small units (frequently
comprised of one or two battalions), though leaders frequently consult with a wider circle of
officers before taking action.3 3 During this initial military phase of a coup, the organizational
quality of the force (particularly its ability to arrive on time at the right location) matters more
than the size of the unit. The navy's elite infantry (i.e., its marines) and its ability to muster
combat aircraft or naval gunfire support for that infantry - witnessed in the Argentine navy's
surprise infantry-air assault on Peron in June 1955 - give it potent capabilities in this form of
domestic warfare.34
The navy is perhaps even more capable of deterring or defending against coups d'etat.
Having raised the flag of revolt, most coups depend on statements of support from other key
garrisons, especially those near the capital, to succeed. Early negative reactions and the threat
of civil war they engender will frequently deter other military elements from joining the
rebellion. Here, the navy's artillery helps it establish the proper tone of gravity in its
signaling, and the mobility of its marine units allows it to position units quickly in key
blocking positions. On February 26, 1936 a handful of army officers and a battalion of
33 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 225. For more on coups as military
operations, see Edward Luttwak, Coup d'etat; a practical handbook (New York,: Knopf, 1969). Gregor
Ferguson, Coup d'etat: a practical manual (Poole, Dorset: Arms and Armour, 1987); Alexander M. Grace, The
coup : tactics in the seizure ofpower (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
34 This particular assault failed due to poor weather and the inability to land reinforcements as planned, but other
naval coups have succeeded as planned - as, for example, the Argentine navy's March 1962 action (supported by
the army's cavalry corps) against Frondizi.
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infantry seized the center of Tokyo and called for a general army uprising (and a new imperial
restoration). The navy, however, quickly moved battleships and marines into Tokyo Bay,
helping to convince the army's high command, which had been equivocating, to also come
out against the revolt.35
CIVIL WARS. The navy's ability to deter coups d'etat depends in part on its prospects
should a coup actually degenerate into combat - bringing about a short but intense civil war.
If such combat were to pit the full combat forces of the army against those of the navy, the
navy would almost certainly be unable to defend its bases. But here, the navy's cohesion--
and more importantly the army's frequent lack of it - provides the former with the
opportunity to bring its considerable support assets to bear and tip the balance in favor of one
side or the other. In 1964 the Brazilian navy was aligned with the 2nd and 4 th armies in the
rebellion against President Goulart, who was supported by the 3rd Army and parts of the 1St
Army. The 1 st Army in Rio de Janeiro collapsed when faced with converging attacks by army
elements on the landward side and naval marine units landing along the coast, and the 3rd
Army abandoned the fight when naval warships steamed into Porto Alegre, the 3 rd Army's
headquarters. 3 6
35 One indication that the army was not planning on moving against the rebels prior to the fleets arrival was that
in its communiques, it continued to refer to the group as a "gigun" (righteous army), a term associated with
samurai acting rebelliously out of loyalty to a higher principle. Oide Hisashi, Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no
Kaigun Taisho, 45-86; Yoshida Toshio, Gonin no Kaigun Daijin (Tokyo: Bunsho Bunko, 1986), 60-62.
36 Lieuwen, Generals versus Presidents. Neomilitarism in Latin America, 69-85.
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BUREAUCRATIC/INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. The navy can also play a critical role in
supporting the work of political authorities (whether elected or not) within the military
establishment. As uniformed members of the military, senior naval officers can be tapped for
to fill senior military posts (e.g., supreme commander or chairman of the joint staff). Once in
these positions, naval officers can monitor the behavior of all the services, push through
reform measures designed to restructure the military, or revise its operating procedures and
rules in ways that advantage incumbent political leaders. Although it is generally possible to
find individual army officers (or pockets of them) who will support liberal economic policies,
those officers may come under intense pressure from brother officers with different views. As
a separate and highly cohesive service, naval officers bring the support their organization and
institutions with them, giving them value beyond the numbers actually appointed to senior
posts. Even pro-reform army officers serving in senior political or military positions
frequently select naval officers for critical subordinate positions previously dominated by the
army. Admiral Jose Oliveira, for example, was brought in by leaders of the Brazilian army's
liberal Sarbonne faction to head the Escola Superior de Guerra - where he rewrote the
military's political doctrine, emphasizing the norms of civilian control and nonintervention.3 7
POLICING FUNCTIONS. The navy's primary weakness in domestic politics is that it
generally maintains only small ground forces, a weakness that limits its domestic policing
capabilities.3 8 When the military attempts to rule the country directly for extended periods of
time, policing tends to become a critical military function, and the navy's utility in any
37 On changes at the school during Oliveira's tenure, see Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the
Southern Cone, 45-54.
38 Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 225.
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military government (even one that it supports in ideological or policy terms) may decline. At
the same time, more emphasis on police functions - whether or not extra funds for this
purpose go to the navy - tend to distract the navy from its external defense missions more
than the army. Given the post-coup policing problem, the navy's weakness in that area makes
its sponsorship of coups somewhat self-destructive. More accurately, however, such
instances suggest that the navy sees integral nationalism - against which naval coups are
almost invariably directed - as a greater threat to its interests than that posed by some period
of direct military rule.
SUMMARY. The navy's domestically relevant military power is less than that of"the
army," but divisions within the army are frequently deep, and the relative cohesion of most
navies tend to make such comparisons misleading. Naval officers can lead coups d'etat, and
their units can act as the spearhead for such operations, though to succeed, they generally
need the support of some army elements. Their defensive role can be even greater, since
quick action by even small units can easily frustrate the ambitions of military coup plotters.
And if internecine warfare does occur, naval guns, amphibious operations, and interdiction
may become decisive factors, tipping the balance in favor of the navy and its allies. While
less dramatic, the navy's role in backing political authorities within the military establishment
- providing intelligence and sponsoring military structural adjustments - can frequently be
even more important.
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Two Bodies of Literature
The above observations about several well-documented cases of navies in politics justify
much of the approach used in this thesis, as well as many of the specific propositions tested. I
will now turn to a discussion of the broader literature on civil-military relations and the
literature on the domestic sources of grand strategy, highlighting where my approach borrows
or diverges from one or more parts of the existing literature.
Broadly speaking, the civil-military relations literature relates to the first component
of the thesis, that having to do with service preferences, while the literature on the domestic
sources of grand strategy relates to the second component, the impact of service preferences
on coalitional politics, political outcomes, and military strategy. That said, there is overlap in
the substantive content of these two fields: Some civil-military relations theorists treat the
effects of military politics on strategy, and some analysts of domestic politics and grand
strategy treat the military in considerable detail. There is also overlap in theoretical approach:
Both fields, for example, include works that use sociological, organization theory, and
ideational approaches. But to the extent that one can separate these fields according to the
primary dependent variables - the main outcomes that each is trying to explain - the
individual discussions serve as a good way to introduce and frame key theoretical questions.
CIV-MIL RELATIONS: BRINGING ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY BACK IN
The literature on civil-military relations, as most define it, looks at questions related to
civilian control of the military or, conversely, military intervention in politics. Although this
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literature has addressed both the civilian and military sides of the equation in relatively equal
measure, I deal here with how the military - and specifically its motivations for intervention
in politics - has been treated. In this literature, the military's domestic policy preferences
(here, the dependent variable) have been defined in three ways: (I) in strictly political terms -
specifically, in terms of support for or opposition to democracy; (2) in economic and social
terms; and (3) in terms of the search for factional advantage. The relevant explanatory (i.e.,
independent) variables have also been defined in three ways: (1) sociological determinants;
(2) organizational interests; and (3) ideational factors.
Unlike much recent scholarship on this subject, I treat domestic preferences largely in
economic and social terms, rather than as support for or opposition to democratic rule. This
thesis proposes that support for or opposition to democratic rule is largely derivative of the
services' views of the proper economic and social organization of the state. In explaining the
services' domestic preferences, I propose an inclusive organization theory, one that considers
functional organizational interests and early socialization as well as the material interests of
the services. This inclusive approach, I believe, provides significantly better explanatory and
predictive power than one that focuses more narrowly on the material interests of the services.
The inclusion of functional interests in the more inclusive approach followed by this thesis
does not imply full organizational rationality: Early professional socialization is generally
related to the functions performed by junior officers, but it can have dysfunctional effects as
officers rise through the ranks.
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FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM AND SOCIOLOGY TO THE EXPLICITLY POLITICAL.
The literature on civil-military relations has generally evolved in step with mainstream views
on comparative politics and, specifically, political development. From the 1950s through the
early 1970s, most analysts treated "development" as a relatively unitary phenomenon
involving economic, social, and political processes - all working inextricably and in concert
to produce change and, ultimately, democracy. 3 9 Those studying civil-military relations
sought to identify the military's role in those processes. Many found that armies - most did
not treat navies or air forces in detail - frequently defined their most important tasks in terms
of economic and social development. In order to explain this observation, theorists looked
primarily to the sociology of military institutions, including the social class of military
officers and the degree and nature of the professional characteristics of the military's
corporate body. Some technical training, exposure to more advanced states, relatively modest
middle class origins, and a national rather than sectional purview gave military officers a
sense of mission to effect the economic and social transformation of their states.40 The
39 In the 1950s democratization was believed to follow almost automatically from economic development. After
the more optimistic prophecies proved unrealistic, most observers began to examine the social bases for
democratization. Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of
Democracy," American Political Science Review 53 (1959).
40 See, for example Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process
of Political Modernization," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Claude E. Welch, "The Roots and Implications of Military
Intervention," in Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political
Change, ed. Claude E. Welch (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). Daniel Lerner and R.R.
Richardson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," World Politics 13, no. 1.
Work by Morris Janowitz, while less sanguine in its conclusions about the ultimate impact of military
intervention in politics, also emphasizes the sociological causes of and economic and social motivation of the
military's political activity. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New
York: Free Press, 1960); Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.
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implication was that military officers in developing states might be a force for economic
progress and ultimately, since economic development and democracy were assumed to be
closely linked, democracy.
This approach was criticized on several grounds. First, the explanations failed to
adequately explain differences in the behavior of the militaries in different countries. While
some militaries exhibited adherence to socially progressive developmentalist ideologies,
others intervened in ways that were described as conservative -- specifically, to defend what
were variously described (depending on the perspective of the observer) as either liberal
economic orders or oligarchic systems.4 1 In another line of attack, several critics observed
that there was no correlation in the developing world between military rule and economic
growth.4 2 Meanwhile, students of comparative politics began to question whether economic
development, even if it could be accelerated, would necessarily bring democracy in its
wake.4 3 Indeed, claims to developmental priorities could be used disingenuously to put off
democratic reform indefinitely.
41 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role qf the Military in Politics, Second ed. (Boulder, Co.:
Westview Press, 1981), 288-97.
42 Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World," American
Political Science Review 70, no. 4 (1976); Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule
Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," The American Political Science Review 64, no.
4 (1970).
43 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E.H. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1992); Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of
Latin America," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, Ma.: Cambridge University
Press, 1985). Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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Civil-military relations theorists began to focus more narrowly on the question of
when and how militaries intervened against democratic rule.44 And their explanations focused
on other (i.e., non-sociological) factors, such as the organizational interests of the military,
struggles for power and resources between informal factional groups in the military, and
institutional arrangements subordinating (or not subordinating) the military to civilian
authorities.45 More recently, some have again sought answers in the culture of the military
organizations. But rather than looking at the sociological or interest structure of the military
to explain that culture, they have instead treated culture as a largely free-standing (i.e.,
independent) variable that can differ profoundly from one military to the next depending on
the specific belief-systems of the military's senior officers or the education purveyed by its
educational institutions.4 6 And the cultural content they treat is defined by military attitudes
44 Note the difference between titles of two books published in 1964 (Johnson's The Military and Society in
Latin America or Janowitz' The Military in the Political Development of New Nations) and two works published
in 1977-78 (Linz and Stepan's The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes and Nordlinger's Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Government). All of the works cited subsequently in this paragraph focus on the effects of
various factors (generally military-related) on democracy - not on economic or social development.
45 Those who emphasize the organizational interests of the military include Eric Nordlinger and Alfred Stepan.
(Samuel Finer, it should be observed, preceded both of these individuals in exploring organizational
motivations.) Bruce Farcau also stresses the importance of interests, but believes that it is the competition
between factions that drives many of the coups in Latin America. Wendy Hunter argues that civilian
commitment - and particularly its aggressiveness in confronting military prerogative - can be decisive in
subordinating the military to civilian rule. Farcau, The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of
the Military; Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics; Wendy Hunter, Eroding
military influence in Brazil: politicians against soldiers (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1997); Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers
in Politics: Military Coups and Government (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
46 Cultural theorists do not deny that structures matter (or vis-A-vis). The question is one of emphasis: To what
degree do structures shape culture, or to what degree can culture be considered a truly independent variable.
With this caveat in mind, those works that emphasize culture as a relatively independent (instead of
intermediate) variable include: Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences; Brian
Dean Taylor, "The Russian Military in Politics: Civilian Supremacy in Comparative and Historical Perspective"
(Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998). There are many works that are less explicit about theory
and method, but nevertheless emphasize the distinctive culture of individual militaries. See, for example, Hayes,
The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporatist Mystique. Alain Rouquie, The Military and the State in Latin
America (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1987).
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towards civilian authority, electoral politics, and the military's proper role vis-A-vis political
authorities.
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: BACK TO A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC APPROACH. This
first component of this thesis examines the economic and social preferences of military
organizations. (See figure 2. 1.) Hence, its dependent variable is similar to that examined in
the civil-military relations literature of the 1960s and early 1 970s. While acknowledging the
validity of some of the points raised by subsequent critics of that literature (and making some
adjustments in response), I would offer several arguments for revisiting the question of
military attitudes towards economic and social issues.
First, critics of early theories on the military's economic and social role were more
trenchant in their attack on the efficacy of military programs than on the ascribed motivations
for many of the military's interventions in politics. The most widely cited critiques, by Eric
Nordlinger and Robert Jackman, correlate military rule and measures of economic growth (or
indicators of social change that generally correlate with economic growth).47 Having found
little or no correlation, they conclude that military rulers (and hence the military) are no more
oriented towards development than civilians. But to conclude from the fact that, for example,
Juan Peron's economic policies were a disaster - which they were when viewed from the
47 Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-
Western States." Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World.". Both
utilize the same data set. Of seven dependent variables considered, six are measures of GNP growth or related
indicators (such as "improvement in agricultural productivity"). Only one ("leadership commitment to economic
development, 1957-1962") has more to do with economic strategy than outcome - and that measure covers only
six years of data.
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perspective of most measures of economic growth - that he had no distinctive economic or
social ideology (or that his ideology was not shaped by his military background) would run
counter to almost any historian's account of the man or his rule.
The policies of Brazil's Getulio Vargas, South Korea's Park ChungHee, Thailand's
Sarit, Egypt's Gamal Nasser, and Turkey's Mustafa Kemal also met with uneven success.
Some did better than others. But early work on the military origins of their social and
economic perspectives did identify common motivations and worldviews of these officers.
They all pursued state-led development that would guarantee a relatively equitable
distribution of wealth. This thesis takes greater interest in the motives for military positions
vis-A-vis political authorities and in the political and military effects of military leaders'
economic and social preferences than it does in the success their economic programs, though
in drawing policy implications it does assumes that in today's world, transparent, liberal
economic orders will, under most circumstances, both outperform state-led economies and be
more compatible with democratic political rule.
A second argument for revisiting this literature is that in doing so I address (and hope
to help resolve) a question that undermined the apparent validity and utility of earlier work on
this subject: Why have militaries in developing states intervened in politics for very different
reasons? A number of scholars have observed that, while there may be a surprising number of
socially "progressive" military governments (e.g., those like Peron, Vargas, or Park), there
have also been "conservative" coups. Indeed, one possible explanation for why Nordlinger
and Jackman find no correlation between military rule and key indicators of social change (as
55
Chapter 2: Literature Review
described above) is that a relatively even distribution of"progressive" and "conservative"
coups might cause the social effects of each to cancel each other out in the aggregate.4 8
The failure to deal adequately with variance in the motivation of military officers has
provided the most powerful ammunition to those who have argued that military officers have
no consistent ideologies about which scholars or policy-makers might generalize. This thesis
seeks to explain variations by treating the military as less than a unitary, single organization,
but more than a collection of individuals or factions. Specifically, it looks at the interests and
outlooks of different components - services, branches, and functional groups - of the larger
whole.
Third, although this thesis takes a non-deterministic stand on the connection between
economic strategies and democracy, it nevertheless has direct relevance to the question of
protecting electoral democracy. If the thesis' propositions are true, even a rudimentary
knowledge of political conditions - i.e., a rough outline of the political-economic issues
dividing the nation, which side controls the government, and whether or not they were elected
to office - should be sufficient to determine how the military will be divided and which
elements will be relatively more supportive or more opposed to electoral democracy. (For
48 Jackman does make one attempt to test Samuel Huntington's explanation for the variance in coup motives.
Huntington proposed that during the beginning of the modernization process, militaries (generally led by middle
class officers) tend to conduct progressive "breakthrough" coups, designed to free the economy, society, and
politics from traditional, premodern elites. But when labor begins to make increasing demands on government
as more of the society is politicized, the military becomes relatively more conservative. Jackman looks to test
this by looking at the effects of coups in low-income countries and higher-income developing states. Finding
little difference, he concludes that Huntington's hypothesis is incorrect. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform:
Governments and Social Change in the Third World." Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 221.
56
Chapter 2: Literature Review
example, when elected populists dominate the government, the navy is unlikely to support the
electoral system that brought them there, while portions of the army will be supportive.)
In a more general sense, this analysis suggests that the problem currently thought of as
the "military coup d'etat" might be more productively addressed as the "civilian-military coup
d'etat." 49 When society is deeply divided and politics gridlocked, all sides will generally be
able to find sympathetic actors within the military. And even if those actors have no intention
to preempt, they may seek out military allies in an effort to protect themselves against
offensive action by their competitors. In other words, domestic security dilemmas are likely
to be acute, and the civilians may well share responsibility for the military's increasing
participation in politics. A survey of Latin American coups (including, for example, the
infamous 1973 coup in Chile that overthrew Allende) indicates that in many if not most, coup
leaders were lobbied by civilians, and both military and civilian actors appeared to believe
that if they did not act, their ideological opponents would.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: AN INCLUSIVE ORGANIZATION THEORY. My
proposed explanation for the services' economic and social preferences draws primarily from
organization theory. It is, however, broadly inclusive. It incorporates ideas consistent with a
sociological approach to organizations. And it also considers ideology, though it proposes
that ideology is heavily influenced by the material conditions under which organizational
49 This language is increasingly accepted as a descriptor of many coups. Argentina's civilian defense minister,
Horacio Jaunarena, recently stated that "the vast majority of coups d'etat in Argentina were civilian-military
coups." "Argentine Defense Minister Underscores Military's Respect for Democratic Rule; Denies Malaise in
Armed Forces", La Nacion, March 13 2001, in FBIS-LAP-2001-0313.
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leaders operate. (In other words, it suggests that officers who lead primarily conscripted
soldiers will, for example, tend to have a different outlook on many issues than those who
work primarily with highly trained volunteers - or directly with high-tech equipment.)
Hence, my treatment treats ideology primarily as an intervening variable, though it does not
reject outright the idea that it is also an independent variable. (See figure 2.1.)
Civil-relations theorists have keyed on three different types of logic to explain the
behavior of military organizations: functionally based, material interest based, and those
based on socialized biases. Military historians tend to emphasize function, political scientists
tend to emphasize the quest for material gains, and sociologists stress perceptual biases
derived from early education. While some have built theories or arguments based strictly on
one of these motivations, most scholars combined specific elements of two or more of these
motivations to explain specific phenomena. For example, some political scientists, in
explaining why military officers appear to almost invariably prefer offensive to defensive
doctrines, see a combination of functional motivations (e.g., to reduce uncertainty in military
planning) with material budgetary motives (e.g., to justify higher budgets and more
resources). 50 Sociologists have observed that officers' early socialization revolves around the
need to fulfill specific missions (i.e., functions), but that once socialized, the officers' belief-
5O The reduction of uncertainty requires standard operating procedures, which themselves have unintended
consequences. Nevertheless, military organizations cannot operate without these SOPs. Yet offensive doctrines
also serve as a strong basis for high budgetary demands on the state. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany
Between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the
Offensive Between the World Wars," International Security 9, no. 1 (1984).
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systems or ideologies may become at least partly dysfunctional in other settings.51 Both of
these groups observe the unintended and frequently unfortunate effects of large organizational
structures on the performance of tasks.
This civil-military coalition theory is eclectic, in the sense that it includes several
explanatory variables. At the same time, however, it establishes specific relationships
between variables, as well as the relative importance of each. As I argue in Chapter 3,
function, material interests, and socialized biases all work together to overdetermine the
predicted outcomes. Over time, domestic preferences that may originally be driven by a
combination of functional motivations and socialized biases are likely to crystallize into
organizational culture - a force that will then exert some independent influence over
preferences. But this thesis treats organizational culture primarily as an intermediate variable
and suggests that it will be shaped, in probabilistic ways, by the structure of the
organization.5 2
DOMESTIC SOURCES OF STRATEGY
The second aspect of this thesis looks at the effects of military preferences on domestic
political conflicts and the selection of national military strategies. In doing so, it builds on a
51 See, for example, Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Bengt Abrahamsson,
Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1972). Many political
scientists have borrowed from this logic. See, for example, Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America.
Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics.
52 Of course, officers may seek to structure their organization in ways that conform with and support their
culture. But military structures are more amenable to adjustments by political actors and will also be influenced
by technical factors. At the end of the day, air force pilots must fly aircraft (and soon perhaps drones) to remain
air force pilots, and the aircraft, as well as the demands of flying, will always be central to the air force's culture.
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growing body of work on the domestic sources of grand strategy. Specifically, it combines a
consideration of politics and class conflict, issues highlighted by the work of Jack Snyder.
with a more fine-grained understanding of how the military defines its own interests in those
conflicts.
REALISM AND THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF STRATEGY. Work on the domestic
sources of grand strategy represents a reaction against, or at least an amendment to, strict
adherence to structural realism. Structural realists propose that states behave in a certain way
or are punished by the international system. In other words, although all states may not
behave in absolutely uniform ways, the international system conditions a certain type of
behavior. Specifically, structural realists suggest that it is safe to assume that most state react
relatively smoothly and rationally to threats in their environment, and protecting the state
against these dangers will generally take precedent over other values the state might pursue
(e.g., maximizing the benefits of absolutely free trade).5 3 In challenging those assumptions,
research on the domestic sources of grand strategy recalls classical realism, which embraced
the idea that domestic factors were likely to make some states more aggressive than others or
that states might otherwise perceive their interests in very different ways.5 4
53 Examples of structural realist work includes Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1979). Stephen Walt, The Origins ofAlliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
54 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1960). Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964).
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Recent scholarship on the domestic sources of grand strategy has sought to make
explicit generalizations about how and under what circumstances specific domestic variables
affect the foreign and defense policies of nations. This work falls broadly into three
categories.
The first of these draws on organization theory to show that the interests of sub-
national, bureaucratic units can affect the rationality of responses to the external
environment.55 Analysts of military bureaucracies, for example, have concluded that those
organizations' interests in both size and the reduction of operational uncertainty gives them a
strong predilection for offensive war-fighting doctrines - regardless of whether technology or
political circumstances favor such operations.56 Hence, political intervention is frequently
necessary to achieve the integration of foreign policy tools into a coherent and mutually
supporting whole. Others have argued that national strategic orientation - including the very
definition of what constitutes a critical threat - can be heavily influenced by the relative
power of bureaucracies (including the military or subordinate components of it) within the
government.57
55 Allison, Essence of Decision.
56 Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars." Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and
Germany Between the World Wars.
57 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Chalmers
Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Arthur A.
Stein (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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A second approach to studying the domestic sources of grand strategy looks at the
foreign policy effects of more explicitly political aspects of the state - including conflicts
between the economic groups (e.g., industries), social classes, and ethnic groups, as well as
the political structures available to moderate those conflicts.58 Michael Doyle revives the
discussion of democracy and its effects on war-proneness. 59 David D'Lugo and Ronald
Rogowski assess the effects of constitutional fitness on the relative ability of Britain and
Germany to sustain the pre-World War I naval arms race. 60 Jane Kellet Cramer has
demonstrated that security "panics" can and have on a number of historical occasions been
created and/or manipulated to further specific political agendas - an observation that, without
denying the real challenges faced by the U.S. since 9.1 1, may say much about the specific
content of recent American rhetoric and strategies for fighting the "war on terror."61
Of most relevance to states in the developing world (and hence, to the present thesis),
Jack Snyder argues that domestic pathologies, frequently resulting from major social change
brought in the wake of rapid economic development, can lead states to adopt irrational or self-
destructive grand strategies. When major social groups see their political power threatened in
58 Andrew Moravcsik has made a noble effort to incorporate political actors and political structures into a single
coherent theoretical framework. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Relations," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997).
59 Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986). Michael
E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, An International
Security Reader (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996).
60 David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski, "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional
'Fitness'," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1993).
61 Jane Kellett Cramer, "National Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National Security" (PhD
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002).
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ways that will prevent its future recovery, they may make every effort to obstruct the political
processes that may lead to such an outcome. The gridlock that results can be most
conveniently be broken by coalitional log-rolling, but because domestic issues are non-
negotiable, logrolling tends to be outwardly oriented, producing imperial projects that benefit
coalitional members but jeopardize the state.62
A third approach has concentrated on the influence of ideational and cultural factors
on foreign policy. John Mueller, for example, makes a strong case that attitudinal changes
towards war have made Europe inherently more stable than it has ever been historically.6 3
Literature on strategic culture is weakest when it explains differences in foreign policy
preferences in terms of enduring and unchanging national characteristics. 64 These accounts
are difficult to reconcile with cases in which major events have punctuated the equilibrium of
foreign policy and produced dramatically new approaches - for example, Japan, where some
strategic ideas and assumptions changed dramatically after World War II even as others
remained relatively stable. The strategic culture literature is strongest, when it is explicit
about the relationship between ideas and the structures that maintain them over time.6 5
62 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1991).
63 John Mueller, Retreatfrom Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1988).
This explanation is, unfortunately, difficult to test against others.
64 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Win a Nuclear War," Commentary 64, no. 1 (1977).
Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986). Alastair Johnston offers
perhaps the most careful test of strategic conceptions as long-enduring features of individual states' histories.
Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
65 Peter Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara's work on Japan provides a relatively good example. Peter J.
Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: STRATEGY IN DEVELOPING STATES. The second
component of this thesis looks at the effects of the military services' domestic preferences
(the independent variable) and the involvement of civilian-military coalitions in politics (the
intermediate variable) on the military strategies of developing states (the dependent variable).
(See figure 2. 1.)
There are two reasons for pursuing this research on the sources of strategy in the
developing world. First, understanding strategy in these states is important - and becoming
more important. Military strategies and force structures can be more or less threatening to
neighbors and produce lesser or greater security dilemmas. And without the bipolar Cold War
framework to dampen and restrict intra-regional conflict between developing states, the
danger of war between them has become more real - as has the danger that the U.S. might be
drawn into them. The ongoing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically
raises America's stakes in the strategies chosen by developing states and the conflict that may
result. At the same time, different military strategies may also be more or less compatible
with effective governance and democratic rule, an issue that is of increased salience to
America's own security in a highly integrated and interdependent world.
Second, apart from historical studies from Europe during the age of industrialization,
there have been few attempts to generalize about the effects of politics on grand strategy in
Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1993). Neither Katzenstein and Okawara nor
others have, however, dealt adequately with what effects changes in the structure of the Japanese state has or will
have on Japanese strategic culture.
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developing states. Perhaps the longest standing generalization about these states and their
military policies holds that high levels of domestic threat frequently produce inwardly focused
counterinsurgency strategies. The corollary of this has been that conventional strategies,
where they appear, signal an absence or at least diminution of domestic threat.66 Most
analysts tend to explain conventional military phenomenon, such as the naval arms buildup in
Latin America during the 1970s, by looking for the international threats or conflicts that may
have sparked them.6 7 But this simple dichotomy between internally focused
counterinsurgency and externally oriented conventional strategies fails to consider the effects
of politics on strategy - effects that were evident even in Europe during the 19th and early 20th
centuries.
One work that does systematically address domestic sources of grand strategy in
developing states takes as its focus European states during the age of imperialism. In Myths
of Empire Jack Snyder argues that whether or not national leaders care more about foreign or
domestic threats cannot be decided a priori; they will react to whichever threat is greater. 68
And threats will not always be defined relative to the state; they may often be viewed from the
perspective of regimes and the social groups that supported them. An expanding middle or
working class seeking constitutional change may be viewed as a critical threat to state leaders.
66 This pattern is, for example, taken as a matter of course in Muthiah Alagappa's edited volume. Alagappa, The
National Security of Developing States: Lessonsfrom Thailand.
67 Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Rivalry to Friendly Cooperation,"
Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (1985). James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel
Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone," Journal of nteramerican Studies and World
Affairs 27, no. 3 (1985).
68 Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.
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Those leaders may, in response, craft military force structures or strategies in ways that
sandbag their own political position. If domestic politics affected the foreign and military
policies of these major powers in the heart of Europe - a contention Snyder's research
generally supports - the effect should be even larger on the small- and medium-sized states in
the developing world today.6 9 The external threat faced by most of these states is relatively
minor, whereas domestic conflicts tend to loom larger.70
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: REVISITING MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES. In a
broad sense, this thesis seeks to build on Snyder's work, though the application of his ideas to
developing states today demands some adjustment. Specifically, it requires a more detailed
and nuanced treatment of military organizations. In most of Snyder's cases, top civilian and
military elites were relatively unified in class and social outlook (though perhaps less so than
his treatment suggests).71 In Britain throughout most of the 1 9t century, for example,
commissions into the Army's officer corps were purchased, effectively limiting membership
to sons of the aristocracy. Once in the service, technical military training and indoctrination
for many of these officers was minimal. Today, examinations for admission to military
academies in developing states may result in certain social classes being disproportionately
represented. But the more important effect of selection based on merit - especially given the
69 Snyder does apply many of these ideas to a variety of contemporary developing states, including China, in his
subsequent book. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2000).
70 On the external threat level of developing states and the involvement of militaries in those cases see Charles
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 76, 206-07.
71 Even as late as the mid-20t century, European militaries (and those of many other states) tended to be
dominated by aristocratic elites. See George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, Social Origins and Political
Orientations of Officer Corps in a World Perspective (Denver: University of Denver, 1973).
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relatively modest training needed to pass most entrance exams - has been to widen, rather
than narrow, the social origins of most officer corps.
If it proves true that state leaders manipulate strategies and force structures for
political ends, that conclusion will challenge established ideas on the relationship between
military and political change. In the mid-1 970s, Charles Tilly persuasively argued that the
development of nation states as we know them today was a natural and almost inevitable
response to the financial and social demands of interstate wars in the heart of Europe.72 That
view, embraced by many students of political development, sees the functional military
demands of the state as a primary driver of everything from financial to education to welfare
policy. But if political actors desire a given political organization for the state, and if there is
no truly pressing external threat that requires them to select a particular military format, then
it stands to reason that those political actors will select the military strategy and force
structure that best supports their political designs.
As many scholars of international security dilemmas have observed, military forces
are largely fungible, meaning that offensive and defensive forces are difficult to distinguish
but also implying that many military threats can be addressed by a variety of means. A wing
of ground attack aircraft may, under many circumstances, replace an infantry division or vis-
a-vis, and threat analysis can frequently be manipulated to accentuate the need for politically
attractive doctrinal adjustments. There may be some loss of efficiency in military spending.
72 Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in The Formation of National States in
Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). Michael Howard, War in
European History (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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But often either the external threat environment or the dynamics of modem war will be
ambiguous enough for the trade-offs to be unclear. And even where they are clear, inefficient
approaches to security may be worth the political gains for those faced with prickly domestic
political dilemmas.
The point is not that Tilly was wrong. Indeed, these observations are the corollary of
Tilly's own conclusions. Rather, the point is that the causal direction established by Tilly -
with military demands driving social needs and political formats - may not hold in many
states during much of their history. This thesis seeks, in part, to determine how often
domestic politics drives military strategy, as opposed to the reverse.
68
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I outline the logic of my
proposed theory of domestic politics, military services, and grand strategy in developing
states. In the second section, I briefly summarize the logic of two competing theories and list
the major and minor predictions generated by both my own theory and the two competing
alternatives. And in the third section, I discuss case selection and methodology.
Civil-Military Coalition Theory
The theory proposed here suggests that domestic politics frequently have a decisive effect on
grand strategy in the developing world. The theory includes four major predictions about the
domestic preferences of the military services, the formation of contending civil-military
coalitions, and the impact of coalitional competition and its outcomes on subsequent
continuity or change in grand strategy. The four primary predictions are:
The composition and organization of military organizations will have a major impact
on their political preferences. Officers from technology-oriented military
organizations (e.g., the navy and air force) will generally support liberal nationalist
domestic positions; officers from troop-oriented organizations (including many army
elements) will support integral nationalist ones. Values will be reflected both in the
services' activities and the rhetoric of their officers.
* The degree of internal unity and cohesion of each service's officer corps, in terms of
political outlook, will depend on the degree of homogeneity in the composition and
organization of subordinate units and officers - again, in terms of the degree of
relative technological content. The navy's officer corps, being more homogenous in
this dimension, will tend to be more united than that of the army.
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When politics are gridlocked over issues that threaten the future power or existence of
major social or political groups, military organizations are likely to be drawn into - or
seek to create - domestic political coalitions with like-minded civilian actors; often,
two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge. All things being equal, relatively
strong technical services and branches - e.g., navy, air force, and army general staff-
will advantage liberal coalitions, while the weakness of these arms will advantage
their integral nationalist competitors.
* Domestic victors will solidify their position against a comeback by their rivals by
adjusting force structures and military strategies to reward their military allies.
Victories for liberal nationalists will, therefore, likely signal shifts toward maritime
strategies, while victories for integral nationalist positions will herald the rise of
continental strategies.
IDEAL, TYPES AND THE IMPERFECT WORLD
Before elaborating on each of these predictions, it is necessary to have a working definition of
integral nationalism and liberal nationalism. Presented here as ideal types, these represent the
fundamental choices from which the leaders of most developing states have selected during
the sixty years since World War Two. Needless to say, many if not most political actors in
the real world embrace mixed positions, but these ideal types allow us to place actors on a
continuum.
The integral nationalism adhered to by many army leaders posits that economic
development and increasing national power can be achieved only by consolidating and
unifying the nation. Many developing states have been threatened by a lack of cohesion.
Integral nationalists believe that strengthening unity and cohesion requires reducing
differences and increasing coordination between all elements of society. Integral nationalists
seek development that is balanced across regions and in which income and other resources are
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relatively evenly distributed.7 3 "Balanced" (i.e., even) development requires strong central
leadership of the economy and society and tight restrictions on foreign involvement in the
domestic economy.74 Unregulated trade and social contact with foreign cultures will tend to
further favor those regions of the state that are most advanced (generally coastal areas), hence
exacerbating the divide between the nation's large hinterland and its few wealthy trading
centers. 75 Politically, integral nationalists are likely to oppose political systems in which the
electoral process is the only point of contact between social groups and the government, and
they oppose those in which private money plays a major role. They generally prefer systems
where electoral politics is supplemented by government-mediated corporatist systems of
direct social representation. 76
73 On the military, and especially the army, penchant for income equality and for justice more broadly construed,
see Harold Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," in Jay Stanley, ed.,
Essays on the Garrison State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), p. 53.
74 Integral nationalists believe in concentrating the state's limited financial assets (especially foreign currency)
and managerial talent to achieve maximum results. This requires government intervention and supervision. See
Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1962).
75 This philosophy is broadly consistent with the "Dependendista" ("Dependency") school of political
economists. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Peter B. Evans Dependent Development: The Alliance of
Multinational State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
76 On corporatist systems, see Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great
"Ism" (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); and Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in
Brazil (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971).
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Figure 3.1: Elements of Integral Nationalist and Liberal Nationalist Ideologies
Economic
Social Values
Social Organzation
Foreign Contact
Regional Focus
Center-Periphery
Political System
Pejorative moniker (or
deviant variant)
Examples
Integral Nationalist
State guided
Equity
Corporatist
Regulated, discouraged
Interior
Centralized
Electoral system supplemented with
functional representation
Fascism
National Socialism
Peron's Argentina
Park's Korea
Mussolini's Italy
Liberal Nationalist
Free market
Liberty, efficiency
Free association
Unregulated. encoraged
Coastal areas
Decentralized
Electoral representation only
Plutocracy
Oligarchy
Columbia (today)
USA (today and arguably even more
so in the early 20th century)
The liberal nationalism adhered to by naval leaders, on the other hand, emphasizes
national progress through integration with global markets and the free flow of people and
ideas across borders. It accepts - indeed honors - differences at home between individuals,
regions, and social groups, and it tends to favor reliance on markets, classical economic
rationality, and economic pluralism. Liberal nationalism tends to stress aggregate economic
growth more than integral nationalism and worries less about equitable distribution. Although
it may take time, wealth will ultimately diffuse to all areas of the state. Politically, liberal
nationalists support electoral systems that respect individual difference, personal freedoms,
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and the free market.7 7 They may oppose democratic electoral systems where checks and
balances on government power do not protect those values.78 Conflict between integral and
liberal nationalist visions of the public good describes much of the political struggle that has
taken place in the developing world since World War II, and disputes over "democracy"
frequently mask contests over the economic and social organization of the state.
Integral nationalists and liberal nationalists both commonly accuse the other of
favoring systems inherently prone to corruption. In contemporary America, the failures of
integral nationalism - collusion, opacity, and crony capitalism - are accepted wisdom. And it
may be true, as I assume in drawing implications from this thesis, that in order to have very
low levels of corruption, a relatively liberal system is necessary. But in the developing world,
very high levels of corruption have also plagued many regimes established along liberal, free
market lines. If liberal economic positions are defined as being relatively free of corruption
by definition or if corrupt market economies are defined as being imperfectly liberal, then the
logic connecting markets and reduced corruption becomes circular. In a number of countries
since the end of World War Two, integral nationalist regimes that succeeded liberal ones
reduced corruption by increasing commitment to the task, reducing the number of individuals
with access to power that can be put to ill use, or both. The point here is not that these two
77 Liberal nationalists believe that free markets are necessary to the maintenance of true and meaningful
democracy and the defense against authoritarianism. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962).
78 Liberalism is often equated with electoral democracy. In fact, liberalism respects individual rights and
difference, whereas democracy subjects the minority to the will of the majority. On this tension, see David
Braybrooke, "Can Democracy Be Combined with Federalism or with Liberalism?" in J. Roland Pennock and
John W. Chapman, eds., Liberal Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1983).
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ideologies are equally valid, but that in an imperfect world, there is enough truth in the logic
of both to accept that either can motivate political actors. Which view an individual embraces
will of course depend in part on highly particularistic factors but will also be influenced in
probabilistic ways by organizations, groups, or societies to which that individual belongs.
HYPOTHESIS 1
"Naval officers will generally support liberal nationalist domestic positions. Army officers,
on the other hand, will frequently support integral nationalist ones."
Students of government (and other) organizations have long observed that differences
in composition and mission frequently lead these organizations to work toward different
objectives - sometimes in opposition to one another or even in opposition to executive
political authorities. Analysts of military organizations have concluded, for example, that
military organizations tend to have relatively fixed doctrinal preferences, regardless of the
strategic merits of that doctrine in individual cases. European armies preferred offensive
action during the late 19t h century and early 20 th century, despite the demonstrated fact that
barbed wire and machine guns appear to have given the edge to the defender. Many of the
same theoretical precepts suggest that military organizations may have relatively constant
domestic political or economic preferences, in addition to military ones. But given that
different types of military organizations within the same state will vary in their material and
human composition, mission, and structure (e.g., command and control relationships), it is
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reasonable to suppose that different types of military organizations may differ in terms of
their specific domestic preferences.
An inclusive organization theory (and the one adopted here) suggests that an
organization's function, material interests, and the socialized biases of its members all affect
motivation and behavior. Functional motivations are those endowed by the organization's
need to perform stipulated tasks. In the case of the army and navy these are: to win wars on
land and sea, respectively.7 9 Material interests are those that are driven by a desire to benefit
the welfare or power of the institution and its professional members - for example, by
increasing the manpower or budget of the organization.80 Finally, socialized biases are based
on early personal or professional experience (dependent, for example, on social class or
professional schooling) and will incline officers to embrace or reject certain types of
economic or social policies, regardless of subsequent exposure to information or data that
79 There are at least two types of literature that take a largely functionalist approach to the treatment of military
organizations and political-social issues. First, a variety of historians have observed that intensive warfare in
Europe resulted in the victories by those military thinkers (such as Carl von Clausewitz) who advocated social
policies with functional benefits for the military's ability to win wars. Howard, War in European History.
These individuals viewed many military professionals as being relatively more functionally oriented than the
traditional members of the political class, who sought to utilize military hierarchy to reinforce the interests of
themselves and their preferred social systems. See Hew Strachan, European armies and the conduct of war
(London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983). Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western
Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). A second body of literature that begins from
functionalist premises is on military sociology and politics. (While much of this literature begins from
functional premises, it does not end there. See footnote below discussing perceptual biases.) Representative
works on this include Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Samuel P.
Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations," (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).
80 On organization theory in general, see James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and
Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989). James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1967). On the application of these ideas to military organizations, see Posen, The Sources
of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Van Evera, "The Cult of the
Offensive Between the World Wars." Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive. Allison, Essence of Decision.
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undermines the apparent validity or rationality of those inclinations.8' Many scholars have
observed that socialized bias can critically affect the organization's preferences or behavior.
Functional imperatives faced at the unit level during their first years of service will continue
to influence the officers' worldview later in their careers - sometimes becoming increasingly
dysfunction as the officers become farther removed from unit level leadership.8 2
Below, I summarize key structural differences between the anny and the navy and
then discuss how those structural differences shape the interests (both functional and material)
and biases of the services.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMIES AND NAVIES. While individual differences in
outlook will always exist between even individuals with similar backgrounds, the functional
and structural characteristics of organizations will influence the perspectives of their members
81 As noted above (in the footnote on functional explanations), many sociological approaches to the study of
military organizations begin with functional premises. (For example, infantry officers must lead troops, and
therefore junior officer education teaches the importance of developing a heroic persona. See Morris Janowitz.)
But this literature acknowledges that (1) there might be other (especially class or organizational) motivations for
socialization; and (2) that early, functionally-motivated sociology might either prove dysfunctional later in the
later careers of many officers or that it might have unintended consequences in, for example, shaping the
political views of those individuals. On socialization and political attitudes, see Huntington, "The Soldier and
the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations." Janowitz, The Military in the Political
Development of New Nations. Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power. Johnson, The
Military and Society in Latin America.
82 This can be demonstrated, once again, with an analogy to the military's behavior in combat. Most military
leaders during the U.S. Civil War, especially during its early stages, got their first combat experience during the
Mexican American War, when the smooth-bore musket was still the main infantry arm and bayonet attacks
therefore still had a good chance of succeeding with relatively modest casualties. By the start of the Civil War,
rifles, deadly at much longer rangers, had replaced muskets, but for several years, commanders continued to
show a preference for the infantry charge - despite the high losses incurred by those using such tactics.
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and produce distinctive distributions of true believers in various types of ideologies within
different types of organizations.
The army and the navy differ in at least five important dimensions: (1) the relative
importance of capital and technology; (2) the background, education, and experience of their
officers; (3) the quantity and quality of the enlisted personnel required by each; (4) the
location of their bases; and (5) the degree and type of contact that the officers enjoy with their
foreign counterparts. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but rather one that captures
the most salient structural factors highlighted by the political scientists, historians, and
military analysts who have sought to explain the domestic behavior of military
organizations. 8 3
Technology. If there is a "keystone" difference between armies and navies it lies in
the level and type of capital and technological content incorporated into the weapons systems
of the two. 84 Navies, even in developing states, are organized around high-technology
83 For perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of service characteristics in a single states, see Ikeda, Kaigun to
Nihon. On Germany, see Steinberg, Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet. For a more general
treatment of the relationship between technological requirements and military culture in general (i.e., not
army/navy specific), see Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. And for an
application of Janowitz' ideas to the Korean army and navy, see John P. Lovell, Mun Hui Sok, and Young Ho
Lee, "Professional Orienation and Policy Perspectives of Military Professionals in the Republic of Korea,"
Midwest Journal of Political Science 13, no. 3 (1969).
84 For example, in the developing states of East Asia, the per capita capitalization of the navy (with marines
included) is between 50 percent (in Taiwan) and 287 percent (South Korea) higher than that of the army.
Taiwan's budget shares can be derived from "Characteristics of Taiwan's 1997 Defense Budget", Kuang-Chiao
Ching, May 16 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-0516. South Korean service budget shares are from "Ministry to
Reorganize Basic Defense Structures", Yonhap, September 25 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0926. Military
manpower figures are from IISS, Military Balance.
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weapons systems (many of which must be imported). Most army units rely to a much lesser
extent on technology. These differences between the services in the technological content of
weapons and other equipment largely, though not entirely, drive the differences in the other
four areas.
Officers. The services draw from different segments of the population to fill their
officer corps. Because of the high technical requirements of operating naval weapons, naval
academies tend to place more of a premium on recruiting cadets with strong academic
backgrounds than do army academies.85 But perhaps more important than the respective
recruiting base for the two academies lies in the percentage of total officers in each service
who are academy trained. Whereas navies in developing states tend to draw the bulk of their
officers from their academies, only 15-25 percent of army officers are academy-trained. 8 6
And whereas the navy generally draws the remainder of its officers from Reserve Officer
Training Courses or direct commissioning programs (all of which are based on college
campuses), the army fills out much of its officer corps with Officer Candidate School
graduates drawn from its enlisted ranks. These recruiting patterns generally mean that naval
85 This is true even in the U.S. military. According to U.S. News, 91% of Naval Academy successful applicants
submit SAT scores, whereas only 65% of successful applicants Army Academy do. And among those who do
submit scores, averages for the army range between 1 160 and 1350 (25-75 percentile), while those for the navy
range between 1210 and 1380. www.usnews.com (viewed on August 18, 2002).
86 This is a rough estimate based on data from several states. In the Indonesian army, for example, around 20
percent of officers are academy-trained, another 20% are ROTC-trained, and the remaining 60% are former
enlisted personnel trained in OCS programs. A "majority" are said to come from the academy. Robert Lowry,
The Armed Forces of Indonesia (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 118. Another way of looking
at this problem is that the navy graduates 60% as many academy-trained officers as the army, but only has 14%
as many officers in its force - making the ratio some four times as high.
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officers tend to come from relatively higher-income families and that more come from urban
areas than is the case in the army.
Post-recruiting differences in military education and experience are at least as
significant as those in recruiting. Virtually all naval officers have some engineering training,
and most are assigned to oversee mechanical sections during their early onboard assignments.
Although some academy-trained army officers have some engineering training, few are
expected to use many of those technical skills in their early assignments - if ever. Rather,
most academy-trained officers, and virtually all OCS-trained officers spend most of their
careers leading troops or managing relatively low-tech, manpower-intensive operations, such
as basic logistical support units (e.g., moving food and fuel).
Enlistedpersonnel. Most armies in the developing world continue to draw a large
majority of their soldiers from conscription. Navies, again because of their higher
technological requirements and lower quantitative requirements, use a higher percentage of
long-service volunteers. 87 While army recruits come from the nation's social base, frequently
peasant families, the navy draws much of its force from urban areas. Given the absence of
long-serving volunteers in the army, these organizations tend to lack an effective, functioning
87 According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the proportion of the armies' manpower
acquired through conscription in the states of South America for which data is available (Brazil, Chile,
Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) is over twice as high as that of navies'. IISS, The Military Balance, 2000-2001
(London: Oxford University Press, 2000). Because the IISS figures provide figures for conscripts as a
percentage of the total force (including officers), it is difficult to estimate how much of the enlisted force they
represent. In the case of China, interviews with Chinese army and naval officers, as well as a survey of relevant
Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation army daily) articles, suggests that between 3 and 8 percent of army enlisted are long-
term volunteers, while the number in the navy is between 25 and 35 percent.
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non-commissioned officer corps. In the navy, senior enlisted personnel frequently serve as
front-line supervisors and provide an effective layer of middle management between the
officers and junior enlisted personnel.
Basing. The need for harbor and repair facilities ensures that most naval units and
bases are located in or near coastal cities. Army units, especially operational units, tend to be
located in the countryside, where they can train unobstructed by the civilian population, where
they are closer to their conscription base, and where they frequently have been deployed
historically for the purposes of preserving order or suppressing rebellion.
Foreign contact. Because of the navy's need to acquire technical knowledge, the
location of its bases in coastal cities, and the simple fact that its ships visit foreign countries,
the naval officers of most developing states are likely to have more contact with foreign
military officers (and even civilians) than those of the army. Moreover, the foreign contact
that naval officers have is more likely to be with individuals from liberal maritime states,
given the advanced naval capabilities enjoyed by those states and their value as organizational
models and sources of technical information.88 Relatively more of the army's limited foreign
contact will be with individuals from continental states. Finally, even in the exceptional cases
where the navy's foreign contact is not primarily with liberal maritime states, the officers with
88 Between 1870 and 1941, the Japanese army took Germany as its model, dispatching a large plurality of its
exchange students to that nation, while the navy took Great Britain as its model. Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon. The
same was true of both Chile and Argentina and a host of other nations. Today, although the United States serves
a model for both the armies and navies of many states, armies in the developing world get relatively more of
their assistance from elsewhere.
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whom the navy has contact will, as naval officers, tend to be more outwardly oriented and
cosmopolitan than the army officers of the same state. 89
SERVICE POSITIONS. The specific characteristics of the services in these five
dimensions endow the officers of each service with different functional and material interests
and perceptual biases, inclining the two in largely opposite directions on economic and social
issues.
The army. Interests and socialized biases incline army officers toward integral
nationalism - encouraging it to emphasize social welfare and equity issues, as well as state-
led approaches to economic development.
The most compelling functional consideration pushing the armies of most developing
states toward integral nationalism derives from their enlisted manning patterns. With higher
disciplinary demands than technical ones, most of the army's manpower is drawn from the
countryside and, to a lesser extent, the urban poor (though generally not from the very poorest
urban elements). Most armies in the developing world rely on conscription. Depending on
the terms of service, between 40 percent and 60 percent of the enlisted force is replaced
annually in conscript armies, bringing a constant flow of young men straight from farms and
89 Both the Thai army and navy received much of their technical assistance and military equipment from Japan
before World War II. Japanese naval officers were, however, considerably more cosmopolitan and liberal than
their army counterparts, who generally shared strong preferences for national socialist doctrines.
81
Chapter 3: Theory
villages through army line units. In some developing states, these soldiers are only barely
removed from the farm - during harvest season many are given passes to return to assist their
parents.
Given these manning patterns, anything that causes major hardship in the countryside
will also have a detrimental effect on unit-level morale and effectiveness. Army officers will
favor nationally sponsored development projects designed to preserve the viability of rural
life. 90 They will, on the other hand, tend to be suspicious of purely market-based solutions
that may risk causing rural dislocation or opening farmers to usury.9 1 Foreign trade and
investment may raise aggregate national wealth, but it is also likely to increase the gap
between urban and rural areas, as well as between coastal and rural ones. If agriculture is
included in the free trade regime, as urban and coastal elites are likely to advocate, the army's
rural base may be eviscerated both physically and spiritually. In Japan during the 1930s,
thousands if not tens of thousands of farm families were forced by destitution to sell their
daughters into urban prostitution, a fact that damaged morale among the army's enlisted force
and was blamed by angry junior army officers on free trade and the liberal, mostly urban,
politicians who backed it.
90 On the logic of army support for income equality and for 'justice' more broadly construed, see Harold
Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," in Essays on the Garrison State,
ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), 53.
9' Army officers expressing socialist, national socialist, or anti-capitalist doctrines have not been rare, and all
have cited the negative effects of capitalism on the countryside as a primary motive for their economic and social
doctrines. These include Argentina's Juan Peron, Brazil's Getulio Vargas, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Imperial
Japan's Ugaki Kazushige and Tanaka Giichi, Thailand's Sarit, and Korea's Park ChungHee. Interestingly, the
officers of aristocratically-dominated armies - including those in Victorian Britain, late 19h century Germany,
and pre-1917 Russia, have also bemoaned the ill effects of capitalism on the countryside and the effects of
urbanization on the health and discipline of soldiers.
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Organizational and personal interests tend to reinforce these preferences. The army's
large presence in the countryside enables it to play a significant role in social development
projects, and these projects in turn, generally provide a rationale for further increases in the
army's size. Growth in personnel strength (and consequently in officer billets) - and
increased prestige and authority at home - may compensate the army in part or in full for
whatever degradation it may suffer in conventional capabilities as a result of its
developmental involvement.92 At the same time, the humble social origins of many army
officers may give them a personal stake (through their families or localities) in the
development of poorer areas. And developmental work may give officers potential second
legal or less than legal sources of income.
Perceptual biases reinforcing tendencies towards integral nationalism derive from the
early professional experience of army officers. For valid functional reasons, young army
officers are encouraged to demonstrate a sense of welfare (and often an exaggerated sense of
welfare) for the men under their command. Even today, many ground commanders around
the world would agree with Napoleon's statement that the "moral is to the material as three is
to one" - a ratio that naval or air commanders would likely believe is reversed in their own
areas of endeavor. Without understating the importance of technology and skill in land
92 Under Peron, for example, weapons imports were cut back sharply, but the size of the army increased from
30,000 in 1943 to 100,000 by the end of 1945. The size of the enlisted force was subsequently reduced, but the
number of officers continued to climb. These inducements, justified by the army's involvement in social
problems, successfully bought the loyalty of most of the Argentine army. David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987
(Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1985), 251, 81-82.
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warfare, for young army officers at the small unit level, morale is one variable of great
military consequence over which they have great control.
The difference between the services in terms of emphasis placed on the moral factor in
war is reflected in the etiquette and habits of U.S. military officers. Army officers eat in the
"mess" with their men, generally waiting until all their troops have been served before taking
the last portion of the same food. Naval officers, from the most junior to the most senior, eat
in the "wardroom" away from their enlisted troops who eat in the "mess deck." Places in the
wardroom are frequently set with linen and china and crystal, and until recently, ships officers
were served by Pilipino mess boys. (Enlisted sailors have since taken the mess boys' place as
servers.) Army officers see their roles as something akin to that of football coaches,
responsible for imparting the basic skills necessary to win but equally important for
motivating their charges, while naval officers on board ship may view their own collective
role as closer to that of a brain trust in a Fortune 500 company.
Early socialization, functional at the junior officer ranks, shapes the lenses through
which army officers see larger economic and social issues as they advance in rank - and may,
at higher levels, become dysfunctional for the organization and its mission.93 Some army
officers in developing states may even begin to reverse the original functional logic, seeing
93 For an application of this general principle to the air force, see Arnold Kanter, "The Career Patterns of Air
Force Generals," American Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 (1977).
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their paternalistic care for their soldiers and the classes from which they come as their primary
purpose, rather than as a boon to the potential combat effectiveness of their force.
The navy. Interests and biases incline most naval officers to favor liberal nationalism
- including market-based approaches to the domestic economy, free trade and exchange with
foreign states, and social freedoms.
The navy's functional interest in liberal nationalism derives primarily - if largely
indirectly - from its high technology content. Whereas infantry battalions form the backbone
of most armies in developing states, warships and aircraft provide the bulk of combat power
in the navies of virtually all states, developing or otherwise. In developing states, critical
systems (if not whole platforms) must be imported. This is true even of relatively wealthy
developing states, i.e., those on the cusp of becoming advanced industrial states. New OECD
member South Korea - which has a massive shipbuilding industry and an equally large
electronics industry - purchases foreign surface-to-surface missiles (Harpoon and Exocet),
surface-to-air missiles (Sea Sparrow), shipboard helicopters (Super Lynx and Alouette III),
torpedoes (Mk 46), and communications and radar gear for its domestically built naval hulls.
The Korean army, on the other hand, has been building its own tanks and artillery - including
most of their on-board electronic equipment - for at least the last fifteen years. On the eve of
the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy, which had been building its own warships for
decades, continued to import not only massive amounts of steel and oil, but also critical
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machine tools and other production equipment from the United States for the manufacture of
guns, propellers, and other high-end, precision items.94
In theory, and sometimes in practice, state-led economic strategies (especially export
led strategies) succeed in raising the industrial and technical capacity of the state. But they
may require decades to produce domestic industrial capabilities relevant to the navy and in the
meantime almost invariably call for tight controls on the use of foreign exchange and a virtual
ban on the import of major capital items other than the machine tools necessary for export
industries. In some cases, such as Peron's Argentina or Goulart's Brazil, trade balances and
foreign reserves may remain in a constant state of near crises, effectively precluding the
import of arms for the military. In the Argentine and Brazilian cases, this affected both the
army and the navy but had a much bigger effect on the latter than the former.95
Even where smarter strategies are pursued and massive foreign reserves built up, as in
Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, integral nationalist leaders tend to set
foreign reserves aside for industrial purposes. In the Korean case, emphasis on domestic
military production raised questions about the reliability of artillery ammunition (all of which
94 Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press), 185-86.
95 In Argentina, foreign reserves were depleted by two-thirds (including the entire dollar fund) in the two years
between 1946 and 1948, putting the nation on the verge of default and making the purchase of foreign military
equipment impossible. Similarly, in Brazil in 1963 (less than a year before the officers of the Navy Club
submitted an ultimatum to the President to resign), the government announced that interest payments on the debt
already scheduled for 1963-1965 equaled 43 percent of expected export revenues. Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987,
293. Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in The Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes: Latin America, ed. Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 114-15.
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was domestically produced) and other ground forces equipment, but it had a more significant
impact on the navy, which remained small and relatively primitive until the 1990s.96 (The
navy began to grow during the mid-1 990s when the consensus behind strict controls on the
use of foreign currency began to erode.)
It is arguably true that both integral nationalists and liberal nationalists can tell a
plausible story about how naval capabilities might be strengthened in the long term. Integral
nationalism, however, asks naval leaders to defer the import of critical systems and
technologies, an idea they are unlikely to embrace. Moreover, the social and socialized biases
of naval officers will further incline them towards liberal nationalist ideas and away from
integral nationalist ones. The navy's technical needs generally lead it to seek better-educated
officer candidates than those of the army. The navy's officer corps may be predominantly
aristocratic, where the aristocracy is relatively better educated than other social classes (e.g.,
Imperial Japan or early 19th century Latin America); or it may be primarily bourgeois, where
that class achieves higher education attainment (e.g., 19th century Germany). Either way,
naval officers will be raised in a social milieu that is more cosmopolitan and outward looking
than that of army officers. Naval officers' professional residency in coastal ports,
assignments that require their collaboration with industry, and their frequent contact with
96 On the South Korean preference for indigenous production, see Choi Jong Chul, "South Korea," in Arms
Procurement Decision Making: Volume 1: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand, ed. Ravinder
Pal Singh (Solna, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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foreign officers, often from leading liberal maritime trading states. all reinforce this
perceptual bias in favor of liberal economic policy. 97
Moreover, free trade and market-based domestic economic policies carry fewer
negative ramifications - and more positive ones -- for the navy's enlisted base than for the
army's. In the navies of even many developing states, long-service volunteers make up much
of the enlisted force, reducing the flow of volunteers through the force. With a more
permanent, professional force, then, social dislocation wrought by rapid growth and structural
economic change has less of an impact on the navy than the army. Because volunteers
generally serve as an NCO class, naval officers are further insulated from direct supervision
of- and contact with - the conscripts that do serve in the force. Moreover, the base from
which the navy tends to draw its enlisted sailors - whether short term conscripts or longer
term professionals - tends to be positively rather than negatively affected by free trade.
Navies tend to recruit from more coastal and urban areas than the do armies, and free trade
regimes generally lift the economies of these areas first, producing a better-educated group of
potential recruits.
97 All of these points are illustrated in the pre-war Japanese case. The navy's senior officer corps prior to the war
was almost entirely descended from samurai families, which had been transformed into an educated bureaucratic
class before the Meiji restoration of 1868 and took a leading role in scientific, industrial, and educational
endeavors of the new state after that time. Yamamoto Isoroku, as famous for his knowledge of America and
opposition to the war with it as he was for his role in the Pearl Harbor attack, was not alone in his foreign
exposure. Promising officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy were posted to either the United States or Great
Britain at some point in their careers, and most senior officers on the eve of war had served several years in such
posts. They were also posted at mid-career to assignments "overseeing" the construction of one or more ships.
While these assignments probably involved little actual technical oversight, they did bring naval officers into the
industrial world of shipbuilding and precision equipment. Some, like Yamamol:o, also developed ties to the
aviation world and the zaibatsu most deeply involved in it. Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon. Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki
Kankokai, Inoue Shigeyoshi. Agawa Hiryuki, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy. Oide
Hisashi, Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun Taisho.
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Finally, naval officers will tend to have material interests, both organizational and
personal, in liberal economic and social policies. Free trade may give the navy more
important missions - the protection of shipping, screening of coastal areas, etc. - and greater
budgetary potential. And the largely upper middle class origin of most naval officers may
also give those individuals some direct interest (through family or associational groups) in
market-based economic approaches.
The navy's domestic position towards the liberal end of the liberal-integral spectrum is
over determined. Although several factors may conspire to produce a contrary outcome,
change in any one dimension is seldom enough to change the navy's domestic preferences.
Material interests, for example, are unlikely to single handedly trump all other concerns. The
Chinese navy's leadership remained opposed to the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution,
despite the significant expansion of its size and manpower under the doctrine of "people's war
at sea." The same can be said of interests based on social class. Indeed, organizational
culture may often be taken as a reflection of class difference, even where little if any
difference in fact exists. During the recent coup in Venezuela, the contrasting behavior of
naval and army officers was ascribed to the navy's relatively higher social class composition.
Yet although there may be some truth to this idea, it is interesting to note that Rear Admiral
Carlos Molina, the leader of the attempted coup d'etat who is described by at least one source
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as the very symbol of aristocratic thinking in the navy, was actually the son of an army
officer. 98
The navy, liberal nationalism, and democracy. This thesis does not suggest that
navies will inevitably support democratic rule. Indeed, it argues that in general, the military
services define their domestic preferences in economic and social ternms (with the navy more
focused on the former and the army more concerned with the latter), rather than in strictly
political terms. Where economic liberalism collides with political liberalism, the navy is
likely to give greater weight to economic liberalism, as navies in the Southern Cone of Latin
America did during the 1960s and 1970s (or as the Venezuelan navy did in 2002).
HYPOTHESIS 2
"Navies will tend to be more united in their political and economic preferences than armies,
which are frequently deeply divided."
The logic of this prediction is similar to that underpinning prediction 1, but in this case
is applied to the component organizations that comprise the services themselves and the men
(and sometimes women) who staff them. This prediction holds that the degree of unity or
disunity within each service will depend largely on the degree of homogeneity in its
98 Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and President Were Old Rivals".
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subordinate organizations, and that the views of individuals staffing subordinate units will,
again, largely depend on the functional and organizational characteristics of those units.9 9
Almost all naval units either operate technically sophisticated systems, including both
combat systems such as warships and support systems such as weather centers or shore-based
radar and communications systems, or they perform technical functions, such as command
and control or logistics. Consequently, virtually all senior naval officers have substantial
technical education and experience, and many of the navy's enlisted personnel (in virtually all
units) will be long-service volunteers. Army organizations, on the other hand, may perform
highly technical functions (e.g., communications or general staff units) or almost entirely non-
technical ones (e.g., infantry units).' ° ° Even among the combat arms there are significant
differences: leading armored units is significantly more technically demanding leading non-
mechanized infantry units. Mid-level and high-ranking army officers may have almost
entirely technically, or almost entirely non-technical backgrounds, depending on their branch
and choice of career paths.
Within the army, infantry officers are most likely to hold the integral nationalist views
described earlier. We would expect the domestic political preferences of officers with
99 Just as we expect the domestic preferences of armies and navies to differ substantially because of the dramatic
differences (in technological and human requirements, etc.) in their compositions, we would also expect officers
from the component elements (e.g., unit types) of services to differ if those elements differ substantially from
one another along similar axes. We expect less difference where they are more similar to one another.
'00 For two works that treat the effects of technology on the attitudes of both army combat arms officers and
technical officers, see Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations; Lovell, Sok, and Lee,
"Professional Orienation and Policy Perspectives of Military Professionals in the Republic of Korea."
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primarily technical career paths - e.g., the communications branch, those with long
experience in the general staff, and, to a lesser extent, armored officers - to be relatively more
like those of naval officers. Even the technical requirements of many relatively high-
technology army units, however, are generally closer to low-end naval units (such as torpedo
boats) than they are to the navy's primary units (which are, in most developing navies,
corvettes, frigates, and destroyers).
The specific structure of the army or the arrangement of its parts can alter the balance
of power between those who would favor integral nationalism and those who might be
relatively more sympathetic to liberal nationalism. Either might enjoy a commanding position
within the organization. To the extent that general staff officers have an advantage in
promotions, for example, the army's top command will be more inclined to accept liberal
economic and social positions than it would otherwise. Conversely when line officers
dominate the highest posts, the army will tend to be more inclined towards integral
nationalist, anti-liberal domestic positions. Doctrine and force structure are likely to affect
these outcomes. Conventional military doctrines with centralized command structures are
more likely to ensure the dominance of technical officers, while guerrilla doctrines and
territorially-organized forces are more likely to promote flat hierarchies and the dominance of
line officers.
But despite the possibility of manipulating army ideology by tweaking structure, two
differences between it and the navy are likely to remain. First, even the army's relatively
liberal officers will generally be less liberal in economic and social outlook than will most of
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the navy's officer corps. Relatively liberal army officers may make alliances with the navy
and liberal civilians, and they may even, depending on the balance of domestic power and
other variables, take the lead role in military or political action against common enemies. But
even many of these "liberal" army officers may prefer a greater degree of state leadership in
the economy or society than their coalitional partners. The Brazilian army split in 1964 over
whether or not to depose the elected president Joao Goulart, a socialist and Vargas protege.
But after his overthrow, those liberal nationalist army officers who allied with the navy to
depose him introduced substantial state control over the economy, much to the chagrin of
naval officers who were among the first to then support a return to democratic (but not
socialist) rule.
A second difference with the navy is that whether the army is dominated by relatively
technically-minded (and liberal) officers or radical military socialists, the raw materials for
the latter are almost always present in the armies of developing states. When the nation's
social base is enduring economic hardships, some portion of the army's junior and mid-level
line officers are likely to embrace integral nationalism with great fervor. The army is the
service of the "Young Turk," intent first on purifying his own institution and then the state.
And because these military socialists are generally troop commanders from line units, they
will almost always represent a potentially important political force. Much of Argentina's
army hierarchy was still aristocratic and pro-status quo when Juan Peron and the colonels of
the Grupo Obra de Unificacion (GOU, or Task of Unification Group), under the banner of
"political sovereignty, economic independence, and social justice," overthrew the oligarch
Ramon Castillo in June 1943. Having seized power, Peron not only established an integral
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nationalist state, he also secured the dominance of like-minded officers within the army. The
same story can be told of Getulio Vargas and the tenentes (lieutenants) group in Brazil, or
Park Chung Hee and his fellow conspirators in Korea. (Park's preference for state activism
won him a death sentence as a cormnunist before being pardoned during the Korean War.)
Historically, there have been exceptions to the above generalizations. Indeed, in the
case of armies, the description above has only been valid since the adoption of some minimal
merit-based standards for entry. In armies where officer commissions were restricted entirely
to a narrow and cohesive ruling class, especially a landed one as was the case, for example,
in Wilhelmine German army), those organizations often functioned as powerful reactionary
forces. Nevertheless, although this thesis does not examine differences in service preferences
in 19th or early 20th, it is interesting to note that army preferences were close to the integral
nationalist ones in at least one dimension - they tended to be anti-capitalist (though they were
anything but progressive).
It is significant that, as the cases of the Argentinean Grupo Obra de Unificacion or the
Brazilian tenentes (among others) suggest, army officer corps do not have to be thoroughly
inclusive or representative in order for integral nationalist ideologies to take hold among
significant groups of officers. It is sufficient, rather, that they be partly open or that the
"ruling classes" themselves lack cohesion or formal definition. Today, virtually all armies,
even in the developing world, depend largely on merit-based exams for recruiting officers.
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HYPOTHESIS 3
"When politics are gridlocked and economic strategies failing, military organizations are
likely to be drawn into - or seek to create - domestic political coalitions with like-minded
civilian actors; often, two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge."
Rapid economic growth (as well as economic downturns along that path) frequently
leads to political gridlock and acute crises surrounding the legitimacy of governing
institutions.1 1° Economic change produces powerful new economic groups capable of
challenging political structures that may privilege older elites. But both historical observation
and experimental sociology suggest that individuals and groups are more inclined to expend
energy defending existing interests than acquiring new ones. Hence, old elites will fight
fierce rearguard actions. Poorer groups - displaced peasants or new classes of urban workers
- may also become mobilized by hardship or uncertainty, throwing yet one more element into
the mix.'0 2 In this highly competitive and uncertain environment, some groups may have
little faith that new legal or institutional arrangements can represent their interests and may
challenge the legitimacy of governing institutions. While there is no inevitability about armed
clashes or civil war at any particular step during the process, the threat of violence certainly
looms large during many key transition points.
101 See, for example, Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon, 1966). Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
102 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon, 1944). Huntington, Political Order in Changing
Societies.
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This thesis suggests that civil-military coalitions are frequently found on both sides of
domestic disputes. This observation is consistent with a growing number of scholars and
officials in both Latin America and Asia who argue that many events heretofore labeled
"military interventions" in government should more rightly be called "civil-military
interventions." 103 When the legitimacy of political institutions is challenged, social groups
(the challengers or status quo groups) will often arm themselves to take direct action against
their political adversaries. Even more likely, groups will armnn defensively, seeking to protect
themselves against the threat (imagined or real) that political adversaries will attack them. As
domestic security dilemmas worsen, it is likely that both sides will look to sympathetic actors
within the military to provide weapons and/or personnel.' 0 4 Given the importance and
urgency of military support, civilians will look to officers whose loyalties are most likely to
correspond to their own, naval officials and staff officers in the case of liberals and army line
officers in the case of integral nationalists. Alternatively, military organizations themselves
may also take the initiative in creating domestically oriented political coalitions.
103 For example, Argentina's civilian defense minister, Horacio Jaunarena, recently stated that "the vast majority
of coups d'etat in Argentina were civilian-military coups." "Argentine Defense Minister Underscores Military's
Respect for Democratic Rule; Denies Malaise in Armed Forces". Indonesia's defense minister has made a
similar argument. These arguments are not entirely new. In 1968 Samuel Huntington argued, "Military
explanations do not explain military intervention. The reason for this is simpiy that military interventions are
only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization
of social forces and institutions." Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 194.
'04 This type of spiral logic explains why it is frequently difficult - even in hindsight - for analysts to determine
whether specific coups were offensive or defensive, preemptive strikes. This was true in the Indonesian case in
1965, in the Argentinian case in 1955, and to some degree in the Chilean case in 1973 in Chile. Both sides are
arming today in Venezuela, and if violence should break out, it will undoubtedly be difficult to determine which
side was on the offensive and which on the defensive.
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Specifying the services' coalition partners. Which specific social groups each military
faction will align with depends on a constellation of factors, the most important of which will
be the competitiveness of individual sectors and social groups in free market domestic and
international competition. If there is an iron-fast rule, it is that navies in the developing world
are almost invariably aligned in their liberal preferences with the middle class, especially the
upper middle class and those parts of the middle class engaged employed in the private
sector.10 5 The navy will also tend to be aligned with industry, especially in industrializing
states (as opposed to states where industry is a declining force), and may be aligned with
aristocrats and other large-scale landholders, especially where commercial agriculture is
internationally competitive.
Integral nationalists in the army may ally with white-collar workers in government and
or managers in state-supported firms - both groups that stand to be substantially enlarged and
enriched under integral nationalist economic structures. Where the lower middle class sees
itself structurally trapped in its inferior status by established social or economic actors, it may
also align itself with army integral nationalists. Integral nationalist military officers will also
champion society's more vulnerable groups, including farmers and, often, urban workers.
(Appearing before a workers' rally, Peron announced, "I am a soldier in the most powerful
unionized association of all: the military."'0 6 ) But while these integral nationalist officers
may ally with existing farmers groups and/or labor unions, their suspicion of groups outside
105 This is likely to be true those occasions when the economic and political interests of the middle class collide
with one another and the middle class backs non-democratic political solutions.
106 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact, 142.
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of state supervision may lead to friction with those groups. Integral nationalist officers will
partner with civilian groups, but the nature of their relationship with those is less than fully
equal.
Picking winners. Which coalition will win? A variety of factors are likely to
influence political-military outcomes, and this thesis is circumspect about making predictions
in this area. I will, however, venture a few comments about several key variables.
Several of these variables are non-military. The economic performance of the
incumbent government will help determine how large and committed faction members on
both sides may be. During 2003, the Chavez government's economic difficulties
progressively alienated even the parts of the government's labor base, but Chavez' slide in
popularity was reversed after the surge in world oil prices permitted him to initiate major new
social programs in 2004. The long-term political and economic interests of contending social
groups, however, may lead them to emphasize the relative distribution of domestic wealth and
power over absolute welfare, diminishing to some extent the expected impact of any objective
assessment of governmental performance. The structure of the economy and cohesion and
organizational capabilities of the contending coalitions' civilian elements will also influence
outcomes. The dominant position of the extractive industries in Chile, for example, gave the
upper middle class significant leverage in its showdown with Allende's socialist government
in 1973.
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Several military variables will also affect political outcomes. The logic of this thesis
suggests that a large, powerful navy will increase the probability of liberal victory. After an
era of integral nationalist dominance in Argentina and Brazil during the 1930s and 1940s,
strong naval traditions (and relatively powerful navies) helped largely upper class, liberal
actors claw their way back into power in Argentina and Brazil during the 1950s and 1960s. In
Asia, the army's dominance in South Korea probably helped Park Chung Hee consolidate his
integral nationalist regime quickly after his coup d'etat in 1961, whereas a powerful navy in
Thailand resulted in a much longer transition after an army coup in 1947 - and one in which
the outcome was not decided until the failure of two naval-led counter coup attempts in 1949
and 1951. A second variable, the army's doctrine and force structure, will affect the
distribution of integral nationalist and liberal actors within that service. (See prediction 2
above.)
Powerful military enemies can complicate the task of consolidating power, even
without threatening coups d'etat. They may, for example, allow insurgencies to fester (or
even aid and abet them), refuse to release resources for economic projects, or publicly
question civil authorities' competence on military issues (thus damaging their perceived
legitimacy). Military allies can, in contrast, assist in consolidation work. Ultimately,
however, a powerful military coalition can only buy time for new or existing regimes. If the
regime fails to perform, civilians will ultimately come challenge its legitimacy. No matter
how much military restructuring the regime has done, it will almost always harbor significant
elements inclined to support the opposition, and when major portions of civil society turn
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against the government, the size and energy of military opposition too will grow. Purely
military variables are important in determining the outcome of developmental crises, but they
alone do not determine outcomes.
HYPOTHESIS 4
"Victories for liberal nationalists in domestic political contests will likely signal shifts toward
maritime strategies, while victories for integral nationalist positions will signal shifts toward
continental strategies."
Two-level games theorists modify traditional realist precepts by arguing that national
leaders give precedence to whichever threats to the regime are greatest - whether foreign or
domestic."07 Based on this logic, the effects of domestic politics on military policy should be
particularly large in new regimes (i.e., new constitutional or institutional domestic orders).
The consolidation of new democratic regimes frequently takes ten years or more, even when
no decisive reversal overturns incremental gains. l0 8 To a lesser extent, we also expect this
logic to apply to most non-democratic regimes, regardless of age, since those governments
tend to be plagued by low levels of legitimacy and the lack of peaceful means of
107 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics
and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Michael C. Desch, Civilian
Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1999).
108 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton,
2000).
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succession.'0 9 Both new democratic regimes and all non-democratic ones are frequently
vulnerable to either armed domestic threats or, depending on the circumstances, "people
power" (i.e., non-violent mass action aimed at crippling the government and forcing it from
power).
Securing military allies is often critical for regime survival in these situations.
Ultimately, political leaders will seek to establish firm control over all facets of the military
and military policy. But military organizations tend to be largely self-governed and difficult
to penetrate. ll° Civilian leaders may be able to replace top military leaders, for example, but
military organizations often have control (either by law or by custom) over which individuals
stand as candidates for those top positions. More important, the self-contained nature of
military society creates organizational cultures that may be difficult to influence in the short
term using the tools available to civilian leaders. Faced with these dilemmas, civilian leaders
frequently rely heavily on those parts of the military that are known to be sympathetic to their
domestic agenda, at least until widely recognized legal prerogatives can be established giving
leaders more articulated control of the military establishment. Integral nationalists are thus
likely to promote army line officers (and the army in general, once those individuals are fully
in command of the hierarchy), while liberal nationalists are more likely to promote naval
officers and technical officers from within the army.
109 On this point, see Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequence in the Middle East."
O10 On the self-governing nature of military organizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:
The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); and
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960).
Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.
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Allies within the military serve several specific domestic functions. First, they deter
coups d'etat by threatening to defend the government by force of arms. Second, they gather
intelligence on activities by military (and sometimes civilian) opponents of the government
who might be determined to undermine or overturn the regime - allowing the government to
take preventive action. Third, they sponsor structural military changes designed to advantage
military groups that are sympathetic to the government. Finally, if they gain effective control
over the key administrative positions and have already carried out structural reforms to ensure
the authority of those positions, they can begin to take more direct measures to shift the
organizational subculture of those groups that remain hostile to the government. They may,
for example, change doctrine as it taught in military academies or command schools. This
effort, which will take many years, may diminish the domestic differences between military
organizations, though it is unlikely to eliminate them entirely.
In return for this support, civilian leaders offer two incentives to military allies:
increased resource allocation relative to those of other military organizations and considerable
leeway in promoting preferred military doctrines. Increasing relative resource allocation to
military allies not only secures the loyalty of those allies, it also strengthens their capability to
support the government, especially in deterring coups and gathering intelligence (i.e.,
functions that require budgets and manpower). Granting military allies significant control
over military doctrine may serve similar purposes, further cementing loyalty and justifying
military structural reforms strengthening their own position within the military hierarchy.
102
_
Chapter 3: Theory
Perhaps more importantly, however, political leaders in these cases frequently have little
choice. They are likely to be engaged in other desperate political fights simultaneously, and
they will also be undertaking difficult and delicate efforts to restructure the national economy
without causing massive dislocations. Hence, given these constraints on time and political
resources, civilians may have little choice but to cede considerable control of strategy to their
military allies.
In the case of liberal transitions, these resource constraints may limit the degree to
which the navy's warship strength can be increased. Some budget share can be taken from
the army, a tactic that may weaken that organization (or key parts of it) at the expense of
potentially increasing its hostility to the new government. In addition, doctrinal shifts towards
maritime strategies will, in addition to the functions discussed above, serve as a promissory
note to the navy, implying that when resources do become available, the navy will receive
priority. In the short term, the marine corps may be strengthened, since this can be done
relatively cheaply and will, dollar-for-dollar, provide the most domestic military muscle.
Competing Explanations
Tests pitting proposed theories against relevant alternative explanations tend to be more
robust than those that simply address the null hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis that the theory is
not true and has no utility). 1 Two competing explanations, one for each of the above two
" ' Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 38-39.
103
Chapter 3: Theory
elements, are considered. A material interests-based theory is considered as an alternative to
the more highly articulated theory I have proposed to explain the services' domestic leanings.
And an explanation based on armed threats to the state (the "strategic military environment")
is proposed as an alternative explanation for national military strategies and force structures.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED THEORY
If two theories, one simple and one complex, explain the same number of outcomes, we
should favor the former over the latter as more parsimonious and powerful. 2 Some
organization theorists explicitly recognize a mix of task-related functional, interests-based,
and socialization effects on preferences and behavior. 13 Others recognize some combined
subset of specific motivations that fall within two or more of these categories. 114 Perhaps the
most parsimonious approach to organizations has been taken by those who suggest that the
organization's pursuit of its material interests - specifically manpower and budgets - provides
the most compelling explanation for much if not most organizational behavior.'15 If material
interests can explain the domestic preferences of the military services without reference to
112 The requirement for equal explanatory power imposes a difficult condition, and there is some debate on the
merits of simplicity. Nevertheless, all things being equal, simplicity is generally best. King, Keohane, and
Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 20.
113 See, for example, Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.
114 These authors are the most numerous. Sociologists, not surprisingly, tend to emphasize a combination of
functional and socialization effects. See, for example, Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political
Portrait. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. Political scientists - again not
surprisingly - tend to emphasize a combination of functional and material motivations. Barry Posen and Stephen
Van Evera, for example, stress the functionally-related desire to reduce uncertainty in military planning, as well
as motivations related to budgets and manpower, in explaining the preference of military organizations for
military doctrines. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World
Wars; Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars."
115 For an explanation of military strategy prior to World War I that rests almost entirely on the material interests
of organizations, see Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive.
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function or, especially, without considering the effects of socialization we should prefer this
explanation.
A simple organization theory that sought to explain army and naval preferences would
treat those two organizations as interest-driven factions without stable ideology. 1 6 This
theory would predict that the services would make cost-benefit calculations about support for
political actors on a case-by-case basis. Given the propensity to defend existing assets more
fiercely than they would pursue new gains, we would expect the services to behave relatively
conservatively and not turn against those who had favored them with budgetary or manpower
increases, except in cases where there were credible promises from rivals to provide large
rewards quickly. Also, the services should show relatively little interest in economic and
social issues per se, except insofar as they directly affect political outcomes.
Perhaps the most challenging variant of this theory might suggest that both services
will, for reasons related to predispositions about national strategy, expect liberals to favor the
navy and integral nationalists to favor the army. Service preferences might frequently look
similar to those predicted by the civil-military coalition theory predicts, but predictions would
nevertheless diverge in some cases. The preferences of the army's subordinate elements
would not, for example, diverge based on the degree of capital or technology used. And we
would still expect the services to evaluate costs and benefits on a case-by-case basis. Army
officers will not, for example, continue to support integral nationalist leaders who cut the
116 Though focused on army factions, Bruce Farcau has offered just such an assessment, arguing that Latin
American military behavior can be satisfactorily explained by the struggle for factional advantage. Farcau, The
Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military.
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army's budget and show little indication of increasing it again soon. The navy, similarly,
might back integral nationalists who have demonstrated a willingness to increase naval
budgets.
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
Explanations based on the strategic military environment predict that national strategy and
force structure will adjust to match the most pressing military threats facing the nation.
Broadly speaking, these explanations are consistent with realist theories of international
relations. Realists assume that state leaders tend to be highly sensitive to external threats and
will work to insure that strategy and forces are reasonably well tailored to meet those
threats." 7 Many realists, however, attach a number of qualifications to their threat-based
predictions, including two that are particularly germane to this thesis. First, modem realists
have suggested that the great powers are most likely to make a serious effort to match
doctrines and forces to external threats; weaker states may view the task of unilateral defense
as difficult if not hopeless. Second, some realists do not deny that bureaucratic or other
politic affect strategy and force planning when threat levels are low, but they nevertheless
demonstrate that when threat levels are high, military planning tends to become more
rational. 18
117 The clearest summary statements of structural realism are Waltz, Theory of International Relations. Walt, The
Origins ofAlliances.
118 See, for example, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World
Wars.
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Despite the qualifications that realist theorists place on their predictions, the popular
literature on military strategy and force planning - even on those of small states and even in
relatively low threat environments - is generally dominated by military threat-based
explanations. Civilian state leaders and military commanders almost invariably explain their
choices about strategy and force structure as the best response to the state's external threat
environment. Reporters, often unschooled in military analysis and looking for explanations
that are easily comprehensible to general (and sometimes distant) readers, tend to report these
official explanations uncritically as reflecting the actual calculations behind military planning.
These explanations then find their way into longer analyses of strategic and military affairs.
The privileged place accorded the strategic military environment and rational defense
planning in the press, popular international relations literature, and even in some academic
writing makes testing strategic explanations important. Given the caveats attached to realist
theory, these do not necessarily represent tests of realist theory more broadly. Nevertheless,
realist caveats, especially about the applicability of the approach to relatively weak states,
tend to be under-specified. (Do the predictions not apply to these states or merely apply with
less force or in modified form - e.g., with greater emphasis on allies and alliances - to these
cases?) And those caveats have sometimes been broadly ignored even by those who
acknowledge them in principle. Hence, this thesis' side-by-side examination of politically
based and military threat-based explanations should provide additional perspective on the
applicability of realist theory in a variety of settings and threat environments.
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Explanations based on the strategic military environment (which I also refer as
"threat-based theories") include a variety of specific propositions. Relatively greater overall
threat levels should result in increased military spending and invigorated efforts to find allies,
while a decline in the threat should, to a lesser extent, result in less emphasis in these areas.
In general, new or stronger continental threats should lead the state to redouble efforts to
strengthen their ground forces. Where the threat of conquest is high and the state cannot
plausibly generate the resources to defeat it in conventional combat, the state may rely more
on guerrilla-type forces. Where the ground threat is to peripheral, largely uninhabited areas
and where the state can plausibly generate forces capable of defeating more substantial
invasion threats outright, we expect the state to pursue conventional ground forces and
doctrines. An increase in the maritime threat should generally lead the state to build stronger
naval forces. This generalization may not hold, however, when the state cannot plausibly
generate the resources to defeat the threat with their own maritime power. In these cases, we
would expect states to build forces appropriate for a sea-denial strategy in offshore areas.
Such forces may, for example, include submarines or ground-based air capabilities.
Alternatively (or in addition), these states may devote most of their military resources to
building strong ground or air capabilities, so that potential invaders can defeat the enemy once
he comes. But to the extent that external threats are naval and maritime defenses plausible,
we should certainly expect to find emphasis on naval forces and strategy.
The balance between domestic and foreign military threats to state sovereignty may be
particularly relevant to East Asian states during the post-World War II period. When major
insurgencies are in progress, we expect that military doctrine will be modified accordingly. A
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relative shift from naval to ground capabilities will be observed. In the context of this thesis
and its subject matter, I examine an alternative explanation for strategic change based on the
rise and fall of communist insurgencies in the region. Specifically, I examine the possibility
that the decline of naval forces throughout the region after an initial postwar maritime buildup
corresponded with the rise of communist insurgencies. Viewed from an aggregate regional
perspective, the explanation is plausible and worthy of investigation.
Case Selection and Methodology
I test the above hypotheses in structured, focused comparative case studies of three countries
(Thailand, China, and Indonesia), dividing each examination into between two and four cases,
each of which revolves around the services' reactions to changes in the dominant organizing
ideology of the state and changes in grand strategy.
CASE SELECTION
Having formulated the theory largely on the basis of empirical observations of the record of
Latin American navies and armies, I test its hypotheses against historical events in East Asia.
This eliminates the problem of using the same data to generate and test the theory, and,
perhaps more importantly, offers the chance to demonstrate the utility of the theory in two
separate regions." 9 Case studies on Thailand, China, and Indonesia offer considerable
119 There is disagreement on the necessity of using different data sets to generate and test theories. King,
Keohane, and Verba argue using different data sets helps reduce the possibility of eliminating known theory-
infirming cases. King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research. Van Evera argues that the measure is largely ineffective, since the researcher will almost always start
with some knowledge of all his cases. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 45.
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variation in terms of domestic structure, military institutions, and strategic variables. They
are also all important for U.S. policy in Asia.
These states have varied considerably in their domestic political and economic
structures over the post-World War II period. For example, Thailand was ruled by a
succession of uniformed officers for much of the period; China has been ruled by its
Communist Party since 1949; and Indonesia was ruled by a civilian (if former military)
strong-man between 1967 and 1998. Variations in the economic and social organization of
these states have been equally dramatic. If the domestic preferences of armies and navies
when confronted by a choice between figures representing relatively liberal nationalist and
relatively integral nationalist positions - despite significant differences in the actual structure
of government or economy - then the theory's results can be said to be relatively robust in
this dimension.
A second dimension in which these cases vary lies in the institutional origins of their
military establishments. The Thai army and navy are bureaucracies that have enjoyed great
institutional continuity from the 1 9 th century. The Indonesian army and navy were born
during the war of independence against the Dutch (1945-1949), though most of the high
ranking officers who built the force were graduates of either the pre-World War II Dutch-
trained military structure or the Japanese-trained wartime training system. The Chinese army
was the child of a lengthy revolution - though some key military officers did have prior
military experience. The Chinese navy (or "People's Liberation Army Navy") was and is
officially a branch of the army, though it has become a full service in all but name. The
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variation and evolution of the organizations involved provides additional longitudinal
variation in organizational characteristics in addition to those based on snapshots of different
organizations at a given point in time. (We will, for example, expect service differences to
become sharper as they become more institutionalized and as they establish independent
recruiting and training systems.)
The third dimension in which these cases vary is in terms of geography and power.
Indonesia is an archipelago with important resources separated from its population and
political center of gravity by relatively large stretches of ocean, making it more vulnerable (in
purely geographical terms) to sea-borne invasion. China is a large continental state that has
historically focused on landward threats. And Thailand is a peninsular state, potentially
vulnerable to either sea- or ground-based attack. These states also vary in size, with China
qualifying as a medium power aspiring to be a major power and the other two being aspiring
medium powers. These strategic differences help produce divergent predictions for the civil-
military coalition theory (which suggests external events will fail to explain outcomes) and
structural realism (which suggests that they will).
Finally, these states are important cases because the domestic politics and military
policies of all (especially China and Indonesia) significantly affect U.S. security. This is most
obviously true of China, which many in the United States have regarded as a potential threat
to regional peace and stability since after the end of the Cold War. The dissertation will, I
hope, speak directly to important causes of grand strategy in China. The examination of
politics and grand strategy in Indonesia and Thailand should also place events in China in a
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comparative context of other developing states in East Asia. This set of cases allows us to ask
whether China's strategic behavior is exceptional. The strategic futures of Indonesia and
Thailand are also important in their own right. Although significantly less powerful than
China, both are strong enough in a Southeast Asian context that their military postures can
provide a powerful influence - positive or negative - on sub regional stability.
In addition to the importance of their military postures, the domestic futures of all
three states are also critical to American interests. The consolidation and gradual expansion
of liberal economic and political reforms - or the failure and collapse of those reforms - will
help determine whether the democratic third wave in Asia gathers further momentum or
whether instead a backlash develops. A related concern is that, at least in the case of China or
Indonesia, political gridlock surrounding these issues could conceivably result in the partial
collapse of the state, resulting in massive refugee flows, lawlessness, and even the possibility
that terrorist groups could find important new sanctuaries in remote areas. Understanding of
the dynamics of civil-military relations in these states is critical for predicting and influencing
(to the extent possible) the domestic futures of these states.
CASE DEFINITION AND OUTLINE
With some variation, the post-World War II histories of Thailand, China, and Indonesia have
seen three decisive shifts in the dominant political-economic organizing principles that
governed national policy. Each saw (1) a postwar interlude of liberal politics; (2) a longer
period of state-led integral nationalist government; and (3) a revival of liberalism. In each
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case, a domestic crisis pitting advocates of one ideology against the other preceded the shift in
ideology and leadership. Each case covers one state during one major domestic crisis.
Each case is divided into seven parts: (1) a brief summary of the key events covered
by the case; (2) an assessment of the domestic political order and any challengers and a
coding of each as integral nationalist or liberal nationalist; (3) a summary of the military
services' positions taken towards the ruling regime and its competitors, as well as an
assessment of each service's unanimity on these issues; (4) an assessments of what factors
appeared to drive service preferences; (5) an assessment of the changes in force structure and
doctrine, especially changes in the relative balance between maritime and continental forces,
which took place after the resolution of key political contests; (6) a summary evaluation of
how the predictions generated by the civil-military coalition theory perform; and (7) an
evaluation of the two competing theories discussed above, one based on the strategic military
environment and another based on the material interests of the services (specifically, in
manpower and budgets).
THEORY TESTING AND PROCESS TRACING
The predictions generated by the three theories addressed by this thesis (and especially the
civil-military coalition theory's predictions) are tested in two ways. The first involves the
coding of independent and dependent variables and the comparison of those values to
predicted results. This is, in principle, a straightforward exercise, even if coding is sometimes
difficult or yields ambiguous results. The second method, used wherever the data permit, is
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process tracing. 120 Process tracing involves not just coding variables, but also examining the
steps (or process) by which the independent variable caused (or did not cause) the dependent
variable. This can, with sufficient data, confirm not just the expected correlation predicted by
a theory, but create a rich tapestry that can confirm suspected causal logic - or suggest
modifications to it. In this thesis, predictions about service positions and strategic effects are
coded and tested, while causal logic, including the effects of various organizational
characteristics, are tested through process tracing. Process tracing is conducted more in the
case of recent cases, where the data are richer, than for earlier ones, for which the data are
sparser.
Summary of Predictions
Civil-military Coalition Theory (1)
1.1.0 Navies will generally support liberal nationalist domestic positions. Armies will
frequently support integral nationalist ones.
1.1.1 The services' domestic preferences will remain relatively stable, changing
slowly if at all even when they stand to lose materially in the short term from
adherence to those preferences.
1.1.2 The services will show direct interest in economic and social issues beyond
their support for political leaders engaged representing those interests in
domestic struggles.
1.1.3 Where military services have long and relatively uninterrupted institutional
histories, the degree to which they will ascribe to this general prediction - even
when it runs counter to the services' material interests - will be strengthened.
1.2.0 Navies will tend to be more united in their domestic preferences than armies.
120 On process tracing, see George and Mckeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision
Making." King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research,
226-28. Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 64-67.
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1.2.1 Divisions within the army will see line officers (especially from the infantry
branch) more inclined toward integral nationalism than officers from more
technical branches or units (such as general staff units or communications).
1.2.2 Manipulating the leadership or structure of the army can produce changes in its
official doctrine, but strong integral nationalist sentiments will almost always
remain among the officers of many line units.
1.2.3 Naval resistance to non-liberal national arrangements will run deep, and
replacing top naval leaders will have relatively little effect in changing the
organization's ideology and behavior.
1.3.0 When politics are gridlocked and economic strategies failing, military organizations
are likely to be drawn into - or seek to create - domestic political coalitions with like-
minded civilian actors; often, two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge.
1.3.1 Civilians will be aware of the services' distinctive domestic preferences, and
communication between like-minded civilian and military groups will occur.
1.3.2 Navies will generally find themselves aligned with those groups involved in
the most internationally competitive sectors of society, which will frequently
include the middle class (especially the upper middle class), industry, and,
sometimes, large scale, commercial agriculture.
1.3.3 Integral nationalists in the army will frequently ally with state workers
(including workers in state-owned enterprises) and disadvantaged social
elements (including peasants, blue collar labor, and sometimes the lower
middle class).
1.3.4 Military variables affecting the outcome of contests between integral and
liberal coalitions include the relative size and strength of the army and navy
and the degree to which the army's doctrine and force structures are oriented
towards conventional as opposed to guerrilla (or territorial) warfare.
1.4.0 Victories by liberal nationalists in domestic political contests will signal shifts toward
maritime strategies, while victories by integral nationalists will bring shifts towards
continental strategies.
1.4.1 The timing of major doctrinal and force structure shifts will follow closely on
the heels of domestic political crises that result in the incumbent's ouster.
1.4.2 Military doctrines and the specific force structure decisions will tend to be
poorly integrated with diplomatic or economic policies when new domestic
groups are consolidating power.
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1.4.3 During transitions to liberal regimes, the costs of adding major new warships
and the other demands on the resources of new regimes will generally mean
that doctrinal change and the promotion of naval leaders will frequently be
more significant than actual changes in the navy's warship inventory.
1.4.4 To the extent that naval personnel or budgets expand, new resources will
frequently be devoted first and foremost to the strengthening of marine ground
strength.
1.4.5 Integral nationalist leaders will frequently restructure the army to
systematically advantage line officers (by, for example, decentralizing
command, thereby minimizing the importance of the general staff and other
technical positions.) Liberal leaders tend to restructure the army to advantage
technical officers.
Material Interests-based Theory (2)
2.1.0 Services will make cost-benefit calculations about support for political actors on a
case-by-case basis and will weigh the potential material rewards (in terms of
manpower and budgets) above all other considerations.
2.1.1 Services will be generally risk-averse and will not cease to support those who
have favored them with budgetary and manpower increases, especially without
the credible promise of large short-term rewards by opponents.
2.1.2 Services will not oppose incumbent political authorities when there is little
prospect for their successful removal, but will abandon loyalty to old political
elites soon after their removal or defeat. They will be prone to bandwagon.
2.2.0 Neither service will show interest in economic and social issues per se, except insofar
as that involvement directly affects political outcomes.
Strategic Military Environment (3)
3.1.0 Doctrinal change will track closely in time to changes in the nature of threats to state
sovereignty and survival.
3.1.1 Heightened external continental (ground force) threats will lead to increased
resource allocation to ground forces - conventional ground forces if the state
can plausibly generate sufficient resources to successfully mount such a
defense and guerrilla-type forces when it cannot.
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3.1.2 Increased external maritime threats will lead to relatively greater emphasis on
naval capabilities.
3.1.2 Increased threats from armed domestic insurgent groups will lead to shifts
towards greater resource allocation towards the army and the adoption of
counterinsurgency strategies.
3.2.0 State leaders will show an interest the content of military strategy - especially in those
aspects designed to meet pressing threats - and military policy will be well integrated with
diplomatic and other aspects of the state's foreign and security policy.
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Introduction
Both Thai inter-service politics and strategic outcomes support the civil-military coalition
theory. By the mid-1 9 th century, the army and navy had emerged as independent
bureaucracies, and by the outbreak of World War II, the two services already had very
different ideas of how the state, economy, and society should be organized. That divergence
only widened during and after the war, placing the two squarely in opposing domestic camps
by the end of the war. The army was divided, but many in it supported the creation of a
national socialist (and integral nationalist) state prior and during World War II. Naval
officers, unhappy about the direction of national policy, served as the military core of the
opposition Free Thai movement during the war years. Over the following decades, the navy
maintained its commitment to liberal values, while the army's position became further
solidified behind an increasingly well-defined program of state-led development. Nor was
support for these positions passive: On several occasions the army and the navy engaged in
armed conflicts against one another, and in many other instances, they proffered other forms
of key organizational or political support to like-minded civilian actors.
With the different political-economic preferences of both services on record since at
least 1942, political leaders have subsequently manipulated grand strategy to strengthen the
hand of sympathetic military actors. Liberal leaders have held sway three times since 1942:
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immediately before and after the end of World War II (especially between 1944 and 1947);
between 1973 and 1976; and between 1980 and the present (especially between 1986 and the
present). In all three cases, liberal leaders promoted naval leaders, strategies, and force
structures. In the intervening years available resources were devoted instead to army
expansion, with naval budgets and capabilities declining in relative - and sometimes even
absolute - terms.
The degree to which naval fortunes have been tied with those of liberalism in Thailand
is illustrated by the correlation between naval officers serving as either supreme commander
or defense minister and periods of liberal parliamentary rule. Between 1932 and 1997, there
were only two brief periods (1946-47 and 1975-76) when the Thai constitution provided for
an elected senate with no administratively appointed military representatives. During both of
those parliamentary interludes, and at no other times, were naval officers appointed ministers
of defense. Naval officers also served as supreme commander during the second of these
periods. (The position, having been abolished in 1944, did not exist during the first.) Naval
officers also occupied the position between 1986 and 1987 and between 2001 and 2002 - i.e.,
during years of liberal reform. At no other point since World War II have naval officers
served in that position.
Each examines civil-military politics and strategic outcomes during an important
political-economic transformation or attempted transformation. The periods covered by each
are:
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· Case 1 (1938-1947). The Free Thai revolt against national socialism. The navy
backs the Free Thai movement against General Phibun's regime.
* Case 2 (1947-1973): The rise of Sarit and the developmental state. General Sarit
creates an integral nationalist regime that serves as a model for his army successors;
the navy remains in opposition.
* Case 3 (1973-1980): Student revolution and the struggle between liberals and
radicals. The navy sides with students, reap some rewards, but turns against the
students as their economic demands become more radical.
· Case 4 (1980-2002): Consolidating liberal rule. The navy, together with army
general staff officers, help engineer a return to democratic rule.
With some variation depending on the specific demands of the historical period in question,
each case is divided into five subsections: (1) an assessment of the political-economic choices
available to the services; (2) an evaluation of the positions taken by each service, as well as
the extent of internal unanimity; (3) a discussion of the political resolution in each case and
changes in military strategies and force structures under the new political authorities; (4) a
summary evaluation of the civil-military coalition theory; and (5) an assessment of the
relative merits of two alternative theories - one based on the strategic military environment
and a second based primarily on the material interests of the services.
Institutional Background of the Military
The modern Thai army and navy were established under King Mongkut in the mid- 1 9th
century and have enjoyed a high degree of continuity in their institutional history, especially
in comparison with the military organizations of other East Asian states. 12 1 The difference
121 The naval academy was established on its current site in 1900. From undated pamphlet by the Royal Thai
Navy, The Royal Thai Navy Brief History.
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between Thailand and other regional states was particularly pronounced in the case of the
navy, which was modem, if small, by the time of the 1932 revolution against royal
absolutism. The 1932 revolution - really a bloodless coup d'etat - was executed by civilians
and military officers who had coalesced as a political group during their overseas training in
France and other European states. The number of naval participants in the coup was only
slightly fewer than the number of army participants despite the much smaller size of the
former, and the number of naval parliamentary representatives between 1932 and 1951 was
always close to the number of army representatives. 122 In short, the navy was a formidable
institutional and political force during the earliest period examined by this thesis.
This section briefly reviews those characteristics of the services that might be
expected to influence their views on domestic (i.e., political, economic, and social) issues.
These service characteristics did not remain entirely constant across time, but changes tended
to be by degrees, and including a discussion under each case would, in many respects, prove
redundant. The discussion is divided into similarities and differences in five areas: (1) the
degree of non-human capital used by each; (2) the background and training of officers; (3) the
recruitment and composition of the enlisted ranks; (4) basing patterns and locations; and (5)
the degree of foreign contact enjoyed by each.
122
122 For example, there were sixteen naval and eighteen army officers in the 1932 and 1933 parliaments. Kato
Kazuhide, Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1995), 102.
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CAPITAL CONTENT. The navy's non-human capital content is significantly higher
than that of the army, and much of its capital is imported. This is evident from recent data:
the navy's personnel level is 38 percent of the army's; its budget is 43 percent of the army's;
and although its imports vary significantly from year to year, they have, in recent years,
ranged between 50 and 100 percent of the army's.2 3 The navy's higher per capita spending
holds despite the army's extremely top-heavy rank structure. As of 1998, the army was 128
percent over strength in terms of general officers (with 1060 on the payroll to fill 462
positions), while the navy was only 28 percent over strength (with 270 to fill 211
positions). 24 The Thai army, with one general officer for every 130 men, has more generals -
by absolute count - than the notoriously top-heavy Russian army.
Although figures on manpower, budget, and foreign purchasing are sketchier for
earlier periods, the discrepancies between per capita army and navy spending (both domestic
and foreign) seem to have been even higher during the 1930s and early 1940s than they are
today. On the eve of Thailand's Indochina War against France (1940-41), the navy's
manpower was 28 percent that of the army (10,000 vs. 35,000), while its budget was 62
123 Personnel figures are from IISS, Military Balance, 1998-99 (London: IISS, 1998). The breakdown for the
1998 military budget is found in "Battle to Beat Military Cuts", Bangkok Post, April 27 1997, in FBIS-FTS-
1997-0428. Budgets for foreign purchases are found in various places. Most only track budget requests, not
approved purchases. The budget request for 1997 included naval purchases worth 62 percent those of the army.
See "Chawalit and Military Spending", The Nation, December 20 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-1220.
124 Most navies have heavier rank structures than the army. In terms of official billets, Thailand is no exception.
The Thai navy, with 38 percent as many personnel, has 45 percent as many slots for general rank officers. "Too
Many Generals in Thai Armed Forces", The Nation, September 7 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0906. "Thai Defense
Council Agrees to Streamline Armed Forces", The Nation, May 28 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-0528.
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percent as large - making its per capita spending over twice that of the army. 125 The navy's
vessels were all imported. Thailand purchased nine ships from Italy and fifteen, including
two light cruisers and four submarines, from Japan between 1936 and 1938.126 The army's
divisions were overwhelmingly infantry formations, with a total of two armored battalions
and nine artillery battalions. Although armor and artillery were imported, this could have
only amounted to a small fraction of the navy's overseas spending.
OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING. The navy's officer corps has generally been
drawn from a higher social class than the army's. Prior to the 1932 revolution, the navy had
traditionally been commanded by royal princes, several of who were generally serving with
the fleet at any one time. During the two decades after 1932, the navy's top officers were
almost invariably the scions of aristocratic families. 127 The army's top commanders prior to
1932 were aristocrats, with an occasional prince thrown into the mix. But even by the late
19 th century, joining the army was seen as an avenue of social advancement. And after 1932,
125 Budget figures for the services are from Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, The Free Thai Movement and
Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-1949) (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian
Studies, 1991), 15. Army manpower figures are from Royal Thai Army Operations Division, The Unit
Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War (No city given: Royal Thai Army
Operations Division, 1946), 92.
126 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957 (Kuala
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 1, footnote 34. The navy's older vessels were also all
imported, with most having been purchased from Britain.
127 Thak Chaloemitarana writes that after the revolution of 1932, "the social prestige and the highly technical
nature of the navy's armaments attracted the sons of the aristocracy." Naval officers with aristocratic lineage
included, among others, admirals Thamrong and Sangad, both of whom play prominent roles in the case studies
discussed below. Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social
Science Association of Thailand, 1979), 72 (in Japanese version).
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most of its most prominent generals and commanders - including at least three prime
ministers - were of common birth.' 28
While the social difference between the two services was more significant in the 1940s
and 1950s than it has been recently, the cultural sense of difference has persisted. This is
reflected, among other places, in the difference at which the glass ceiling for OCS graduates is
set. In the army OCS graduates fill out a substantial portion of the officer corps. And
although none has risen to command army regions, many in that service have become
colonels and some have become at least brigadier generals - all reifying the notion that the
army is relatively "democratic" and remains an avenue for social advancement. OSC officers
are present in the navy, but these individuals serve only as section chiefs and none has ever
commanded even an offshore patrol craft.' 2 9 Reinforcing differences in social class, the two
services also differ on the basis of education capabilities and expectations. A 1967 survey of
cadets, for example, found that 47 percent of naval cadets and only 1 percent of army cadets
saw the military as a means to further their education. 3 0
ENLISTED PERSONNEL. Enlisted recruiting in Thailand has been conducted locally
since at least the late 19th century. And since that time, much of the army has been deployed
128 Murashima Eiji, Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996). Kobkua
Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957, 12. Generals
Phibun, Sarit, and Thanom, all prime ministers, were of common birth.
129 Information on OCS and non-academy officers is from interviews with Thai army and navy officers
conducted in Beijing, September 12, 2000. Individuals left unidentified at subjects' request.
130 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 50.
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in border areas, especially in the northeast, to assert royal control over territories that had not
yet been fully settled or integrated. 13 ' Although the army's mission has evolved, its basing
patterns have changed relatively little. Hence, the army's personnel have been and still are
drawn relatively evenly from Thailand's thirty provinces, though with higher than average
proportions drawn from the impoverished north and northeast and south. The navy's bases,
and consequently, its recruiting, is conducted almost entirely in the six coastal provinces
along the northern portion of the Gulf of Thailand, where the population is more heavily
urban and generally better off than those in the interior.
While both the army and the navy fill a majority of their enlisted manpower needs
with conscripts, the navy supplements more heavily with volunteers.' 32 There are currently
two types of volunteer programs. One is a recent program that takes volunteers on conscript
terms (i.e., with the same pay and benefits), generally finding willing individuals only in
Thailand's poorer provinces. The second, targeting individuals capable of performing
important technical tasks, has been in existence longer. It is used primarily by the navy and
air force to fill positions requiring extensive training and not suitable for short-service
conscripts. 133
'3' Murashima Eiji, Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei, 8-10.
132 Although it is difficult to get precise figures on the percentage of the enlisted force conscripted, the
International Institute of Strategic Studies provides an estimate of the percent of total personnel (including
officers in the denominator) conscripted. According to those figures, 53 percent of army personnel and 34
percent of naval personnel are conscripted, with the remainder recruited on a volunteer basis.
133 Information on volunteer systems is from interviews with Thai army and navy officers, Beijing, September
12, 2000.
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BASING LOCATIONS. In addition to the effects of basing locations on recruiting
patterns and the composition of the enlisted force, basing locations also have direct effects on
the economic interests of the services. The army, deployed largely to interior and relatively
backward provinces, can be involved in and benefit from the development of those areas, but
the market is less likely to bring such development in the short term than are state-led efforts.
(Markets will tend to take investment capital to coastal areas, where the infrastructure is better
and the workforce better educated.) Under the integral nationalist regimes that ruled from the
late 1950s to the mid-1970s, developmental tasks in those areas received top priority. The
navy has had an interest in the development of the seaboard - expectations that have been
better met by liberal leaders of the 1940s and from 1987 to the present.' 34
FOREIGN CONTACT. Prior to 1951, naval officers were significantly over represented
among those officers sent overseas for training. (Despite the army's officer corps being
several times that of the navy, both services sent an approximately equal number of officers
overseas.) And, prior to 1945, the location and type of that contact differed substantially.
Although the navy bought much of its equipment from Japan immediately prior to the war
(when General Phibun served as defense minister and later prime minister), it looked
primarily to England and even more to Denmark (which the Thai navy saw as a good model,
134 Two recent cooperative ventures between the navy and liberal political parties are the Southern Seaboard
Development Project and the proposed Kra Canal across southern Thailand, which will, if completed, link the
Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea. Piyanart Srivalo, "PM Gives Three Seaboard Developments Green
Light", The Nation, February 14 1997; "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra
Canal", The Nation, August 30 1999.
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being a small neutral state) for its training and organizational models. The army, on the other
hand, was more fully enamored with Germany and Japan.' 35
Although the army has received the bulk of the overseas training billets since 1951
(when the navy and army clashed and the navy lost), other forms of foreign contact appear to
favor the navy on a per capita basis. The services, for example, maintain an approximately
equal number of officers in foreign embassies - one attache per service per embassy in most
mid-sized states. Fleet visits and joint exercises also bring naval officers into more regular
contact with foreign officers than that experienced by army officers, who, apart from the staff
and senior command, tend to be in more isolated areas.
EXPECTED IMPACT. I expect each of the differences summarized above to have
some impact on the services' domestic preferences. On balance, the characteristics of the
services in all five areas should push the navy towards liberal nationalist positions and the
army more towards integral nationalism. The higher capital content of the navy and its
dependence on imported capital should give it a greater interest in economic policies that do
not tightly restrict the use of foreign currency reserves. Differences in the educational and
family background of army and navy officers are likely to endow the officers of the two
services with different biases in looking at economic and social problems. (On balance, upper
middle class officers should be more prone to share the views of civilian upper middle class
groups on economic problems than officers with lower middle class backgrounds.) The
'35 Moreover, while both services had extensive contact with Japan, the Japanese naval officer corps was heavily
influenced by British and American models, while the Japanese army was much closer to Germaly and Italy.
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biases that officers bring with them to their military service will be further reinforced by early
professional socialization.
Of particular note, the experience of army officers leading conscripted troops is likely
to given them an interest in issues that affect the nation's social base. There is some evidence
that this was true, even before 1932, when the army's highest posts were still dominated by
the aristocracy. In a warning to cadets in 1913, the commandant of the army academy said:
"Most of our people are farmers, and our government exists to for their welfare
and benefit. Officials of the government have a duty to work for the welfare of
the people... and there is nothing that makes me angrier than officers abusing
their troops. The costs of the government's work are borne less by the King
who leads than by the people and their taxes." 3 6
Finally, coastal urban basing and contact with foreign officers and civilians should endow
naval officers with more cosmopolitan views than their more physically and socially isolated
peers in the army.
Case 1: Overthrowing National Socialism (1941-1947)
This case looks at the choices that were made by the army and navy between late 1941 and
August 1944, together with the circumstances and outcome of those decisions. Between 1938
and 1944 General Phibun Songgram created and directed a national socialist regime (coded
integral nationalist) and threw Thailand's lot in with the Imperial Japanese Empire. From
December 1941, however, a Free Thai movement, led by prominent pre-1938 political
figures, emerged to challenge Phibun. The movement included a mix of liberals and
136 Murashima Eiji, Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei, 15.
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moderate socialists. The navy served as the military core of this opposition movement, while
the army remained generally united behind Phibun.
In 1944, with the war going against Japan and a growing opposition at home,
parliament (which Phibun had packed with ostensible supporters) overthrew him and called
on the leaders of the Free Thai movement to form a new government. In 1946 parliament
passed a new, liberal constitution that established a bicameral legislature and eliminate
appointed members of parliament. Naval forces and leaders provided military protection for
Thai political leaders against a feared army resurgence. The navy's chief, Admiral Thamrong
Nawasawat, headed a thoroughly liberal, middle class backed political party in parliament.
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CHOICES
According to the definition established in Chapter 3, the incumbent regime, led by General
Phibun Songgram, was integral nationalist. The challenger, represented by the Free Thai
movement was, on balance, more liberal.
General Phibun, who led the incumbent regime in 1942, was elected prime minister in
1938 and quickly set about to establish a national socialist state. Phibun's closest advisor,
Wichitwathakan (dubbed 'a pocket Dr. Goebbels' by one British diplomat), stated shortly
before Phibun's accession that "The constitutional government is a revolutionary government.
Its revolutionary task is to build a new nation."'3 7 The government's economic policies were
137 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957, 104.
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nationalist - defined largely in opposition to Western interests, the domestic upper class, and
Thailand's Chinese businessmen.' 3 8 Producers were strongly encouraged to join agricultural
cooperatives or trade associations, organizations over which the government exercised close
oversight. These organizations were expected to break the hold of business over life in the
countryside. Hefty taxes were also imposed on independent commercial organizations
(mostly foreign multinationals and Chinese-owned businesses). After Thailand's declaration
of war on the allied powers (in January 1942) remaining Western industries were
nationalized. 139
Phibun's government was equally integral nationalist in its cultural policy. A Ministry
of Culture was established, and twelve Cultural Mandates were passed. The first of these
changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand, a move intended to emphasize
nationality (comprised of all Thai-speaking people) over the physical boundaries of the state.
Other mandates prescribed uniform dress, behavior, and speech. Some provisions (such as
those mandating the wearing of pants and shirts) were designed in part to make Thailand more
Western in appearance. But all - especially the linguistic provisions prohibiting the use of
honorifics and other words with class connotations - were intended to reduce social
distinctions. 140
138 Much of this activity was advanced under the slogan "Thailand for the Thai." Wichitwathakan's special
antipathy to the Chinese was on display in several speeches in which he called them the "Jews of Siam." David
K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 254.
139 On Phibun's economic policies see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through
Three Decades, 1932-1957, 144-51.
140 Ibid., 110-29.
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Phibun's means to achieving his integralist objectives were largely authoritarian.
Parliament was not dissolved, but its membership was purged and, to an even greater extent,
cowed. Police powers were expanded and used liberally by Phibun to arrest prominent
political opponents. Within one month of taking office, he ordered the arrest of forty such
opponents, including members of the royal family and the old bureaucratic aristocracy,
parliament officials, and army rivals. Eighteen were executed. 141 Phibun relied for his
authority largely on his leadership of the military, and fifteen of Phibun's twenty-five
ministers were military officers.
The Free Thai movement offered an alternative center of allegiance, one with the
declared aim of establishing a liberal parliamentary regime and ending Thailand's active
cooperation with Japan. The movement was formed several days after the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor in December 1941 with British and, especially, American support. Its two top
leaders were Seni Pramoj and Pridi Phanomyong, both lawyers and both with aristocratic
lineages. Seni Pramoj was Thailand's leading lawyer and was thoroughly liberal, in economic,
as well as social and political terms. 142 As ambassador to the United States at the time of
Pearl Harbor, Seni refused to deliver Thailand's declaration of war and led the overseas Free
Thai movement. Pridi, who remained in Thailand throughout the war, was a prominent
141 Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 253.
142 On Seni's economic, social, and political views, see David Van Praagh, Thailand's Strugglefor Democracy:
The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996).
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member of parliament prior to 1938 and was a political liberal, even if his economic
inclinations sometimes led him to advocate vaguely socialist solutions.
Pridi's socialist economic ideals notwithstanding, the Free Thai movement was more
liberal than its alternative. Its leaders, largely drawn from the ranks of the old elites and the
upper middle class, were firmly committed to restoring effective parliamentary rule.
Parliamentary rule prior to 1938 had produced moderate, liberal economic and social
policy.'4 3 After Phibun's fall a pluralist parliamentary order was, in fact, reestablished, with
business interests heavily represented. And Pridi, who remained the single most powerful
figure in parliament, but was unable to establish policy without securing a parliamentary
coalition beyond his own party, was either disinclined or unable to push a socialist economic
agenda. A September 1948 memo from the U.S. Embassy in Thailand called the Seri-Free
Thai group "the best democratic, liberal talent in the country."'4 4
ARMY AND NAVY POSITIONS
Pridi's association with naval officers extended back before 1938, and many of these officers
opposed Phibun's government even before the outbreak of war. When the war began and the
Free Thai was established, the navy was immediately active in it and, throughout the war,
provided the core of the Free Thai's regular military forces.
143 Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 250.
144 This endorsement, unfortunately, came after the group's overthrow, but nevertheless while they stood some
chance of restoration. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades,
1932-1957, Note 87, page 228.
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On December 11, 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Pridi
convened the movement's first meeting. The organizational group, designated as the "X.O.
Group," was comprised of "leading civilian members of the government and influential elders
from the Thai aristocracy."' 4 5 Overseas, in the United States and Britain, the movement was
comprised primarily of liberal students, and its membership both inside and outside of
Thailand remained primarily among the educated elite throughout the war. 146 During the war,
especially its early stages (1941-1943), General Phibun's was able to strengthen his base of
support among the urban lower and lower middle class.'4 7
At the movement's founding in December 1941, the only members of the military
present were naval officers.'4 8 The most senior of whom was Rear Admiral Songwon
Yuthakit, the Deputy Commander of the Royal Navy. The navy provided the Free Thai with
intelligence on General Phibun's plans and on those of the Japanese. The navy also provided
ground forces in key locations: In addition to serving as Deputy Cornmander of the Navy,
Admiral Songwon Yuthakit also commanded all of the military police in Bangkok.1 49
145 John B. Haseman, The Thai Resistance Movement During the Second World War (Illinois: Northern Illinois
Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), 23.
146 On this point, see Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political
Conflicts (1938-1949).
147 Ibid.
148 Haseman, The Thai Resistance Movement During the Second World War, 28.
149 Ibid., 24.
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During its first year in operation, the Free Thai expanded its membership within the
navy, but had not yet gained a following within the army or police. This, according to one
source, was a result of Pridi's reluctance to approach "leaders whose political reliability and
friendship was questionable" or those who were not longtime personal acquaintances. 150 By
summer 1944, the movement included some army and regular police units, but the navy
maintained a dominant military position. 151
The navy's dominance is reflected in strength figures and leadership composition.
Among the 50,000 armed followers Pridi believed he could count on for the planned uprising
against the Japanese late in the war, he counted several thousand naval and marine soldiers
and their officers. 52 Most of the remainder was comprised of armed civilian guerillas in the
country's northeast, together with and a handful of army units and a somewhat larger group of
regular police. (Others have estimated the total number of armed Free Thai effectives at
closer to 10,000, suggesting a much higher proportion of naval members.' 53) At the end of
the war, civilians occupied the Free Thai's number one and two positions, naval officers
occupied the number three and four positions, an army general held the number five position,
150 Ibid., 47.
I5' Kato Kazuhide lists the primary members of the Free Thai as "Northeastern members of parliament, the navy,
a portion of the army, and the police." Kato Kazuhide, Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru
Minshushugi, 116. Thak Chaloemtiarana lists the main supporters as "senior officers in the navy, Isan
[Northeastern Thailand] MP's, students studying in England and the United States, and others who were closely
associated with Pridi." Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 3.
152 For an outline of the plan, which included a joint U.S.-Thai marine drive on Bangkok from Satthahip naval
base, see Bruce E. Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945 (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994), 208-09.
153 Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-
1949), 3-4.
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and a police general held the number six post. Until August 1944, when General Phibun's
government fell, the bulk of the army remained loyal to Phibun's government.' 54
In August 1944, with the war turning against Japan, the rump National Assembly
(including many members appointed by Phibun) ousted Phibun and established a provisional
government dominated by members of the Free Thai. During the liberal interlude between
1944 and 1947, Pridi served as prime minister for only five months, but all five of the other
individuals who served in the same post during this period were close associates of his and
cooperated closely with him on political issues. The government adopted a new constitution
in 1946, one that limited the role of active duty military officers in government as well as that
of the King and was arguably the most democratic constitution that Thailand had had until the
1997 constitution was promulgated.
The navy's senior officer corps remained firmly allied with Pridi on political issues
throughout this period and was firmly committed to liberal, parliamentary rule. On economic
policy, however, they were more committed to liberal, market principles than Pridi. Most
naval members of parliament did not join Pridi's Cooperation Party, which they regarded as
socialist leaning. Admiral Thamrong Nawasawat, the navy's former commander and prime
minister from August 1946 to November 1947, formed the Constitution Front party, which
operated in coalition with Pridi but advanced a more market oriented economic position. 155 A
154 The commander of the First Division, strategically located near Bangkok, was probably the most important
army supporter of the Free Thai.
55 David A. Wilson, Politics in Thailand (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 236.
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smaller number of naval officers joined Khuang Aphaiwong's Democrat Party, the more
aristocratic, right wing of Pridi's parliamentary coalition. 156
Thai political historian Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid summarizes the three wings of
Pridi's coalition in the following terms. Pridi's Cooperation Party, which the navy did not
join, "was characteristic of democratic socialism" and "represented the needs of the lower
classes in society." (Its composition was not lower class, but rather largely intellectual and
regional, with a northeastern membership.) Admiral Thamrong's Cooperation Party, which
had the most naval support, "espoused the concept of democratic liberalism" and "represented
the needs and aspirations of the middle class." And Khuang's Democrat Party, with some
naval support, "espoused the ideals of conservatism and monarchism," "represented the
interests of the upper class" (including the aristocracy and the royalty), and "had ties with
capitalists, big business, and real estate. " '57 (After 1947, the Cooperation Party disappeared,
the Democrat Party gradually became less monarchist and more middle class, and the navy's
support shifted towards the Democrat Party - developments discussed below as part of cases
2 and 3.)
After 1944 the army was highly unpopular and generally distrusted - especially by
those groups with most influence and access in parliament. The handful of army officers who
had joined the Free Thai movement, mostly junior officers, generally joined Pridi's own left-
156 Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-
1949), 30.
'57 Ibid., 28-30.
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leaning Cooperation Party. Some aristocratic members, who also represented a small portion
of that service's total officer corps, joined the Khuang's Democrat Party. The majority of
army officers, however, remained hostile to Pridi and the parliamentary system. Ultimately,
the army's hostility manifested itself in the coup d'etat of 1947, discussed in Case 2 (below).
Of the five service characteristics outlined earlier, the social origins of the officers
appeared to be particularly important. Admiral Thamrong's family, like those of most other
senior naval officers who participated in the 1932 revolution, was from the pre-1932 lower
aristocracy. In this, they came from the same social mix that produced Free Thai leaders Pridi
and Seni, who were lawyers by profession and members of the pre-1932 lower aristocracy.
Most other civilian members of parliament also shared this upper class background. General
Phibun, in contrast, was from a distinctly lower middle class background, as were many of the
senior army officers who supported him.'58 While it is difficult to prove a link to class
background, Phibun's army-backed regime consciously appealed to members of the lower
middle class and created social and economic organizations to give the members of that class
greater political and social voice. 159 Thak Chaloemitarana, who has written one of the most
158 Murashima Eiji, Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei. Although there were army officers from
the lower aristocracy who participated in the 1932 revolution and later gained senior positions, these individuals
were fewer in number than their aristocratic counterparts in the navy, and they were purged or neutralized by
Phibun after he gained power in 1938.
159 Phibun's advisor, Wichitwathakan, was also of the same class. Kobkua writes that "The People's Party under
Phibun's leadership decided to identify as their power base the petty bourgeois class from within and outside the
bureaucratic system. The economic policy thus introduced aimed to weaken the socio-economic power and
prestige of the old regime, while promoting the economic prosperity of the country based on the active
participation of the petty bourgeoisie." Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun
Through Three Decades, 1932-1957, 145.
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careful accounts of military politics during this period, attributes much of the services'
differences to the social rivalry and the mutual prejudices of their members.1 60
Although many senior officers in both services had foreign experience, the location
and type of that contact probably also had played a role in defining different identities. In
going to war with the English, the navy was moving against the state that had provided its
organizational model for many years prior to 1938. The army, on the other hand, was
cementing an alliance with a partner it viewed as not only a military model, but a political and
social one as well.16 1
POLITICAL OUTCOME AND MILITARY POLICY
The navy thrived under Thailand's post-1944 liberal leaders, while the army was treated with
suspicion. Fearing a comeback by Phibun and the army, the new government relied largely
on the navy for protection. Naval leaders were put in positions from which they could control
or, at a minimum, observe the movements of the army, and naval strength was reinforced so
that it could counter such an armed threat should it materialize. Under the first post-1944
cabinet (headed by Khuang Aphaiwong) no army officers were represented; naval officers
served as Defense Minister, Minister of Interior, Minister of Agriculture, and Minister of
Industry. 162 The importance of the Defense Minister was, moreover, enhanced by the
160 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 50.
161 Moreover, while both services had extensive contact with Japan, the Japanese naval officer corps was heavily
influenced by British and American models, while the Japanese army was much closer to Germany and Italy.
162 Kato Kazuhide, Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi, 177. Direk Jayanama, Siam
and World War II (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand Press, 1978), 98.
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elimination of the post of supreme commander, which technically had operational control
over the services and was occupied by Phibun even after he stepped down as prime minister.
(The government felt it safer to eliminate the position than try to replace Phibun as its
occupant.) Naval officers subsequently filled other key security posts. In 1945, Vice-
Admiral Sangworn Suwannachip, one of Pridi's key allies in the navy and former Free Thai
officer, was appointed to serve simultaneously as adjutant general of the armed forces and
chief of police. 16 3
The navy was also strengthened materially, both in absolute terms and relative to the
army. Between 1944 and 1946, parliament increased naval budgets by 50 percent, while
reducing the army's budget by 40 percent. 164 Pridi funneled many of the best weapons given
to the Free Thai movement during World War II by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services to
the navy. By 1947, naval marine infantry units were, unlike the army, equipped with tanks
and were generally equipped with more and better support weapons than most army
elements. 165 But while Pridi and other civilian Free Thai leaders used the navy as a first line
of defense, they were aware that the marines, as well equipped as they were, would not
prevail if the army were united in opposition. By 1947 Pridi began emphasizing the sacrifices
of"all sincere Siamese patriots" [including army units that had remained loyal to Phibun],
163 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 28.
164 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 27.
165 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalisnm, 49.
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rather than only those who had participated in the wartime underground. And, in 1947, just
months before he was overthrown by a coup d'etat, he asked the United States to establish an
army training mission in Thailand.
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The historical data during this period generally support the civil-military coalition theory.
During the war years, an army officer created and led the integral nationalist regime, a regime
backed strongly by most of the army, even when the war turned against Thailand. Naval
officers opposed General Phibun's integral nationalist government, served as core members of
the Free Thai movement during the war, and occupied prominently in key positions (both
elected and appointed) under the liberal parliamentary order after the war.
These patterns are consistent with predictions on the political-economic positions of
armies and navies. The evidence assembled here also generally supports - though more
weakly - predictions on the internal unanimity of the services. It is true that the army was
more deeply divided in its preferences than the navy, supporting the thesis' second major
prediction, but the navy also suffered from some divisions. (The navy's commander, for
example, was a latecomer to the Free Thai camp.) And the data are insufficient to draw
conclusions about the background of officers who dissented from the majority integral
nationalist position, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the more detailed
predictions.
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The historical data provide strong support for predictions about coalitional patterns
and their impact on force structure. Both the army and the navy cooperated with sympathetic
civilian groups - the army's Phibun actively courting the lower bourgeoisie, while the navy
was more closely aligned with aristocratic and upper middle class groups. Probably the only
surprise in this regard is that many government workers, whom we might expect to side with
Phibun's integral nationalist government, instead backed Pridi's Free Thai. But the exception
in this case proves the rule, since the bureaucracy and old aristocracy were unified.
(Membership in officialdom conferred aristocratic status and opened access to land and other
benefits.) Changes in military resource allocation and force structure tracked closely with
domestic events. Regime change - occurring in the midst of a war - brought a quick and
large shift in resource allocation between the services. The marines received early and
disproportionate attention after 1944, further suggesting domestic motives.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES
The civil-military coalition theory performs relatively better than the other two theories
considered by this thesis, though both help explain parts of the case.
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Explanations based on the strategic
military environment expect that military policy should track reasonably closely in time with
changes in the external security environment. Prior to August 1944, this was arguably the
case, but shifts in the distribution of military resources during the three years after that time
are more difficult to square with Thailand's external threat environment.
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Between 1934 and 1944 (when General Phibun served first as Defense Minister and
later as Prime Minister), Thailand's military resource distribution provided a relatively good
match for Thailand's strategic position - at least as they were defined by Phibun. Phibun
harbored irredentist claims against both the French in Indochina and the British in Burma and
the Malaysian states and was unafraid to take risks in "re-acquiring" these territories. 166 By
capitalizing on opportunities presented by Japanese gains, Thai forces might plausibly seize
territory in both areas, but those operations might nevertheless bring Thailand into conflict
with some combination of French or English land, sea, and air forces. Under these
circumstances, increasing defense budgets was in order, and Phibun did just that - expanding
the defense budget from 22 percent of the national budget to 38 percent. 167 The navy's share
of the total declined marginally, from 64 percent of the total in 1934 to 62 percent by 1938.
But the navy's budget nevertheless increased substantially in absolute terms (by 21 percent
between 1934 and 1938), and naval tonnage more than doubled while the average age of ships
in the fleet declined substantially. 168
The actual outcome of Phibun's wars did bring temporary gains for Thailand, though
these were reversed at the end of the war. After losing a naval engagement to France in
January 1941, a combination of Thai ground and air attacks and Japanese political pressure
166 Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 256-57. For a more detailed explanation of outstanding grievances against
France, see Royal Thai Army Operations Division, The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and
The Great East Asian War (No city given: Royal Thai Army Operations Division, 1946).
167 Constance M. Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983).
168 Calculated from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939-1940.
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forced Vichy French concessions in Indochina later in the year. 169 The Thai army and air
force scored wins against British-backed forces in Burma in 1942, and Phibun gained
Japanese agreement for Thailand to administer one additional province in Burma and the four
in Malaysia.
Changes in the distribution of Thai military spending after August 1944, when Pridi
and the Free Thai took control of the state, appear less well connected to military threats
facing the state. Immediately after August 1944, Thai troops remained in defensive positions
in Burma, and Thailand was still, formally at least, a Japanese ally. In reality, Thailand was,
however, leaning towards the Allies. Both Thai and Japanese leaders were contemplating
preemptive action against the other. And each realized the other was considering hostile
action. 170 Although there was some coastal component to these plans, both Thai and Japanese
contingency planning called for the main action to take place on land, inside Thailand's
borders. 171
Given Thailand's position inside Burma and Laos and the threat posed by possible
Japanese action inside Thailand, we would expect that Thai leaders would, at a minimum, not
reduce the proportion of military resources devoted to the army. The quick shift in budgetary
169 During the engagement, "a motley collection of warships, led by an aging cruiser," ambushed the Thai fleet
just offshore and sank one of two of Thailand's new Japanese-built cruisers, as well as two Thai torpedo boats.
Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945, 43.
170 Ibid.
171 At that time, Japanese forces inside Thailand numbered about 170,000. Ibid. The Thai army, including
forces deployed in Malaysia, Burma, and Laos, numbered 120,000. Royal Thai Army Operations Division, The
Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War, 325.
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and equipment priorities towards the navy, then, appears better understood as an effort by
Pridi to strengthen those military elements most inclined to respond to his orders and as an
effort to weaken the army, significant elements of which still harbored strong sympathy for
General Phibun. This assessment is strengthened by the observations of a Thai prince, who,
visiting Pridi's residence, found it guarded by naval sailors, rather than the army. 172
Nor does the shift in resource allocation, which continued before and after the end of
Allied hostilities with Japan in August 1945, seem particularly well suited to the threat
environment Thailand faced in the post-war period. At the end of the war, the European
powers fought their way back into Asia - the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in India, Burma,
and Malaysia, and the French in Indochina. Both Britain and France pressed for concessions
from Thailand to which it leaders were loath to agree. Britain's demands would have given it
substantial control over the Thai economy making it, in the words of Seni Pramoj "a slave
state for years to come."' 73 French demands were limited primarily to the return of territory
in Laos ceded by the Vichy government in 1941, but Thai elite sentiment ran strongly against
concessions to France on what they regarded was territory stolen in the late 19th century by
Paris. '74
172 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945, 147.
173 Britain's twenty one postwar demands included, among other things, monopoly rights over exports in Thai
oil, timber, rice, rubber, and tin; control of Thai shipping; bases, including the power to station troops at strategic
points indefinitely; and a monopoly of commercial airlines through Bangkok. Pp. 26-28.
174 Royal Thai Army Operations Division, The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great
East Asian War.
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These issues could have led to substantial military clashes with Britain, France, or
both. 17 5 Ultimately, the United States brought considerable pressure to bear on London to
soften its demands, but the Anglo-Thai peace treaty signed in January 1946, while not as
tough as earlier demanded, nevertheless imposed harsh reparations demands on the latter.' 76
British action to collect reparations or enforce other terms of the agreement was not
unthinkable. The situation with France proved even more difficult to resolve, and by April
1946 Thai and French forces along the Thai-Indochina border were conducting company- and
battalion sized raids across their respective lines of control.17 7 In November 1946, Thailand
agreed to return the French territories it had regained during the war. Pridi provided some aid
to insurgents fighting the French in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia before and after the
settlement of these issues.
The nature of the military threat posed by Britain and France was multidimensional.
But the disputed provinces were contiguous with Thailand proper; the action (to the extent
there was any) was on the ground; and without a Japanese naval shield, any naval maritime
efforts against Britain or France were likely to be futile. The end of large-scale active
hostilities in East Asia at the end of World War II probably did call for a reduction of army
budgets and some recalibration of relative priorities, but it is harder to explain the large
175 Both the U.S. and Thai governments were worried about the prospects for violence. Although Thailand's
difficulties with France proved more difficult to resolve and ultimately resulted in border skirmishes, the U.S.
was, in August 1945, more concerned about problems between Britain and Thailand. See Adulyasak
Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" (Ph.D., University of Akron, 1986).
176 According to the treaty, Thailand was to provide reparations for British wartime losses, plus provide
1,500,000 tons of rice free to Britain - an especially exacting demand, given the economic hardships suffered
throughout Thailand after the war. Ibid. 32.
177 Ibid. 37-38.
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absolute increase in spending on the navy, especially given that budget deficits caused high
inflation throughout 1944-1947, threatening the state's economic base and threatening
domestic stability.
Probably the best case that could be made for the impact of the strategic military
environment on force structure change between 1944 and 1947 is that because the threat was
indeterminate (especially after August 1945) and its level low (especially after August 1945),
the theory's predictions in this case might be indeterminate. State leaders were therefore
relatively free to establish military policies that would defend the state against a plausible
range of threats while focusing their attention on other considerations, including cost and
domestic political considerations. In other words, this case might be a relatively easy one for
the civil-military coalition theory - one that it does in fact comfortably pass. Thai leaders
reacted primarily to the threat that ultimately brought their demise (and the death of some) - a
threat from recalcitrant army officers, not external foes.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. In looking at why and
how the services chose their political-economic positions and partners, did the search for
budgetary or other resources provide a compelling explanation? A logical place to start such
an investigation is to ask: did the navy support the Free Thai because of their loss of relative
budget share during the war years? 178
178 This is one of the explanations cited by Kato. Kato Kazuhide, Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru
Minshushugi, 116.
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While this might have been one contributing factor, it alone is insufficient to explain
the navy's actions. A narrowly material interests-based explanation would suggest risk-
averse behavior from organizations, if not from individuals. Parties will not abandon alliance
with political authorities unless there is a high probability of better rewards under a different
partnership. Yet it was a gamble, personally and for the institution, for naval officers to join
the Free Thai in 1942 - and certainly in late 1941 when the movement was founded. The
movement was dependent on Allied victory for success. Yet even after the Battle of Midway,
Japan's reputation was riding so high in Bangkok in the autumn of 1942 that a British
observer there heard that the Thai were betting 10-1 to 20-1 odds on an Axis victory.179 And
even assuming an ultimate allied victory, naval participants were also gambling that the
movement would not be discovered and wiped out, together with the navy's top officers,
before the end of the war. 180
Another problem with this proposed material interests-based explanation involves
Phibun's record on the navy. Phibun, who served as defense minister from 1934 to 1938,
spearheaded a successful drive to increase aggregate defense spending and did more than
anyone since King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) to build up the navy prior to 1942. Even a
moderately conservative organization would stick with Phibun - at least as long as the war
179 Reynolds, Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945, 37. Japanese power was widely respected
even by anti-militarists before the war. Japanese trade as a percentage of total trade increased in virtually all
Asian states during the decade before WWII. Japan occupied northern Vietnam in September 1942, an event
that might have weighed heavily in the Thai calculation reported by this particular observer. The Japanese
disaster at Midway was, for its part, kept as a tightly guarded secret in Japan, and may not have been widely
known in Thailand.
180 The Japanese were well aware of the movement and considered moving preemptively against it. But instead
gave priority to maintaining the appearance of pacific alliance relations with Thailand. Ibid., 2 18-19.
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was going even moderately well - if material interests were the overriding concern. Finally,
some senior army and naval officers - most prominently Phibun and Thamrong -
demonstrated direct interests in economic affairs that appear difficult to explain in terms of
the services' direct material interests.
Case 2: The Rise of State-led Development (1947-1969)
Military politics from 1947 to 1969 was very much a continuation of the struggle between
Phibun and his army successors on the one hand and civilian parliamentary leaders and the
navy on the other. In November 1947 a group of mostly mid-level army officers overthrew
Thailand's liberal parliamentary regime and reestablished a new integral nationalist one in its
place. But the army was not entirely unified in its preferences, and, while most line officers
were compliant if not supportive, officers from the general staff launched an unsuccessful
countercoup in 1948. The navy was both united and strenuous in its opposition to the 1947
"Coup Group" (as the coup participants called themselves). Naval officers participated in the
army general staff s uprising and launched two of its own. After the second of these, the
navy's strength was drastically reduced, but it continued a close association with liberal
politicians through the end of the period.
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ORDER IN EARLY 1947
The existing political order between August 1944 and November 1947 was significantly more
liberal than its predecessor or successor governments. The constitution, developed by a
parliamentary committee and promulgated in May 1946, introduced a bicameral legislature
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with a fully elected House of Representatives and a Senate elected by the lower house. 18 The
number of military representatives of the upper house dropped from 61 percent to 34 percent
(a percentage that was less than half any post-1947 government until the temporary
restoration of democratic rule in 1973).182 Phibun's Ministry of Culture was abolished, as
were his cultural edicts, and freedom of speech and the press were restored. 183 Restrictions
were eased on Chinese entrepreneurs, and industrial planning was abandoned. Foreign
investment was actively sought, especially to develop Thailand's mineral resources, and by
the end of 1946, the United States had concluded an agreement with Thailand, Australia, and
the United Kingdom for the procurement of Thai tin.'84 Conservative royalist and democratic
socialist party competed in parliament with liberal parties, but the latter, together with their
business and commercial allies, tended to dominate. 185
That the government was largely organized along liberal lines does not imply that it
was without problems or entirely free or corruption. Faced with severe economic challenges,
it made critical errors that allowed corrupt politicians and businessmen to profit. The
government inherited a massive government deficit and runaway inflation from Phibun's
regime, problems that were compounded by reparations agreements with Britain restricting
181 Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 263.
182 Ketut Gunawan, "Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratization," (Japan Institute of
International Affairs, 2000).
183 H.M. Spitzer, "Siam's Political Problems," Far Eastern Survey 15, no. 7 (1946): 108.
184 Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" 40.
185 Pridi's Cooperation Party, the partial exception in terms of composition and policy, held power for only five
of twenty-five months.
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the sale of Thailand's primary exports (rice, teak, tin, and rubber). In an effort to both raise
government revenues and reduce urban inflation, Prime Minister Thamrong passed legislation
in 1946 requiring farmers to sell rice cheaply to the government. Although the intent was to
resell the rice in urban areas for a marginal markup, some officials sent rice instead to
Malaysia, where it commanded even higher prices, and pocketed the difference. 186
Despite mistakes and corruption, however, the governments associated with Pridi and
Thamrong between 1944 and 1947 were relatively more liberal in both political and economic
terms than either Phibun's earlier regime or the army-backed governments after 1947. And
the army's drug-running and business activity during the latter period demonstrated that,
despite the relatively egalitarian developmentalism embraced by many Thai army officers, the
army's integral nationalism was no less corrupt than the parliamentary governments of 1944-
47. Rather, its corruption was of another variety.
THE SERVICES' POLITICAL-ECONOMIC POSITIONS
ARMY PREFERENCES. In 1947 the army proved relatively - though not entirely -
united in opposition to the existing liberal order. An army coup overthrew the sitting prime
minister in November 1947. In April of the following year the same Coup Group restored
Phibun, Thailand's wartime leader. Phibun resurrected a modified version of his previous
186 Virginia Thompson, "Government Instability in Siam," Far Eastern Survey 17, no. 16 (1948): 186. In
another example, the government sold wartime stockpiles of consumer goods to parliamentary leaders, who then
used their commercial connections to make handsome profits from the transactions. Thak Chaloemitarana,
Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 19.
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national socialist regime (described in case 1). In 1957 another coup brought General Sarit
Thanarat to power. Sarit, borrowing some ideas from Phibun but also adding much that was
new, unified the army behind a distinctive developmental - integral nationalist - ideology.
Sarit's approach was more pragmatic in foreign economic relations than Phibun's (i.e.,
somewhat more open) and more focused on basic rural infrastructure and small industry. But,
like Phibun's administration, Sarit's government remained committed to state-leadership of
the economy and suspicious of both private capital and parliament.
The 1947 Coup Group took advantage of a constellation of factors that made liberal
parliamentary government vulnerable. In particular, its members capitalized on the
widespread hardship that Admiral Thamrong's rice policy was causing in the countryside.
They blamed the collusion of politicians, big business, and urban elites more generally for the
hardship in the countryside. The Coup Group's first proclamation, issued one day after the
event, stated, "At a time when people are starving, the government and other opportunitists
live in wealth and extravagance and ignore the cries of the people."' 87 The mysterious death
of the king, which the government deemed a suicide but which royalist opponents suggested
was possibly a government-sponsored assassination, added to the government's
vulnerability. 188
187 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 35.
188 One survey of attitudes in a single rural village highlights the role of the king's death and the effectiveness of
opposition publicity campaigns in weakening the image of the ruling parties. Lauriston Sharp, "Peasants and
Politics in Thailand," Far Eastern Survey 19, no. 15 (1950). The "assassination" scenario held that the plot was
hatched and executed by a naval officer, Wacharachai Chayasithiwet. Although tried and executed under the
Coup Group, the purported witness on whose testimony the trial turned recanted his testimony many years later.
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The Coup Group was not content simply to remove Pridi and his supporters, but rather
moved as quickly as politically feasible to create an integral nationalist order. Constrained in
the immediate aftermath of the coup by a lack of high profile members, the group recruited a
known and respected moderate politician, Khuang Aphaiwong, as prime minister.189 Within
six months, however, they reneged on their promise not to interfere in his administration,
forcing Khuang from office and replacing him with Phibun. Phibun's policies over the next
nine years were largely a continuation of those of 1938-1944. If anything, his integralist
ambitions and programs were on a grander scale, despite the need to balance the demands of
the Coup Group on the one hand and a weakened but still potentially troublesome parliament
on the other.
The regime's integral nationalist traits are visible in both economic and cultural
policy. Economically, he appealed to his base of supporters in the lower middle class by
passing the Low-cost Housing Act in 1948, and attempting to redistribute land from landlords
to peasants through the Land Titles Act in 1953 and the Land Codification Act in 1954.
Phibun imposed severe restrictions on the use of foreign currency in order to reserve those
assets to supply capital equipment for government-sponsored industrial promotion projects.
He established a National Economic Promotion Corporation that purchased foreign industries
operating in Thailand, installing Thai leadership in an effort (largely unsuccessful) to promote
domestic management capabilities.' 9 0 In the cultural realm, he codified his earlier efforts to
189 The group's most senior member was Phin Chunhawan, a lieutenant general, and most of the other thirty-two
members were majors or colonels.
190 On these policies, see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three
Decades, 1932-1957, 150-51.
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homogenize Thai culture by, among other things, establishing a Ministry of Culture in
1952.191
Support for the 1947 coup within the army was not unanimous, especially after the
Coup Group brought in Phibun to replace Khuang's caretaker government. Members of the
general staff planned a coup for October 1, 1948 - seeking to take advantage of a wedding
party for Sarit Thanarat, a key member of the Coup Group, to capture its leadership in one
swoop. The plot was uncovered and the plotters arrested. During their trial, the staff officers
suggested they were motivated by the conviction that further involvement in politics would
divide the military and hinder professional development. Prosecutors demonstrated that the
plotters had been soliciting opinions about the best path to develop and modernize the army
from other officers - possibly in an attempt to sound-out other officers about possible support
for action.' 92 Although a weak effort, the 1948 countercoup attempt represented the efforts of
technical officers to revive constitutional, if not fully democratic, government.
Sarit Thanarat, a member of the 1947 Coup Group and commander of the 1s t Infantry
Division (stationed near Bangkok), took personal control of the government in two coups, one
that removed Phibun in 1957 and the other that dissolved parliament in 1958. Sarit's politics,
described by one historian as "despotic paternalism," appear to represent the mainstream
191 Ibid., 138.
192 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 41^44.
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preferences of the army, or at least line officers. 193 At a minimum, they reflected a powerful
current within the army, one that Sarit was to make the mainstream.
Sarit's policies were, like those of Phibun, integral nationalist - though in some
specifics, they differed from Phibun's. Sarit placed particularly heavy emphasis on education.
Between 1956 and 1959, the education budget climbed from 7 percent of the national budget
to 19 percent - or from 35 percent of the defense budget to 90 percent. 194 (Under the Pridi-
Thamrong governments, spending on education had declined from 11 percent in 1943 to 7
percent by 1947.) Perhaps even more indicative of Sarit's integral nationalist philosophy,
however, was the shift in emphasis within the education budget. Whereas the Pridi-Thamrong
governments placed considerable emphasis on secondary and tertiary education, the Sarit's
priority was increasing mandatory education from four years to seven. 19 5
At the same time, the government increased its attention to the development of
physical infrastructure in the nation's interior, a fact also reflected in the expansion of
development budgets from 10 percent of the government's budget in 1957 to 16.3 percent in
1959.196 Sarit established regional development committees for less developed areas. He
193 Ibid.
194 Wilson, Thailand. A Handbook of Historical Statistics, 276.
195 Suehiro Akira, Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 43. Sarit's government did establish
two new universities, but they were not established in Bangkok. Both were opened in the impoverished
northeast.
196 Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 343.
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began with a Northeast Development Committee, a body he personally chaired. In 1963 he
created a National Development Ministry to unify these efforts.19 7
Sarit's industrial policies, laid out in a decree on "encouraging productive activity" in
November 1958, were designed to promote import substitution. He permitted more fbreign
investment in the economy than Phibun and de-emphasized public ownership, but he raised
tariffs substantially in an effort to protect infant industries. In 1959, he established a National
Economic Development Board to strengthen planning capabilities and, in an effort to
coordinate domestic and international investment and ensure that it was "properly" targeted, a
Board on Investment was created.' 98
NAVAL PREFERENCES. The navy remained firmly opposed to the Coup Group after
1947, allying itself first with Pridi until 1951 and later with Seni Pramoj's pro-business
Democrat Party - an affiliation that remained current at least until the 1990s.
The navy was a central actor in two countercoup attempts after 1947, one in 1949 and
one in 1951.199 During the first, in February 1949, Naval ships smuggled Pridi Banomyong
(the former leader of the Free Thai movement), disguised in the dress white uniform of a
naval officer, into Bangkok. Naval units took over the national Thai radio station and
197 Suehiro Akira, Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi, 39.
198 Both the Board on Investments and a National Economic Development Board were established in 1959. Ibid.
'99 In addition to these, prosecutors under the 1947 Coup Group accused several naval officers of participating in
the October 1948 attempt organized by the general staff. The evidence on that involvement is, however,
ambiguous. See Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 43-44.
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announced a new government, under which the commander of the navy, Admiral Sinthu
Songkhramchai, was to be Supreme Military Commander, and the marine commander, Rear
Admiral Thahan, was to serve as defense minister. 200 As this announcement was being made,
marine units under Pridi's military aide, Naval Lieutenant Wacharachai Chayasithiwet, were
taking over the palace.
Despite solid planning on the part of Pridi and his naval supporters, a combination of
bad luck on the one hand and good intelligence and quick reactions on the part of army
officials on the other led to the failure of the 1949 countercoup attempt. Sarit, then
commander of the army's 1st Infantry Division, with at least partial knowledge of the plan
prior to the event, had stationed tanks in the capital. On the day of the coup, these were
quickly used to recapture the palace. Adverse tides prevented scheduled marine
reinforcements from landing, and many of the Free Thai leaders who were to lead armed
groups from the countryside had been arrested shortly prior to the event and were unable to
participate. Although bitter fighting continued at scattered points around the capital, many
senior naval officers, seeing that things were going the wrong way, decided against
committing their forces.
In June 1951, junior naval officers launched an equally dramatic, if less well planned,
countercoup against the 1947 group. Naval Lieutenant Commander Manat Charupha led a
force of officers and sailors that kidnapped Prime Minister Phibun in full view of foreign
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civilians and naval delegations during a naval christening ceremony. The prime minister was
transferred to the navy's flagship, the Si Ayudhaya, and the plotters called on the navy to
converge on Bangkok.
Seeing an opportunity to finally defeat its naval nemesis in battle, General Sarit and
other army officers launched an all-out attack on naval installations - without, apparently,
regard for whether the commanders of individual garrisons were involved in the uprising or
not. Army howitzers shelled naval ground installations and recaptured strategic land targets.
The air force, independent only since 1941 and staffed largely by former army officers,
bombed naval air bases. Announcing that Prime Minister Phibun was willing to sacrifice
himself for his country (an announcement that apparently came as a rude shock to him), air
force planes also bombed and sank the Si Ayudhaya. Phibun was able to swim to shore. The
rebellion was crushed before the naval high command, led by Admiral Sinthu, could decide
whether or not to back its junior officers. Total casualties numbered around 600.
After the failure of the 1951 coup attempt, Pridi was effectively a dead letter in
political terms, and the navy was drastically weakened (see below). But the navy did not
cease to play a political role. Rather, it joined forces with the Democrat Party, then led by
Seni Pramoj, a prominent lawyer and leader of overseas Free Thai elements during World
War II. (The party had begun as a royalist party in the mid-1940s but had, after Seni assumed
its leadership, become increasingly identified as a pro-business, middle class party. 20l)
201 After the demise of Admiral Thamrong's Constitution Front Party in 1947 led business and middle class
actors shifted their allegiance to the Democrat Party. The party was led by Seni Pramoj, a lawyer who, together
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During the mid- 1 950s, both the Democrat Party and the navy made a tactical alliance with
Phibun in order to protect parliament's continued function against the 1947 Coup Group's
threats of closure.
Despite Phibun's ideological proclivities and the history of antagonism between
himself and Seni, he understood that, without the control of the army, his only effective
power-base was in parliament, and his only viable military protection was offered by the
navy.20 2 Phibun's rhetoric became more democratic and liberal. The Democrat Party and the
navy, for their parts, saw alliance with Phibun as the best hope of defending themselves
against even more radical active duty army officers.20 3
But while the navy's alliance with Phibun was tactical and relatively short-lived, its
cooperation with the Democrat Party was more enduring. This was evident in the 1969
parliamentary elections. Having suspended parliament entirely after 1958, popular pressure
forced the army leadership to promulgate a new constitution in 1968 and schedule elections
for February 1969. The navy was solidly in its camp. According to one source, the army
generals, understanding the navy's loyalties, ordered the fleet to sea during the elections to
prevent its personnel from voting.204 Whether apocryphal or true, the story indicates that the
with Pridi, was one of the two most important leaders of the wartime Free Thai movement. Van Praagh,
Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj, 112, 30.
202 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957, 202-
03.
203 Van Praagh, Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj.
204 Ibid., 130.
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army and navy were still widely understood to maintain divergent political-economic
preferences in the late 1960s.
EXPLAINING SERVICE DIFFERENCES. As in case 1, differences in the social origins
of the officer corps appear to have been one of the most important factors in deciding the
above outcomes. Phibun was, as noted earlier, from a lower middle class background.
General Sarit shared similar origins. In this case, the regional backgrounds of key individuals
- especially Sarit - also appear to have been important. Sarit's family was from the northeast,
and he explained his own emphasis on developing that area largely on the basis of his own
early exposure to that underdeveloped region. The degree of foreign contact may also have
been a factor. Unlike the navy's senior officers who had experience overseas, Sarit and many
of his associates were entirely domestically educated.
EFFECTS ON FORCE STRUCTURE AND GRAND STRATEGY
Immediately after the 1951 naval revolt, the army formed a committee for the "restructuring"
of its rival. The navy's responsibility for public security, which it had exercised in six of the
nation's seventy-one provinces (mostly in coastal states), was stripped, together with a large
portion of its police force. Its state and provincial organizations - including both regular
reserves and coastal patrol elements - were split between the army and the police. Fleet
headquarters was moved from its location on the Phraya River, close to the capital of
Bangkok, to the Sattahip naval base (half way between Bangkok and the Cambodian border).
A pre-cadet school was established, in which the future cadets of all services would spend
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several years together, a move that was almost certainly intended to retard the perpetuation of
a separate navy (and air force) culture. A personnel limit was established, and individuals in
excess of that limit were transferred to other services. The navy's air service was disbanded
and all combat aircraft were transferred to the air force. The navy's musical band was given
to the army, presumably as a trophy to signify the navy's subjugation. Most importantly - at
least from the army's perspective - the navy's marine corps was reduced from four battalions
to one.20 5
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The facts of this case conform very closely to the predictions of the civil-military coalition
theory. First, the two services supported very different types of domestic orders: The navy
backed liberal institutions and actors, and the army favored integral nationalist ones. Both
took risks in their support of these positions, and both maintained their preferences for long
periods of time. The the October 1948 counter-coup attempt by army general staff officers
supports the prediction that armies are often internally divided, with the more technologically-
intensive and less troop-oriented branches adhering to relatively more liberal positions than
line officers.
The services engaged in coalition building with civilian groups, and political outcomes
correlated closely in time and kind with subsequent changes in strategic direction. The navy's
205 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957, 198-
99.
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"downsizing" occurred immediately after the failure of its second countercoup attempt in
1951. Its budgets - and marine corps -- recovered somewhat after the navy found common
cause with Phibun in the mid-1950s. But that recovery proved temporary. The navy was
relegated to a secondary, supporting role throughout the period of army-led integral
nationalist rule. Despite the purchase of three small frigates in late 1969, its fleet tonnage
ended the period smaller than at its begirnning.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. I suggested in Chapter 3 that one plausible
explanation for the general regional shift toward continental strategies might be the rise of
local insurgencies that required the redeployment of scarce resources. A history of
insurgency in Thailand prior to 1932 had done little to inhibit naval building. Despite serious
periodic warfare in the northeast, the Thai navy vied with the army during the 19th century as
an almost equal service in terms of both budgets and status. Nor does the threat of insurgency
seem to adequately explain the timing or degree of Thailand's strategic shift during this
period - and specifically, its dramatic naval deconstruction in 1951.
Thai intellectuals and bureaucrats (including members of the military) had debated the
relative merits and demerits of communism at least since the Russian Revolution in 1917, and
many, though certainly not all, within elite ranks were clearly fearful of it. 206 But Thailand
206 The civilian-military group that overthrew absolute monarchy in 1932 had virtually all been exchange
students in Europe - primarily France. There, they debated all the latest political theory, and some became
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did not face an insurgency on its own soil until 1965.207 The French fought an active and
armed communist movement in Indochina from 1946, but because it was a nationalist
movement - and one fighting Thailand's longtime enemy - Pridi supported the communist
movement there. Two events in 1953 raised the stakes for Thailand. First, China established
a Thai Nationality Autonomous Area in its southern province of Yunnan, an area with Thai-
speaking minorities and one that could be used as a base from which to destabilize Thailand.
Second, Vietminh forces moved into Laos and Cambodia for the first time. In 1954, Thailand
and the United States began discussing the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO), which came into being in 1955 and helped usher in an era of
expanded U.S. economic and military assistance to Bangkok.20 8
Thailand's external environment, however, does not appear to have been the decisive
factor in the demise of its navy. First and most obviously, the navy's major reduction
occurred in 1951 - immediately after its coup attempt and two years before communist
insurgents landed on Thailand's doorstep. Phibun then sought to rebuild naval strength in the
mid-1950s, only to be stopped by another army coup in 1957. Second, while Phibun and the
army welcomed U.S. military assistance, there are questions about how imminent they viewed
enamored of socialism. Two communist parties were formed in Thailand, one in 1929 and one in 1935. But
these appealed to a narrow range of dissidents. And to the extent that they had gained adherents under the
relatively tolerant politics of the Pridi-Thamrong period (1942-47), those gains were easily wiped out by quick
police sweeps after the 1947 coup. Sean R. Randolph and Scott W. Thompson, "Thai Insurgency:
Contemporary Developments," (Beverly Hills: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown
University, 1981).
207 Thailand's own Internal Affairs Ministry agrees with this assessment. Suehiro Akira, Tai Kaihatsu to
Minshushugi, 72. See also Randolph and Thompson, "Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments."
208 Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" 87-101.
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the insurgent threat. Military spending fell dramatically after 1947, from an average of 26
percent of the national budget in 1944-1947 to an average of 12 percent between 1948 and
1958.209 And when SEATO was formed in 1955, Phibun sought to use it to gain heavy
weapons systems, arguing that an army of 50,000 Free Thai forces was gathering inside China
for an invasion of Thailand. 210 At the same time, however, he argued for improving relations
with communist China, including the establishment of trade ties.
Neither Thailand's continental shift nor its integral nationalist domestic policy was
unconnected to the concept of national strength embraced by Thai army leaders (and those of
many other developing states). At the heart of this concept was a perceived need to use state
power to consolidate an immature nation state by narrowing differences within the state.
While nearby insurgencies may have heightened the perceived need to put their plans into
action, these disturbances did not create their conceptions of national security, which were
formed well prior to the insurrection.
The development of an integral nationalist state was not the only possible response to
insurrection. Different actors can have different conceptions about how best to attack any
given national weakness. In Latin America, naval officers, working in conjunction with the
besieged middle class, established authoritarian police states designed to protect neo-classical
economic orders. In Thailand, the rise of the state-led developmental model (in this case
209 Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics, 276.
210 Pridi escaped to Beijing after the failure of the 1949 countercoup attempt, but there is no evidence that he or
any other Free Thai ever plotted an invasion. Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai
Relations, 1945-1975".
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import substitution) was a product of victory by relatively young army integral nationalists.
And although the distribution of military resources was partly consistent with the needs of
fighting an insurgency, it was even more a function of political outcomes. In Latin America,
fighting insurgency meant rising defense budgets, larger navies, and the emergence of
immensely powerful military intelligence organizations; in Thailand, local insurgencies
brought smaller defense budgets, redeployment of military assets to infrastructure and other
nation building tasks, and a much smaller navy.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. In this case, it is
possible to make a moderately strong case for a purely interests-based organization theory
model, but material interests alone failure to account for many of the more important aspects
of the case. Material interests offer a plausible explanation for the army's 1947 overthrow of
Pridi - who had cut the army's budget, reduced its status, and questioned its loyalty. From
the standpoint of organizational interest, it is somewhat harder to explain why the army
needed or wanted to install its own regime after Pridi's ouster. The Khuang government
increased the army's budget and proffered respect for the institution and its autonomy.
Indeed, general staff dissent against the Coup Group's actions demonstrated that even some
who could support the overthrow of Pridi could not countenance more active involvement in
administering the state.
Army leaders also demonstrated direct interest in economic and social affairs that
went beyond what organization theory might expect. While the army's increased involvement
in infrastructure projects might possibly justify higher budgets, it is remarkable that military
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budgets did not, in fact rise (at least as a percentage of GNP). Hence, whatever money the
army was putting into civil engineering projects came out of other parts of the force structure.
And the jump in educational spending under Sarit was of such magnitude that it impinged on
any possibility of increasing military budgets, if not on maintaining them at current levels.
Clearly, although material interests help us understand some of the army's motivations, the
actions of senior army leaders reflect much more than simple rent seeking.
Similar conclusions can be reached with regard to the navy. The 1949 countercoup
attempt might be comprehensible as a risky, but nevertheless promising, attempt to restore a
pro-navy government. But with Phibun in charge of the government, aggregate defense
budgets on the rise, and its marine corps and combat air power intact, other approaches (such
as seeking beneficial accommodation) might also have been a realistic interest-based strategy.
Indeed, the navy failed to reach a satisfactory accommodation with the military government
even after the quick return of liberal rule became extremely unlikely during the 1 960s.
Case 3: Liberals vs. Leftists (1969-1980)
This case looks at the military services' behavior during two key crises: a civilian uprising
against military rule in 1973, and a period of political gridlock and economic collapse
culminating in a second political crisis in 1976. In the first instance, the army was divided,
with some elements backing tough action against the students and some not; the navy took a
clear stand against suppression and helped usher in an era of parliamentary rule. In the latter
instance, naval leaders and army staff officers launched a coup d'etat and established a
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constitution under which parliament was reestablished, but with a proportion of its
membership - set to decline over several years according to a fixed timetable - appointed by
the military. While the navy's actions in this case were not always pro-democratic, the navy
was - without exception - in line with business and middle class positions. And when
democracy did not appear to jeopardize liberal economic values, the navy did support
democratic positions. Military outcomes were also consistent with the theory: the navy saw
its officers promoted to top military positions, both under civilian rule from 1973 to 1976 and
after the establishment of a pro-reform military-led government in 1979.
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CHOICES IN 1973
The most salient choices available to military leaders (and others) when student protests
began in 1973 were, on the one hand, support for General Thanom Kittikachorn's integral
nationalist regime, and, on the other, what appeared at the time to be a liberal alternative
backed by the students themselves.
After the death of General Sarit in 1963, General Thanom Kittikachorn stepped into
his place as premier, keeping and in some cases strengthening Sarit's developmental (and
integral nationalist) policies. Economic planning agencies were strengthened, and the
government's economic bureaucracy grew in size and reach, as did national or quasi-national
firms.2 1' Foreign investment and ownership was allowed, but was restricted to those areas
that could provide maximum opportunities for Thai companies to learn and develop. The
211 Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," in
Driven By Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, ed. James Moreley (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1993), 134-36.
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budget for development projects in the countryside increased significantly faster than that of
the military.212 But the picture was not all positive: corruption also become a much bigger
political issue under Thanom than it was under Sarit, whether because the problem itself grew
larger or because of greater public scrutiny of the problem (or, most likely, some combination
of the two). 213
In 1968, after ten years without a permanent constitution or parliamentary elections,
General Thanom, under pressure from the middle class and the United States, promulgated a
new constitution and agreed to hold elections in February 1969, The army's own party, with
help from election rules that worked to their benefit, was able to gain a majority. But
opposition parties in parliament - and some in Thanom's own party - proved unruly, and
Thanom suspended parliament once again in 1971. A combination of evident corruption and
police brutality, however, galvanized professors and, later, students to action in 1972-1973.
By October 1973, student protests demanding General Thanom's resignation had swelled to
two hundred thousand, and the government faced a major crisis.
On the eve of Thanom's fall, his ouster appeared to offer a liberal alternative to the
military's integral nationalism. In October 1973, there was little indication that under a post-
Thanom regime, business would lose out to student radicals. Student leaders in charge of the
212 Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand," Asian Survey 16, no. 12 (1976): 1194.
2 '3Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand (Chiang Mai:
Silkworm Books, 1994), 42-43.
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demonstrations quoted St. Augustine, Rousseau, and Abraham Lincoln in their speeches.21 4
Parliament would be reestablished, and in the 1969 elections, 46 percent of those elected had
been businessmen and another 16 percent were lawyers.215 The business-friendly Democrat
Party had garnered more seats than any party except the military's own party, and in a fair
election, most expected it to emerge as the dominant party.2 1 6 Despite the ties of many in the
middle class to government, that group was solidly behind the students. These middle class
actors believed they could do better with less government regulation and bureaucracy, and
most desired the personal liberties associated with democracy. 21 7
THE SERVICES' POLITICAL ECONOMIC POSITION
NAVAL PREFERENCES. Between 1969 and 1980, the navy generally took liberal
political positions, and it was always in line with the majority of the middle class in backing
positions consistent with the maintenance of free market economic regimes. Naval officers
had maintained strong ties with Seni Pramoj's Democrat Party, and many voted for the party
214 Robert F. Zimmerman, "Student 'Revolution' in Thailand: The End of the Bureaucratic Polity?," Asian Survey
14, no. 6 (1974): 511.
215 Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence," Asian Survey 28, no. 4
(1988): 454.
216 Van Praagh, Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj.
217 On middle class support for the movement, see Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History. See also James M.
Markham, "A Year After Uprising, Uneasy Thais Take First Steps Toward Democracy", New York Times,
October 13 1974. Between 1960 and 1970, Bangkok's middle class grew by 60 percent, from 170,000 to
284,000 (or 7 percent of the city's population), and industry had grown from 18 percent to 24 percent of GDP.
Average incomes in Bangkok's commercial industries were some ten times higher than farm wages. Figures are
from Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Board and cited in Chai-Anan Samudavanija and
Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," 122-23.
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in the 1969 elections.21 8 The navy did not support the attempted suppression of the student
revolt in 1973. It did sponsor a coup in 1976 to end the political polarization that was
paralyzing the country at that time, and launched another coup the following year to remove
an ultraconservative prime minister appointed by the king and install a junta of moderate
military figures committed to restoring parliamentary democracy.
In October 1973 the navy sided with the middle class in opposing an armed
crackdown on the student movement, helping pave the way for their victory in that struggle.
By October 14 crowds of students demanding an end to military rule had grown to 200,000
people. The army, on orders from General Thanom (serving as both prime minister and
supreme commander), began a military attack on the demonstrators, firing into the crowds
with tanks and from helicopters (see army section below).2 19 Navy boats, in contrast,
evacuated wounded students from Thammasat University (on the Chao Phya River).220 On
October 15, King Bhumiphol summoned the service chiefs to his palace to ascertain their
views. The air force chief and the navy's commander, Sangad Chaloryu, were strenuously
opposed to employing force. The army's commander, Kris Sivara, took a more tentative
position. With fighting continuing in Bangkok and a deeply divided military threatening to
plunge the nation into civil war, the king directed the service chiefs to exile Thanom. The
218 Van Praagh, Thailand's Strugglefor Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj, 130.
219 Some "units" of the student group, especially from among the vocational schools, was armed and violent.
Most were unarmed. The army was indiscriminate in using force against both. Ruth-Inge Heinze, "Ten Days in
October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand," Asian Survey 14, no. 6
(1974): 500-02.
220 Ibid.: 501.
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president of Thammasat University and committed liberal, Sanya Thammasakdi, was
immediately sworn in as interim president. The new government promptly promoted the
navy's commander, Admiral Sangad, as the new supreme commander.2 2 '
In 1976 the navy once again sided with the middle class, but this time cooperation
took the form of a coup d'etat against parliamentary government. Between October 1973 and
October 1976 students, feeling their role in the overthrow of Thanom's military regime
entitled them to a standing voice in government, pushed an increasingly radical agenda. The
Democrat Party ruled parliament, and businessmen were heavily represented in parliament.
But socialist-leaning student groups made direct demands on elected officials, backed by the
threat - often exercised - of taking direct action in the streets should their demands not be
met. They sought and won the nationalization of key segments of the economy, and they
worked to organize labor in the private sector. The number of strikes rose from 34 in 1972 to
an average of 360 a year over the next three years, and both the number of workers involved
and the duration of those strikes (in work days lost) rose even more dramatically. 22 2 The
number of communist insurgents in the countryside also increased - as did the number of
peasant and urban anti-communist groups. Assassinations and other forms of intimidation on
both sides became more common, and many moderates were caught in the middle.22 3
221 On these events see Van Praagh, Thailand's Strugglefor Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni
Pramoj, 153. For two somewhat different account (that nevertheless agree on the navy's refusal to participate in
the crackdown), see Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86 (Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 17. Jeffrey Race, "Thailand 1973: 'We Certainly have been Ravaged by
Something..."' Asian Survey 14, no. 2 (1974): 200.
222 Suehiro Akira, Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi, 72.
223 Ibid., 72, 76-80.
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In October 1976 Admiral Sangad, who was then serving as defense minister for the
Democrat Party's Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, led the military high command in a coup
d'etat. Key participants, calling themselves the Administrative Reform Council, consisted in
almost equal measure of naval officers, air force officers, and army general staff officers. 224
Their action had the full support of Thailand's business and commercial class, who had
backed the restoration of parliament three years earlier.2 25 Even Prime Minister Seni, who
was overthrown by the coup, admitted later "to tell you the truth, I felt quite relieved then. I
knew we couldn't handle the situation." 226 On taking power, Sangad assured the public that
the real goal of the action was to stabilize the social and economic situation and restore
democracy as quickly as possible, but on firmer ground.
Although his promises were not widely believed at the time they were made, Admiral
Sangad honored his commitments to restore parliamentary rule and begin the process of
economic and social liberalization. The first months, however, were not auspicious. Two
days after the coup, the king appointed an uncompromising anticommunist judge, Thanin, as
224 In addition to Sangad, who served as the chairman of the group, the most powerful members included Deputy
Supreme Commander General Kriangsak Chamanand (discussed further below), Air Chief Marashal Kamol
Dechatungka, who was placed in charge of overall national security, and Admiral Amorn Sirikaya, the new navy
commander, who was put in charge of internal affairs. David A. Andelman, "New Thai Junta Solidifies Rule;
Curfew Lifted", New York Times, October 8 1976.
225 William Bradley et al., Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implicationsfor U.S. Policy
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1978), 17.
226 In a more general vain, he said, "Democracy did not work at that time. Democracy does not work in a
situation of anarchy. Van Praagh, Thailand's Strugglefor Democracy: The Life and Times ofMR. Seni Pramoj,
184.
172
__
Chapter 4: Thailand
prime minister. Relying heavily on the army (and increasing its budget), Thanin began a
harsh and largely indiscriminate crackdown on leftists, swelling the ranks of guerilla bands in
the countryside with new recruits and pushing foreign investment below even its modest pre-
1976 levels.22 7 In October 1977 Admiral Sangad, still serving as defense minister, led the
high command in a second coup, this time to replace Thanin.
In announcing the coup group's reasons, Sangad highlighted the Thanin government's
harshly repressive tactics, its failure to improve the investment climate, and its lack of
willingness to deal with the new government of Vietnam. 22 8 Sangad also argued that Thanin's
twelve-year timetable for the reintroduction of democracy was "unnecessarily slow and
against the wishes of the people." 229 The high command promulgated a new constitution in
1978, setting parliamentary elections for the following year (1979) and establishing a four-
year schedule for reestablishing effective parliamentary rule. As one historian observed, "For
the first time, the military moved to get rid of a civilian government not because it was too
liberal for their tastes but too conservative." 2 3 0
227 Many of these were moderates - including the Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, the former governor of the Bank of
Thailand and rector of Thammasat University - who almost certainly would not have joined the guerrillas
without the harsh crackdown. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History, 303.
228 Spokesmen for the coup leaders emphasized the economic importance of improving Thailand's image in the
West, especially the United States. Bradley et al., Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and
Implicationsfor U.S. Policy, 57.
229 Murashima Eiji, Nakharin Mektrairat, and Chalermkiet Phiu-nual, Political Thoughts of the Thai Military in
Historical Perspective (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, 1986), 150.
230 Van Praagh, Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj, 196. For a similar
contemporary assessment, see Henry Kamm, "Thai Junta Ousts Civilian Regime, Charging It Delayed Vote Too
Long", New York Times, October 21 1977.
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THE ARMY'S PREFERENCES. One reason that the navy has been able able to reassert
itself in politics since the mid-1 970s is that it has been allied with an increasingly powerful
middle class. The other, more immediate, reason is that the army has been profoundly
divided. Although there were many army faction during this period - too many to discuss in a
brief summary of events - it is possible to divide its politically-minded officers into three
groups: (1) status quo groups organized around senior army line officers (especially in the
First Army command area); (2) young officers bent on purifying the Thai military of
corruption so that it might better achieve the its social and security tasks; and (3) general staff
and other senior technical officers seeking a more professional force and a gradual end to the
military's domination of politics. Here, I discuss the policy choices and beliefs of each,
followed by a short discussion of the often-understated commonalities.
The first group was comprised of factions of line officers organized around different
senior commanders, according to army, academy graduating class, or blood relations. Each
was vying to make its leader the next Sarit or Thanom - both of whom had emerged from
command positions. None sought fundamental change in the role of the military or the
domestic direction of the state, but cooperation among them, even for the defense of the status
quo, was problematic. Hence, despite these factions' common dislike of both the commercial
class and middle class students, only a handful of officers defended Thanom's regime in
1973. It is perhaps a statement on the state of factional politics in the army that two of the
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most important officers who did follow his orders were his son and son's father-in-law. 231 An
attempted coup d'etat in March 1977 was also orchestrated by a father-son combination. 23 2
Army line officers in the Sarit-Thanom mould remained a potentially dominant force within
the military during this period, but none emerged to realize that potential.
A second group was the so-called Young Turks faction (formally known as the Young
Military Officers' Group) of junior officers.233 The Young Turks, organized in 1973, was a
secret group committed to purifying the military of corruption - especially, by eliminating its
involvement in business management. But they did not call for an end to government or
military involvement in projects designed to promote social welfare. On the contrary, they
believed in committing the army more fully to developing the countryside, thereby reducing
the chances for communist recruitment in those areas. The group, though anti-communist,
was almost equally vehement in its distrust and criticism of businessmen. Formed first by
five individuals who had served in Vietnam or against the Thai communist guerrillas in their
own country's northeast, it included eighteen battalion commanders by 1977.
231 Thanom's son, Narong Kittikachom, a colonel who was serving as assistant to the National Executive
Council's director of national security, and most importantly, had ties to most of the battalion commanders in the
First Division (located near Bangkok). Narong's father-in-law was Police Director General Prapass
Charusathiara. David Morrell, "Thailand," Asian Survey 13, no. 2 (1973): 165-66. Heinze, "Ten Days in
October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand," 500.
232 David A. Andelman, "Thai Coup Attempt, Mostly Just a War of Words, Is Foiled", New York Times, March
27 1977.
233 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982).
See also Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 12-14.
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A third group was comprised of staff and technical officers who became a politically
significant force after 1973, marking the first time since the General Staffs attempted coup
against Sarit and his "Coup Group" in 1948 that army staff offices had played an important
role in military politics.234 Staff officers organized the Democratic Soldiers faction shortly
after the student revolution of 1973. Few had ever commanded troops, but they had all served
in planning positions in Thailand's own counterinsurgency war. They believed that
"democratization" - a term they never defined carefully during the 1970s - was the only
solution to its problems. The democratic soldiers supported Admiral Sangad after October
1976, and proved instrumental in supporting General Prem Tinsulanonda - the non-First
Army general that set Thailand firmly on a path to parliamentary rule - during the 1980s.
Although few expected staff officers to remain influential for long following 1976, they
remained a major force in Thai military politics through at least the mid-1990s (see case 4).235
There were important differences between these groups. The second (Young Turks)
group was against participation by military officers in business management. The third group
(Democratic Soldiers) foreswore military coups d'etat as instruments of influence. The first
group (senior line officers) was significantly more distrustful of politicians than the third
(Democratic Soldiers). The Democratic Soldiers favored contact with independent business,
234 On the Democratic Soldiers see Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, especially pages
14-15 and 21-22.
235 Speaking of the October 1977 coup group (led by Admiral Sangad), one group of American observers wrote
in 1978 "The coup group was composed of little-known officers from staff rather than command positions. The
continuing support of senior military officers, which is essential, remains questionable." Bradley et al.,
Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy, 25. In fact, however, the group
remained cohesive and proved able to balance its own enemies against one another.
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labor, and student groups in addition to outreach through state-sponsored organizations; the
other two groups preferred to rely solely on the latter and discourage the former.
But these groups also shared several common fundamental beliefs about the correct
socio-economic organization of the state. They all believed that business tends to be corrupt
and, without close monitoring by the state, has a tendency to exploit the urban poor and, even
more so, rural farmers. In a 1981 public statement, the Young Turks said "Traders and
capitalists have taken advantage of the farmers and other laboring people who are regarded as
the backbone of the country and who have earned their living in a persistent, industrious
manner amidst hardships. These poor farmers and laboring people have been mercilessly
intimidated by some bold-faced traders who lack virtues."236 A strategic document written by
members of the Democratic Soldiers similarly states that "Because Thailand has a liberal
economic system but its state mechanisms for mobilizing resources and distributing benefits
are still weak, some economic groups have been able to take advantage to build up
monopolistic power which inflicts social injustice and material hardship on the people,
creating conditions for War." 237 Another document refers to corrupt businessmen as "dark
influences."23 8 All of these groups also saw the gap between the rich and the poor - and
urban areas and the countryside - as primary threats to national stability and security. They
all believed that the military had a critical role to play in organizing and implementing
developmental projects at the local level. And they all believed that the military should have
236 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks, 89.
237 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 96-97.
238 Ibid., 101.
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a constitutionally sanctioned place in national politics - ensuring both that business interests
would not dominate the agenda and that the interests of the peasants would be heard. As the
Democratic Soldiers warned, "Monopolist groups [i.e., pernicious businesses] have been able
to develop great political bargaining power which is an obstacle to the development of
democracy." 23 9
The staff officers that made up the Democratic Soldiers group was, on a relative scale,
the most liberal army group in terms of their economic, social, and political values during this
period. They worked for reform in cooperation with the navy and politicians from several
liberal political parties. But even the Democratic Soldiers pursued an ideology that was
relatively more integral nationalist than those of its civilian and naval allies.
While army officers clearly had mixed motives during this period, their troop-leading
experience and their heavy exposure to the poor north and northeast regions of the country
(where incomes were one quarter to one third of the national average) almost certainly
influenced their thinking on economic and social issues. While many sought power, none
sought it in conjunction with business or middle class groups, and all - whether or not they
foreswore the military coup d'etat as a valid means to their ends - emphasized the dangers
inherent in an urban-rural divide. As a member of the Young Turks put the issue, "We went
to fight in Laos and [later] in the jungle with the [Thai] communist terrorists. Our feeling
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while fighting in the jungle was that the country was decaying and degenerating because the
mechanisms in the city were bad."2 40
IMPACT ON MILITARY POLICY, 1969-1980
The navy gained new prominence and resources following General Thanom's ouster. After
some discussion about doing away with the position of supreme commander, the post was
retained, with Admiral Sangad as its occupant. Despite a drop in defense spending from 18.2
percent of the budget in 1972 to 16.4 percent in 1975, the navy added six new large offshore
patrol craft to the inventory. 241 Between 1973 and 1976, the navy's manpower grew, from
20,000 to 27,000 (or from 16 percent of the army's to 19 percent). The marine component of
that expanded from 6,500 to 9,000.242 The Ministry of Defense portfolio was given to a non-
army officer, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulladrabya, and the first deputy minister of defense
was a naval officer. Dawee, who had tried to acquire frigates for the navy as deputy minister
of defense in 1968, worked closely with the navy.243
240 Ibid., 44.
241 The Thai government did not break down military budgets by service during this period, but according to
most analysts, the navy's proportion "increased" during this period. See, for example, Ibid., 17. Aggregate
Budget data is found in Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessonsfrom Thailand, 120.
Thak Chaloemitarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 343.
242 Wilson, Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics, 275.
243 The attempted frigate purchase was opposed by the U.S. government, which wanted Thailand to strengthen its
ground forces. The U.S. ambassador suspected the request may have made for political reasons and reported that
the request "may be one of the first fruits of a constitutional Thailand." Cable to Secretary of State Dean Rusk
on Congressional reluctance to approve a military sale to Thailand's Navy. Ambassador Unger describes his
meeting with Dawee. Cable. Department of State. Secret. Issue Date: June 29, 1968. Date Declassified:
November 20, 1995.
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Despite a decline in available resources, the army, coping with a worsening
insurgency, expanded its manpower. It also revised its doctrine, formalizing a Total People's
Defense strategy aimed at maximizing its social and political in the countryside at the grass
roots level. It rapidly built up local militia-type forces in the villages and urban areas.
(Lower middle class vocational students, who had worked with other students for Thanom's
resignation in 1973, were heavily recruited by the army and proved among the most violent
during subsequent military actions.)
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The evidence strongly supports three out of four predictions associated with the civil-military
coalition theory and offers more limited support for the fourth. The navy supported liberal
positions, while the army was divided. Although the navy backed a coup against an elected
government, the action was (like several navy-led coups in Latin America) taken with the
support of the middle class and for the purpose of ensuring a liberal economic order.
The evidence generally supports, if somewhat more weakly, a connection between
domestic politics and grand strategy. On the one hand, the navy made relative gains
immediately after it helped install civilian government (gains it maintained after overthrowing
that government and establishing a pro-reform military government in its place). As the
theory predicts, marine combat forces were the most heavily effected by change. On the other
hand, the magnitude of the shift appears to have been relatively small. While the theory as a
whole holds up well in this case, the data offers only partial support for its predictions on
force structure and doctrine.
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EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
Material interests and, especially, the strategic military environment explain some aspects of
this case. In this case, the best explanation for changes in force structure and doctrine is
probably explained by a combination of the strategic military environment and civil-military
coalition theory.
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Between 1972 and 1975, the estimated
number of communist guerrillas increased from fewer than 6,000 to 8,000.244 Cambodia and
Laos were facing increasingly severe insurgencies. Thailand was under significantly greater
military pressure than it had been since World War II. The pressure along Thailand's
northeastern borders makes the increase in the navy's relative share of resources difficult to
explain in purely strategic terms. On the other hand, within the army, the shift to a Total
People's Defense doctrine and the expansion of paramilitary forces was consistent with the
mounting insurgent threat.
After 1975, shifts in the threat picture are more ambiguous. Thailand did face an
influx of boat people crossing the Gulf of Thailand after that time, and additional naval craft
would be useful in policing Thai waters. But only a small portion of new Indochinese
refugees came by boat. Many more came by land - with Lao representing the largest number
and even many Vietnamese coming by land through Cambodia - and the management of
244 Suehiro Akira, Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi, 72.
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refugees was primarily a new challenge to the army.245 At the same time, the fall of the Lao
and Cambodian governments to communist forces brought communist forces to Thailand's
doorstep, and the domestic insurgency continued to grow, reaching a peak of 11,000 by 1979.
These military pressures may help explain why the Thai navy did not appear to gain relative
to the army between 1976 and 1980.246
Ultimately, it is difficult to understand Thai defense policy between 1969 and 1980
without considering both the military and political threats faced by Thai leaders.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. An explanation
based purely on the services' material interests would suggest that the navy sided with civilian
protesters in 1973 on the expectation of gaining a greater share of the military budget under
parliamentary rule. This is possible, but not likely. The government of General Thanom,
which was overthrown by the 1973 movement, had used some of a growing military budget to
purchase warship in 1969 and again in early 1973. Backing the student rebellion was, in any
case, a high-risk strategy. At worst, the movement would fail, and the navy would once again
find itself, politically and materially speaking, out in the cold. Moreover, even if the student
movement succeeded, there was no guarantee that the new civilian authorities would
245 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Thailand: The Indochinese Refugee Question," in
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:field(DOCID+thOO75). As of 1979, the Thai army was caring
for 149,000 Cambodians.
246 The ratio of manpower between the services remained about the same, and Thailand did not add significant
naval vessels to its inventory.
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appreciably increase spending on naval equipment. In the actual event, the navy received
relatively more of a declining defense budget and its net gains were modest.
Some army factions were clearly angling for factional advantage and parochial gains.
But while there were some army officers who were more self-motivated than others, the
degree of similarity in the political-economic views of these officers is perhaps more
remarkable. The most prominent difference between the factions in this regard was over
whether or not coups d'etat were regarded as legitimate means to their desired ends, but even
those who foreswore coups (of which there was only one group) distrusted businessmen and
believed in the guiding hand of the state.
Case 4: Consolidating Liberal Rule (1980-2002)
The period from 1980 to the present represents a coherent single case because - with the
exception of the interlude between February 1991 and May 1992 - liberal reformers were in
power but struggling against entrenched opposition to overhaul state institutions. But while it
is reasonable to discuss these two decades as a single case, liberal consolidation was achieved
through a series of important but incremental moves. Hence, this treatment is divided into
three parts, each focused on a different problem or group of problems:
· The political and military structural reforms carried out by Prime Minister General
Prem Tinsulanoda between 1980 and 1988.
* The coup d'etat by General Suchinda Kraprayoon in February 1991 and the middle
class civilian movement to end military rule in May of 1992.
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The economic, political, and, military structural reforms carried out under civilian
prime ministers after May 1992.
During much of this period, reformist army officers took leading roles in affecting
liberal change. But, although holding top positions, these reformers were opposed or
threatened by factions representing large portions of the army's officer corps - if not an
outright majority of its members. The case provides an opportunity to examine in greater
detail the differences within the army. At the same time, the navy, significantly more united
than the army, played an important role in the pro-reform coalition. It provided forces that
helped suppress coups d'etat in 1981 and 1985. A year after General Suchinda's February
1991 seizure of power, the navy weighed in on the side of middle class protesters and helped
push the general from power. Although the navy received most acclaim (and the largest
rewards) for its role in ousting Suchinda, perhaps its most important role was its quiet but
clear support for institutional military reforms from the beginning to the end of this period.
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC BASELINE: LIBERAL TRANSITION
The entire period from 1980 to 2002 - with one short setback from 1991 to 1992 - can be
regarded as a long period of transition to a more liberal economic, social, and political order.
The transition occurred in two phases: the first led by annrmy General Prem Tinsulanoda from
1980 to 1988 and the second, after 1988, under parliamentary rule.
Under Prem, change was more gradual, but also more steady than under later civilian
governments. The most significant change during this early phase was recorded in politics,
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rather than in the economic or social spheres, but political change under Prem clearly (and
predictably) set the stage for later economic reform. Politically, the biggest change was
simply that elections were permitted and respected and that the constitution, established in
1978, was upheld. Prem ruled through a parliamentary coalition of liberal parties. In 1983,
he led a successful parliamentary effort to defeat a drive by conservative civilian and military
officials to extend the interim provisions of the 1978 constitution, which granted a variety of
political prerogatives to the military. 247 Whereas previous military prime ministers had
launched coups d'etat against their own governments when faced with recalcitrant
parliamentary opposition, Prem called new elections (in keeping with the constitution).
Elections were held three times, in April 1983, July 1986, and April 1988, and when he could
not establish a coalition after the April 1988 elections, he resigned and allowed the leader of
the largest party to form a new government.
Economic change under Prem was less dramatic. Prem and his technocratic economic
advisors continued to strengthen state planning organizations by, for example, raising the
profile of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), responsible for
drawing up the nation's five year plans. On the other hand, Prem's government sought to
build a cooperative relationship between business and the planning agencies, rather than one
in which the government simply ruled by fiat. A Joint Public and Private Consultative
Committee (JPPCC) was formed, with the representation of both government agencies and
247 The interim clauses, which were due to end in 1983, allowed active duty military officers and other active
civil servants to serve in cabinet, and they gave the senate (which was chosen largely from the military ranks by
appointment) nearly equal power to the elected house. Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-
86, 41.
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three members each from Thailand's three largest industrial associations. The government
also allowed new provincial chambers of commerce to be establishing, with the number rising
from 3 in 1979 to 34 in 1984 to 68 in 1987.248 Although economic change was incremental,
and was not all in one direction, the economy saw net liberalization.
Economic change under civilian rule was less evolutionary, and large sectors of the
economy were rapidly deregulated. Under Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991), of the
provincial business party Chart Thai (Thai Nation), the NESDB was downgraded, and the
Bank of Thailand (an institution with a generally more liberal economic outlook) became the
most important organization in setting macroeconomic and fiscal policy.249 Both the
governments of Chatichai and Chuan Leekpai (Democrat Party, 1992-1995) increased the
flow of investment funds to domestic provincial businesses, which had previously been
largely starved of access. 250 Perhaps most significant of all, civilian government opened the
spigots on foreign direct investment (FDI), giving private firms an alternative source of loan
money and dramatically reducing the government's leverage over industry. Annual FDI
248 But while businessmen were pleased to have some progress, most felt that both the JPPCC and the chambers
of commerce tended to be dominated by the bureaucrat's agenda, rather than their own. On the economy under
Prem, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without
Democracy," 134-39. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," in
Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewson (New York: Routledge, 1997),
26-27.
249 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," 27.
250 Parichart Chotiya, "The Changing Role of Provincial Business in the Thai Political Economy," in Political
Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, ed. Kevin Hewison (London: Routledge, 1997), 254-55.
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inflows increased from around 0.6 percent of total GDP in the early 1980s to 2.5 percent of
GDP during the early 1990s and 6.5 percent of GDP in 1998.25
SERVICE POSITIONS UNDER PREM, 1980-88
The army was divided on Prem's reform agenda, with most line officers deeply suspicious
and staff officers largely supporting it. The navy was part of the pro-reform coalition. It
participated in suppressing coup attempts and backed reform measures intended to extend
greater civilian control over the military.
THE ARMY'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC POSITION, 1980-88. The forces working
against Prem came from both civilian and military circles, but given both the willingness of
integral conservative (i.e., integral nationalist) army officers to cross newly established legal
lines and the entrenched position of the army throughout Thai society, his most dangerous
opposition came from within that organization. Ultimately, Prem and his military allies were
able to balance the army's line factions against one another while undertaking structural
reforms of the military that gradually weakened both the motives for opposition and power of
those groups. This section first reviews the problem of army factions, their sources of power,
and the threat they presented to Prem's regime. It then assesses the nature of Prem's army
supporters and the tactics they used to maintain and strengthen his hold on the military.
251 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailand's Boom and Bust (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1998).
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Line officer factions and army opposition to Prem. Army factionalism presented Prem
with a double-edged sword. On the one hand, he need to and could court some of them to
balance against the others. On the other hand, having promoted any single group, that
faction's power would grow, making it a potential threat to his authority. Prem's relationship
with General Arthit Kamlangek's faction illustrates the dilemma. General Arthit and his
group supported Prem during the early 1980s. As commander of the Second Army Region,
Arthit helped the prime minister suppress a 1981 rebellion by the Young 'Turks, who were,
among other things, seeking to purify the army of vested business interests (of which Arthit
had many). Arthit also used his influence in parliament to block moves by the opposition
Chart Thai party to bring down Prem's government. 2 52 In recognition of Arthit's services and
the ongoing coup threat from other factions, Prem promoted him first to army chief (1982-
1986) then supreme commander (1983-1986). Having reached the top of the military
hierarchy, however, Arthit increasingly challenged Prem's positions and authority, becoming
his greatest nemesis after 1983.
At the start of the 1980s, army leaders had a number of powerful political assets at
their disposal: parliamentary representation, access to the media, the control of mass
organizations, and, in the last resort, soldiers. The first of these, representation in parliament,
was an asset that a senior commander with good connections might mobilize to take direct
(and constitutional) legislative action. According to the December 1978 constitution,
members of the upper house, with the power to effectively veto legislation, were appointed by
252 Suchit Bunbongkam, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 40-41.
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the king - an interim provision set to expire in 1983. In April 1979 over 80 percent of its
members were active military officers. Nominations were forwarded by the supreme
commander, who assigned quotas to the services. In 1979 the quotas gave 60 percent to the
army, 20 percent to the navy, and 20 percent to the air force.253 Soldiers turned politician also
headed several major political parties in the lower house.2 54 Many of the military officers in
both houses retained strong ties to serving military officers and factions.
Many of General Arthit's anti-Prem efforts were centered in parliament and utilized
his factional ties and alliances. In 1983, for example, he Arthit worked with a variety of right-
wing (royalist and army-connected) parties in an attempt to extend the interim clauses of the
1978 constitution. In early 1986 he took measures to mold those same parliamentary allies
into a single organization, the United Democratic Party (UDP). From at least 1985, when he
backed Major General Chamlong Srimuang (a former Young Turk officer) against a
Democrat Party candidate for mayor of Bangkok, he was involved in efforts to defeat political
candidates associated with Prem. 255
A second source of potential power for senior army officers was the army's control
over media outlets. Although an independent print media existed prior to 1980, the army and
253 Kato Kazuhide, Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi. Between 1932 and 1957, the
number of army and navy representatives in parliament were approximately equal.
254 Van Praagh, Thailand's Strugglefor Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj, 198.
255 Barbara Crossette, "Bangkok Elects Ascetic Ex-General as Mayor", New York Times, November 29 1985. It
is not clear whether Chamlong sought help from Arthit. By 1985, he had become more associated with a new
reformist Buddhist organization than he was with the military, and he had publicly criticized Arthit in 1983. On
Chamlong, see Duncan McCargo, Chamlong Srimuang and the New Thai Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1997).
189
Chapter 4: Thailand
other government agencies maintained its own sizable print media. More significantly, all of
the nation's radio and television channels were government owned and operated. The army
managed a disproportionate number of these. With 128 of a total of 523 radio stations, it had
more than any other single organization except the Public Relations Department (with 145).
The army operated eight times the number of stations controlled by parliament (16), and it
controlled more than all other military organizations combined. The navy controlled twenty-
one stations.25 6
General Arthit made extensive use of both supreme headquarters and army media to
support his efforts in parliament, influence administrative policy issues, and weaken the
public's support for Prem. He personally appeared on army television in November 1984 to
attack Prem's decision to devalue the baht (November 1984) and call for both a repeal of the
decision and the removal of responsible cabinet ministers.25 7 Arguments for extending the
interim provision of the constitution and against Democratic Party candidates in the Bangkok
bi-elections in 1985 were delivered on the army's national weekly radio program, The Arnmy
Meets the People. The Democratic Party, was (with some irony) accused of being under the
control of bankers and communists. During General Chamlong's mayoral race against a
wealthy businessman and member of the Democratic Party, Arthit was quoted on army radio
256 Apart from the army and navy's, other military stations included those held by tile police (44), air force (36),
supreme headquarters (16), and office of the secretary of defense (3). Civilian stations included those held by
the University Bureau (12), Post and Telegraph Department (12), Task Force (1 1), and Meteorological
Department (6). Six other agencies held four or fewer. These numbers are for 1998, but they were probably
similar for the mid-1980s. "Army Bids to Hold 124 Radio Lines", Nation, May 6 1998.
257 Nick B. Williams, "In Thailand, Military Still Has the Final Word", Los Angeles Times, October 31 1985.
190
Chapter 4: Thailand
as saying "Only the army has never abandoned the people and its sincerity towards the
people."2 58
A third source of power for senior army officers was control over mass organizations.
The army had been heavily involved in rural development since the late 1950s, and it built on
that base to establish mass organizations in the countryside in the early-1 970s to counter the
Communist Party of Thailand's expansion there.259 The Village Scouts and the National
Defense Volunteers provided an auxiliary combat and intelligence gathering force for the
army. The Volunteer Development for Self-Defense Villages worked primarily to mobilize
resources for developmental projects at the village level. Regardless of their origins,
however, these organizations could and occasionally were diverted to achieve other ends. 260
In his position as army commander and chief of the Internal Security Operations
Command (always held concurrently by the army commander), General Arthit strengthened
and made extensive use mass organizations. For example, he created the Military Reservists
for National Security. The organizations stated goal was to encourage participation in the
democratic political process, but it was used to turn out the vote for political parties affiliated
with General Arthit. Under the Reservists organization, "democratic pavilions" were
established to "educate" rural voters at the sub-district level. In May 1986, shortly before he
258 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 44.
259 On these organizations, see Ibid., 49-68.
260 The Village Scouts, for example, were brought to Bangkok in early 1976 and used to provide fights with
radical university students, creating the appearance of chaos and the need for the military to step in and restore
order.
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was finally removed from active service by Prem, Arthit established "election centers" in each
of the four army regions in an apparent attempt to support his new United Democratic Party.
A fourth and final politically useful asset available to army commanders was access to
soldiers and units deployable in coups d'etat. During Prem's tenure as prime minister, there
were two attempted coup attempts against his government, one in April 1981 and the other in
September 1985. In the latter case, a force of 500 soldiers and two-dozen tanks took over the
Internal Security Operations Command headquarters and radio Thailand. Although officers
of the Young Turks faction led tactical units during this assault (as they had in 1981), there
was strong suspicion that they had the backing of senior army leaders, perhaps even Arthit
himself.261
Supportfrom staff and technical officers. A handful of senior staff and technical army
officers organized Prem's defense against the threat from line officer factions described
above. These individuals, many of whom were former members of the Democratic Soldiers
group during the late 1970s, were relatively more liberal in their economic and political
outlook than the line officers and sought to create a more professional military.
Kriangsak Chomanand, Admiral Sangad's closest collaborator during the October
1977 coup against the hard-line Thanin government and supreme commander from 1976 to
261 Ted Chan, "Letter Links Thai Military Leaders to Coup Attempt", United Press International, January 17
1986.
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1977, was the first long-time staff officer to command the military since at least the 1940s. 2 62
(Again with Sangad's backing, he served from prime minister from 1977 to 1980.) During his
tenure as supreme commander, he was reportedly "not considered an army man."263 But he
did clear the way for other staff officers to reach top army positions. General Saiyud Kerdpol
and Chavalit Yoongchai, also long-time staff officers, followed Kriangsak to the supreme
commander's post in 1981 and 1987 respectively. Chavalit, a communications officer and
founding member of the Democratic Soldiers, played a central role in designing Prem's
domestic military strategy and has arguably been the most important military reformer in
Thailand during the liberalization process of the 1980s and 1990s - pursuing a consistent
agenda first as an advisor to Prem from 1979 to 1986, supreme commander from 1987 to
1990, defense minister from 1995 to 1997, prime minister from 1996 to 1997, and once again
defense minister after 2001. Both generals Saiyud and Chavalit brought with them a broad
network of general staff colleagues.
Under Prem's administration, senior staff officers served three functions. First, unlike
every faction with which Prem made tactical alliances between 1980 and 1988, the staff
officers never attacked his policies and served as a reliable base around which to organize
more instrumental coalitions. Second, they drafted a new strategy for the war against
Thailand's communist insurgency, embodied in the 1980 Prime Ministerial Order No.
66/2523. That order called for a more political approach to the guerrillas (as opposed to a
262 Kriangsak's biography on the official government site on Thai prime ministers does not mention service as
commander of the army and suggests that instead he had been promoted from army chief of staff to supreme
commander in 1976, while Sangad was serving as minister of defense.
263 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86.
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strictly military one) and more democratic engagement with the general civilian population of
Thailand's remote areas - tactics that would better serve Prem's domestic agenda than the
status quo treatment of large areas of the northeast as a general war zone. The third function
these individuals performed was to begin military structural reforms that would, in the long
run, diminish the threat posed by the army's line factions.
Structural military reforms, which began tentatively during the 1980s and accelerated
in the mid-1990s, revolved primarily around efforts to centralize decision-making on key
military issues (such as military appointments and budgets). In 1981 Supreme Commander
Saiyud appointed the three service commanders as deputy supreme commanders. Although
largely symbolic, the move was intended to restore the equality of the services in fact as well
as principle - as well as to subordinate all three to a higher authority. In 1987 Supreme
Commander Chavalit ushered the Military Service Regulations Act through parliament,
establishing a Defense Council to decide on budgets and promotions. The Defense Council
was chaired by the defense minister and includes the supreme commander, members of the
supreme commander's staff, the service commanders, and four other officers from each of the
services.
THE NAVY'S POLITICAL POSITION, 1980-88. The navy, together with the air
force, served as a loyal coalition partner for Prem and his general staff supporters, especially
Saiyud and Chaovalit. The technical services gave the pro-reform group critical military
capabilities, as well as the numbers they needed in administrative and parliamentary settings
to achieve their ends.
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This military support was particularly important in facing down a March 31, 1981
coup attempt.264 The revolt was led by members of the Young Turks, a faction that had been
formed in the early 1970s by junior officers seeking to cleanse the military of corrupt
influences and return it to an idealized, integral nationalist past. The Young Turks, now
lieutenant colonels and colonels, brought all or parts of 18 battalions, totaling 8,000 men, into
the streets of Bangkok, seizing key sites and announcing the formation of a new government.
Some members of the high command were captured and put on television reading vague
statements neither explicitly condemning nor disavowing the coup. Others, including the
army's deputy commander and, most ominously, the commander of the First Army Region,
appeared to be more active in their cooperation.
With a large hostile force in the capital, General Prem faced the threat that the
wholesale defection of the First Army might effectively seal the government's fate. He
gambled on quick action by small forces. The commanders of the navy and the air force
declared quickly for Prem and remained committed to the government's defense, as did
Arthit, the commander of the Second Army Region covering southern Thailand. Prem moved
his headquarters - together with the royal family - to the Second Army Headquarters of
Korat. The navy's commander, Admiral Samut Sahanavin, moved to the Sattahip naval base
southeast of Bangkok and remained in close touch with Prem. The air force commander
remained at the Don Muang airbase outside of Bangkok and sent F-5 fighter-bombers over
264 This account is taken primarily from John McBeth, "The Coupmakers' Order of Battle," Far Eastern
Economic Review, April 10-16 1981. Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A War of Words But Not of Bullets," Far
Eastern Economic Review, April 10-16 1981.
195
Chapter 4: Thailand
rebel positions in Bangkok in a show of force. On April 3, Prem ordered Bangkok cleared
and moved elements of six loyal battalions into the capital - four battalions from the Second
Army airlifted by C-130s into Don Muang air force base, together with a reinforced marine
battalion moving into the city from Sattahip. Together, they had perhaps half the manpower
of the coup leaders.
Despite the prospects for a major confrontation, the incident ended with only minor
bloodshed. Two Young Turk regimental commanders (including its most aggressive
commander) and the First Army Region's deputy commander were captured when their jeep
ran into one of the government's advancing columns. The rebels appeared confused by the
rapid thrust, and aside from scattered skirmishing, most of the rebel forces surrendered
peacefully. Most of the Young Turk officers were then cashiered from the army. Prem's
victory, viewed from the perspective of the first day's action, was unlikely. It hinged on three
factors: (1) quick declarations of loyalty from enough operational commanders (including the
commanders of the navy, the air force, and the Second Army Region commander) to give key
senior officers pause before declaring fully for the rebels; (2) the operational mobility
provided by the navy and, especially, the air force;26 5 (3) and quick, decisive, smart action by
Prem, including his quick action to move the royal family.
265 In addition to being able to move troops, command of the air allowed the personal mobility of key leaders -
and lack of it hampered their mobility. Prem's first attempt to escape Bangkok was foiled by army helicopter
gunships, but later, within one day of the coup' launch, the air force was active and it was the coup leaders who
could not travel by air.
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Following the coup attempt, General Saiyud (a professional staff officer and former
member of the Democratic Soldiers faction) became supreme commander, and the navy (and
air force) worked closely with him. In late 1981 the navy backed General Saiyud's plan to
make the service commanders into deputy supreme commanders - a move opposed by Arthit,
who had been promoted to army commander after the March 31 coup attempt.26 6 In 1983, the
navy backed Prem and once again opposed Arthit on the issue of extending the interim
provisions of the 1978 constitution.2 67 The amendment would have allowed the army to
maintain its appointed positions in the parliament's upper House (and effective veto power
over legislation) for four years and perhaps longer. The amendment failed by a razor thin
margin, and without the support of the pro-reform military bloc in parliament, consisting of
the navy, the air force, and several members of the Democratic Soldiers faction, it would have
passed.2 68
In September 1985, the navy again assisted in the suppression of an army coup. The
coup was launched by several cashiered Young Turks and their former soldiers, this time
numbering only 500 men and a handful of tanks. The navy's commander again declared early
for the government, and a marine task force was among the first several battalion-sized units
266 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 24.
267 Niel Kelly, "Thailand Overrules Miiltary to Move Closer to Democracy", Christian Science Monitor, March
17 1983.
268 John McBeth, "Politicians Win in Parliament, But the Military Strikes Back: The Sweet and the Sour," Far
Eastern Economic Review, March 31 1983. Even with Saiyud's pro-reform coalition voting against the measure,
the vote was constitutionally ambiguous. A number of parliamentary positions were empty due either to death or
retirement, and the constitution did not specify whether amendments needed over half of the authorized number
of members or more than half of the sitting members of parliament. The difference was decisive, and much
debate followed.
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mobilized for action. (The marine force was tasked with recapturing one of the three radio
stations held by coup forces.26 9) Members of Class 7, a rival faction to the Young Turks, held
key commands in the Bangkok garrison and the coup was easily defeated. But a number of
serving and former generals, including Arthit, were investigated after the coup, and there is
strong circumstantial evidence that Arthit was involved.
The services' relationships with civilians remained a study in contrasts throughout this
period. Army generals cultivated alliances with demagogic urban politicians like Samak
Sundaravej, whose base of support was among Bangkok's lower classes. 270 Union leaders in
Bangkok were among the only prominent civilians to publicly welcome the brief three-day
reign of the Young Turks during their March 31, 1981 coup effort.27' And two labor leaders
attempted to rally public support for one-day Young Turk coup in September 1985.272 Naval
officers, on the other hand, remained closely affiliated with the pro-business Democrat Party,
as they had been since 1951. In a closely watched by-election in May 1985, Democrat Party
candidate Admiral Somboon Chuapibun resoundingly defeated an army general, running as
part of Samak's populist Prachakorn Thai Party, for one of Bangkok's seats in parliament.
Admiral Somboon's popularity was due in no small part to his outspoken defense of
269 Royal Thai Army, White Book on the Chronology of the Coup Developments on 9th September 1985 (Nexis,
October 5, 1985 [cited September 1 2003]).
270 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," 24.
271 Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A War of Words But Not of Bullets."
272 John McBeth and Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A Barrage of Cannon Fire Bloodies a Failed Coup," Far Eastern
Economic Review, September 19 1985.
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democratic principles during the 1983 debate over the extension of the constitution's interim
provisions.27 3
In May 1986 Prem removed General Arthit from his post as supreme commander, the
first time an individual had ever been removed from the post before his term had expired.
(The prime minister prepared for the move by engineering the appointment of rivals to key
commands around Bangkok and, immediately prior to announcement, moving under escort to
the Second Army Region headquarters.2 7 4) Arthit was replaced by the navy's commander,
Admiral Sup Kotchesenee. Alone among military organizations, the navy had both provided
consistent support to Prem and his reform agenda and had significant operational ground
forces.275 In 1986, the size of the marine corps was increased by 50 percent, from 13,000 to
20,000. And in 1987, Chavalit began negotiations with China for the purchase of naval
frigates, the first step towards the substantial expansion of Thailand oceangoing fleet.276
273 John McBeth, "Setback for Samak: The Democrats Regain a Seat in a Bangkok By-Election and Claim This
is the Beginning of Their Resurgence in the Capital," Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23 1985.
274 John McBeth, "Pre-emptive Strike: Prem Fires Arthit to Stop Army Meddling in Election," Far Eastern
Economic Review 1986.
275 In this latter aspect, the navy differed from the Democratic Soldiers faction, which was comprised primarily
of staff officers. The air force had only a limited air marine. Moreover, the air force's loyalty to liberal
reformers after 1980, while generally reliable, was less ironclad than that of the navy. Part of its air marine was
involved in the 1985 coup, and its commander threw his weight fully behind General Suchinda's coup in 1992
(described below). On all other major issues observed during this period, however, the air force acted as a core
member of the reform group.
276 When Chavalit, who was serving as Prem's military advisor in 1986, became defense minister in 2001, he
engineered the appointment of another naval officer to the post of supreme commander.
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THE SERVICES UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1991-1992
Chatichai Choonhavan's government (1988-1991) proved less adept at managing military
factions and coalitions than had Prem's. Chatichai allowed Class 5 officers (from the Military
Academy Class of 1958) to dominate key operational commands, without balancing that
faction with those of competing groups or maintaining a core pro-reform faction composed of
officers from the technical services and branches.277 In February 1991 Class 5 officers
executed a coup and established a military-dominated government. Although the government
lasted less than a year and a half, it was able to reverse (if only temporarily) many of the
liberal economic and administrative reforms that had been undertaken by Prem and Chatichai
Choonhavan (Chart Thai party, 1988-91). The navy remained largely aloof from the military
government and protected protesters from army attack during the anti-government
demonstrations of May 1992 that ultimately restored parliamentary rule.
The 1991 coup was planned and executed by the Class 5 faction under its class
president, army commander General Suchinda Kraprayoon. A National Peacekeeping
Council (NPKC) was created to control political events behind the facade of an appointed
civilian prime minister. Officially, it included Supreme Commander Sunthorn Kongsompong
and the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and police. In fact, almost all key decisions
were made by three senior army and one air force officer - specifically, generals Suchinda,
Sunthorn, Issapong Noonpackdee (Suchinda's brother-in-law and Interior Minister under the
277 The rise of the Class 5 group admittedly dated to Prem's regime, but judging by Prem's past behavior, had he
remained in power as prime minister, he would have taken measures to hedge against that faction's defection.
Chavalit, appointed supreme commander in 1987, remained in that post until 1990, but the pro-reform military
coalition was in disarray by early 1991.
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NPKC), and Air Marshal Kaset Rojananil.2 78 While the naval commander was present on the
NPKC, he remained a passive member, a fact appreciated by political leaders after the
restoration of parliament: No naval officers were arrested or reassigned. 279
In May 1992, when massive crowds of largely middle class protesters sought an end to
military rule, the navy's position became more visibly differentiated from that of the army.
Protests began after General Suchinda announced in April 1992 that he would personally
assume the post of prime minister despite earlier assurances that he would not. Informal
surveys by reporters on the scene indicated that a large percentage of the protesters, who
numbered over 200,000 by May 17, were well-to-do white collar workers.2 80 On May 18
Suchinda ordered the suppression of the democracy movement, and police and army units
began using deadly force against the crowds. According to government figures released later,
40 civilians were killed and 600 were wounded. Reports of the missing ranged from 70 to
1,200.
At the critical moment, the marine corps staked a clear position against the use of
deadly force. The first public revelation of the marine position came on the evening of May
278 Air Marshal Kaset was a member of contemporary of Suchinda's, and attended the pre-cadet school with the
officers of the army's Class 5. After becoming commander of the air force, he purged its top ranks of rivals.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that his following within the air force was deep, and after the restoration of
civilian rule in 1992 (and the removal of Kaset) the air force was far more supportive of liberal reform than was
the army.
279 Three senior army generals and an air force officer were arrested, while several other members of the army
were reassigned.
280 David Murray, Angels and Devils: Thai Politics from February 1991 to September 1992 (Bangkok: White
Orchid Press, 1996), 140-42.
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18. Marine forces guarding the western entrance to the city center at the Pinklao Bridge
allowed fleeing protesters to pass through their ranks and escape pursuing soldiers. The
following day, newspapers reported that one marine officer at the scene said "we will not use
force against the people."281 Although it does not explicitly refer to a split in the military's
ranks, an official army report on the May 1992 violence refers to even greater confusion at the
same bridge as army infantry units attempted to pass over it into the city, causing a
confrontation between the units that the army report officially ascribed to poor
coordination. 28 2
Historian David Van Praagh, in his assessment of the May 1992 events, suggests that
the threat of an intra-military civil war led Suchinda and his colleagues to relinquish power on
May 24 th. He argues that army units opposed to the government's actions had been mobilized
by retired supreme commander Prem (then serving as advisor to King Bhumiphol) and were
moving on Bangkok.283 While that may (or may not) have been the case, the marines, already
in Bangkok, were almost certainly the first unit to openly flout the orders of the high
command, and their actions likely had a major impact on the thinking of Suchinda and his
companions.
281 Ibid., 168.
282 "Phichit Panel Throws Light on Black May", The Nation, June 29 1999.
283 Van Praagh cites reports by reliable diplomatic and military sources. Van Praagh, Thailand's Struggle for
Democracy: The Life and Times ofM.R. Seni Pramoj, 261-65.
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Following the May 1992 violence and the restoration of democratic rule, the navy
received a double bounce. It benefited both from its lack of involvement in the events of May
1992 themselves and, as a consequence of its distance from those events, from its ability to
maintain its organizational autonomy in the post-May 1992 environment. The navy came
away from those events as an organization that was publicly recognized as a disciplined,
professional force that could provide a model for, and perhaps even assist in, the restructuring
of a military that would not intervene in politics. As one observer remarked "The only arm of
the military to emerge from the tragedy with some of its honor intact was the navy." 284 The
navy itself only vaguely veils its satisfaction with the public acclaim it has won since the
1970s and, especially, during the events of 1992. Its official Website reports that,
"By the 1970s, Thais began calling for more democracy. In the resulting
upheaval, the Navy unwittingly found itself in a conciliatory position.... [In
1992], the gates of Navy headquarters were thrown open to people fleeing the
violence. Ironically, simply by doing its job, the RTN scored a major media
and public relations coup, inspiring loyalty and respect for the military from
the very people who were protesting!"285
In return for its support for democracy in 1992, the navy was rewarded with approval
on a variety of new procurement contracts (discussed further below in section on force
structure). The Far Eastern Economic Review reported "The navy's non-involvement [in the
May 1992 massacre] did not go unnoticed, either by the public or the elected civilian
government which came into power in September 1992." Given the "favorable political
284 Murray, Angels and Devils: Thai Politicsfrom February 1991 to September 1992, 168.
285 Royal Thai Navy, Inside the Royal Thai Naval Academy ([cited September 1 2003]); available from
http://www.navy.mi.th/newwww/eindex.php.
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mood towards it," the article quoted one Western diplomat as saying, "the Thai navy is in a
rush to buy now."286
The army emerged from May 1992 battling to preserve its autonomy, especially over
personnel management issues. When Prime Minister Leekpai attempted to introduce
legislation that would penalize the leaders of abortive coups in early 1993, army commander
General Wimon Wongwanit replied that coups were caused by bad government, not military
irresponsibility. He argued that "when something's wrong and the politicians won't do
anything to correct it, it will be up to the people whether a coup takes place or not."287 Two
years later, when Defense Minister Chavalit sought to block the appointment to army
commander of General Phaibun Emphan, a military classmate of General Suchinda and
participant in the May 1992 suppression activities, Wimon again warned, "If they [members
of parliament] want to make changes [to the military's personnel reshuffle list], let them. I
wouldn't mind. But I think they understand what they have to do if they do not want the
military to become involved in politics."28 8
By 1993, it was clear that the new civilian government was using both naval and air
force leaders as point men in an effort to separate the military from politics. In October 1993,
Prime Minister Chuan invited the commanders of both those services to separate meetings
286 Rodney Tasker, "Silent Service: Navy Reaps Rewards of Steering Clear of Politics," Far Eastern Economic
Review, October 21 1993.
287 "Army Chief Does not Rule Out Coup Possibility", The Nation, January 25 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-0125.
288 "All Set for the Changing of the Guard", The Nation, July 23 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0723.
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where, according to one source, "he urged them to help protect the country's democratic
system." Prime Minister Chuan had, the same source said, "a lot of faith and confidence in
the two commanders as he considered them tough professional soldiers who would not stray
from the democratic system."289 Following their October 1993 meetings with the Prime
Minister, both naval and air force leaders reaffirmed their commitment to democracy and the
civilian government. The naval commander "pledged to distance himself from politics,"
while the air force commander offered a similar statement, saying "one of our main policies in
the air force is non-interference in politics."2 90
SERVICES POSITIONS DURING LIBERAL CONSOLIDATION, 1995-2002
From 1995 to the present the civilian authorities in Thailand have introduced a number of
structural reform initiatives. Many of these measures have been shepherded past the military
by the same pro-reform military coalition - including army staff officers, the navy, and the air
force - that supported Prem's reforms during the 1980s. General Chavalit (who was an
original member of this pro-reform coalition) played a central role once again as defense
minister (1995-1997), prime minister (1996-1997), and again as defense minister (2001-
present). But he could have not have succeeded without a solid coalition, and the navy was
his most steadfast partner. While the degree of opposition by senior army line officers and
289 "New Commanders Reaffirm Apolitical Status", Bangkok Post, October 2 1993, in FBIS-EAS-1993-1002.
290 Ibid. By all appearances, the commanders of the two services coordinated both their military and political
positions after 1992 more closely than they had historically. During a ceremony at the Sattahip naval base,
airforce commander Kan Phimanthip was made an honorary admiral. He used that occasion to deliver a message
that seemed to reflect the position of both the navy and airforce: "The military's worst fault in the past was its
interference in politics, which led to various troubles. But now that we have proven our grounds of
noninterference, we will in time regain the support and confidence of the people." "Air Force Chief Warns
Military to Avoid Politics", The Nation, September 30 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-0930.
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their factions may have declined somewhat during this period, the change was incremental,
and many army leaders bitterly opposed political and economic liberalization and military
reform.
POLITICAL REFORM. Shortly after taking office in July 1995, Prime Minister
Banharn Sinlapa-acha established the Political Reform Committee, charged with preparing the
ground for further democratizing the constitution. Defense Minister Chavalit invited the
services to meet with key members of that organization to receive briefings on the
committee's thinking. But even before the army could meet with members of the committee,
official army media organizations attacked the committee. In an August 1995 article in the
Army Times, published by the Royal Thai Army's Information Center, an officer from the
Army Secretariat Office published a satirical piece openly mocking the committee and its
agenda. The officer wrote that the Political Reform Committee's plan was a matter of "taking
away power from the powerful by the unpowerful," and stated that Mr. Chumphon (the
committee's chairman) had been made a "clown" for chairing the committee.291
Later in the same month, the Army's Sayamanusati radio program launched a broader
attack on the Prime Minister himself. The program blasted the government for failing to
solve the problem of soaring prices for essential goods and called for a courageous "social
manager" or "administrator of society" to take change and solve these problems. Democratic
activists from the Campaign for Popular Democracy saw the program's "social manager" as
291 "Army Paper'Ridiculed' Political Reform Panel", Bangkok Post, August 16 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0816.
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being a transparent surrogate term for "army rule," and the program's overall message as an
invitation to coup d'etat. Although the army commander, General Wimon Wongwanit denied
direct involvement, he did defend the program, saying that "The editorial may have been too
harsh, but we only try to present the truth."2 92
The navy proved more receptive to constitutional change. Concerning army radio
criticisms of the Banham government, the navy's commander, Admiral Prachet Siri Siridet,
would say only that the navy "has nothing to do with it."293 In August 1997, after the details
of the proposed constitutional revisions had been decided, the navy's new commander
Admiral Vijitr, the navy's commander said that he had examined the draft charter and would
"almost certainly vote for it," while the army's commander, General Chettha Thanajaro, was
noncommittal.2 94
MILITARY REFORM. The navy was also more receptive than the army on issues of
military reform. Although military reforms proposed by Chavalit were multi-faceted, the
most important involved strengthening the hand of the Defense Minister vis-a-vis the supreme
commander. Under one such measure, many general staff functions, including coordination,
planning, and research, would also be transferred from the supreme commander's office to
that of the permanent secretary of defense. Whereas the supreme commander was, by custom,
292 Information from this paragraph is from "Army Comments Trigger Extensive Reaction, CPD Criticizes
Program", The Sunday Post, August 27 1995, in FBIS-FTS- 1995-0827.
293 Ibid.
294 "Army Chief Remains Non-Committal on Draft Charter", Bangkok Post, August 21 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-
0821.
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chosen by his predecessor and therefore less subject to political control, the permanent
secretary of defense (who was not actually permanent) was a direct selectee and subordinate
of the defense minister.29 5
Another of Chavalit's measures was designed to bring the Defense Council,
responsible for reviewing and forwarding the services budget and personnel proposals, under
the control of the defense minister and strengthen its functions. In effect, control of the
Defense Council was determined by how seats on the body were apportioned. Under the
existing structure, officers from the army commander's chain of command and officers
appointed by the supreme commander had a controlling majority. Under the proposed
structure, a clear majority would either be appointed by the defense minister, or be reserved
from individuals from organizations directly controlled by him.296
The navy proved more receptive to the reform of these military institutions than the
army. According to an August 1995 article from The Nation, the navy's commander
"guardedly supported" Chavalit's plan for centralizing budgets under a revised Defense
295 Many of Chavalit's "structural" reforms, were actually structural fixes for problems that were more
customary in nature than structural. The power of appointment within the military was one of the most
troublesome and ambiguous issues left over from decades of military rule. Although the Defense Minister might
"legally" be entitled to "intervene" in the selection of a Supreme Commander, custom, as emphasized by senior
army officers, dictated otherwise. The power of custom is witnessed by the fact that during a 1995 personnel
reshuffle Chavalit found it necessary to say "I believe that there will not be any more interference [in military
selections]." (Emphasis added.) "Defense Minister Discusses Military Plans", Naeo Na, October 16 1995, in
FBIS-FTS-1995-1016. "Think Tank for Thai Military Proposed", Bangkok Post, October 5 1998, in FBIS-FTS-
1998-0805.
296 These would include seven retired officers appointed directly by the minister of defense, five officers serving
in specific positions within the defense ministry staff, and two members of the Royal Aide de'Camp's
Department. For more details and numbers on the old and new strutures, see "Concerns Expressed Over
Proposed Change to Defense Council", The Nation, July 28 1988, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0728. "Think Tank for
Thai Military Proposed".
208
Chapter 4: Thailand
Council, while the army remained "firmly against the plan." A high-ranking army officer
explained, "Each of the armed forces has always tried to get as much money as possible." He
asked, "Who would back off?" 297 The answer is, of course, that under the proposed structure,
the army might occasionally be forced to back down. Senior army officers also objected to
giving the Defense Council greater authority over military transfers. Army General Phaibun,
for example, argued "there would not be any problem with military reshuffles if everything is
based on a decision made by the commander of the three armed forces with the approval of
the Supreme Commander."29 8
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES. The army and the navy have taken a direct
interest in different economic and social causes and formed partnerships with different types
of social groups.
Army officers demonstrated a continuing interest in the welfare of rural peasants - and
have continued to do so some two decades after the end of the communist insurgency. As one
observer has remarked, "Every chief of the army since 1990 has emphasized this
[developmental] role and declared that soldiers have a duty to improve the living conditions
of the people." 299 While most of this development attention was and is targeted in rural areas,
during the 1980s and 1990s the army also began showing increasing concern for the urban
297 "Navy Chief on Centralized Armed Forces Budget", The Nation, August 22 1995, in Navy Chief on
Centralized Armed Forces Budget.
298 "Military Rejects Proposal on Force Reshuffle", Bangkok Post, December 15 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1215.
299 Suchit Bunbongkam, "Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads," in Military Professionalism in
Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001), 82.
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poor. General Arthit used his position as chief of the Capital Security Command (CSC) to
peacefully resolve several pending labor problems and improve the quality of life in some
squatter areas dramatically. In the words of one observer, Arthit "has demonstrated to the
poor and the deprived that he has power, authority, influence and most of all, a willingness to
help."30 0 Nor was the interest of army officers in these subjects purely official or tactical in
nature. The Young Turk officer, Chamlong Srimuang, wrote his Master's degree thesis at the
US Naval Postgraduate School on labor unrest in Thailand. After retiring from the army he
went on to become mayor of Bangkok, largely on the strength of his appeal to the urban
working class, but both his early interest in the subject and his ascetic lifestyle after becoming
mayor both suggest more genuine commitment to the issues than tactical calculation.3 01
As in past decades, the civilian organizations and groups with which the navy was
closely associated in the 1990s were the leading forces for liberal political, economic, and
social change. The Democratic Party, which represented a broader range of liberal interests
including moderate economic and political decentralization, continued to enjoy strong ties
with the navy.302 Both the liberal press and liberal academic institutions also continued to
have a generally favorable view of the navy and its causes, especially after 1992. Prominent
300 Suchit Bunbongkarn, The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86, 59-60.
301 For a sympathetic treatment, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks, 28-29. For a less
sympathetic one, see McCargo, Chamlong Srimuang and the New Thai Politics.
302 Admiral (and Senator) Surawut Maharom, for example, was known to have strong ties to the party and, had
the Democrat Party regained power in 1996, was a candidate for the post of Permanent Secretary of Defense.
"Military Reshuffle '95 Analysis: Big Chiu Controls 30 Percent", Athit, October 6-12 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-
1006. The party sympathies of naval officers during the 1990s were almost certainly more disparate than they
were in past decades. But this trend may be seen as a function of the movement of the political center itself
towards moderate liberal positions, relative to the days when dominant army officers ensured that the center
remained conservative and state centered.
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liberal papers, such as The Nation and the Bangkok Post, strongly supported naval expansion
during the mid-1 990s and, for the most part, have continued to provide sympathetic coverage
to the present. A 1994 article in The Nation predicted that the navy would become "the most
influential policy decision-maker in 2010."3 03
All of these elements were brought together in a series of 1999 discussions galvanized
by liberal nationalists in Chuan's Democratic administration on Thailand's future. The Nation
reported, "Interestingly, the Royal Thai Navy has [been] featured in all of these debates."30 4
The army did not participate in any. Among these discussions was a seminar co-organized by
the nation's top two elite liberal universities (Thammasat and Mahidol) and the navy on
"Thailand's National Power in the 21 st Century."30 5 During the conference, the predominant
messages echoed by variety of "academics and social critics" were that Thailand could not
isolate itself against the trend towards globalization and that it needed stronger systems of
deliberative democracy, a knowledge-based economy, and thoroughgoing economic reform to
cope with such a transition.306 Other discussions have included debates on building a canal
across southern Thailand linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a move supported by the navy
303 The article is quoted in J.N. Mak and B.A. Hamzah, "Navy Blues," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 17
1994.
304 "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra Canal".
305 The navy began its co-sponsorship of the annual seminar in 1998, indicating an interesting institutional
relationship between these organizations. The Nation touched on the 1999 conference in a series of reports. The
reports included: Ibid. "Knowledge Crucial to Nation", The Nation, August 28 1999. "Thais Told to Aid China
on Global Stage", The Nation, August 27 1999.
306 "Knowledge Crucial to Nation".
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but opposed for years by the army leaders who have been concerned about the implications
for the government's relationship with the Malay minority population in the south.307
EXPLAINING ARMY/NAVY DIFFERENCES
By 1980 each of the services - and especially the army - had well developed political-economic
ideologies. Conscription and involvement in the hinterland gave the army a sense of itself as the
representative and protector of the nation's base. In his (unsuccessful) argument for extending the
interim provisions of the 1978 constitution - especially those clauses preserving appointed positions in
the upper house - one major general suggested that without appointment "We shall not have
representatives of the poor people, farmers, and workers in parliament." He estimated that an elected
parliament would produce 20 percent old politicians, while 80 percent would be "influential persons
and the rich."308 Although clearly self-serving, these beliefs reflected the army's sense of itself as a
democratic reflection of Thai society. As one long-time observer of Thai military politics remarked,
"The army is a huge organization, with traditions deeply rooted in socity, with its own culture and
ethics." Change, he suggested, would take time.309 The navy's political economic views similarly
reflected its own composition and strengths, but rather than reflecting Thai society at large, it views
itself as representing the most productive vanguard of that society.
307 "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra Canal".
308 "Army Leader Questioned on Threat to 'Stage Exercises"', BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 18
1983. These same views found their way into Arthit's official army report on the subject.
309 The comment, by Suchit Boonbongkarn, is cited in Ron Corben, "Development-Thailand: Army Chief Leads
Troops on Reform Mission", Inter Press Service, March 4 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS. Despite the difficulties and
time required, Suchit sees reform as inevitable.
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MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY, 1980-2002
During this period - especially between 1987 and 1996 - Thailand saw a major shift in the
balance between the continental and maritime aspects of its strategy. Maritime forces
expanded, and naval doctrine became more ambitious. Some change was also seen in the
army's force structure, though of a more limited nature.
NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE. Between 1980 and 1986, the biggest
change in naval strength was in the marine corps, which grew from 14,000 to 20,000 in 1986.
The government signed contracts for two corvettes in 1983 (commissioned into the force in
1986 and 1987), but those ships only maintained the size of the fleet. Between 1987 and
1990, however, a rapid expansion of the fleet began. During that period, contracts were
signed for three additional corvettes from Italy (September 1987), six frigates from China
(four in July 1988 and two in September 1989), and an amphibious assault ship capable of
supporting Sea Harrier aircraft (1990). These ships were all delivered between 1991 and
1997. In addition, contracts were signed in 1994 for the lease of two Knox class frigates, and
the navy took delivery of those ships in 1995 and 1996. Between 1991 and 1997, the number
of major surface ships in the inventory increased from eight to twenty, and the total tonnage
of those ships more than tripled, from 13,000 tons to 47,000 tons. Between 1986 and 1996,
the average age of warships in the fleet decreased from 28 years to 19 years. The amphibious
assault ship added a capability not enjoyed by any other country in East Asia, and four of the
new frigates were larger and more capable than anything in the Thai inventory during the
1980s.
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In addition to major surface ships, the navy added or strengthened a number of other
capabilities in the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1995, the Thai navy negotiated for and
purchased ten AV-8 Sea Harrier vertical lift fighters and six S-70 Seahawk heavy lift
helicopters for the Chakri Naruebet and eighteen A-7 attack aircraft for use from ground-
based sites. For a force that had not possessed any ground or carrier based fixed wing fighters
since 1951, the AV-8s and A-7s represented a significant new capability. Minesweeping
vessels, logistical ships, and new patrol craft rounded out the fleet, and new sealift assets were
purchased for the marine corps.310 Commensurate with the addition of tonnage and other
capabilities, the navy's manpower also increased, both in absolute terms, and relative to that
of the army. Between 1988 and 1998 the navy's manpower increased by 140%, from 22,000
to 53,000 (not including marine personnel). While naval manpower represented only 8.6% of
total military manpower in 1988, the figure climbed to 17.3% by 1998.
In 1993, one year after the navy was hailed for its role in bringing General Suchinda's
military regime down, the government adopted three new defense-planning documents, all of
which emphasized the importance of naval power.311 The Thai navy also strengthened its
intellectual infrastructure during the 1990s and improved its capacity to promote maritime
thinking and planning. The navy introduced five-year plans in 1993 (the first of which run
from 1993 to 1998 and the second of which covers 1999-2004), strengthening its ability to
perform three tasks: design its desired force structure in more detail than was previously
310 The supreme commander, an army general, vetoed a proposed tank purchase for the marines.
311 Panitan Wattanayagorn, "Thailand: The Elite's Shifting Conception of Security," in Asian Security Practice:
Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 438-39.
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possible; press its claims for domestic resource allocation based on an official planning
document; and justify the importance of the navy as an institution in the court of public
opinion.312 In 1994, the navy formed a think tank modeled consciously on the US Center for
Naval Analysis within the Advanced Naval Studies Institute to coordinate the navy's
message.3 13 The Naval Institute and its leadership pushed for the formation of a Maritime
Affairs Research and Development Institute of Thailand, which would carry out additional
research on maritime matters in coordination with other government agencies and the private
sector.314 Together with the Naval Operations Department, a stint commanding the Advanced
Naval Studies Institute is becoming one stop on the way towards becoming commander of the
navy, ensuring that the maritime ideas and policies generated at the navy's new think tank are
absorbed by the navy's top leadership.
In 1993 the commander of the navy said the force was moving from a "brown water to
a blue water" role.315 Clearly, the navy's first five-year plan (1993-1998) reflected a shift in
that direction. According to that document, the navy sought not only additional frigates, it
also wanted to purchase at least two submarines. The submarines would be of little use for
operations within Thailand's 200 mile EEZs, which are confined and shallow, but they would
be of potentially greater use in the South China Sea or Indian Ocean. With the preponderance
312 "Hopes Pinned on Maritime Security Policy", The Nation, July 26 1999. One of the prime purposes of the
second five-year plan was "to educate the public about the importance of maritime defense."
313 Sermsuk Kasitipradit, "Disputes Over Spratlys Worry Navy's Top Brass", Bangkok Post, June 30 1997, in
FBIS-FTS-1997-0630.
314 Ibid.
315 Tasker, "Silent Service: Navy Reaps Rewards of Steering Clear of Politics."
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of naval assets then based on the Gulf of Thailand coast, a new naval base was also to be set
up on the Andaman Sea coast to cover contingencies to the west of Thailand. There was also
talk in 1993 of acquiring a second aircraft carrier, although that item was not included in the
first five-year plan.3 16
ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE. The army saw considerably less
change than the navy in its force structure and doctrine during this period, though by the late
1990s, some attitude changes toward the purpose and direction of the force were beginning to
occur. As early as the late 1970s, Chavalit and other general staff officers advocated
downsizing the army and making it a volunteer force. But while staff officers had increased
influence at the highest military levels, they did not yet have effective control of the army
hierarchy. Far from becoming smaller and more compact, the army grew steadily from
141,000 in 1978 to 190,000 in 1991. And in 1993, the army's commander, General Wimol
Wongwanich declared that the experimental introduction of volunteers had "met with little
success." 317
In a 1995 interview Chavalit, returning to the military policy world as defense
minister, restated his goal: "I want a small-sized armed forces. They must be well-versed in
national defense and particularly modernized in terms of equipment and operations."3 18 He
also revived the goal of increasing volunteer numbers. In 1996 Supreme Commander
316 The two carriers were to give the Thai navy a carrier presence on both coasts. Ibid.
317 "End to Draft Poses Acid Test for PM", Bangkok Post, February 24 1997.
318 "Defense Minister Discusses Military Plans".
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Mongkhon Amphonphisit, an army officer close to Chavalit (and chosen by him for the
position), announced a goal of reducing army strength by 25 percent by sometime between
1999 and 2001.319 These measures proved difficult to implement. As of 2001 (the latest year
for which data is available), the force size remains unchanged at 190,000. The introduction of
a volunteer system has made more significant gains. In 2001, 24,000 individuals volunteered
though, because some areas may have then been oversubscribed, it is unclear how many of
these could actually be inducted. (The national total annual intake of enlisted soldiers was
87,000.)
Doctrinal change was also mixed. On the one hand, defense budget increases and the
stabilization of the force size allowed greater mechanization of the force during the mid- to
late 1990s. The number of armored and mechanized divisions increased from four in 1993 to
seven by 2000. On the other hand, there was no change in the official doctrine of total
people's defense or the emphasis on economic development. The Defense Ministry's 1996
white paper devotes more space to "national development and civic action" than to "defense
against external threats." The former includes subsections on "creating national unity from
regional and local diversity," "basic infrastructure projects," and "promotion of agricultural
cooperatives." 320 Throughout the 1990s, the army continued to maintain four "development
divisions," with manpower equivalent to those of infantry or armored divisions. Indeed, even
many of those calling for a more "professional" force issued simultaneous - and from all
319 "Supreme Commander: Military Can Hold Off Arms Purchases", Thailand Times, December 3 1996, in
FBIS-FTS- 1996-1203. "Military Chief of Staff on Modernization", Siam Rat, June 27 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-
0627.
320 Ministry of Defense, "The Defense of Thailand, 1996," (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1996).
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appearances heartfelt - statements of support for the army's developmental work. As late as
May 2002, the army's commander suggested the army would, at the behest of General Prem
Tinsulanonda (serving as Privy Council), open 50 new "development camps" in border
provinces.32 1
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The civil-military coalition theory explains much about the speed, timing, and nature of
strategic change in Thailand over the last two decades. There were clear differences in the
political-economic preferences of the army and the navy - as well as relatively more
unanimity among naval officers - throughout this period. Army officers, and specifically
senior army line officers, proved to be dogged opponents of liberal domestic reform. Army
staff officers, on the other hand, not only backed reform, they took leading positions in the
reform coalition during the 1980s and continued to support it thereafter. The navy has
likewise been a strong supporter of political, economic, and military reform from the 1980s
through the present, serving as a committed member of Prem and Chavalit's reform coalition.
The Chatichai government (1988-1991) mismanaged its handling of the military - albeit not
an easy task - and was overthrown by General Suchinda and his Class 5 faction in 1991. The
navy remained aloof from the military government, and, during the anti-government protests
in May 1992, its refusal to participate in suppression efforts helped bring about the collapse of
Suchinda's regime.
321 "King Tells Army to Keep in 'Regular' Touch with Border Villagers", Bangkok Post, May 3, 2002 2002, in
FBIS-SEP-2002-0503.
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Finally, the specific timing of force structure and strategy decisions tracks closely with
major domestic events. First, the navy's marine corps was strengthened and an admiral
chosen as supreme commander one year after the navy provided support in suppressing a
coup attempt by the Young Turks in 1985. Second, the largest and most dramatic set of ship
purchases took place from 1987 to 1990, the same years that Chavalit served as supreme
commander - a position that made him the key military player in procurement decisions.
Chavalit's support for the navy's procurement agenda cemented his pro-reform coalition and
enhanced its power. Third, more purchases were made and a new emphasis placed on
maritime strategy shortly after the collapse of Suchinda's military regime (which the navy did
not support) in 1992.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Changes in Thailand's strategic military
environment may help explain changes in Thai force structure and doctrine during the 1980s
and 1990s, but it fails to explain many aspects of the case.
An explanation for Thailand's strategic change based on the strategic military
environment might suggest that the end of the effective communist insurgency in 1982 (when
mass surrenders emptied the ranks of rebels) and/or Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia
diminished the land-threat facing Thailand and enabled it to reorient its resources towards
naval-building. It might also posit that the end of the Cold War, uncertainties attending
continued U.S. naval presence in the region, and regional naval rivalries might also have
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provided motives. But during the 1980s, changes in Thailand's strategic environment were
more ambiguous than this account suggests. And during the 1990s, the scale of Thailand's
naval buildup - and the way in which it was executed and financed - is difficult to reconcile
with a balanced assessment of the military threats and economic capabilities.
The end of the insurgency and the Vietnamese threat, 1979-1989. The insurgency
threat did decline dramatically after 1979, and the insurgency was effectively over by the end
of 1982. But the insurgency threat declined because the threat posed by Vietnam increased.
That is, China cut off its aid to Thai insurgents in response to Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia, an event that threatened Thai and Chinese interests.
Despite the easing of the insurgency, the primary military threat after 1979 remained
continental. In 1979, the Vietnamese army numbered 1,000,000 men, more than six times the
size of the 155,000-strong Thai army. At peak strength, Vietnam maintained around 180,000
troops in Cambodia alone.322 Moreover, Vietnamese forces were equipped and trained better
for conventional warfare than their Thai counterparts. When the Vietnamese army launched
its Cambodian venture, it operated close to ten times as many medium and light tanks as the
Thai military (2,500 to 278). Yet between 1979 and 1986, when it became clear that Vietnam
was beginning to withdrawal troops, the percentage of total military manpower held by the
Thai navy climbed from 12.9 percent to 16.4 percent. And Thailand began exploring the
322 Although Vietnam began withdrawing these troops in the mid-1980s, until the late 1980s, the withdrawals
were small. Up to 70,000 Vietnamese troops - together with a Soviet-equipped Cambodian regular force of
40,000-50,000 - were still present in country as of early 1989. The last Vietnamese forces withdrew in
September 1989. Murray Hiebert, "Phnom Penh Prepares for Vietnamese Withdrawal: Standing Alone," Far
Eastern Economic Review, June 29 1989.
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purchase of major new warships in 1986, well before it became clear when (or even if)
Vietnam would withdraw its full complement of troops. Contracts signed between 1987 and
1989 increased Thailand's combat fleet tonnage by 40 percent, and if a 2 percent annual
discount rate is used to determine "combat value" of the fleet based on the average age of the
fleet, its "effective" tonnage increased by 85 percent. This increase was from a very low base,
and there could be some use for naval forces even in a war with Vietnam. But similar military
arguments could also be made for naval forces between 1951 and 1979 (or certainly parts of
this period), a period when the Thai navy was in secular decline.
An era of reduced continental threat, 1989-2003. After 1989, the strategic military
environment seems more consistent with national strategic outputs, though this is more true
because the overall threat level declined, creating a relatively forgiving strategic environment,
than because naval threats or opportunities became overriding or urgent.
The continental threat clearly diminished with the final withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces from Cambodia in 1989. These forces could, of course, have returned to the Thai
border by re-invading Cambodia, and Vietnam probably remains Thailand's greatest potential
ground threat, when rated purely on capabilities. But Vietnam lost its primary military aid
donor with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989, it has established firm diplomatic and
economic ties with most states in Southeast Asia (including Thailand). Few have rated a
Vietnamese repeat performance in Cambodia likely since its withdrawal from that country.
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At the end of the 1980s, Thailand had - and to some extent still has - land border
disputes with most of its neighbors. In 1988 Thailand fought (and lost) a border skirmish
with Laos, an event still remembered and celebrated in the latter. Thailand's boundaries with
Malaysia are not yet fully settled, and Bangkok protested moves by Kuala Lumpur to build a
wall in disputed territory in 1997.323 Parts of Thailand's border with Cambodia are disputed,
and Phnom Penh has occasionally protested what it claims are incursions by Thai army units.
And past or present involvement of Thailand in ethnic separatist movements, the drug
business, and illegal logging in northeastern Burma have resulted in numerous skirmishes -
and several Thai villages burned - since 1988. Nevertheless, Thailand and its neighbors,
especially Malaysia, Cambodia, and Laos, have made progress in resolving border and other
disputes.
Given both political and military considerations, Burma is probably Thailand's most
significant ground threat. Burma's army doubled in size (to 325,000 men) between 1988 and
2002. And poor terrain along much of the Thai-Burmese border would neutralize, to some
degree, Thailand's superior firepower. Moreover, China maintains a strategic partnership
with Burma and provides arms and expertise to the regime. Nevertheless, Burma's military
logistics are poor, a problem that prevented it from destroying ethnic rebellions for decades.
Deep Thai military relations with China (discussed further below) make Chinese support for
any Burmese military effort against Thailand unlikely. And the remoteness of the Thai-
Burma border region would make sustaining any significant combat there extremely difficult.
323 "The Troubled Waters of Thai-Malaysian Ties", Nation, February 26 1997, in NEXIS-LEXIS.
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Burmese forces do not present nearly as challenging a potential military threat as Vietnam's
did while they occupied Cambodia. Malaysia, which has enjoyed relatively good relations
with Thailand over the last fifteen years, is the only other force that might be considered a
continental competitor. But Malaysia's ground forces (105,000 in 1980 and 80,000 today) are
substantially smaller than Thailand's, and no better armed.
The maritime dimension. disputes and resolutions. If Thailand's continental threat
picture has improved since 1989, what of the maritime situation? Regional maritime disputes
received high-profile attention in the U.S. media and elsewhere during the 1990s. Rising
regional energy demand, the creation of large but overlapping exclusive economic zones
under the UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (which took effect in 1994), and the
presence of oil and gas in disputed regional waters were all said to contribute to regional
rivalries and naval arms buildups.324 The Spratly Islands are claimed, in part or in whole, by
five states (if Taiwan is counted as a state). Some of these fortified their positions there
during the 1970s and 1980s, and China evicted Vietnamese forces from several of islands in
1988. China subsequently built structures on several other disputed reefs and islets.
Some of these emerging problems, however, did not affect Thailand directly. Other
problems proved to be overstated (or selectively reported), and some had largely the opposite
effect of that hypothesized by some American analysts in the early 1990s.
324 For a treatment that blends all of these elements, see Kent Calder, Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy
and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1997). For a critique of this logic,
written three years later, see Robert A. Manning, The Asian Energy Factor (Revisited): Myths and Dilemmas of
Energy, Security and the Pacific Future (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
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While American Asian observers tend to view military developments in the region -
including those in Thailand - in the context of China's rising power, there is little evidence
that the naval buildup was undertaken in response to stimulus from that quarter. Thailand is
not a participant in the Spratly Island dispute. Few Thai commentators highlighted China as a
potential military competitor, though some do point to an uncertain future. Indeed, Thailand
has maintained a close military and strategic relationship with China since at least 1982 and
was the first Asian nation to sign a "strategic partnership agreement" with it. In addition to
purchasing a large number of tanks and artillery systems from the PLA, Thailand has also
bought six out of the nine warships it has purchased since 1986 from that source. The two
countries continue to exchange military delegations, and Thailand continues to explore
additional arms purchases from China.
China aside, energy issues and maritime boundary disputes might - on the surface -
nevertheless provide a plausible explanation for Thai naval growth. In November 1993 the
navy's commander reported that the only strategic problem the navy was facing was the
conflict over the demarcation of sea boundaries between Thailand and its neighbors. 325
Thailand's energy situation is one of the most severe in Asia. During the 1970s, Thailand
experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization. Oil consumption increased 500 percent
by volume between 1975 and 2000, while the nation's economy grew only half that
325 "Admiral Calls for Adjustment of Combat Forces", Bangkok Army Television, November 2 1993, in FBIS-
EAS-1993-1102.
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amount.3 26 By the early 1980s, Thailand's oil imports by value represented over 40 percent of
Thailand's total imports, accounting for much of Thailand's growing deficit.32 7 At the same
time, the Gulf of Thailand has been known since at least the 1960s to contain large untapped
reserves of oil and gas. And the Gulf of Thailand's maritime boundaries are as messy as
anywhere on the globe, with overlapping claims between Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and
Cambodia. Several of these states had recently been in actual or virtual states of war with one
another, and outside major powers have backed varying subsets of these states. If any energy-
related situation should have produced conflict in Asia, the Gulf of Thailand should have been
a likely candidate.
These disputes were, however, relatively smoothly resolved. During the early 1970s,
all of the Gulf of Thailand states established claims to 200 nautical mile EEZs, and
overlapping claims and misunderstandings did lead to tensions over the next several years.
But the need to resolve energy supply problems was pressing, both for the health of national
economies and for the survival of individual political actors. The government of Prime
Minister Kriangsak (1977-1980) fell as a direct result of its 1979 decision to raise oil prices
by fifty percent, a decision taken to ensure adequate access to oil supplies.3 28 And
326 In 2000, the price of oil was only twice that of 1975, while the consumer price index was 320 percent of what
it had been in 1975. Adding price into the equation, the value of Thailand's imported oil in 2000 was less
relative to its total economy than it had been in 1975. But price volatility has produced dramatic shifts in this
picture over time. In 1983, for example, the price of oil stood at $38 per barrel, far higher than either its cost in
1975 ($12) or its cost in 2000 ($24) - and the repercussions for Thailand's economy were severe. Thailand has
struggled to maintain access to oil, a consideration reflected in the three-day 18 percent drop in Thailand's stock
market following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
327 Stewart Dalby, "Thailand Reconsiders Energy Programme", Financial Times (London), March 1 1983.
328 Richard Nations, "Prem Balances His Cabinet: Deep-Seated Problems Over Energy and Economic Policy
Remain Despite the New Sense of Confidence in Bangkok," Far Eastern Economic Review, March 28 1980.
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international oil companies - whose involvement is necessary for the success of oil operations
- would not do substantial work in contested areas.3 29 Thai leaders, like those of its
neighbors, had major incentives to reach agreements with their neighbors, and they have
generally acted accordingly.
Tensions over oil and sovereignty did not disappear after the 1970s, but Thailand was
already embarked on the diplomatic resolution of these issues by the start of the 1980s. In
1979, Thailand signed separate MOUs with Vietnam and Malaysia to establish joint
development areas with those states. (In the case of Vietnam, the agreement came after its
invasion of Cambodia.) In 1985, Thailand and Malaysia began negotiating revenue sharing
arrangements for any work done in jointly claimed areas. In 1990, Bangkok and Kuala
Lumpur established a joint authority organization to oversee work in their disputed areas, and
in 1992, Thailand and Vietnam did the same. In 1995, Thailand began negotiations with
Cambodia over maritime boundaries and the joint exploitation of resources in areas claimed
by both.
Since the 1950s, the government has strictly controlled the retail price of oil. The government has provided
subsidies, but also pressured foreign-invested refineries to keep prices down. This pressure on domestic
middlemen has resulted on occasion in insufficient supply, and Kriangsak's move to increase the price of oil was
an effort to ease capacity and supply problems.
329 Thailand itself had experience with this truth. In 1973, it awarded exploration rights to a block claimed by
both Thailand and Cambodia to Amoco, Unocal, and Sun Oil. These companies began exploration, but quickly
pulled out in the face of Cambodian protests. Harish Mehta, "Tensions Run High Over Disputed Oilfields",
Business Times (Singapore), October 7 1992. Of particular note here is that Cambodia had, for all intents and
purposes, no navy, and yet it was able to deny Thailand the ability to exploit jointly claimed resources.
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On balance, energy needs and the ambiguity of maritime boundaries have produced
more cooperation than conflict around the Gulf of Thailand.330 By 1996, the national oil
companies of Thailand and Malaysia - with collaborative achievements behind them and
knowledge of their complementary technical and business strengths -had established
committees to look into joint projects outside of the Gulf of Thailand.3 31 The Royal Thai
Navy did refer to the need to resolve boundary disputes on satisfactory terms as one rationale
for fleet growth. But given the interests of Thailand's civilian leadership in cooperation and
their largely successful efforts at resolution, it is not surprising that the navy's arguments were
advanced only in vague terms, without reference to any substantial conflict generated by
unsettled borders, much less a discussion of specific disputes.
Admiral Prachet Siridet, the navy's commander, suggested a second possible rationale
for naval building in a December of 1993 interview. "Our mission," he said, "is to maintain a
power balance vis-A-vis our neighbors." 3 32 But in 1993, as the navy was preparing to embark
on a new round of purchases, Thailand's naval balance of power vis-A-vis its immediate
neighbors was more than adequate. Thailand's defense budget was more than 33 percent
larger than that of Malaysia, which had the largest defense budget of any state sharing a
maritime boundary with Thailand. It had more than twice as many surface warships as
330 Robert Manning makes a similar argument. See Manning, The Asian Energy Factor (Revisited): Myths and
Dilemmas of Energy, Security and the Pacific Future. Also, although the timing of events in the South China
Sea lagged significantly, a variation on this pattern can be seen: political authorities in China allowed the navy to
engage in adventurous and self-serving behavior for a decade, but around the time China's actual (instead of
projected) energy needs began to exceed its production, civilian leaders became serious about reigning in the
navy and preventing its actions for alienating important regional partners.
331 Peter Janssen, "Oil Soothes The Way to Resolving Conflict," Asian Business, August 1996.
332 "Navy Chief on Modernization, PRC Technology", The Nation, December 26 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-1226.
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Vietnam, the leading neighbor in that category, and more than three times as many as
Malaysia. Thailand's best anti-ship missiles had a range twice that of any neighbor. There is
little question that Thailand's navy was already superior to those of its neighbors in 1993.333
A third strategic argument put forward by the navy was the protection of the sea lines
of Thailand's communication (SLOCs). In 1996, the military's official white paper discussed
sea-lane defense as one of the navy's primary missions.33 4 In June 1997, the commander of
the Advanced Naval Studies Institute observed that the vast majority of the country's imports
and exports are via the sea, and any conflict over territorial rights in the South China Sea
could threaten Thailand's survival. Two months later, Admiral Vijitr Chamnankarn, the
navy's commander in chief (and the former commander of the Advanced Naval Studies
Institute) offered a similar assessment. He observed that 95 percent of Thailand's imports and
exports go through the Straits of Malacca and into the Gulf and said, "The main responsibility
of the Naruebet is the protection of the international sea lanes of communication."33 5
But while Thailand could conceivably face a problem defending its SLOCs, it does not
seem that concern over the SLOCs drove Thailand's naval buildup. The rationale was not
offered until a full decade after Thailand had embarked on a major expansion of its naval
forces. When the contract for the aircraft carrier, the Chakri Naruebet, was signed in 1990,
333 If anything, the balance of conventional land forces required more attention. Because Thailand devoted
substantial army resources to developing effective counterinsurgency capabilities and local development
projects, it was outnumbered in medium tanks by more than six-to-one by Vietnam.
334 Ministry of Defense, "The Defense of Thailand, 1996," (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1996).
335 Kavi Chongkittavorn, "The Changing of Our Naval Defense Strategy", The Nation, August 14 1997.
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the vessel was publicly justified as a ship that would be useful in the event of hurricanes or
other natural disasters. And the fleet even today is simply too small to effectively escort
Thailand's maritime traffic in the event of hostilities - much less sweep the South China Sea
of potential competitors.
All things being equal, more military power (of all forms) is better than less, and the
easing of the continental threat with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in
1989 allowed Thailand to consider other types of forces. But there was no pressing naval
threat that required an expansion of maritime forces on the scale that Thailand undertook.
China has arguably emerged as a latent threat to Thailand's SLOCs, but it is less of a threat
than Soviet naval forces represented before 1989, and the fact that Thailand purchased the
bulk of its new ships from China is not consistent with an effort to balance against that threat.
By all appearances, the Thai navy was a force in search of a mission. In 1993, the navy's
commander said that to design the best strategy, "we must first figure out what kinds of
threats we might face" and "which countries should be listed as possible enemies." 336 Six
years later, the navy's chief said that "there is no threat of a major war in the next 10 years....
We will monitor weapon buildup by every country and try to achieve a balance with it."33 7
But certain features of Thailand's naval buildup - namely its speed, scope, and
financing - suggested that something other than reallocating loose resources was at work. For
a state with a total defense budget of between two and four billion dollars (depending on the
336 "Admiral Calls for Adjustment of Combat Forces".
337 "Navy Chief on Budget Cut, Foreign Threat," Bangkok Post, January 2, 1999.
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exchange rate) and an army that continued to demand the bulk of military resources, naval
growth between 1986 and 1996 was extraordinary. In order to pay for this extraordinary
buildup, Thailand's parliament allowed the navy to use unorthodox - and risky - means. The
navy borrowed heavily against future budgets, in U.S. dollars, with the partnership of foreign
commercial banks. And while the navy did not cause Thailand's 1997 financial crisis, it did
contribute to it. The aircraft carrier alone added $500 million to an annual current account
deficit of around $7 billion.
The Thai navy was already dangerously overextended financially before the baht's
value plummeted in 1997. With the baht's collapse, the navy's dollar-denominated debts
suddenly doubled in value. At the same time, the navy's budget, under IMF scrutiny, was cut
by a third. The navy's aircraft carrier and most other capital ships ceased even limited
training operations, and the navy requested funds for small patrol craft to conduct its basic
coastal functions on a lower budget. Some pundits suggested the navy should sell its carrier
to cover any new purchases.
Although the navy may have benefited from a decline in land-based threats at the end
of the 1980s, the more permissive external environment does not appear to tell the whole
story. National political authorities examined army budgets critically after 1980, and
especially 1992. They did not do the same with naval requests. Without the navy's defense
of liberal, constitutional rule during the 1980s and 1999s and its close ties to the Democratic
Party, the rapid expansion of the fleet seen over the last two decades seems unlikely. A 1994
article in the Far Eastern Economic Review observed that Thailand's military modernization
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"seems to have taken a heavily maritime bias." But, the article continued, "Such a shift is not
immediately explicable, given that Thailand has no real external threats to its maritime
security." 338 Indeed, the navy appears to have benefited as much from its domestic political
position as it did from any shift in its strategic environment.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Material interests also
explain only some aspects of this case, especially in the case of the army. After 1986 the
navy received significant material rewards for its support to those undertaking Thailand's
liberal transformation. Those benefits could arguably have been anticipated in the earlier
1980s, given that the military reform efforts of Prem and Chavalit promised to strengthen the
navy's relative institutional position. Nevertheless, the navy's extended support for domestic
reform early in the 1980s is remarkable.
Even more remarkable - and more clearly at odds with an explanation based narrowly
on material interests - has been the army's refusal to embrace liberalism, or military doctrines
suggested by liberals, over the last fifteen years, and especially since the collapse of
Suchinda's government in 1992. A material interests-based theory predicts bandwagonning
with domestic political winners, especially in the absence of viable alternatives. By 1990
most political analysts believed that while military officers still might attempt to execute
coups d'etat, they could no longer rule the state - a belief confirmed by the experience of
1991-92. While the long-term future is difficult to predict, a return to integral nationalist rule
in the short term is at least as unlikely today as a quick return to liberal rule was in the early
338 Mak and Hamzah, "Navy Blues."
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1960s. Yet, like the navy during the earlier period, the army has adjusted its domestic
position only slowly and incompletely.
Summary and Conclusions
The civil-military coalition theory frequently does a better job than the strategic military
environment at explaining changes in military force structure and doctrine, and, on balance, it
does a better than material interests-based theories in explaining the domestic preferences of
the services.
The strategic military environment is more consistent with strategy and strategic
change during some periods than others. It appears to have trouble explaining particular
events during four periods. First, it does a relatively poor job of explaining the absolute
growth in naval budgets between 1944 and 1947, at a time when Thailand had few potential
enemies and even fewer against which its navy might stand a chance of defeating. Second, it
cannot explain the speed or magnitude of the decline in naval force structure in 1951. Until at
least 1954, Thai leaders were at least as concerned about the return of the European powers
(and especially the French) to East Asia as they were about the rise of communism, and
concerns about a possible communist insurgent threat only gradually emerged during the
following decade. Third, the increase in relative spending on the navy between 1973 and
1976 - exactly the period when the armed communist insurgent movement was reaching peak
strength - seems anomalous. In this case, the strategic shift was less dramatic, and the
disconnect between threat and response therefore less pronounced, but the facts nevertheless
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present the theory with an apparent puzzle. Fourth, the extent of the naval buildup after 1986
is also difficult to explain. While some relative shift in priorities might be expected, there
was no new naval threat that would easily explain an absolute increase in naval spending.
At other times, strategy and strategic change have appeared more consistent with the
strategic military environment. The army experimented with a variety of strategies for
addressing the communist insurgency after its outbreak in 1965, and despite the addition of
some additional resources to maritime forces during the period from 1973 to 1976, the
military was clearly and largely successfully focused on attacking that problem. Strategy
today is arguably being brought into line better with Thailand's potential military threat.
Since 1999 the army has slowly begun moving towards a smaller, more professional
conventional defense posture (though there are also mixed signals), and since 1997 naval
purchases have received greater scrutiny on strategic grounds. The legitimacy of domestic
institutions has been largely settled (at least for the foreseeable future) even as state budgets
have tightened, reducing the impact of politics on strategy and force structure.
Although the material interests of the services may partly explain some aspects of the
cases, they too do a relatively poor job compared to a theory that also considers functional
interests and, especially, the effects of socialization around those interests. Supporting a
material interests-based explanation, there are instances in which the services overthrew
government that had cut their budgets. The army's opposition to the Pridi-Thamrong
government (1944-1946) is one example. In other cases, one service or the other supported
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opposition groups or positions that promised greater rewards, as in the case, for example, the
navy's support for liberal reform during the 1980s.
But a theory based purely on the services' pursuit of material interests would surmise
a wide variety of domestic alliance patterns. While navies might back outward looking liberal
regimes more than half the time, we would also expect many exceptions. Not all integral
nationalist leaders will necessarily stint the navy (or liberal leaders the army). Phibun, for
example, supported naval growth between 1936 and 1938, and Thanom approved more
modest, but nevertheless significant purchases in 1969 and early 1973. Yet at critical
moments, the navy joined in opposition to these leaders. Perhaps more importantly, the act of
forming tactical alliances itself could have significantly changed instrumental calculations
based on regime type. For example, the navy could have joined in Suchinda's military
crackdown in May 1992 with the expectation of being rewarded afterward. And given little
prospect of changing the government during the 1960s, we might have expected the navy to
throw its weight behind Thanom with similar expectations. Yet throughout the postwar
period, the navy supported liberal groups and policies, while most army officers backed
integral nationalist ones.
The civil-military coalition theory performs well as an explanation for both service
preferences and strategic change in Thailand during the postwar period. The theory does a
better job than a more narrowly material interests-based theory in explaining the strong
continuity of the services' domestic preferences, and the direct interests that the services
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showed in economic and social policy. The army took an early role in rural development - at
the cost of its conventional force structure. More recently, it has also demonstrated an interest
in urban poverty alleviation. The navy, for its part, has been associated with pro-business
political parties, the liberal media, and academia. And while the civil-military coalition
theory illuminates broad patterns of service preferences, it also helps explain the variations
found in their strength. For example, the theory helps explain why the army's general staff
officers were relatively more liberal than army line officers.
The civil-military coalition theory also largely explains Thailand's military and
strategic policy during the postwar period. On balance, the theory accurately predicts more
instances of strategic change or continuity than does the strategic military environment. In
some instances the effects of domestic politics - and specifically conflicts between civil-
military coalitions - are quick and unmistakable. After the collapse of Phibun's government
in 1944, the navy received an immediate lift from its support of the Free Thai movement
leading up to that event. In 1951 the army "reorganized" the navy, cutting its strength
dramatically and stripping it of many assets, after an army coup ousted Pridi and two naval
countercoups, launched in cooperation with Free Thai civilian groups, failed. Between 1986
and 1990, the navy benefited from its support of Prem's reform government against a coup
attempt in 1985, and after 1992, it received a further boost after refusing to support
Suchinda's military government against civilian protesters. Only during the 1970s do
explanations based on the strategic military environment fit comfortably with doctrinal and
force structure outputs. But those outputs were, it should be added, also consistent with the
civil-military coalition theory.
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Introduction
In China the struggle between Communist Party moderates, who would allow room for
individual economic and social difference, and radical leftists, who would eliminate such
differences, mirrored the conflict between liberals and integral nationalists in other East Asian
states. The Chinese navy aligned itself closely with Party moderates, and naval fortunes rose
and fell with those of moderate political leaders. The army was divided, with some senior
officers favoring moderate politics and others giving support to radical leftist leaders.
Throughout the postwar period, political leaders have been highly sensitive to the social,
economic, and political implications of different military force structures, while military
leaders have been equally attuned to the implications of domestic political and economic
policy on their desired force structures and strategies.
This examination of the Chinese military politics and grand strategy is divided into
two parts:
* Case 1 (1949-1976). This case examines the services' involvement in politics and the
impact of that involvement on military strategy during the transition from an early
period of moderate (if contested) leadership to the radical leftist (and integral
nationalist) leadership of the Cultural Revolution.
* Case 2 (1976-2002). This case treats military politics and strategic outcomes during
the period of"reform and opening," under which Deng Xiaoping and his successors
introduced reforms designed to liberalize economic, social, and, to a lesser extent,
political policies.
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In the first case (1953-1976), political moderates held the upper hand and were largely
in control of the day-to-day administration of the country until 1966, when the radical leftists
launched the Cultural Revolution. The first case, then, involved the transition from relatively
more liberal to integral nationalist governance. The navy's manning, training, and equipment
preferences placed it squarely in the moderate camp. The army was deeply divided, with
technical officers supporting moderate political positions and many others sympathetic to
leftist politics. Civilian and military leftists viewed the navy's leadership, as well as that of
other technical military branches, as a threat to their preferred social and economic policies.
As the leftists, with Mao Zedong's backing, gained power, they sought to remove or constrain
the navy's senior leadership. Opposition to leftist politics in the navy ran deep, however, and
the organization remained a thorn in the side of the leftist faction throughout even the Cultural
Revolution. During the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, naval leaders worked to bring
down the radical leftist leadership known as the Gang of Four, and Xiao Jinguan, the navy's
commander, actively plotted the arrest of those individuals in September and October 1976.
During the second period (covering the years since 1976), moderate civilian leaders,
led by Deng Xiaoping, returned to power. Deng brought the navy into his political coalition
to balance against opposition from conservative (i.e., leftist and integral nationalist) army
officers, especially regional military commanders and those associated with the military's
political department. In return for its stalwart political support, Deng gave the navy
considerable autonomy, an expanded share of military resources, and free license to
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propagandize the cause of maritime industry and maritime defense. But it is important to note
that the navy backed the moderates' return before these rewards were promised, and its
preference for liberalization went beyond backing for any single political program or
individual. Many naval officers appear to have sympathized with demonstrators during the
democracy movement that culminated with the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989.
These cases support the civil-military coalition theory. The services maintained
consistent political preferences, with the army being deeply divided but at a minimum
harboring a considerable core of officers sympathetic to the leftists' extreme integral
nationalist agenda and the navy consistently backing liberal positions. Although these
preference appear to have sprung originally from a relatively narrow range of military
considerations, both military and political authorities quickly became aware of the inter-
connections between military policies and the domestic social, economic, and political milieu
in which they exist (e.g., the influence of military policy on domestic social policy and the
impact of domestic social policy on military possibilities). In forming their domestic
preferences, most military leaders appear to have given substantially greater weight to the
potential impact of domestic issues on the form and doctrines of military forces than on the
size or budgets that would accrue from domestic outcomes. Evaluating the relative effects of
domestic political considerations and strategic calculus in military politics is complicated by
the existence of competing theories about the relationship between different forms of
domestic national strength and national security. But the timing of major strategic shifts
generally correlated more closely with domestic political crises than they did with external
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events, and the leaders involved clearly understood and gave great weight to the domestic
implications of the military choices with which they were confronted.
Case 1: From Liu Shaoqi to the Arrest of the Gang of Four
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS
This case examines the services' involvement in politics during the transition from moderate
leadership (i.e., one that was relatively liberal on the Chinese continuum) towards a political
system dominated by radical leftists (a group that was closer to the integral nationalist ideal),
as well as the effects on force structure and doctrine of that involvement.
The immediate aftermath of the Korean War saw top civilian and military leaders
working in relative harmony. Moderates controlled the day-to-day administration of the
country and Peng Dehuai, an advocate of strengthening China's conventional forces, served
as Defense Minister. But while Peng worked closely and comfortably with Liu Shaoqi and
other civilian moderates, the army was deeply divided. Leftists within the army feared that
liberal politics and a technically-oriented military would undermine revolutionary social
values, while officers from the technical branches supported the civilians' moderate social and
economic policies. The navy gave strong support to civilian moderates and Peng's military
leadership, despite budget cuts that impinged on the navy's desire to develop a major surface
fleet quickly.
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With Mao Zedong's backing, leftists made inroads against the moderates after 1956
and ultimately gained the decisive upper hand during the first phases of the Cultural
Revolution. By then, after more than a dozen years of sparring, it was clear to both the
moderate and leftist camps that the gulf between them was substantial. Before and during the
Cultural Revolution, civilian and military leftists distrusted officers from the technical
services, especially the navy. By reorienting military doctrine to reemphasize "people's war,"
the leftists empowered and expanded their support base while weakening their military
opponents. The leftists' concerns about the liberal political proclivities of the navy were not
entirely unjustified, though they were in part self-fulfilling. By treating the navy as an enemy,
the enmity between it and the leftists was certainly exacerbated. Shortly after Mao's death in
1976, senior naval officers enthusiastically joined with a group of army officers, mostly from
other technical branches, to arrest the Gang of Four, put an end to the Cultural Revolution,
and restore moderate civilian leaders to power.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Since 1949 Chinese politics has been defined by struggles between pragmatic moderates,
concerned largely with economic results rather than social and political purity, and more
ideologically oriented leftists, who remained relatively true to the Communist Party's original
social ideal of absolute egalitarianism.
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During the first decades after 1949, a core of moderate Party leaders thought it would
be necessary to work with social groups that socialist purists found anathema, including
capitalists, intellectuals, and even former Guomindang (Nationalist Party) administrators.339
They saw some trade with foreign states and the importation of technology and capital as
necessary to developing the economy. While they favored state ownership over most
economic assets in principle, they believed that it might be necessary to permit private
production and ownership for an extended period of time during the transition. In the political
realm, they believed that the Party elite should decide policy, but that the Party's decisions
should be reached through intra-party democracy - i.e., according to established procedures
and rules, rather than by fiat or under pressure from mass activism. Similarly, a technically
proficient elite would carefully oversee economic management. All of this suggested that it
would be necessary to tolerate economic and, to some extent, ideological differences in
society.
Mao Zedong and his leftist supporters believed that the tolerance of social and
economic difference, as well as the active recruitment of members of a de facto bourgeoisie
339 The moderate group described here included Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai. The
two coalesced and became more distinct after the Great Leap Forward (1957-59) than they had been before that
time. Some individuals included in this group (e.g., Deng Xiaoping) supported the moderate economic position
described here during the early and mid- 1950s, but went along with Mao Zedong in supporting the Great Leap
Forward - only to regret that decision as the scope of the ensuing disaster became evident. Others, including
most prominently Chen Yun, opposed the Great Leap before it was launched. By 1960, however, Liu Shaoqi,
Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai were working together with Chen Yun to undo the damage and restore more
balanced economic and social policies. For the evolution of this group and the political-economic debates during
these years, see Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-
1965," in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993). For a shorter treatment in a broader context, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for
Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 541-602.
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into government and economic planning, would, in practice, lead to the consolidation and
exacerbation of social differences.3 40 They believed that the revolution itself had decapitated
the old regime, but had not fundamentally changed Chinese society or social relationships.
The bourgeoisie could, in their view, easily return to dominate politics. They therefore
believed in excluding former capitalists and intellectuals from any influential posts in
government, the economy, or society.
The leftists favored continuing the revolution. They pushed for rapid and complete
collectivization and, during the Cultural Revolution, conducted "struggle sessions" against
former members of the capitalist classes to ensure their integration into a new classless
society. In politics, they believed in refreshing the Party's own ideological purity by
mobilizing the masses to oversee and critique the Party itself (an unruly process that was, in
their minds, necessary despite its dangers). And, with 70 percent of the Party recruited from
the countryside (in contrast to the Soviet Communist Party base that was 70 percent urban),
policy emphasized the welfare and empowerment of peasants, though ultimately it was the
peasants who suffered most from their miscalculations. The leftists distrusted urban elites -
whether former capitalist or aspiring socialists.
340 Whereas the moderates were very much a group of equals, the leftists were able to compete during the early
part of this period only through Mao's patronage and support. For the Great Leap, Mao was able to convince
many moderates to join his camp, but afterwards, his remaining supporters were either military figures or low
level Party functionaries. The remainder of this chapter describes how Mao and Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, made
common cause with the army figure Lin Biao to promote other leftists to positions of power and, ultimately,
launch the Cultural Revolution. For a more detailed account of politics on the civilian side, see Harry Harding,
"The Chinese State in Crisis, 1966-1969," in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. Roderick
MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 148-247. Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward
and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965." Spence, The Searchfor Modern China, 514-617.
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In contemporary Chinese politics, there were no individuals who would have been
defined as true liberals, but in relative terms, China's moderates were closer to the ideal type
than were its leftists. They were relatively more inclined towards trade, the toleration of
former capitalists, a more relaxed view of private property and markets (however limited),
and the acceptance of social differences. They were hardly enlightened liberal philosophers,
but they were pragmatic enough to recognize the need for relatively more liberal economic
and social policy. Most if not all of the moderates had significant foreign education, many in
Western Europe, and they were significantly more cosmopolitan in upbringing and outlook
than the radical leftists. Looking ahead to the 1980s, it was the surviving moderate
pragmatists who began the wholesale transformation of the Chinese economy along free
market principles and freed Chinese society from collective controls - without, of course,
making it an electoral democracy.
Domestic politics during the period covered by this case saw first an era of shared
power, with first one group and then the other holding the initiative between 1949 and 1965,
followed by a period of leftist domination during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).
Advantage in the civilian and military worlds did not move in lock-step. On the civilian side,
advantage can be assessed as follows:
The first five-year plan (1953-1957). During the PRC's first five-year plan, moderates
dominated the day-to-day administration of the Party, state apparatus, and economy.
Careful economic management and the use of Soviet models and advisors led to
dramatic increases in output.
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C Great Leap Forward (1958-1959). Mao Zedong and other leftists, fearing that the
moderates' economic policies threatened the social values of the revolution, launched
the Great Leap Forward, under which massive communes were established and private
agricultural production eliminated completely.
* Retrenchment and recovery (1960-1965). Initiative returned to the moderates, who
reduced the scale of collectivization, restored private plots, and reconciled (to a
degree) with urban intellectuals. Mao, discredited, abandoned any attempt to oversee
the day-to-day management of the economy.
* Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Mao and his leftist followers in the Party and the
army regained dominance in 1966 by launching a frontal attack on the political purity
of Liu Shaoqi and his fellow moderates. They sealed China off from most foreign
trade and contact and once again abolished private property completely.
Advantage in the military realm - though heavily influenced by outside actors - was
frequently out of step with that found in the civilian political world. Competition between
"expert" and "red" (i.e., professional and political) factions mirrored that between moderates
and leftists on the civilian side. In the military case, the "expert" faction was dominant
immediately after the Korean War but came under increasing fire from leftists inside and
outside of the military after 1956. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959 and
Mao's withdrawal from everyday economic administration, Mao focused his attention on
securing his base of power within the military. Hence, as moderates reasserted control in
civilian policy, they lost influence in the military. Later, during the first stages of the Cultural
Revolution, the military's institutional structure insulated parts of it from the worst leftist
excesses - though the "expert" faction's position did erode over time. In general, then, shifts
in advantage within the military occurred in a more incremental fashion than it did in the
civilian world, with the "expert" faction strongest during the early and mid-1950s and slowly
but steadily losing out to leftists thereafter.
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SERVICE POSITIONS
During the 1950s, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai enjoyed a strong relationship with civilian
moderates under Liu Shaoqi, and he established military modernization and regularization as
the most important tasks for the PLA. The army, however, was deeply divided, with many in
favor of more revolutionary social and economic policies and opposed to what they regarded
as Peng's attempt to turn the military into a conventional fighting force. The navy, however,
was unified in its support of both Peng Dehuai and Liu's civilian leadership.
After 1956, Mao, fearing that Peng's efforts to modernize and regularize the military
reinforced the position of Liu and his allies and threatened his preferred domestic (mostly
social) priorities, sought and found support from Peng's opponents within the army. When
Peng took the lead in directly challenging Mao over the failure of the Great Leap in 1959,
Mao succeeded in purging him and installing Lin Biao, who had been vocal in promoting
leftist political thought and a return to more revolutionary military doctrines. In 1966, Lin
Biao helped Mao and Jiang Qing (Mao's wife and radical leftists) launch the Cultural
Revolution and sweep moderate civilians from the government. From its inception, the
navy's preferred policies placed it squarely in the moderate camp, and despite repeated leftist
efforts to transform the organization after Peng Dehuai's fall, the organization remained
largely hostile to the leftist program. Although frequently under attack after 1956 and largely
isolated after 1966, senior naval officers maintained their commitment to moderate politics
and, in 1976, played key roles in the eventual overthrow and arrest of the Gang of Four.
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THE ARMY'S POLITICAL POSITION. Although the Chinese Communist Revolution
(1927-1949) was fought largely by guerrilla forces using guerrilla tactics, the balance between
conventional guerrilla operations varied from area to area, as well as across time. The PLA
partly reorganized itself to fight large-scale conventional battles for the final conquest of first
the north (1946-1948) and then the south (1949) of China. It is therefore not particularly
surprising to find that different officers took different lessons from this history, as well as
from their own varied experiences during the Revolution.
The experience of the Korean War, however, tipped the scales towards a heavy
emphasis on conventional organization and tactics. The Chinese had suffered grievously from
their lack of an adequate logistical system and a shortage of artillery, armor, and, at least at
the beginning of the war, aircraft. Peng Dehuai, who was more inclined towards conventional
force structures and doctrines than most PLA generals even before the Korean War,
commanded Chinese forces in Korea throughout the conflict and then returned home at its end
to become Minister of Defense.3 41 Peng proceeded to push a bold program to strengthen the
PLA's conventional military capabilities, but he faced resistance. This resistence was based
341 Peng, for example, took a prominent role in the only major CCP conventional assault on Japanese forces
during the Second World War. Involving some 400,000 men and lasting almost four months (from August to
December 1940) the so-called Hundred Regiments Campaign inflicted significant losses on the Japanese, but the
CCP also sustained heavy casualties, leading Mao to prohibit such costly tactics in all future operations. From
1947 to 1949 Peng fought any number of conventional engagements and, though frequently failing at a tactical
level, managed to attrit Nationalist forces and gradually push them out of his area of operations in Shanxi and
Yenan. Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1985),
25-50. William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command. A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-
1971 (London: Macmillan Press, 1973), 111-14.
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largely on social and political concerns, as well as military ones, and was fed by civilian
leftists, as well as military ones.
In 1953, Peng began to prepare the ground among members of the Central Military
Commission (CMC), unit commanders, and Party and state officials for military
modernization and "regularization" (or standardization, which he saw as a necessary step
towards modernization). He explained the need for such reforms in the following terms:
We need a regularized military system.... A regularized [or professionalized]
military system is an important condition for a modem army. In particular,
because in the past our army was spread over many different areas, the military
system of all the different units was not unified. For this reason, in the course
of modernization, it is of extreme importance that we stress regularization!" 3 42
Regularization would, of necessity, take the PLA far from its guerrilla origins and the military
model developed by Mao Zedong. Mao's model included the integration of military forces
with local administration, the fostering close relations with local populations, and tailoring
military structures to capitalize on local resources and strengths.
Peng advanced a number of regularizing reforms. A system of ranks was introduced,
together with a pay scale graded by rank and experience. Academic standards for entry to
military schools and promotions were introduced. A bifurcated personnel system was
established, under which academic and other requirements were standardized for officers,
while conscription was instituted to fill the enlisted ranks. A regular, military-run reserve was
established, while the bulk of China's vast and disparate militia organizations were either
342 Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image, 68. The comments were made in September 1968.
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disbanded or removed from direct military management. Peng reduced the size of the regular
force from 4.8 million to 3.5 million, and he worked to strengthen the relative authority of
central organizations, such as the general staff and the departments, vis-A-vis the military
regions. Most of these reforms were approved at a marathon 51-day "all military meeting"
from December 1953 to January 1954. The meeting was stacked with branch, service, and
military school commanders - i.e., officers from the central military establishment, rather than
the military regions.343
Peng worked closely with Liu Shaoqi and the other civilian moderates who then
dominated the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee. He shared their interest
in stable and relatively close relations with the Soviet Union, which was providing substantial
technical assistance in both the economic and military spheres (but which was viewed with
great suspicion by Mao).3 44 He favored the continued employment of"intellectuals" and even
former members of the Nationalist military, just as they favored the employment of civilian
technicians who had formerly served the Nationalists civilian government.34 5 Peng
understood that economic growth would require freeing resources for civilian investment and
consequently reduced the military budget from over 30 percent of the budget in 1953 to
343 He Ding Wang Yan, Jiang Baihua, Peng Dehuai Zhuan (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1995), 51 1.
344 In February 1958, long after Mao had made his aversion to "over reliance" on Soviet models and assistance,
Peng delivered a speech commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army suggested closer
military cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image, 81.
345 On the military side, these individuals were largely employed in the air force and, as I will discuss further, in
the navy.
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around 10 percent in 1959.346 And he worked with the civilian leadership to ensure that the
specifics of military industrial planning were in sync with overall economic planning.3 47
But Mao, together with leftists in the army, grew increasingly concerned about the
political, social, and economic effects of Peng's military reforms during the mid-1950s.
Some proposed reforms had direct bearing on the Party's control of the military - especially
Peng's politically naive attempt in 1953 to establish a single commander system (yizhangzhi),
which would have clearly subordinated political commissars to military commanders in PLA
line units.348 Mao's opposition to other aspects of Peng's military program are best
understood in the context of his larger concerns about the direction of social and economic
policy.
Specifically, Mao felt that former capitalist classes were regrouping, that national
policy was once again favoring urban elites and interests over rural ones, and that government
and even the Party was becoming bureaucratized and incapable and unwilling to affect social
revolution.3 4 9 In Mao's view, introducing a system of ranks into the military, an organization
346 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (London: University of
California Press, 2002), 188-89. The figures vary depending on source, but all agree on the direction of
movement and degree of change. See also Wang Yan, Peng Dehuai Zhuan, 503.
347 In an effort to coordinate mid-term military planning with planning for the second five-year plan (1958-
1962), Peng invited the finance minister, state planning minister, railroad chief, transportation minister, heads of
the machinery and heavy industrial departments, and other key economic planners to take part in the expanded
session of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in March 1956. Wang Yan, Peng Dehuai Zhuan, 536.
348 Ibid., 513.
349 On the concerns that led to Mao's intervention, see Spence, The Search for Modern China, 561. Harlan W.
Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981 (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 52.
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that had long led the Party's efforts to educate and set an example for the masses, widened the
problem of class.3 50 The introduction of academic standards for officer schools favored urban
candidates, who benefited from betters schools than their urban competitors. And Peng's
emphasis on conventional military training (which was to be given three times as much study
as politics), his advocacy of studying the Soviet model, and his efforts to divorce the militia
from the PLA all threatened to remove the military entirely from its social role.
Mao's socio-political criticisms resonated with many senior army officers. In 1956,
just one year after most of Peng's professional innovations were put into place, some officers
began to complain about military reform's unintended consequences. In September of that
year, Deputy Minister of Defense Tan Zheng delivered a speech to the Eighth Party Congress
in which he discussed five newly emerging phenomenon in the force: (1) ignoring the unity of
commanders and men and the tradition of unity between those above and below; (2)
overlooking the function of democracy (i.e., an atmosphere within which inferiors could
freely suggest ideas or even criticize those above them); (3) emphasizing administrative work
and ignoring thought (i.e., leftist political) work; (4) departing from applied knowledge in
classroom work and pursuing dogmatism and formalism; and (5) a sense of distance in the
relationship between military units and the people, local Party organizations, and local
government.3 5 1
350 Under the pay scale established by Peng, platoon leaders earned five to six times the average urban wage
(which itself was several times the average rural wage), and the wages received by top military commanders
were some 40 times the urban wage. Wang Yan, Peng Dehuai Zhuan, 518.
351 "Jianjun Xinjieduanzhong Zhengzhi Gongzuo de Ruogan Wenti", Jiefangjunbao, September 24 1956.
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It is difficult to assess with any precision how much of the army supported Peng's
military reform program relative to those who sympathized with Mao's efforts to keep the
military a bastion of leftist strength. Mao was almost certainly right that military reform, left
unchallenged, would ultimately create strong technocratic sympathies within the military and
undermine its commitment to core revolutionary values. But most officers in the mid-1950s
had joined the force when it was still organized largely along revolutionary lines. At the most
senior level, China's ten marshals (so designated because of their sterling service during the
Civil War) appeared split, with some, like Nie Rongzhen (who led China's military
technology efforts), providing reliable support for professionalization, and others, including
Zhu De and He Long, voicing concerns suggesting that although weapons are important,
human qualities had historically provided the PLA with its primary advantage in its military
struggles.3 52 Those human qualities, Zhu De emphasizes, included the democratic unity
between commanders and their men and the unity of the army with the people.3 53 At a
352 The available evidence strongly suggests that certain aspects of Peng Dehuai's program came under serious
and sustained criticism from influential individuals inside and perhaps outside of the military. Comments and
reporting by a wide variety of individuals make this clear. But a caveat is in order. With one or two exceptions,
it is far more difficult to determine from the reporting whether the individuals making such statements were
themselves critics or were, rather, acknowledging some faults raised by others in order to defend broader
programs with which they were in general agreement. Peng Dehuai himself said, "Because of insufficient
experience and investigation, a number of serious problems have arisen.... For example, in the process of
making a conventional force some things occurred that affected the unity of officers and men.... In order to
complete our task of building a modernized army, we must be firm in maintaining the following systems in
accordance with our experience and the actual situation in the units: (1) maintain the military's leadership system
[under which a division of responsibilities exists in the joint leadership of commanders and political officers];
... (2) the military's political system; ... and (3) the military's democratic system." "Zai Dang de Dibaci
Quanguo Daibiao Dahuishang: Peng Dehuai Tongzhi de Fayan", Jiefangjunbao, September 20 1956.
353 Zhu De, "Renmin Jundui, Renmin Zhanzheng", Jiefangjunbao, August 1 1958. As early as 1956, the political
department had been using the example of Mao Zedong and, especially, Zhu De (as commander of the Chinese
4th Worker and Farmer's Army) at Jinggangshan in 1928 as a model of people's war and its power. During Zhu
De's campaigns there, the example set by the commander and his men, according to these articles, turned
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minimum, the army included many left-leaning officers that could, if mobilized, constitute a
major challenge to technically-oriented reforms inside the military and liberal tendencies in
national politics.
The most tenacious military critic of Peng Dehuai's reforms - and later the toughest
military critic of Liu Shaoqi's civilian leadership - was Lin Biao. During the Civil War, Lin
had helped develop the CCP strategy of using the countryside to surround the cities, a key
guerrilla tactic that ultimately enabled Lin to wrest Manchuria from the Nationalists during
the Civil War.3 54 At a meeting of the Central Military Commission in October 1957 Lin
argued that Peng's military policies would not enable the PLA to emerge victorious in a major
military confrontation.3 55 He was one of the most consistent critics of cooperation with the
Soviet Union and welcomed Mao's 1958 attack on "dogmatism" - the uncritical study and
adoption of Soviet technology and methods. And in contrast to Peng, Lin approved
wholeheartedly of the new militia units activated by Mao in 1958, and he was a strong
supporter of the Great Leap Forward for which they had been mobilized.35 6
skeptical, war weary peasants into strong supporters and was instrumental in turning the tide against local
Nationalist forces. See, for example, "Hongjun Zai Jinggangshanshang", Jiefang/unbao, April 12 1954.
354 Lin Biao also participated in a number of conventional operations against the Nationalists, Japanese
(including the Hundred Regiments Campaign), and Americans (in Korea), but more than some early top PLA
leaders he embraced and helped developed the guerrilla strategies that were instrumental in allowing the
Communists to prevail over the Nationalists during the Civil War.
355 Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image, 68. By at least one account Mao was already grooming Lin
Biao for military leadership by late 1957.
356 Lin's support was couched in larger social and political terms: "The Chinese People's Liberation Army...
has always regarded the revolutionary mass movement as its own affair. When the masses rise up and wage
hard, bitter struggles against the old system and for the transformation of society and of nature, the People's
Liberation Army always stands as one with the people.... And whenever hostile forces attempt to obstruct and
undermine the mass revolutionary movements, the People's Liberation Army always stands behind the masses."
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Until 1958, political-military issues revolved largely around the structure and
operation of the military, rather than the military's involvement in purely political or
economic policy areas. There were exceptions: in 1956, for example, Peng, joined by Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, had blocked efforts to have references to "Mao Zedong Thought"
included in a new constitution.35 7 And certainly military questions were debated with clear
and explicit recognition of their political implications. But direct military involvement in the
Party's political direction was relatively unusual prior to the Great Leap Forward. After that
time, however, as politics became more contentious and the stakes for those involved became
higher, military leaders were increasingly drawn into - or interposed themselves in - political,
economic, or social issues of less immediate military relevance.
After sparring with Mao since 1953 (and arguably before that time), Peng Dehuai
openly broke with the CCP patriarch over the question of whether China should continue or
abandon the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960).358 By the end of 1958, Peng was convinced
that communization of agriculture and the establishment of backyard steel furnaces were
having disastrous consequences for production. He presented his findings during the Lushan
Conference of Party officials in July 1959, and he suggested in the process that Mao was less
John K. Fairbank Robert R. Bowie, ed., Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) 46.
357 Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image, 72. An earlier example included a murky affair reportedly
involving the efforts of two military political commissars to push Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi from office and
take their places. Spence, The Search for Modern China, 542-43.
358 This paragraph is based on Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image, 70-102. Spence, The Search for
Modern China, 581-82. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966, vol. 3, The Origins
of the Cultural Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 104-13.
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than truthful in professing ignorance of his policies' negative impact. In addition to making
his own critique, he appeared to urge others to be more bold and direct in their criticism.
Mao, with his Party leadership challenged as never before, charged Peng with having formed
a "right opportunist clique" and having undertaking "unprincipled factional activity." Mao
forced those present to take sides and was ultimately able to purge Peng from his military and
Party posts, as well as secure a commitment to launch the second phase of the Great Leap
Forward during 1959-1960.
Having removed Peng at Lushan, Mao replaced him with Lin Biao. Lin moved first to
buttress the leftist position within the military. In a CMC meeting beginning in September
1960, Lin affirmed the central role of Mao Zedong Thought in military affairs, compiling a
list of Mao's sayings that ultimately became the "little red book" used inside and outside the
military.359 Lin rolled back many of Peng's military reforms, increasing the percentage of
training time devoted to political instruction, expanding the militia, and, ultimately, abolishing
all ranks. There was some resistance to these moves within the army. Although most
opposition came from the technical branches, one of Lin's toughest critics was, ironically, a
political officer, Luo Ruiqing, who had been selected by Lin to serve as chief of staff. (Luo's
association with the navy provided a key pretext for Lin's attacks on the naval leadership in
1966.) But although there were some holdouts, Lin was able to find enough like-minded
senior officers in the army to ensure broad compliance.
359 The book, Quotationsfrom Chairman Mao, was formally published and distributed within the military in
1963 and distributed outside the military starting in 1964. It became the ubiquitous symbol of Red Guard
radicalism during the Cultural Revolution.
255
Chapter 5: China
Lin used his base in the military to exert political influence outside of it. During the
Party's central work conference in 1962, when the Great Leap Forward was again being
reevaluated, Lin offered an unabashed defense. He argued that the gains outweighed the
losses, though the former might not yet be fully visible. Ultimately, his defense of Mao's
policies failed, agriculture was gradually de-communized, and Mao was forced to conduct a
self-criticism.360 But in the ensuing years, Lin helped Mao regain his authority at the grass
roots level and, in 1966, triumph over his critics. In 1963, Mao issued a call for the country to
"learn from the PLA." Lin made clear that the ideal soldier was more politically pure than he
was technically proficient.3 61 Lin integrated the military with local political structures by
introducing civilian Party members into the military's chain of command as political
commissars and making the commanders of the military districts into secretaries in regional
Party bureaus.3 62
Until the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, moderates remained in almost all
key central civilian positions despite suffering losses at lower levels, and they were even able
to provide a modicum of protection to the professionally oriented officers in the military who
supported them. The rough balance of power was, however, shattered in 1966 when Lin Biao,
Mao Zedong, and a circle of radical leftists from the cultural field formed a loose coalition to
360 On Lin Biao's speech, see MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966, 166-68.
361 Around the same time that Mao launched his campaign to learn from the military, the PLA "discovered" (i.e.,
wrote) and published the Diary ofLei Feng, a soldier who, like Hollywood's Forrest Gump, lived by his values
rather than his skills (but who was considerably less lucky than Forrest and was said to have been run over by a
truck while sleeping after tireless efforts to help the masses).
362 Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 127-28.
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launch the Cultural Revolution. The idea came primarily from Jiang Qing - Mao's third wife,
an embittered failed actress, and a hard line leftist. But Lin Biao played a critical supporting
role, providing Jiang with an institutional base by making her the official cultural advisor to
the military and allowing her to use the military's cultural and political organs. This leftist
alliance, by attacking moderates in relatively low-ranking positions and gradually pursuing
those above by guilt through association, allowed Mao Zedong to sweep moderates (including
Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun) out of the Party and enabled Lin Biao to remove
military rivals (for example Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen and a number of technical officers,
including the heads of the navy, air force, and armored corps) from their posts.
The start of the Cultural Revolution and the consolidation of Lin Biao's position
within the military moved that organization, on balance, towards the left politically and
towards guerrilla war doctrinally. But although Lin was certainly more leftist and more of an
advocate of guerrilla war doctrine than Peng Dehuai, he was less committed to those causes
than was the Gang of Four.363 Lin's death and the dominance of the Gang of Four after 1971
brought further leftist pressure on professionally oriented officers within the military. The
Gang sought to virtually eliminate the distinction between the military and civilian realms,
using the military primarily as an agent of social change and opposing the purchase or
manufacture of almost all major conventional military systems. Their impact in some
technical areas - including the navy - was mitigated to some extent by the depth of suspicion
363 Having removed his politically moderate rivals, Lin Biao sought to secure the loyalty of remaining
commanders by securing new resources for virtually all areas of the organization. Although there was a relative
shift towards guerrilla doctrines and strategies, conventional capabilities were not ignored. And politically, Lin
used the military to maintain order, curbing the worst excesses of the Red Guard groups comprised of radical
leftist students and workers.
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felt towards them by the officer corps. But they had allies within the army, especially the
military regions. And by leaving many central military and technical positions (including the
chief of armored forces and the commander of the air force) unfilled for years on end, they
were able to outflank opponents who might otherwise have wielded the power conferred by
these positions.
THE NAVY'S POLITICAL POSITION. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),
despite having been born from the PLA and led by former army officers from its founding in
1949, was largely free from the types of divisions that plagued the army. It was thoroughly
technical in outlook, and its perceived economic, social, and political interests meshed well
with those of civilian moderates, as well as with technically oriented army officers (e.g., Peng
Dehuai and Ye Jianying).
Xiao Jinguang, the navy's first commander, and other officers brought in to staff the
navy were acutely aware of the services' technical demands. "From its inception," an official
navy history reports, the people's navy emphasized education and technical foundations in
selecting its personnel." 36 4 While it officially maintained that its spirit would remain
consistent with that of the Communist "farmer's army" (nongjun), its first request for
personnel - transmitted through the CMC - asked that the "each field army survey its forces
and find those individuals who had served in the [Nationalist] navy, worked on merchant
ships, or studied in maritime schools, as well as those who understood something about
364 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi (Beijing: Zhongguo Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989), 21.
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machinery (including those who had operated or maintained tanks or cars)."36 5 When
conscription was instituted in 1955, naval sailors were expected to spend a full five years in
the service, in contrast to the three served by army conscripts.3 66
Although the bulk of the navy's personnel did come from the army, its most important
core - from a technical standpoint - came from the old Nationalist navy. Some 4,000
individuals from the old navy joined the new, comprising some two-thirds of the new navy's
first frigate detachment (formed in November 1949) and serving as trainers for the rest of the
force on shore.3 6 7 Another important source of personnel for the navy were "intellectuals" -
defined in objective terms in the Chinese lexicon as those with at least some college education
- and 30,000 such individuals were in the force by 1955.368 The employment of these
individuals was consistent with Liu Shaoqi's advocacy of cooperation with and employment
of skilled members of the former "capitalist classes."36 9 But the practice diverged
considerably from recruiting patterns in the army, where even Peng's reforms designed to
introduce academic standards for admittance to the officer corps was proving controversial.
365 Ibid.
366 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 50.
3 67 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 24 and 45.
368 Ibid., 21 and 24. Of 180,000 sailors in the navy in 1955, 1 10,000 (or 60 percent) were from the army, 6,000
(or 3 percent) from the air force, 30,000 (or 16 percent) were intellectuals, and 4,000 (2 percent) former sailors
from the Nationalist navy.
369 At the time, some former Nationalists were returning from overseas and many more who had never left were
contributing to the revival of China's economy.
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The technical orientation of the navy pervaded even its political department. In
August 1951, the navy's deputy commissar emphasized that "Political officers must study
technology.... Discussing the navy's politics without understanding technology will produce
only vacuous dialogue."3 70 Political officers with poor technical knowledge were reported
ridiculed by the new sailors as "ballast," and special classes for political officers were quickly
established.37 Some political officers, having achieved technical proficiency, went on to
assume operational posts, including ship command.37 2 In October 1958 Su Zhenhua, the
navy's deputy political commissar between 1954 and 1957 and political commissar between
1957 and 1967, led a group of Chinese specialists to the Soviet Union, where the team
acquired licenses for China to build warships and missiles. On his return, he took an active
role in organizing the relevant research and design departments to maximize the value to
indigenous design capabilities of the licenses acquired.3 73 This voyage by Su Zhenhua (who
was subsequently tasked with clearing radical leftists out of their strongholds in Shanghai
after the end of the Cultural Revolution) is remarkable for two reasons. First, it was a purely
technical task executed by an ostensibly political officer. And secondly, it took place after
leftists in the CMC had begun their attack on "dogmatism" - an "excessive" reliance on
studying Soviet technical and technical models.
370 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Hayunshi, 35.
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid., 61.
373 Zhongguo Jiefangun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu (Beijing: Haichao Chubanshe,
1999), 1645.
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The navy enjoyed a strong relationship and relatively high status - if not budget
windfalls - under Liu Shaoqi. The PLAN's official 1989 Naval History records that the
period between the Korean War and the Cultural Revolution was, with the exception of those
periods when the navy was under attack from leftists, one of rapid progress.3 74 Navy
commander Xiao Jinguang was appointed deputy minister of defense when the defense
ministry was created in 1954. Peng Dehuai took an active interest in naval affairs. Budget
constraints forced Peng to make trade-offs, and he chose to place strengthening armored and
air force strengths ahead of naval construction. But he nevertheless approved the
establishment of a marine corps (1953), the first PLAN destroyer detachment (1954), and
research on a variety of new capital ships, as well as the establishment of a substantial naval
educational and maintenance infrastructure.
Although there is little if any evidence to suggest that Liu Shaoqi took a personal
interest in the aggressive pursuit of naval building, he was adopted by the navy in later years
as something of an unofficial patron saint. After Liu Shaoqi's political rehabilitation in 1980
(eleven years after his death in prison), the navy supplied four frigates to escort his ashes for
reburial at sea, firing off a twenty-one-gun salute for his overdue state funeral.37 His
inscription, "Build a powerful navy, develop our ocean industries," was featured prominently
in naval propaganda - more so than ostensibly similarly pro-navy statements by Mao
374 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 49. See also Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN),
Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 1948.
375 Guo Jinyan, "Liu Shaoqi Zhuxi yu Shuibing: Yigu Guojia Zhuxi Liu Shaoqi Shengqian Guanxin Haijun
Jianshe Jishi", Jiefangiunbao, November 23 1998.
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Zedong.37 6 The inscription served as the title of naval commander Liu Huaqing's first public
article on naval priorities in 1984.377 And on the anniversary of Liu Shaoqi's hundredth
birthday in November 1998, the only article commemorating the event in the pages of the
PLA's Jiefang/unbao was an article by a naval propagandist entitled "Chairman Liu Shaoqi
and the Sailors," a collection of stories by retired naval officers and enlisted about their
interactions with Liu during his various interactions with the navy.3 78 Although the evidence
is more suggestive than definitive, the navy appears to have adopted Liu Shaoqi as its patron
more because of the political-economic policy atmosphere he established than because of any
specific contribution to naval construction.
Any concerns leftists had about the direction of military policy prior to 1966 were
especially deep in regards to the navy, and leftists marked the navy for special criticism and
attack. During the "anti-dogmatism campaign" mentioned above (begun in May 1958), the
navy had already been singled out for its poor politics in an expanded session of the CMC.379
In early 1962, Lin Biao took over the daily work of the CMC and lost no time in launching
more serious attacks on the navy's direction. In a February 1962 all military work
376 Although Mao's relationship with the navy appears to have been profoundly ambivalent, there are certainly
quotations that could have been used had the navy sought to highlight its relationship with the founding father of
the CCP. In 1953, for example, Mao wrote "In order to prevent imperialist invasion, we absolutely must build a
powerful navy." There is at least one non-PLAN book that does make the most of the relationship between Mao
and the navy: Yang Zhaolin, Jianli Qiangda de Haijun, Zhongguo Chule ge Mao Zedong [China Produced a
Mao Zedong] (Jiangsu: Jiangsu Wenyi Chubanshe, 1993), 160. The book is part of a series on Mao Zedong (not
the navy) and carries a prologue by an army general, Yang Shangkun rather than a naval officer.
377 Liu Huaqing, "Jianshe Yizhi Qiangda de Haijun, Fazhan Woguo de Haiyang Shiye: Haijun Siling",
Renminribao, November 24 1984.
378 Guo Jinyan, "Liu Shaoqi Zhuxi yu Shuibing: Yigu Guojia Zhuxi Liu Shaoqi Shengqian Guanxin Haijun
Jianshe Jishi".
379 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 63-64, 75.
262
Chapter 5: China
conference, he compared the navy to a "sick patient, who is already in possession of good
medicine [i.e., socialist political and military thought] but refuses to take it, running around
instead looking for other medicine [i.e., foreign military ideas]."380 In April 1962 Lin
dispatched a CMC inspection team led by Li Zuopeng, an army political officer and
committed leftist, to survey the navy's political situation. The team concluded that the navy's
"problems are deep, its political foundation is weak, relations [among its personnel] are
strained, and its general work style is poor."3 8' Using the report as a pretext, Lin Biao then
installed Li Zuopeng to be the navy's deputy commander (with specially designated
responsibilities in its political committee) and another of Lin's followers, Zhang Xiuchuan, to
be its deputy political commissar. These individuals acted as a shadow command and
continued to apply pressure for conformity with Lin's leftist military and political line.
The navy, however, continued to enjoy the protection of Liu Shaoqi and other
moderate political and military figures. In May 1966, with radical leftists gaining the upper
hand in the political struggle unfolding across China, Li Zuopeng convened a meeting of the
navy's political committee and suggested that navy commander Xiao Jinguang and political
commissar Su Zhenhua were "capitalist representatives" and "followers of Luo Ruiqing" (the
recently ousted proponent of modernization and professionalization). Although Lin Biao and
Li Zuopeng launched their attack when Liu Shaoqi (still the president and the number two
man in the CCP) was under siege within the Party, Liu was not yet out of the game
completely. Both he and the moderate CMC vice chairman Ye Jianying came forward to
380 Ibid., 76.
381 Ibid.
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defend the navy's professional leadership, and they were able to turn the navy's political
meeting into a counterattack against Li Zuopeng and Zhang Xiuchuan. In all likelihood, Liu's
calculation at this most dangerous time in his political career was that he could not afford to
lose one of his last remaining anchors in the military and that, with the support of a generally
friendly political committee in the navy, this was one fight he could win. Lin Biao,
outmaneuvered and in danger of losing the men he had planted in the navy's command
structure, retreated, instructing both sides in the dispute to cease their attacks and undertake
"mutual criticism and mutual assistance."3 82 Two months later, Liu Shaoqi and Ye Jianying
again personally intervened to save Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua from yet another attempt
to affect a coup within the navy.3 83
By the end of 1966, however, Mao's radical student Red Guards had turned their
attacks directly on Liu Shaoqi, making physical safety his primary concern and leaving Xiao
Jinguang and Su Zhenhua without political protection. Xiao and Su were relieved of their
positions in January 1967. As the navy's official history records, "during the ten chaotic
years of confused and complex struggle [during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976], the
navy was one of the organizations that suffered the most damage." 384 Nine of fourteen naval
schools were shut down, and four out of the remaining five were forced to move because of
conflicts (unspecified in naval histories) with local authorities. Academic selection standards
for officer programs and other training schools were reduced as political qualifications were
382 Ibid., 77-78.
383 Liu Tienhe, Xiao Jinguang (Beijing: Zuojia Chubanshe, 1997).
384 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 74.
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placed above technical ones. Most new students had only elementary or some middle school-
level education. Training time at the unit level was limited to one hour per day, as political
education was given priority. And central maintenance and repair facilities were closed, with
units instructed to do their own repair work.
Lin Biao died in 1971 while fleeing the country after an abortive apparent coup d'etat
attempt. Li Zuopeng was stripped of his party and military positions two years later. But
although Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua were quickly brought back in to assume their old
positions, the Gang of Four proved no less persistent in their attacks on the navy than had Lin
Biao.385 In 1972 Zhang Chunqiao - a member of Standing Committee of the Politburo and
one of the Gang of Four - staked out a military rationale against purchasing new ships for the
navy: "We are continentalists. With advanced missiles installed on shore and capable of
hitting targets at any location, there is no need for building a big navy."386 Yet despite this
strategic justification, other incidents betrayed a political motive for the Gang of Four's
campaign against strengthening the navy. In a June 1974 fleet visit, Jiang Qing, Mao's wife
and another Gang of Four member, pointed to an officer in front of the assembled crew and
said: "I do not trust your type, and that is to say I do not trust you." Pointing to an enlisted
party member, she then declared, "I do trust you and your type." Unlike the army, the navy
385 How Xiao and Su regained their positions is one of the many mysteries of the Cultural Revolution. Some
moderates, especially those who were not prone to challenge the leftist political drift in broad terms but rather
defend specific programs or policies important to the moderates' cause, remained in important posts through the
Cultural Revolution. These included Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. It is possible that these individuals had some
role in this decision. Both had protected professional military institutions against physical attack by Red Guards
during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution.
386 Quoted in "'Sirenbang' Shi Yihuo Shizu de Touxiangpai, Maiguopai", Jiefang/unbao, March 15 1977. See
also John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the
Nuclear Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 223.
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had retained the Soviet-style uniforms first adopted in 1955, and Jiang next turned her
attention to that question. She derided enlisted naval headgear as "imperialist" in fashion,
calling on enlisted sailors to cut the "tails" off their caps. Finally, she accused navy
commander Xiao Jinguang - who was not present - of having failed to distribute reading
materials on the correct "military line."3 87
Although the navy's leaders were too weak to reverse the leftist onslaught during the
1960s and early 1970s, they did resist its full conquest, and, when opportunities presented
themselves, they did counterpunch. Xiao Jinguang was a leader, not just in the navy's
defense, but also among the broader community of moderate survivors seeking to reverse the
radical leftist tide. He maintained his Party posts even after having been driven from the
navy, and according to later reports in the Jiefangiunbao, he voted against Lin Biao and all
four members of the Gang of Four during the 1969 Party Congress, a bold move by any
standard at a time when Lin Biao was being written into the constitution as Mao's
successor. 3 88 During the mid-1 980s, Xiao wrote the obituaries for two other prominent
military moderates - a task he more than likely drew because of his own credibility in
reporting their opposition.3 89 Although the Chinese Communist Party has remained
ambivalent about reporting military intrigues - even those related to combating the Cultural
387 "Baigujing Jiang Qing Chundao Haijun Jianting de Yici Chou'e Biaoyan", Jiefangjunbao, March 13 1977.
Harlan Jencks writes that "The navy has clung to the highest degree of rank-consciousness in the PLA. Even
during the Lin Piao years, cadres and sailors wore different styles of shirts under their blue Chung-shan jackets."
Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981, 162.
388 "Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi Shengping", Jiefangjunbao, April 9 1989.
389 Xiao Jinguang, "Daonian Su Yu Tongzhi", Jiefangjunbao, February 13 1984. Xiao Jinguang, "Chentong
Daonian Xiao Hua Tongzhi", Jiefangiunbao, August 27 1985.
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Revolution - these obituaries recount angry and excited conversations behind closed doors
between military opponents of the gang of four.
A variety of Chinese sources indicate that, following the death of Mao in September
1976, naval commander Xiao Jinguang and naval political commissar Su Zhenhua played
important supporting roles in the arrest of the Gang of Four.3 90 Immediately after Mao's
death, the Gang activated Shanghai's 100,000-strong militia and prepared for a showdown
with their many enemies. They made the critical error, however, of personally remaining in
Beijing instead of retreating to Shanghai, where they had substantially more support.
Historians agree that General Ye Jianying, an army officer with long involvement in technical
research and development projects who was then serving as Vice Chairman of the CMC, was
the central figure in the plot to arrest of Jiang Qing and her followers. An account of Ye
Jianying's actions in the months before and after the October arrests, however, suggests that
the navy's Xiao Jinguang was involved in a parallel effort to gather support for decisive
action against the Gang and that he and his coconspirators coordinated with Ye and urged him
to take quick and decisive action.3 9 Two official obituaries for Xiao Jinguang after his death
in 1989, one by General Yang Shangkun and another by the navy, support this contention. In
similar language, both state that in September and October 1976, Xiao twice approached
390 See, for example, Yang Shangkun, "Dao Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi", Jiefangiunbao, April 10 1989. Zhongguo
Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun (the PLAN), "Daonian Women de Silingyuan -- Xiao Jinguang Dajiang",
Jiefangjunbao, May 1 1989. Fan Shuo, Ye Jianying Zai 1976 (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao
Chubanshe, 1995), 361-62.
391 Fan Shuo, Ye Jianying Zai 1976, 361-62.
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Marshall Ye Jianying with "an important suggestion" related to "smashing the Gang of
Four.,,392
The navy's political commissar, Su Zhenhua, is also credited with playing a
significant role in the arrest of the Gang. According to one account, Su personally arrested
the Gang's leader, Jiang Qing, at her residence in Zhongnanhai and, in the process, pulled off
her wig to complete her humiliation.393 While the above story may be apocryphal, Ye
Jianying's biographer writes that Ye consulted Su on tactics prior to the arrest.394 And,
without delving into specifics, Deng Xiaoping himself credited Su with having made a "major
contribution" to smashing the Gang of Four in a speech delivered at Su's funeral in February
1979.39 5
The 1987 Haijunshi (History of the navy) suggests that opposition to leftist thought
was broad based within the navy's officer corps. The history says that naval officers had a
difficult time "understanding and accepting" Mao's exaggeration of continuing class conflict
and his consequent efforts to make politics and class struggle the focus of military activity.39 6
Naval officers, it says, complained openly that "over the last few years, our naval work has
392 Yang Shangkun, "Dao Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi". Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun (the PLAN), "Daonian
Women de Silingyuan -- Xiao Jinguang Dajiang".
393 Cited in Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1994), 404n50.
394 Fan Shuo, Ye Jianying Zai 1976, 360.
395 "Zai Su Zhenhua Tongzhi Zhuidao Dahuishang Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi Zhi Daoci", Jiefang/unbao, February
16 1979.
396 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 75.
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been one step forward, two steps back, with standards in each year falling short of the
previous year. Presently, we have fast attack craft that are no longer fast and submarines that
cannot submerge. Soon, we will have aircraft that cannot go airborne." 3 97 And the history
claims in several places that naval officers resisted (dizhi) the implementation of leftist
programs.39 8 The navy may have been only vaguely sensitive to civilian political issues
(including social and economic thought) prior to the 1960s, but there is no question that it
became increasingly sensitive to the importance of politics during the course of the 1960s and
1970s.
STRATEGIC CHANGE
Throughout the period from the end of the Korean War to the end of the Cultural Revolution,
the navy grew, but its development was qualitatively different before the Cultural Revolution
and during it.
THE FORCE STRUCTURE UNDER THE MODERATES (1953-1966). Under Peng
Dehuai (1953-1959), two trends were evident. First, defense budgets shrank, especially
relative to the national budget. Second, emphasis was placed on modernization and the
establishment of stronger conventional (as opposed to guerrilla) capabilities. After Peng's
replacement by Lin Biao in 1959, some of the former's priorities were reversed. Militia and
other force structures appropriate for guerrilla war received renewed emphasis. The trend
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towards guerrilla doctrines and force structures became even more pronounced after Lin Biao
died in 1971 and the Gang of Four established its supremacy on military matters.
Under Peng Dehuai, the central military budget was cut from some 34 percent of the
national budget in 1953, at the end of the Korean War, to around 9 percent by 1959.399 Peng
cut the size of the force from 4.8 million in 1953 to around 2.5 million by 1957. He
established a regular reserve force apart from the militia and diminished the role and
importance of the latter. Peng also established a new military doctrine, under which the
enemy would be ensnared on Chinese soil by popular resistance but would also be hit with
counterattacks by mechanized units. Special emphasis was, therefore, placed on the
development of armored capabilities. Air forces, which could support China's conventional
ground forces, also received emphasis. The entire force was also made more professional,
with ranks, pay scales, insignia, and recruiting standards introduced in 1955.
The navy did not receive top priority under Peng's plan, but its conventional
capabilities were nevertheless strengthened. A marine corps was established in 1953.
China's first destroyer detachment was established in 1954.400 The first Chinese-made frigate
(the Chengdu-class, assembled from Soviet parts) was launched in 1956.401 Research on a
new Chinese-designed guided missile destroyer, which, after substantial delays, became the
399 Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 188-89. The figures vary
depending on source, but all agree on the direction of movement and degree of change.
400 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 1946.
401 John Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980 (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1979).
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Luda-class, was begun in 1960.402 Naval educational structures were established, and an on-
shore support base established.
But although civilian moderates remained in power until 1966, leftists began making
inroads in the military significantly earlier, and the modernization and regularization of the
force faced political obstacles from the start. Ranks, insignia, and pay systems, put in place in
1955, were abolished in 1957. The marine corps was disbanded the same year. Funds for
continuing research on destroyers was cut shortly after being allocated. Nevertheless, despite
major obstacles, the navy's 1999 encyclopedia calls the period between 1956 and 1966 "a
period of progress on all fronts." 403
THE FORCE STRUCTURE DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. The Cultural
Revolution enabled Lin Biao to consolidate his position within the military. As noted earlier,
this shifted military politics leftward and, on balance, pushed the force structure towards a
guerrilla organization, though not as far as it was to move between 1971 and 1975 - i.e., the
period between Lin's death and the appointment of a successor (Ye Jianying), during which
time the Gang of Four were able to dominate military policy.
The military grew substantially during the Cultural Revolution. The budget expanded
from around 18 percent of the national budget in 1966 to around 26 percent two years later.40 4
402 Hiramatsu Shigeo, Yomigaeru Chugoku Kaigun (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1991), 70.
403 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 1948.
404 Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 188-89.
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After Lin Biao's death, the official national military budget stabilized (and went down as a
percentage of total national spending). But the military's increased role in local politics and
the economy expanded dramatically, and it is reasonable to assume that its access to extra-
budgetary resources also grew appreciably. Total PLA manpower grew 76 percent over the
course of the Cultural Revolution, from 2.5 million at the beginning to 4.4 million at its close.
The navy also grew - by some measures faster than the army. But it grew in ways that
hardly pleased its professional leadership - as opposed to those leftist army officers who were
transferred into the navy to dilute its political "rightism." The number of naval personnel
jumped 160 percent between 1966 and 1976, from 136,000 to 360,000.405 (The army grew 60
percent.) The navy's leadership was, however, forced to accept a doctrine of guerrilla
strategy at sea - and a force structure to match. Under Lin Biao, the defense industry
accelerated warship production. The rate of production dropped precipitously under the Gang
of Four. But even under Lin, the relative balance of production was already shifting towards
forces more appropriate for guerrilla war.
The shift in strategic and force structure emphasis during the Cultural Revolution is
evident from unit and personnel figures. Swarms of patrol craft and a substantial fleet of
submarines were built and dispersed along the coastline. The number of light coastal craft
272
405 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1966-1967 (London: IISS, 1966).
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1976-1977 (London: IISS, 1976).
Chapter 5: China
(between 50 and 400 tons) doubled or tripled between 1966 and 1976.406 The number of
destroyers and frigates grew more modestly, expanding by about 50 percent (from 22 to 34
ships). Assessed by total tonnage, the combined weight of coastal craft increased from 48
percent of that of major surface ships in 1966 to some 158 percent in 1976. The submarine
fleet also grew rapidly, from 29 units in 1966 to 89 by 1976. Naval forces and facilities were
dispersed and hidden along China's coastline, with new pens constructed for small strike
forces. The biggest naval growth area was, therefore, its construction corps, which expanded
by over 800 percent, from 9,000 at the beginning of the period to 76,000 by its end.407
As noted previously, however, the educational, maintenance, and command structure
of the navy decayed during this period, and no amount of growth in the navy's water-borne
guerrilla command could convince its commanders that either the new doctrine or its
accompanying leftist politics were good for the navy.
SUMMARY OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The civil-military coalition theory explains much about the services' political positions and
strategic change in China between 1953 and 1976. The army was divided on major political
issues, with those supporting moderate (i.e., relatively liberal) political positions holding an
advantage during the mid-1950s and their leftist (i.e., integral nationalist) opponents gradually
406 Jane's Fighting Ships, various years. According to the figures provided by Jane's, the number grew from
between 200 and 300 in 1966 to between 700 and 800 by 1976. These are generally lower than figures provided
by other sources for the PLAN around this time, but the point here is that numbers in this category were growing
rapidly, rather than the absolute count.
407 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 86.
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gaining influence after that time. The navy cooperated closely with moderate civilian leaders
during the first part of the period and remained deeply suspicious of radical leftist politics
during the latter part. It remained relatively united in its political outlook, despite concerted
attempts by leftist civilian and military leaders to undermine the position of senior naval
leaders and encourage the growth of leftist political sentiment within its ranks.
Military doctrine and force structure decisions tracked closely with domestic events
and, especially as politics turned towards the left, appeared to be driven largely by political
motives. Civilian moderates supported Peng Dehuai's efforts to turn a force largely organized
for guerrilla warfare into a slimmer, better armed force more prepared for conventional
battles. Civilian moderates and military modernizers shared a variety of common interests:
strong relations with the more technically advanced Soviet Union; social and political policies
that would not completely alienate former capitalist or intellectual classes; and prudent
economic planning (a dual track that would support key state industries, while preserving
room for some private production). After Peng's removal in 1959, civilian moderates
gradually became aware of the threat presented to their own position of the growth of leftist
influence in the armed forces and sought - with some success until mid-1966 - to protect the
navy and other technical services that were most sympathetic to their position.n os
408 Kenneth Lieberthal argues that it took some time for the moderates, who continued to occupy most key
civilian posts, to realize the dangers of resurgent leftism, in the military and elsewhere. Lieberthal, "The Great
Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 91. But over the course of the 1960s, they
did become increasingly aware of the threat.
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As Mao and his leftist civilian and military allies gained authority, they shifted away
from conventional military doctrines and attacked the supporters of such doctrines within the
military. Civilian and military leftists alike openly admitted social and political motives in
these moves, as well as military ones. They also openly acknowledged the opposition their
programs faced from technical officers inside the military establishment, including, perhaps
most prominently of all, the navy. The Gang of Four opposed the expansion of an ocean-
going surface fleet and publicly questioned the political reliability of the navy's senior
leadership. They did, however, back the expansion of other naval elements more appropriate
for a guerrilla war at sea, but they did so with the understanding that those elements would
undermine the authority of the navy's senior leaders. The construction corps, with its
responsibilities for local infrastructure, was recognized by all to be a particular bastion of
leftist thought within the military, and this was precisely the naval element increased the
fastest. The shift from larger ships to smaller craft reduced, to an extent, the need to recruit
"intellectuals" into the force. And the diminution of central organizations within the navy,
increasing decentralization, reduced the authority of the navy's senior-most leaders.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. The changes that took place in China's
strategic thinking between 1953 and 1976 were not unrelated to a strategic debate, but the
strategic debate appeared appears to have been frequently motivated more by domestic
political considerations than by external events. True, specific personal military experiences
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during the Chinese Revolution, the war against Japan, and the Korean War had a profound
impact on some participants in these debates. But virtually all of these individuals understood
the domestic political implications of different military doctrines, and many appeared to be at
least as concerned about these implications as they were about military efficacy. Indeed,
some of China's external threats were self-made under circumstances that raise strong
suspicions about possible domestic political motivations. On balance, although strategic
considerations were not irrelevant in determining China's military doctrine and force posture,
they should not be regarded as the primary drivers of military policy.
The doctrinal debate throughout this period revolved around the proper balance of
guerrilla, conventional, and nuclear forces. Some sought a mixed doctrine with significant
conventional forces, while others were content to rely exclusively (or almost exclusively) on a
guerrilla forces and a pure strategy of "people's war." The strategic rationale used to argue
these positions focused on differing assessments of several factors: the likelihood of a full-
scale invasion of China; the likelihood of more limited wars around China's borders; the
likelihood of nuclear attack; and the technical capacity of the Chinese state to produce
specific systems (such as tanks or nuclear weapons). In general, advocates of "people's war"
held that the likelihood of global war, hostile nuclear use, and invasion was high; the
likelihood or peripheral wars low or their importance negligible; and the capacity of China to
produce advanced conventional weaponry limited. Advocates of a more mixed strategy, with
a significant conventional component, made the opposite arguments.
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From the Korean War to the Cultural Revolution (1953-1966). In general, external
events more plausibly correlated with expected doctrinal changes between 1953 and 1966
than they did between 1966 and 1976. The experiences of the Korean War - during which the
lack of air, armor, and artillery cost the PLA dearly - could explain a shift towards more
conventional doctrines. Such a shift was in fact justified by Peng Dehuai on precisely those
grounds. Later, the 1957 deployment in Taiwan of U.S. Matador missiles, capable of hitting
targets hundreds of miles inside China, could help explain a shift the other direction - i.e.,
back towards "people's war." Sino-American relations were further damaged the following
year after the second crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. China's worsening relations with the
Soviet Union, increasingly serious in 1959, led to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors the
following year and presumably raised Chinese nuclear insecurities, providing further
incentive to fight a dispersed guerrilla war, rather than one in which China's military assets
would be massed (and therefore vulnerable) in conventional formations.
Even during this early period, however, strategic imperatives were more mixed than
the selective account above would suggest. The record of the Korean War did not imply that
there was no chance of China's being invaded; indeed General Douglas MacArthur had
advocated both the use of nuclear weapons and widening the conventional war to China
during that struggle. The 1954 and 1958 skirmishes over Quemoy and Matsu worsened
relations with the United States, heightening the probability of large-scale conflict and
providing a plausible explanation for China's quick return to more traditional "people's war"
doctrines. But the fighting over Quemoy and Matsu was peripheral, limited, and capital
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intensive - the same characteristics that were said to have made the Korean War a catalyst for
strengthening conventional doctrines and capabilities. And if it raised tensions with the
United States, it especially highlighted the continuing conflict over the status of Taiwan and
its offshore islands - strategic problems that should have underscored the need for stronger air
and naval forces. The 1962 war against India, though primarily a ground war, was also
conventional and peripheral.
One particularly knotty problem during this period is the strategic "chicken and egg"
question: Might the external threats to which China was ostensibly reacting have been
produced by its own actions and, if so, were domestic political interests driving events.40 9 Of
the plausible external explanations for the gradual return towards guerrilla doctrines
beginning in the mid- and late-1950s, nuclear insecurity is perhaps the strongest. Yet in
considering China's position vis-A-vis both the United States and, especially, Russia during
this period, it is clear that its insecurity was largely self-made and at least partly motivated by
domestic political considerations. While Taiwan shares some of the blame for the fighting
over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954, the Chinese opened fire first in 1958. In launching the
attack in 1958, Mao appears to have been asserting Chinese independence from the Soviet
line and the idea of Peaceful Coexistence, rather than pursuing a more coherent strategy
409 A number of analysts have highlighted the role of domestic political motives in Chinese foreign policy during
this period. Thomas Robinson, for example, writes that "domestic politics ... reigned supreme over international
politics during Mao's time." Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy From the 1940s to the 1990s," in
Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
For a treatment that sees a greater mix of motives during this period, but nevertheless highlights the importance
of domestic political objectives, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
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toward either Taiwan or the United States.4 10 He also believed that tensions with Taiwan
would give him the support needed to overcome opposition to his plans for the Great Leap
Forward. Shortly after the attacks began, Mao reported to the State Council that:
"Besides its disadvantageous side, a tense [international] situation can mobilize
the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize
the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in
economic construction.... Lenin said that a war could motivate people's
spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a
tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring
about every positive factor."411
Events over the following two years further demonstrated Mao's opposition to Premier
Nikita Khrushchev's condemnations of Stalin's tough line against the west and Mao's
determination to ensure that China did not follow the same line domestically or
internationally. Chinese moderates had gained politically from shifts in the international
environment brought about by Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist
states, as well as from adherence the Soviet economic models at home. As Kenneth
Lieberthal observes, "Mao's own position in the system would be affected by the type of
economic development strategy pursued." 41 2 Mao's core areas of competency were foreign
policy, rural economics, and the pace of revolutionary social change, while finance and urban
economic issues - both emphasized under Soviet-style planning - represented areas about
410 On the 1958 crisis, see Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-
American Conflict. Lorenz Luthi, "Ideology, Strategy, and Misperception: The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and
American-Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1950s."
411 Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 175.
412 Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 96.
279
Chapter 5: China
which he knew very little.413 Mao could and did use his control over foreign policy to undo
China's adherence to both a Soviet-made foreign policy and the Soviet economic model.414 In
the process, he made China less secure but strengthened his own argument for both guerrilla-
based strategy and leftist economic and social policy. It is significant to note that Peng
Dehuai, who favored continued strong relations with the Soviet Union as well as a more
conventional strategy, opposed the 1958 attacks on Taiwanese-held islands.4'1 5
On balance, political events track more closely, both logically and temporally, with
doctrinal and force structure change than do external events. Mao was concerned about the
direction of social, economic, and political policy by 1956, and those concerns provided the
motivation for him to begin reversing the trend towards professionalization within the PLA.
Mao's desire to mobilize support for the Great Leap Forward led him to launch a second
round of attacks against Quemoy and Matsu islands in 1958 - without reversing, either before
or after this event, his preference for guerilla strategies and forces. After the failure of the
Great Leap in 1960, mounting political pressure for Mao's effective retirement from politics
provided further incentive for him to solidify his base of political support within the military
413 Ibid.
414 A related domestic argument is offered by Steven Goldstein: "The Chinese leader was seeking to attenuate
co-operation with the Soviet Union not primarily because of global developments, but because he was coming to
believe that such attenuation was essential to his unfolding plans for China's domestic transformation." Steven
M. Goldstein, "Sino-Soviet Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 240.
415 Domes, Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image.
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and take steps to weaken his opponents.4 16 The navy, favoring relatively moderate economic
and political policies and distrusted by Mao and his leftist associates, was particularly
vulnerable.
Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976). During the Cultural Revolution, and
especially after 1969, the connection between external threats and doctrinal change became
particularly tenuous. At the start of the Cultural Revolution it is true that the Vietnam War
was intensifying, and that event certainly raised concerns in Beijing about U.S. intentions in
Asia. On the other hand, China's nuclear position was eased somewhat by its successful test
of a nuclear weapon in 1964 - the product of a sustained nuclear effort supported by
moderates and the left alike. And the Vietnam War itself was, from a Chinese perspective, a
limited battle outside of its own borders involving Chinese forces that were from relatively
technology intensive fields, such as air defense and communications.
By mid-1969, the threat of invasion was, from an objective standpoint, more remote
than it had been at any time since 1953, even allowing for a degree of uncertainty. In June
1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the first troop withdrawals in what was to
become the Vietnamization of the Indochina conflict and a protracted drawdown of U.S.
military forces in the region. In July Kissinger went to Beijing, leading to Sino-American
416 Despite efforts by Mao and Lin Biao to shift doctrine, however, the strategic debate continued. Doctrine
shifted less with each external event, but rather with the arrest of each key advocate of conventional war fighting
doctrines, including Peng Dehuai in 1959, Luo Ruiqing in 1964, and a host of other civilian and military figures
in 1966 and 1967.
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rapprochement and a visit by Nixon to Beijing the following year. Relations with the Soviet
Union continued to worsen throughout this period, but until the late 1970s, the only real
perceived military threat from that quarter was along the border. The clash along the Ussuri
River in 1969 was a conventional engagement along China's periphery and should, if
anything, have justified the strengthening of conventional capabilities.
Yet despite a lack of realistic invasion threats, especially after the draw down of U.S.
forces from the region after 1969, Chinese military doctrine continued to move towards
"people's war." Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated and made Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission in 1975, and he did try to stay if not reverse this trend. But he was
purged once again in April 1976. For the next year, the Gang of Four again dominated
politics and the military and reaffirmed a guerrilla doctrine. Deng returned once again to his
post as CMC Vice Chairman in July 1977. But he was not able to overcome military,
especially army, opposition to conventional war fighting doctrines (or liberal economic
reform) until the early or mid-1980s. Debates about China's strategic environment took place
during this period, but many if not most of the arguments were disingenuous. The personal
stakes in political outcomes were high given the fierce and daily political violence endemic
during this period. And by the start of the Cultural Revolution, all major political players
understood that greater emphasis on guerrilla war fighting doctrines would strengthen the
position of the political left and that emphasis on conventional capabilities would tend to have
the opposite effect.
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MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. A theory that
would predict organizational behavior based on the potential rewards of different choices in
terms of organizational size or budgets would also not be sustained by this case. The navy, as
well as technical officers in the army, supported Peng Dehuai's policies to professionalize the
military, despite the necessary cuts to force size this would entail and despite his commitment
to work with moderate civilian leaders in reducing military budgets. Similarly, these officers
opposed radical leftism inside and outside of the military during the Cultural Revolution,
despite a major increase in the size and authority of both the army and the navy.
A somewhat more sophisticated organization theory that considers, for example,
interests in missions, equipment, and force structures for more abstract reasons related to
prestige and perceived importance might arguably explain more about the services'
preferences. Naval proclivities for large surface combat craft have been observed in other
cases. 4 17 And the Chinese navy's political position during the Cultural Revolution would be
largely consistent with this pattern. According to this explanation, the PLAN might have
objected to Cultural Revolution politics because they knew it held out prospects for growth
only in small and not particularly glamorous craft. But even the more sophisticated
explanation fails to explain the navy's support for Peng Dehuai, despite his reluctance to
417 The Japanese, British, and American navies were all reluctant to begin or emphasize convoy operations
during World War II - despite the lessons of World War I. At the beginning of the war, all three faced a
shortage of destroyers appropriate for escort. In the Japanese case, where there was weak if any civilian control,
the Imperial Japanese Navy failed to implement a convoy system until the last year of the war. (The Japanese
navy also failed to use submarines for commerce raiding, hoarding them instead for use as pickets in fleet
actions.)
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spend substantial amounts on the navy. And it does not explain the broad resistance within
the navy to even the symbols of leftism, including egalitarian dress, or the organization's
failure to bandwagon or reach an accommodation with Cultural Revolution authorities in, for
example, 1971, when the radical left was unlikely to disappear from the political scene
anytime soon.
To explain the navy's preferences, one would have to add still more elements to
equation - including the organization's interest in certain types of personnel and training
policies (and the politics most likely to provide them). But adding these other elements begin
to move the simple, interests-based organizational explanation closer to the more inclusive
theory proposed by my own thesis. The navy cares not only about how much equipment or
how many personnel it is assigned, but also what kinds. The navy's access to certain kinds of
equipment and certain types of people, and their ability to secure those resources depends not
just on how much budget it is allocated, but rather a broader range of "domestic" policies
related to the development of certain types of domestic capabilities or the ability to import
them from abroad.
SUMMARY OF COMPETITOR THEORIES. The civil-military coalition theory
does a significantly better job of explaining army navy differences and strategic outcomes
than either competitor theory examined. Threat-based explanations fail to provide a
persuasive explanation for much of China's military policy during this period, especially after
the mid-1950s. The domestic political implications of military policy were well known by all
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the actors by then, and strategic policy was frequently transparently manipulated to serve
political ends. At the same time, a material interests-based explanation only partly explains
the services' political positions during this period. This is especially true of the navy, which
opposed leftist politics, despite the greater manpower and budgets that guerrilla war - even
applied in the naval realm - offered.
Case 2: Deng Xiaoping and 'Reform and Opening'
From 1978 to the present, the Chinese political-economic system has undergone a slow but
steady transition from something approaching the integral nationalist ideal towards a more
liberal system.41 8 The process has been gradual. To borrow Deng Xiaoping's words, it has
been characterized by "two steps forward, one step backward." The process has also moved
much farther in the economic and social fields than in the area of high politics. But the
process has been sustained and steady, and even political practice - if not most structures -
has changed substantially.
Throughout most of this period, especially from the end of the Cultural Revolution
through the early 1990s, conservative (i.e., leftist) army officers represented the biggest threat
to reform. The Chinese navy, on the other hand, was an early ally of Deng and his program.
Its support was clear even before it began to receive substantial new resources. But by the
418 With 40 percent of the economy still accounted for by state owned firms and a government that in which
authority is increasingly diffused and institutionalized but in which even intra-Party democracy is lacking, this is
clearly a relative shift towards a more liberal system, not a completed (or even nearly completed) transformation.
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mid-1980s, Deng recognized the domestic political value of a strong navy. He appointed
naval officers to senior military and political positions, and he freed new resources for the
navy, even as he cut military spending overall and dropped "military strengthening" to fourth
- and last - in China's list of national priorities.4 19
DOMESTIC BACKGROUND
The period from 1976 to the present is frequently called the era of"reform and opening."420
A series of liberalizing reforms have privatized much of the economy. In the process, society,
which used to be strictly monitored and controlled through an interrelated set of state-run
work units, housing projects, and neighborhood committees, has become far more
independent.4 21 While political liberalization has lagged behind economic reform and social
change, significant change has nevertheless occurred. Political power has become more
diffused and institutionalized, and, in a sign that the Party understands it must speak to new
and different constituencies, businessmen have been admitted into its ranks. While the
political and economic debate in the 1950s and 1960s was between relatively more and less
radical socialists, the post-1976 debate has ranged far more widely. The result has been the
419 The four modernizations were first proposed by Zhou Enlai in January 1975. They included "all-around
modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century."
They were adopted as official national priorities in 1978. In 1980, Deng reversed the sequence of the last two
modernizations, putting science and technology in third place and national defense in fourth, and last, position.
Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 52, 88.
420 For more on this period, see Ibid. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China:
Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
421 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political
Change (New York: Columbia, 2003). Michael Dutton, Streetlife China (New York: Cambridge, 1998).
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creation of a largely capitalist economic structure, a vibrant society in the throws of dramatic
change, and an evolving political system. Although the reformers ultimately succeeded, they
were faced with determined opposition at every step of process. They were not only checked
but also forced back on several occasions, and it was at no point until at least the mid-1990s
obvious to supporters or opponents that the reform movement would ultimately triumph.422
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, held in December 1978 set the tone
for the reform movement, advocating some liberalization in general terms and establishing
China's immediate objective as the "four modernizations" - a commitment to modernize
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century.
In 1978 and 1979, an experiment was established in Sichuan and Anhui provinces effectively
decollectivized land and transferred land use rights instead to individual families - an
experiment that proved successful and was gradually implemented in other provinces. In July
1979 four "special economic zones" (SEZs) were established, enabling foreign companies to
establish manufacturing bases in China. Their location, in southern China, was meant to
insulate Beijing and other northern and central cities from any potential ill effects of contact
with westerners. In 1984, however, SEZs were established in fourteen additional coastal
cities in both the north and the south. All of these SEZs brought not only companies, but also
facilitated, directly or indirectly, an expanding stream of foreign workers, dependents,
students, and tourists. Rules on the conduct of private enterprise were relaxed, and private
422 Chinese history has not, of course, ended. The inevitable future debate over democracy may prove more
tumultuous than the events of recent years (and could easily lead to large-scale violence). But while any variety
of outcomes is conceivable, there is no route back to the old system. It is in this sense that I say that reformers
triumphed.
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industries began to expand while supports for state industries were gradually reduced (though
they are substantial even today).
When reform began, senior Party members fell broadly into three groups: (1) those
who opposed change and sought to maintain the status quo; (2) those who favored reform, but
only insofar as it would return China to the pre-1958 status quo (i.e., to a predominantly
planned economy, but with some incentive-based systems and markets in place); and (3) those
who wanted to take China in a new direction by marketizing much or most of the economy.
While the initial reform coalition therefore included the second (limited reform) and third
(strong reform) groups, the farther reform proceeded, the more members of the second
(limited reform) group moved into the opposition camp originally centered on the first group
(those against reform). Hence, although the ranks of the third (strong reformer) group may
have grown with economic success and the entrance of younger actors and although the ranks
of the first (anti-reform) group may have suffered attrition, primarily through age and death,
the migration of many members of the original middle group into the opposition camp
resulted in a rough balance between 1978 and 1993. More than anything else, Deng
Xiaoping's force of will and political savvy kept the reform process alive. Nevertheless,
momentum changed hands on a semiannual basis (with smaller shifts occurring almost every
year), depending primarily on the state of the economy but also occasionally on independent
political or social events and phenomena. 423 And, given the often razor thin margin between
423 For a commentary on the political cycle "letting go" (fang) and "tightening up" (shou) during the process of
reform, see Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 5-9.
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the two camps, every personal and institutional ally in Deng's camp - including the navy -
was important.
Political skirmishing over the question of reform was continuous from 1978 to the
mid- 1990s. Opponents of reform seized opportunities to launch major attacks in 1979, 1981,
1983, 1986-1987 and, to one degree or another, shift the momentum of the debate. These
periods of conservative momentum corresponded with periods when the economy overheated
and inflation surged or when social groups used new freedoms to attack the Party's
leadership. The latter sometimes followed closely on the heals of the former.
A note on the importance of moral debates in real political struggles is necessary to
understand why and, more importantly, how support from one or more element of the military
could be politically critical. Political conflict during much of this period frequently played
itself out in struggles for the moral high ground. Both before and after the Culture
Revolution, Chinese politics operated on a collective basis. Statements of general principle
were typically used not just to signal direction but also leveraged to attack and eliminate
dissenters - generally first at the lower levels and then, with success, moving up the chain.
Senior opponents could be eliminated when shown complicit in the moral offenses of their
subordinates (leading, among other things, to careful calculations about whether to support or
jettison protegds who might find themselves under fire). In this moral combat, conservative
opponents of reform achieved various types and degrees of success. They threatened to stall
change during the early 1980s, eliminated Deng's chosen successors (and thereby threatening
the viability of reform after his passing) during 1986-1987, and came close to seizing control
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of the entire Party and government apparatus in the two years following the Tiananmen
massacre in June 1989. In Each case, however, Deng and his pro-reform allies defeated the
challenge.
SERVICE PREFERENCES
Since 1978 the navy has been unified in its support for reform, while the army has been
divided, with conservative officers from that service representing perhaps the greatest single
threat to reformers and their agenda. This section is subdivided into three periods. During
each, the balance of domestic power and the opportunities presented to each faction were
different. Hence, the tactics employed by the contending civil-military coalitions were
distinct. The relative position of the services, however, remained relatively constant. The
period has been has been subdivided as follows:
* Deng consolidates power, 1978-1984. During this period, Deng's challenge was to
achieve basic working control over political, economic, and military policy. The
army, as in later periods, was divided, but during these years conservative opponents
were deeply entrenched within the military regions and used their bases there to fight a
stubborn rearguard action against economic and political reform, as well as changes to
military doctrine. The navy quickly purged leftists from its ranks and rallied behind
reform, with some of its senior officers serving in key military and civilian positions.
* Search for a Successor, 1985-1988. During this period, Deng Xiaoping had achieved
authority - precarious at times - within Party and government but had not secured a
successor to ensure the completion of his agenda. Conservative army officers used
their dominant position on the CMC to successively obstruct and undermine two of
Deng's designated successors, both liberals. The navy again remained a stalwart pillar
of support for Deng's program and helped prevent conservative momentum from
becoming overwhelming.
* Tiananmen and its Aftermath, 1989-1992. The third subsection deals with the services
during the democracy movement of 1989, the reversal of reform momentum after the
Tiananmen massacre, and Deng's efforts to restart reform in 1992. During this period,
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conservative army officers and civilian conservatives backed strong measures against
student demonstrators. After the crackdown, they exploited the political situation to
consolidate their own position, launch a purge against prominent liberal figures, and
roll back economic, social, and political reform. Within the navy there was
considerably more reluctance to use force against the students, and the organization
continued to support reform and opening even during the nadir of liberal influence
from late 1989 to early 1992. Its leadership supported Deng's reemergence in 1992 to
restart stalled reform.
Although the PLAN was not a decisive political force at the beginning of this period,
it became a more significant factor over time as the navy's power grew and its leaders gained
key positions. Both Deng and his liberally inclined lieutenants supported the growth of naval
power during the 1980s. Naval leaders received key promotions at critical moments during
Deng's struggles with conservative army leaders. In 1992, when Deng came out of retirement
to restart the stalled reform process, he promoted a record number of naval officers to the
central committee. The navy never single-handedly "defeated" the army in these political-
military battles. But together with civilian reformers and a handful of army supporters,
mostly affiliated with its technical branches, the navy did play a critical role in tipping the
balance over the long term in Deng's favor.
THE SERVICES AND LIBERAL REFORM, 1978-1985. The army was divided after
Deng's restoration. Conservative army officers, largely though not exclusively officers from
the regions or with traditional infantry backgrounds, represented perhaps the biggest single
threat to Deng's liberal agenda. Officers from the general staff, technology intensive units
(e.g., armor), and those with long records overseeing research and development projects were
more supportive. Naval leaders were much more committed to reform, and their statements
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and policies suggested that they saw the success of reform and opening - in comprehensive
economic and political terms - as a precondition to achieving their military objectives.
Perhaps more than in other cases, the boundaries of opposition and support for liberal
reform shifted in this case over time, with a wide range of views about how much change
might be appropriate even among those who viewed some adjustment as necessary. Many,
especially in the army, welcomed the demise of the Gang of Four and Deng Xiaoping's
political rehabilitation, but quickly moved into the opposition camp as it became clear Deng
would pursue a continuing program of reform and opening. Naval leaders proved less
diffident.
The army's position (1978-1985). The opportunity for the first army counterattack
against reform was presented by the Democracy Wall movement of late 1978 and early 1979,
during which dissidents wrote manifestos critical of the Party and calling for the "fifth
modernization" - democracy. Deng's most forceful proponent of reform, Hu Yaobang, took a
generally tolerant stand towards these activities, but many in the Party saw them as
threatening the stability and national unity.
Several days after the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh National Congress, held in mid-
September 1979, reconfirmed the reformist direction, Marshal Ye Jianying made a speech
292
Chapter 5: China
introducing a somber note of caution into the discussion of national direction.4 24 Ye had
orchestrated the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 and represented the group of army officers
who favored elite-led socialism with some limited role for the market but not wholesale
liberalization. While he affirmed his commitment to economic modernization, he suggested it
must be achieved without sacrificing discipline. In his speech he appealed to the "four
cardinal principles," mandating unwavering allegiance to (1) socialism; (2) the people's
democratic dictatorship; (3) Communist Party leadership; and (4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought.4 25
Ye emphasized that the Party was a collective leadership and that no one individual
should have absolute power over the Party. Under the Party, "all people are equal...and it is
absolutely impermissible that any Party member would not be subject to the Party's discipline
or that there could be any special persons outside the Party who would not be subject to
national law."426 This last point was almost certainly aimed at Hu Yaobang and his protection
of democracy activists (whom Ye regarded as lawbreakers). Ye's critique of one-man rule
may easily be taken as an indirect critique of Deng's growing power. Finally, he suggested
424 Ye Jianying, "Zai Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli Sanshi Zhounian Dahuishang de
Jianghua", Jiefangjunbao, September 9 1979.
425 Deng Xiaoping himself agreed to a crackdown on the Democracy Wall activists, and in mid-March 1979 he
agreed with the Party consensus that the Four Cardinal Principles should be adopted as a necessary balance to
the four modernizations. Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982,"
in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 324. As with most phrases and concepts in Chinese politics, this one could and was
used by different people in very different ways. And the point of raising Ye Jianying's use here is not that he or
other military officials were the only ones using the term, but that they were pointedly using it to attack Deng's
most liberal allies - and perhaps Deng himself.
426 Ye Jianying, "Zai Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli Sanshi Zhounian Dahuishang de
Jianghua".
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that while improving the material condition of the Chinese people was important, improving
their moral and spiritual condition - in his words, building a "socialist spiritual civilization" -
was equally if not more important.
Wei Guoqing, the head of the PLA's political department, picked up on many of these
themes over the next several months, turning them into a more explicit attack on liberal
bourgeois values.427 In doing so, he acted in concert with Hua Guofeng, who remained the
Party chairman even as the more liberally inclined Deng gained increasing control over the
Party's actual direction. In April 1980, Hua Guofeng addressed an all-army political work
conference sponsored by Wei. During his address he borrowed Wei's admonition to "foster
proletarian ideology, eliminate bourgeois ideology" and criticized "one-sided emphasis on
economic means." 42 8 These admonitions represented barely disguised attacks on Deng
Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, who had staked very public positions in favor of giving economic
growth pride of place among China's national priorities. General Wei also worked with Hu
Qiaomu, a Party propaganda official who had considerable influence over the main
government newspaper, Renminribao. Hu Qiaomu questioned the growing strength of
bourgeois liberalism, manifest, among other places, in the growth of translated Western
novels and the importation of Hong Kong cultural icons. He used his influence to publish
427 "Shuli Chonggao de Geming Daode Fengshang", Jiefang/unbao, November 22 1979. "Wei Guoqing Tongzhi
Zai Quanjun Zhengzhi Huiyishang Tichu, Zhuahao Dang de Jianshe Jiaqiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo", Renminribao,
May 9 1980. The first of these articles was not written by Wei and does not cite him, but it was written by
individuals under his command.
428 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 92-93.
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articles by Wei, while blocking those by liberal supporters of Hu Yaobang - against whom
most of the conservative attack focused.42 9
Although Deng was able to shut down General Wei's persistent criticisms in the
civilian Party press in May 1980 by personally ordering the Renminribao and the
Gangminribao to cease publishing antibourgeois slogans, Deng's battle with Wei was not
over.430 In August 1982 PLAN4 31 propagandist Zhao Yiya published an article in
Jiefangunbao (the GPD's newspaper, controlled by Wei) attacking the neglect of socialist
values in the ongoing process of reform even more directly:
"What our party is advocating is socialist spiritual civilization.... When this
problem was first raised, it was in order to foster the revolutionary spirit and
maintain the socialist road. But some comrades, in interpreting and
propagating the slogan, one-sidedly emphasize 'culture,' but ignore 'spirit,' or
even worse, 'socialism'.... 43 2
With Hu Yaobang emphasizing learning and culture in his own vision of socialist spiritual
civilization, Hu was clearly the primary target of this new leftist assault. Over the next
month, other articles followed, adopting the same explicitly anti-bourgeois rhetoric. Faced
429 Ruan Ming, Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire, trans. Peter Rand Nancy Liu, and Lawrence R. Sullivan
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 77.
430 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 93.
431 The naval leadership's involvement in this affair is assessed further in the next section.
432 Zhao Yiya, "Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang Shi Shehuizhuyi Jingshen Wenming de Hexin", Jiefang/unbao, August
28 1982. The same article was also published on the same day in the Shanghai newspaper, Jiefangribao
(Liberation daily).
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with an increasingly serious threat, Deng Xiaoping, then serving as CMC chairman, managed
to force the resignation of Wei Guoqing in September 1982.433
Although Deng was able to neutralize this GPD political offensive by fiat, widespread
army resistance on military issues during the same period proved more difficult to counter.
During Deng's brief 1975 accession to the CMC (lasting less than a year), he had bluntly told
a gathering of military leaders that the military's deficiencies could be summarized by five
words: "fat, factionalism, pride, luxury, and laziness." 434 His priorities included: (1) a
housecleaning of the military regions and the transfer of senior personnel in each; (2) the
reduction of the army's size; (3) a shift to more conventional doctrine; and (4) the imposition
of professional standards for hiring and promotions. These measures would, if successful,
reduce military inefficiency, free resources for rebuilding the national economy, and make the
army more amenable to economic and political reform.
When he returned to the CMC in 1977 as vice chairman, Deng's priorities remained
similar. The military had, in the meantime, grown even larger and less disciplined. Deng
faced obstacles at every turn. Officers in the military regions, who had grown accustomed to
autonomy during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, refused transfer orders. Deng's
frustration with these regional commanders was evident in his 1977 comment:
433 Precluding any ambiguity about the cause of Wei's resignation, the Jiefangjunbao published a retraction of
Zhao Ziyang's essay on the same day Wei's resignation was announced. "Yipian You Yanzhong Cuowu de
Wenzhang", Jiefangjunbao, September 27 1982. (Deng had been promoted to CMC chairman in June 1981.)
434 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 15.
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"Presently, there are a few officers who do not execute the instructions and
orders of their superiors. This is not disciplined action.... They [the
commanders] think that with the power behind them, no one will touch them -
they think no one will dare rub the tiger's ass!"435
As late as 1980, four of eight division commanders slated for transfer from the Nanjing
military region disputed their orders. It was not until 1985 that Deng was able to transfer the
last holdouts among the Cultural Revolution era Military Region commanders. The most
prominent of these was Li Desheng, the commander of the Shenyang Military Region who, it
was feared, might use his military forces if threatened.43 6
Not only did this inability to control the regions hamper Deng's ability to reduce the
size of the force and accomplish other military tasks, it also damaged his ability to implement
social, economic, and political policy at and below the provincial level. In a 1981 discussion
with military officers, Deng complained of continuing leftist tendencies within the military
and the need to continue efforts to identify and root out those responsible for leftist excesses -
themes that were echoed three years later in a series of articles in the Renminribao and
Jiefangjunbao.4 37 Some senior regional leaders (including Li Desheng) had been closely
435 Ibid., 82.
436 On Li Desheng's removal, see Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 122 and
84. Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army After Mao (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 139. For a
summary of a June 1985 interview with Hu Yaobang concerning whether or not Li could be removed and
whether or not he might use force in his own defense, see MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of
Maoism, 1969-1982," 378-79.
437 For Deng's March 27, 1981 speech, see Deng Xiaoping, DengXiaoping Wenxuan, 379-82. For 1984
Renminribao articles see April 30 and May 20. For a summary that includes these observations, see, Richard
Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and
Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 376-79.
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affiliated with leftist radicals during the Cultural Revolution, most were strongly opposed to
liberal reform, and all had built up a broad and powerful set of connections with regional
officials. 43 8
It was even more difficult for Deng to shift doctrine and strategy away from a purely
guerrilla format towards one that emphasized conventional warfighting. Most commanders
adopted Deng's doctrinal buzzwords (e.g., "people's war under modem conditions" and
"active defense"), but many continued to interpret those in ways that were more consistent
with guerrilla warfare rather than conventional doctrines. Even Yang Dezhi, the chief of the
general staff, for example, argued in 1983 that Mao's conception of people's war had strategic
merit, even under modern conditions:
"In modem war, the enemy will use concentrated masses of high tech
weapons. He will rely heavily on his rear area.... This will make conditions
for the opening of our 'people's war' extremely favorable.... Considering the
justness and greatness of the socialist system, we should be able to bring the
advantages of just war to bear.... We should be able to gradually shift the
balance of power and ultimately emerge victorious."4 3 9
The continued advocacy of traditional people's war provided, among other things, a rationale
for continued high troop levels. Despite Deng's repeated calls to trim the force and split the
438 Li Desheng had cooperated with the radicals during the first stages of the Cultural Revolution and owed much
of his rise to that event. In 1970, he served on the new Central Organization and Propaganda Group with several
of the most senior Cultural Revolution leaders, including Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao
Wenyuan, and Ji Dengkui. MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 267
and 84. Other prominent military leftists included Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, and Wang Dongxing.
439 Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun (Tokyo: Isanami Shinsho, 1987), 97-98. Yang Dezhi was
certainly not an unqualified opponent of military reform. He frequently spoke in favor of"modernization."
Nevertheless, there is evidence he opposed cuts in the force structure, and the quotation cited here might have
been, in part, an argument for maintaining personnel levels.
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associated savings between strengthening the civilian economy and modernizing military
equipment, the number of soldiers in the force continued to climb until 1981.440
The navy's position (1978-1985). In contrast to the army's resistance to both domestic
and military reform, the navy welcomed both. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, it acted
quickly to affirm its loyalty to the new leadership and purge its own ranks of leftists. It served
as a reserve of politically loyal officers to the center. Its public pronouncements - offered in
civilian newspapers and magazines, rather than the Jiefangjunbao (the military's newspaper,
controlled by the GPD), offered a clear military rationale for the domestic economic and
social policies associated with reform and opening. And it openly acknowledged the need for
both limited military spending and military support for infrastructure work during the first
decades of economic reconstruction.
Deng and his supporters enlisted naval leaders in their efforts shortly after their return
to power. In January 1975, when Deng Xiaoping was restored to key military positions, the
navy's political commissar, Su Zhenhua, was promoted to the Central Military Commission.
And in 1976, after Su's participation in the plot to arrest the Gang of Four, he was assigned as
the first secretary of Shanghai with the mission of eliminating Gang of Four supporters who
had made their stronghold in that city.44 ' He died in 1979, having achieved, by all accounts, a
440 Yitzhak Shichor, "Demobilization: The Dialectics of PLA Troop Reduction," China Quarterly 146 (1996):
340.
441 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 1645. MacFarquhar, "The
Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 31 1.
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high degree of success in identifying and removing those who had worked with the Gang of
Four. A second officer with long experience in the navy, Liu Huaqing, was brought in to
serve as Deng Xiaoping's personal military advisor within the CMC in 1979. Liu, despite
already being 63 years old in 1979, remained a key member of Deng's military team until
1997, when he stepped down from his last military position as vice chairman of the CMC.442
Within the PLAN, professional naval officers began rooting out leftists almost as soon
as the Gang of Four fell, though the official navy history states that this work was complicated
- at least until the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978 - by the
accession of Hua Guofeng, who took an ambivalent line on the left-right divide.4 43 Much of
the task fell to the navy's deputy commander, Liu Daosheng, who, with Xiao Jinguang sick,
served as the navy's acting commander between 1978 and 1980.444 Liu Daosheng was a
career naval officer, who had served as the navy's first political commissar in 1950, attended
Voroshilov naval academy in the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957, and remained a strong
advocate of naval building until he was purged during the Cultural Revolution, reportedly for
his outspoken naval advocacy.4 45 In April 1978, under the banner of "investigation,
442 Liu served as Deng's military advisor within the CMC from 1979 to 1982. He was commander of the PLAN
from 1982 until 1987. He was made a CMC member in 1987, and he became a member of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo and 1st vice chairman of the CMC in 1992. He retired in 1997.
443 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Haijunshi, 89-91.
444 During and for several years after the Cultural Revolution, official postings within the military were
frequently out of line with actual responsibilities. Liu Daosheng held the post of 1 st deputy commander of the
navy between 1977 and 1982.
445 For career details, see Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 1272-73.
This source does not record his being purged during the Cultural Revolution. For that, see David Jr. Muller,
China as a Maritime Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 204-06. [PAGE 205] Liu Daosheng's obituary
reports rather cryptically that, "During the ten years of turmoil [i.e., the Cultural Revolution], he fought a
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consolidation, and transformation," 6,000 political officers in 700 teams visited virtually all
naval units.446 The officers visited those identified as radicals or malcontents and removed
those who were unwilling to change their colors. By 1979, the program was largely complete
and the navy began to focus most of its energies on operational training, but occasional
campaigns to "eliminate leftist ideological influence" and correct the "ossification of
thinking" continued periodically even after that time.
The PLAN moved just as quickly to restore the names of those naval officers who had
been purged by the left during the Cultural Revolution. As the Third Plenum ended, the
navy's Party committee held its own meeting. Its two resolutions were: (1) "to clarify truth in
the navy's history and make that history right which had been turned on its head"; and (2) to
restore those leaders who had been wrongfully criticized or purged since 1966. Under the
first provision, all resolutions forced upon the navy by Lin Biao, Li Zuopeng, and the Gang of
Four were briefly but clearly repudiated. Under the second, the names of 2,230 officers who
had been accused of"rightists" or "inclined right" were cleared, and 500 individuals from the
former KMT military but who had participated in uprisings or otherwise joined the PLAN
were declared loyal.44 7 The navy's school system was also quickly reestablished along pre-
Cultural Revolution lines.448
resolute battle against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. He resolutely and thoroughly implemented the policy
direction set forth by the 3 rd Plenum of the 11"h Party Congress [in 1978], and maintained unity with the Party's
politics and thought." "Liu Daosheng Tongzhi Shishi", Jiefang/unbao, June 8 1995.
446 This and the information from the subsequent two sentences are from Muller, China as a Maritime Power,
205.
447 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Hayunshi, 89-91.
448 Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Hayun Baike Quanshu, 1950.
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Between January 1980 and September 1982 the PLAN was commanded, for the only
time in its history, by a political conservative, Ye Fei. But this peculiar interlude in Chinese
naval history was the exception that proved the rule. Ye Fei was a transplanted army officer.
His first experience in the navy came in 1979, at the age of 65, when he was appointed as the
PLAN's political commissar. 4 49 Although there is no Chinese commentary on how this came
to pass, it was probably pushed by Wei Guoqing, the PLA political commissar, and Hua
Guofeng, still serving nominally the chairman of the CMC. (See section above on army
politics.) Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing had served together as commander and political
commissar of the 10th Army during the Civil War (a relatively small command, about the
same size as a U.S. army division). Wei Guoqing and Hua Guofeng were already cooperating
in an effort to block Deng Xiaoping's reforms.4 50 These individuals, acting together, would
have had considerable authority over appointments, especially of political officers. Whatever
propelled his accession as PLAN commander, Ye proved a tough critic of Deng Xiaoping's
reform program, allowing, among other things, Zhao Yiya to publish his devastating attack on
449 On Ye Fei's career, see Ibid., 1818-1 9. From 1953 Ye was the commander of the Nanjing Military Region.
Between 1975 and 1979, he had served as the Minister of Transportation.
450 For an order of battle showing these individuals at the top of the 10 h Army together, see "ChinaDefense.com:
The Third Army Order of Battle, February-June 1949;" http://www.china-
defense.com/orbat/pla orbat 1949/pla orbat 1949-3.html (viewed August 5, 2003). According to Baum, by
early 1979 the PLA old guard was already angry about the Democracy Wall movement. Baum, "The Road to
Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," 324. PLA conservatives might have seen the navy, which was in the
midst of purging its conservative members, as something of a renegade organization and sought to place one of
their own there. Ye Fei's appointment first as political commissar would have been relatively easily influenced
by the GPD, then headed by Wei Guoqing. It is possible that Deng Xiaoping might not have anticipated that Ye
Fei would be critical of reform (especially since he had come under attack during the Cultural Revolution) and
therefore did not oppose the move. But bringing an army officer to any important naval post, not to mention
overall command, was out of character with Deng's military style, so it was almost certainly not his doing.
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Hu Yaobang and Hu's purported lack of communist ideals in September 1982.4 51 But there is
no evidence that Ye Fei's views reflected those of the professional navy, and in fact he and
Liu Daosheng, who remained the deputy commander of the navy, appeared to work at cross-
purposes. And in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping personally intervened to end this interlude
by removing Ye Fei - together with the GPD chief Wei Guoqing - in response to the
publication of Zhao Yiya's article.452
To replace Ye Fei as PLAN commander, Deng brought in Liu Huaqing, a graduate of
the Voroshilov Naval Academy who was then serving as Deng's military advisor. 453 Liu
Huaqing immediately set about restoring the navy's educational institutions and engaging in a
reexamination of the navy's organization and structure. In 1984 Liu Huaqing published two
articles, putting the navy publicly on record as fully supporting not just Deng's military
direction but also his economic and political policies as well.4 54 These statements contrasted
markedly with the hostile tone of Yu Qiuli, Wei Guoqing's replacement in the General
451 Zhao Yiya, "Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang Shi Shehuizhuyi Jingshen Wenming de Hexin". (On the significance of
this essay, see comments on it earlier in this chapter.) Ye Fei himself also chimed in on many of the same issues
in his own essay on socialist spiritual civilization, including appearing on the front page of Jiefangiunbao on
August 16, 1982 -just twelve days before Zhao's article appeared. Like Zhao, he suggested in this article that
some in the Party [i.e., Hu Yaobang] had forgotten that communist ideals must be the core of socialist spiritual
civilization. See "Jianshe Jingshen Wenming de Hexin Shi You Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang: Ye Fei Zai Haijun
'Shuangxian' Huishang Zuo Baogao, Haozhao Wei Shixian Dang de Mubiao Fendou Daodi", Jiefangjunbao,
August 16 1982.
452 MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 333.
453 Liu Huaqing began his career in the army. He joined the navy in 1952, two years after its founding, and
attended Voroshilov from 1954, one year after Liu Daosheng. From 1960 to 1970 he served primarily in PLA
science and technology positions, but returned to the navy in 1970 as deputy chief of staff. Zhongguo Jiefangjun
Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haiun Baike Quanshu, 1274-75.
454 Du Zhongwei et al., "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing", Liaowang,
August 13 1984. Liu Huaqing, "Jianshe Yizhi Qiangda de Haijun, Fazhan Woguo de Haiyang Shiye: Haijun
Siling".
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Political Department, and the more ambivalent but nevertheless critical tone of other senior
PLA commanders. Significantly, Liu Huaqing's statements were carried not by the military's
Jiefang/unbao - which was under the control of the GPD - but by two civilian outlets, the
main government newspaper, Renminribao, and the weekly, Liaowang.
In the Liaowang article, Commander Liu listed the navy's priorities: "First, we must
eliminate the lingering pernicious effects of 'leftism' - a task that history has clearly
bestowed on the people's navy.... Second, we must positively participate in national
economic strengthening and in the development of the ocean.... And third, we must
strengthen training and the development of personnel." 4 55 Throughout both statements (one
of which was an extended interview, the other of which was an article by the commander),
Liu emphasized the importance of establishing the proper political and economic
preconditions for naval strengthening. Both statements reviewed the historical record as seen
by the PLAN - specifically, the positive effects of Liu Shaoqi's moderate economic and
political policies and the disastrous impact of the Cultural Revolution. In a likely reference to
the Great Leap Forward, when the navy increased its tonnage but quality declined, Liu
observed that "The navy not only requires a certain amount of quantity, to an even greater
extent it also requires quality. It requires the use of up-to-date science and technology."
On domestic economic policy, the navy, in contrast to the army, placed itself fuilly and
squarely on the side of reformers - backing an urban, technologically oriented vision of
455 Du Zhongwei et al., "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing".
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growth. Whereas senior army leaders cautioned about unrestrained reform producing
"spiritual pollution" in coastal cities, Liu Huaqing suggested, "The Party center has decided
that with regard to reform of economic organs, making the cities the focus of the entire
economic system is important. This is a great and profound change that could well produce a
major positive effect on naval building." With regard to the opening of new SEZs in 1984,
Liu argued,
"The policy ... to open up fourteen coastal port cities is an important policy in
speeding economic construction. When the economies of the coastal port
cities have developed, when the economic power and science and
technological level of the entire nation has risen, when shipbuilding
electronics, metallergy, machine industries, and chemical engineering
industries have been strengthened, these will all provide a strong foundation
for naval building."
And Liu suggested that not only would growth in coastal cities benefit the navy, but the navy
could "and must support the economic strengthening of these coastal port cities with all its
power." "Executing these tasks," he continued, "will be beneficial to our state, our military,
and our people."
In contrast to the army, within which a brisk discussion of the difficulties of leading
urban troops flourished throughout the 1980s, Liu made no mention of this problem. Nor did
he mention the fostering of the proper socialist spirit or the demands of political education.
Rather, Liu's comments on education were purely technical. The ceaseless integration of new
types of technology in naval systems would continue, "demanding that we place greater
emphasis on intellectual development and the renewal of knowledge.... Therefore, we
absolutely give education and training a position of strategic importance." We must, he
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continued, "thoroughly implement CMC Chairman Deng Xiaoping's command that
"education should face modernization, face the world, and face the future."
One month before Liu Huaqing's keystone statements, two senior army figures,
generals Yang Shangkun (then CMC vice chairman) and Yu Qiuli (the GPD chief) addressed
a gathering of naval officers, and the difference in tone between their address and Liu
Huaqing's statements is instructive. 456 While praising the navy's progress in strengthening its
capabilities and also its work in eliminating "leftism" from its ranks, the generals' remarks
focused on how to adapt to the opening of coastal cities without corrupting the soldiers. "We
must," they suggested, "strengthen political work and administrative management, adhere to
education in the four basic principles [absolute supremacy of socialism and the Party] and
nationalism, ensure that all officers and soldiers are self disciplined in respecting the laws and
regulations of the SEZs, and uphold the solemn dignity of the nation and the glory of our
units." While readily acknowledging the technical demands and skills of the navy, they
cautioned its leaders: "The more modernized the unit, the technical the unit type or branch,
the more it needs strict discipline." Although these comments were not inconsistent with
Deng Xiaoping's position, generals Yang and Yu certainly highlighted different implications
of reform and opening than those chosen by Liu Huaqing.
Deng Xiaoping developed close ties with the navy during this period and appears to
have made some additional resources available to it for special projects, despite an overall
456 "Yang Shangkun Yu Quili Huijian Haijun Shi Yishang Ganbu Shi Qiangdiao Shiying Kaifang he Gaige Xin
Xingshi Gaohao Budui Jianshe", Jiefangiunbao, July 1 1984.
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reduction of defense budgets. He personally inspected naval units in 1979, 1980, 1981, and
1984. None of these visits was made public until 1984 when a photo of Deng Xiaoping
surrounded by sailors on the deck of a warship appeared on the front page of the Renminribao
(People's Daily), together with a lengthy article featuring details of his various naval visits. 4 57
By that time, Deng had both gained substantial control of the national media, including the
Renminribao, and was leaning towards a reevaluation of China's strategic situation that would
highlight the need for a powerful navy. The marine corps, first formed in 1953 but disbanded
in 1957, was reestablished at the end of 1979. Series production was ramped up on new
frigates and destroyers. And funds were made available for the establishment of new research
organizations, including some tasked primarily with producing historical or broad strategic
studies - i.e., naval propaganda.
THE SERVICES AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION, 1985-1989. Between 1985 and
1989 Deng Xiaoping fought to secure the acceptance of a liberal successor to his own position
as Party general secretary. His first appointed successor was Hu Yaobang and, with Hu's
political demise, his second was Zhao Ziyang.
The succession struggle for both was fought against the backdrop of a deepening
economic and social transformation. The fourteen new SEZs established in 1984 (bringing
the total up to sixteen) and spurred inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and, since most of
457 Gu Yuezhong, Liu Nanchang, "Jinge Tiema - Deng Xiaoping Junwei Lingdao Tongzhi Guanxin Jundui
Xiandaihua Jishi," (Glittering speers and steel warhorses - Military Commission leader Deng Xiaoping shows
care for military modernization efforts), Renminribao, August 11, 1984.
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this was in the export sector, the rapid growth of industrial exports. They also carried
attendant unsettling social effects. In 1985 the economy began to overheat and inflation rose
to serious levels. At prominent universities, students began to protest against Japanese
investment, interracial dating (involving African students), and military presence on
campuses, and labor began to organize itself.4 58
Conservatives attacked the ill social effects of reform and, by so doing, sought to
obstruct and undermine the candidacy of Deng's appointed liberal successors. Senior army
commanders were among the most prominent critics. They successfully blocked first Hu
Yaobang and subsequently Zhao Ziyang from becoming CMC chairman, severely damaging
the prospects that either of these individuals (both of whom were liberal in the contemporary
Chinese context) would succeed Deng as Party leader in according with Deng's intentions.
The navy continued to support both reform and opening and Deng's chosen successors,
helping Zhao to remain a viable contender until 1989 and, more generally, helping prevent
political defeats from turning into a rout.
The army's position (1985-1989). Whereas the army had been divided on early
reform efforts and included many supporters as well as opponents, it was, by 1985, largely
unified in its opposition to many continuing reform efforts. That opposition was manifest in
its efforts to torpedo the succession of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Party's top
political position. Yu Qiuli, as head of the PLA's GPD (and Wei Guoqing's successor),
458 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 190-93. The protest against military
activities on campus took place at Beijing Agricultural University.
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established the intellectual basis upon which the army's attack on Hu Yaobang and Zhao
Ziyang was built. Between 1985 and 1987 he launched three propaganda campaigns, each
questioning the effects of economic and social change on the military. With broad support
among senior army officers, these political campaigns drew blood and, ultimately, helped
bring down the candidacies of both Hu and Zhao.
Yu Qiuli launched the "Mao'erdong campaign" in 1985, publicizing the hardships
faced by China's young soldiers deployed opposite Vietnam (near Mao'erdong) and
highlighted the efforts of those soldiers to assist the local minority population in harvesting
and basic education. 459 A musical troupe, organized from frontline soldiers and playing
instruments made from spent artillery casings and other military paraphernalia, traveled to
three elite Beijing universities.460 These universities were, at that time, the focus of liberal
social agitation. The army arranged for extensive media coverage of the tour, allowing the
press and public ample opportunity to contrast the students' life of ease with the soldiers'
lives of hardship and danger. The larger message was that while reforms were unsettled
society and while students were protesting against the government, soldiers from China's
heartland were upholding the country's finest socialist traditions.
459 This campaign bagan in the Jiefangjunbao. Although an ongoing story, the tempo changed in July 1985. In
the eighteen months prior to that time there had been only two articles in the Jiefangjunbao touching on
Mao'erdong. In the eighteen months after that time, there were seventy-two. With the encouragement of senior
army officers the campaign was, by early 1986, picked up by the Renminribao.
460 "Mao'erdong Zhi Sheng Yuetuan Lai Jing Yanchu", Renminribao, December 19 1986. Other articles on "The
Sounds of Mao'erdong" appeared on December 22, 24, 26, 28, and 29. For an example of purported exchange
between students and soldiers, see Liu Yuqie, "Fumei Liuxuesheng Liu Yuqie Zhishu Qianxian Jiangshi, Biaoshi
Zhenxi Shijian Keku Xuexi Wei Guo Zhengguang", Jiefangjunbao, December 31 1986.
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A second campaign had a similar message but was more explicitly critical of the
impact of social change on the military. In July 1986, Yu Qiuli began to encourage all
elements of the military to discuss and debate "the theory of soldiers' gains and losses."
Officers and soldiers were told to examine the idea, said to be "widespread" among military
officers, that during the reform era, "to become a soldier was to take losses."4 61 Ostensibly,
the official "answer" was that soldiering was still a worthy and rewarding profession. But by
posing the question and offering extensive evidence of the hardships that liberal reform
imposed on soldiers, the campaign represented another critique of reform and opening. And
although Yu Qiuli described the campaign as an internal military discussion, it was widely
publicized in the civilian as well as the military press.46 2 In August 1986, Yu Qiuli launched a
third political campaign, a renewal of Wei Guoqing's call for a "socialist spiritual
civilization."
These campaigns built on one another and were used by conservatives with great
effect against Deng's liberal prot6g6s during 1985 and 1986. In preparation to install Hu
Yaobang in key Party positions, Deng Xiaping sought to have him confirmed as the chairman
of the CMC during the 1985 Beidaihe meetings. (Leadership meetings are held annually at
461 Chen Shenggeng, "Yu Qiuli Zai Zhu Jing Budui Geda Danwei Zhengzhibu Zhuren he Zhongzheng Jiguanchu
Yishang Ganbu Hui Tichu: Zai Quanjun Kaizhan Zhengque Kandai Junren 'De yu Shi' Da Taolun",
Jiefangjunbao, July 24 1986.
462 This "internal" military debate was announced in the Renminribao three days after its appearance in the
military daily. "Yu Qiuli Zai Jundui Zhu Jing Danwei Ganbuhuishang Tichu: Quan Jun Kaizhan Guanyu Junren
'De yu Shi' Da Taolun", Renminribao, July 27 1986.
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Beidaihe, a resort on the Yellow Sea.) Hu's confirmation was, however, blocked by
conservative army officers, especially General Xu Shiyou, who blamed him for the rise of
"bourgeois liberalism."4 63 Conservative critics, not least in the military, continued to attack
Hu Yaobang's record, and he was forced to resign his Party posts in January 1987.464
Conservative army officers then quickly turned their political attacks on Zhao Ziyang,
who was, after Hu Yaobang's ouster, Deng's next pick as successor. Zhao favored deepening
economic liberalization, but he advocated a somewhat slower pace than Hu and left himself
less vulnerable to charges of encouraging dissent and disorder - at least until the start of the
Tiananmen democracy movement. Deng appeared more conscious of the need to build
military support for Zhao as chairman of the CMC and courted sympathetic military elements,
including the navy. Ultimately, Zhao was allowed to become vice chairman of the CMC
(behind Deng), but conservative army officers extracted a promise from Deng that Zhao
would report to General Yang Shangkun, who effectively controlled the CMC's agenda.4 65
The navy's position (1985-1989). The navy saw its interests as aligned closely with
those of first Hu Yaobang and later Zhao Ziyang during this period. In the case of Hu
463 Jane Teufel Dreyer, "Deng Xiaoping: The Soldier," The China Quarterly 135 (1993). Baum, Burying Mao:
Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 187.
464 For more on army criticism of Hu Yaobang, see Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun, 193-94. For
the composition of the conservative movement and its arguments, see Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on
Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-1986," China
Quarterly (1988).
465 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 217.
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Yaobang, personal ties to the navy commander Liu Huaqing helped cement a relationship
based on common interest. Hu and Liu jointly led the Chinese Academy of Sciences
immediately after the Cultural Revolution, and both advanced similar, liberal positions with
regard to the development of national technology and exchange with the outside world.4 66 Hu
was a strong backer of a smaller, more professional, more modem military - all positions the
navy appreciated as in its interests.4 6 7 Hence, the navy was willing to publicly support Hu's
pronouncements on economic and political opening, and even those related to the need for
further military budget cuts.
In the midst of Yu Qiuli's conservative campaigns and much army grumbling about
resource cuts, the navy's high command went on record in support of military frugality. The
navy's commander, Liu Huaqing, said, "We must begin all planning and activities with a
consideration of the nation's economic strength.... Given that the nation is not rich, we
cannot get too carried away in emphasizing the needs of national defense or put additional
pressure on the nation." The navy's political commissar, Li Yaowen, said, "Only with a
relatively strong economy can we achieve Deng's call for regularization of our military
equipment. Focusing first on economic building is the key to a establishing a rich country
and, therefore, also a good policy for establishing a strong military." Other officers called for
466 Mitsubishi Sogo Kenkyujo Hen, Chugoku Saiko Shidosha, 1996 Nenban (Tokyo: Sososha, 1996), 269. Other
personal connections included common experience in the Fourth Field Army during the Revolution and the fact
that Liu's former secretary, Liu Shaojiang, married Hu Yaobang's daughter. Liu Shaojiang later became a senior
officer in the GPD after Liu Huaqing became vice chairman of the CMC.
467 See, for example, Hu's comments recorded in Liu Huinian, "You Wenhua de Xin Yidai Junren Chengwei
Jiefangjun Zhuti; Hu Yaobang Gaodu Zanyang Xin de Lishi Tiaojianxia de Renmin Jiefangjun de Geming
Juewu, Junzheng Jilu he Jundui Suzhi You Hen Da Tigao", Renminribao, October 1 1984.
312
Chapter 5: China
maintaining a positive mental attitude; taking advantage of the navy's position in coastal cities
to assist in economic tasks; and making personal adjustments to maximize flexibility.46 8
During the 1987 Party Congress Plenum, Deng appointed Liu Huaqing as a full
member of the CMC. At the same Plenum - when Zhao Ziyang came under pressure from
conservatives inside and outside of the military - Liu was the most prominent military officer
to deliver a speech supporting Zhao Ziyang's call for deepening reform. In it, he said,
"Socialist society should pursue unrelenting reform and cannot be static.... As the policy of
reform and opening faces its most serious test, the navy stands in the forefront of its defense.
The navy, with high technical, knowledge, and personnel skill requirements, is fully qualified
and capable of supporting reform." 46 9 The Tiananmen demonstrations ultimately made Zhao
Ziyang's position untenable and ushered in a period of conservative leftist reaction. But the
navy helped him to survive politically until then, and, more importantly, it was instrumental in
restarting the reform period three years after the Tiananmen massacre.
THE SERVICES, TIANANMEN, AND AFTER, 1989-1992. In the eyes of many
conservative Party leaders, the democracy movement validated the leftist position on key
domestic issues. Conservatives held that marketizing large sectors of the economy and
putting economic reform ahead of socialist values had and would continue to lead to the
468 "Fucong Daju, Yousuo Zuowei", Jiefangiunbao, March 21 1986. Contributors included the navy
commander, Liu Huaqing; navy political commissar, Li Yaowen; naval chief of staff, An Liqun; equipment
chief, Zheng Minghe; logistics chief, Li Chunming; and the head of the navy's political department (a different
position than the commissar post), Zhong Guorong.
469 Li Xuanhua et al., "Gaige Shi Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi de Biyou Zhi Lu", Jiefangjunbao,
October 31 1987.
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resurgence of "bourgeois liberalism." And with the Party apparently threatened, Deng
himself agreed that a crackdown was necessary and that some temporary retrenchment on
reform would be necessary. After June 4 1989, conservatives were assisted materially by the
purge of those liberals seen as responsible for the demonstrations or opposed to their
suppression - including most prominently Zhao Ziyang but also his proteg6s and supporters.
By pressing their gains, the conservatives were, by the end of 1991, threatening to
permanently freeze or undo economic reform. Surviving pro-reform leaders ultimately fought
off this challenge to emerge victorious and restart reform. But they did so only after Deng
Xiaoping's reemergence from retirement to jumpstart the process, and even with the elderly
Deng's assistance, the outcome was far from preordained.
The services reacted differently to the democracy movement of 1989 and to the
choices presented after its suppression. The army was divided, especially on the armed
suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations. But despite these divisions, senior army
officers, especially revolution-era commanders, represented the most forceful advocates of the
move. After June 4 (as the Chinese refer to the armed suppression on that date), these
commanders purged the army of dissenters and allied with other conservative Party leaders to
eliminate liberals from senior positions in the Party. The navy, in this case, was also deeply
divided. But there appears to have been a higher proportion of dissenters in the navy's officer
corps. And even those who did back the use of force in June 1989 (including Liu Huaqing)
did not join the conservative reaction after the event, but rather continued to sing the praises
of reform and opening, if more cautiously than before the event.
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The army (1989-1992). In the days leading up to the June 4th clearance, the army was
divided. It is difficult to make neat or precise generalizations about those who supported or
opposed the action. Some rough patterns do, however, appear to emerge from the sketchy
facts available. Younger officers, officers from the general staff, and technical branch
commanders tended to take a more moderate line than did many of the older officers
(especially from infantry backgrounds) and officers from the GPD.470 By late May 1989,
conservatives had gained the upper hand, and they gradually consolidated their position,
purged opponents within the army, and made the army a core member of the conservative
coalition during the Maoist revival of 1989-1992.
Revolution era officers - including Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, and Li
Xiannian - were among the most outspoken advocates of a forceful response to the
Democracy Movement. Yang Shangkun, the 1st chairman of the CMC, championed the
suppression and was the architect of the military plan.471 But comments by Li Xiannian,
made at a council of elder statesmen shortly before the decision to clear Tiananmen Square
470 On these differences see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons,
1995), 225-27. Paul H.B. Godwin, "Party-Military Relations," in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms,
ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Michael Swain, The Military and
Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).
471 See, for example, the long sections devoted to his arguments in Zhang Liang, The Tiananmen Papers, trans.
Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). Zhang Liang is the pseudonym of the
author and an individual who is said by Nathan and Link to be a former Chinese official. The book was
compiled from notes of key meetings, which were said by the author to have been smuggled out of China. The
veracity of much of its contents cannot be confirmed. But the editors, both experienced China specialists, judge
it to be real. If it turns out not to have been compiled from notes taken by observers, its significance will be less.
Nevertheless, even in that case, it represents an assessment of responsibility by a well-informed insider and critic
of the events covered.
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was made, were typical of the views of all: "Our People's Revolution was built with the blood
of more than twenty million revolutionary martyrs.... We can't allow turmoil to destroy all
this overnight.... China will lose all hope if we let turmoil have its way or open the door to
capitalism.' 72 Wang Zhen said, "When we were their [the students'] age we lived in a forest
of rifles and a rain of bullets; we didn't know what a peaceful day was. Give them peace and
they don't want it...." 473 These were men who, right or wrong, had brought epochal change to
China, and they were not going to let the revolution they had led be hijacked or overturned by
college students.
There were, however, dissenters even among the ranks of the old guard. The group
did include several officers with traditional infantry-oriented military backgrounds, but
technical officers were, even among this group of revolutionary-era officers, over represented.
Two of the most prominent were Zhang Aiping and Nie Rongzhen, longtime leaders of
China's military science and technology community. The group also included Yang Dezhi
and Xu Xiangqian, prominent proponents of military modernization and regularization, and
Ye Fei, a former commander of the navy (who, as pointed out earlier, had little naval
background and a past record of conservative action).474
472 Ibid., 257-58.
473 Ibid., 208. Wang Zhen had long felt antagonized by dissatisfied students. In a confrontation with students of
the Central Party School in 1986 (when smaller student demonstrations were taking place), Wang said "You
have three million college students. But I have three million soldiers, and I will cut your freakin' heads offi"
Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 204.
474 Seven retired senior officers reportedly wrote a letter critical of the declaration of martial law. According to
Godwin, these included former defense minister Zhang Aiping; former vice minister of defense Xiao Ke; former
chief of staff Yang Dezhi; former commander of the navy, Ye Fei; and the former president of the PLA
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Similar patterns can be observed among younger, serving officers, though this group
was regarded by its elders as being, in general, more ambivalent and less politically reliable
than members of their own generation.4 75 Officers affiliated with better-trained and more
technology-intensive units appear to have been less responsive to the Party's commands. The
most obvious and widely discussed illustration is the record of the first two army groups to
reach Beijing. The 38th Army Group's base was closest to Beijing, recruited heavily from in
and around the city, and was known to benefit from the highest standards and best equipped
of any of China's army groups. Given orders to advance into the city, it balked. Many of its
officers apparently refused to obey orders. The 38th Army Group's commander, Xu Qinxian,
avoided the dilemma by checking himself into a hospital. And many of the 38th Army
Group's subordinate units either abandoned or torched their own equipment.4 76 The soldiers
of the 27th Army Group, mostly drawn from rural areas around its base in Shijiazhuang (Hebei
province), were told and apparently believed that the disturbances were being caused by
Academy of Military Science Song Shilun. Godwin, "Party-Military Relations," 83. Baum provides a different
list of elderly military leaders who were not happy with the declaration: Zhang Aiping, Yang Dezhi, Chen
Zaidao, Li Desheng, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian. Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of
DengXiaoping, 305.
475 Some 1,500 officers were reported punished for failings during the clearing operation. According to Far
Eastern Economic Review (and cited by Paul Godwin), 3,500 officers were investigated, including some twenty
officers at the regimental and battalion level and thirty-six at the regimental and battalion level. Godwin, "Party-
Military Relations," 85. For additional sources on the military operation and the problems in the 38" Army
Group, see Yabuki Susumu, Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1996), 94-167. Swain, The Military
and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs, 160-68.
476 According to a classified document leaked to reporters in Hong Kong, the unit's commander, 110 other
officers, and 1,400 soldiers from the army group left their posts or refused to take orders. Lam, China After
Deng Xiaoping, 205.
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drifters and misfits (liumang). The units of the 27th Army Group followed orders and were
responsible for much of the killing during the suppression effort.4 77
In the case of these two army groups, specific regional composition and personal
affiliations played a significant role in determining their behavior. Senior officers in the 27th
Army Group had ties to Yang Shangkun. But after the military suppression of the Tiananmen
demonstrations, conservative military officers cited emphasis on technical education as a
cause of military disobedience, confirming that Chinese military officials perceived a link
between modem and professional military forces and those unwilling to intervene in politics -
or at least those unwilling to intervene in the service of leftist politics.
After the crackdown, Yang Shangkun and his brother, Yang Baibing, the head of the
GPD and also a member of the CMC, mobilized an extensive network of military allies to
"rectify" the military. In order to insulate itself further from bourgeois liberalism, the army
placed renewed emphasis on recruiting in rural areas, less tainted by spiritual pollution. The
army's rectification effort was more successful than that of many civilian organizations
(including Party organizations), and military sections were assigned to radio and television
stations, as well as Party and government departments, to monitor political work.4 78 The
477 There were units from every military region present - presumably to create a collective guilt that would
preclude those in the regional chain of command from later distancing themselves from the event and casting
blame on others. It is difficult to apportion blame for the various shooting incidents that occurred, especially on
the approaches to the city where most of the killing took place. But the 27 h Army Group was clearly among the
most active in the operation.
478 Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, 196.
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Yang brothers increased the proportion of unit time spent on political indoctrination - which
in some units reached 50 percent of all training time.
Nationally, conservatives gained momentum after the purge of the Party's liberal wing
(including Zhao Ziyang and his supporters), and much of their success is attributable to the
support of army leaders. By 1992, conservatives were praising the excellence of "Mao
Zedong Thought," drafting policy documents calling for new restrictions on the SEZs, and
rhetorically associating reform and opening with bourgeois liberalism. 4 79 The army was one
of the most consistent critics of liberalization during this period and contributed to the revival
of "Mao Zedong Thought" by promoting the study of his military theory and practice.4 80 In
November 1991, when Deng suggested renewing reform and seeking reconciliation with the
United States, Wang Zhen challenged Deng's commitment to Marxism and accused him of
fostering peaceful evolution in China.4 8' Yang Shangkun ultimately proved more loyal to
Deng personally, but he too balanced his praise for Deng with an equal (and sometimes
stronger) advocacy of Maoist doctrine. By 1992, Deng was concerned that, even if the Yang
479 Even Jiang Zemin began to emphasize Mao Zedong thought in his public speeches. See, for example, Jiang
Zemin, "Zai Qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang Chengli Qishi Zhounian Dahui de Jianghua", Jiefangjunbao,
July 2 1991.
480 With the move to the left, the number of mentions of "Mao Zedong thought" in Jiefangjunbao (Liberation
Army Daily) increased from 31 in 1988 to 239 in 1990. For examples, see "Yang Shangkun Zhuxi Zai Shanghai
Shicha Budui Shihou Qiangdiao Jiaqiang Zhengzhi Jianshe, Nuli Tigao Zhandou Li", Jiefangjunbao, February 2
1990. "Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang Yiran Shi Wojun Jianshe de Zhidao Sixiang", Jiefangunbao, December 26
1990.
481 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 336.
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brothers remained loyal to him personally - a fact of which he could not be guaranteed - they
might undo his legacy after his passing.4 82
The navy (1989-1992). The student demonstrations of 1989 showed how delicate this
alliance between the navy and a Party intent on economic and social reform but unwilling to
do so at the expense of its own authority could be. Dissent over the suppression of the student
movement appears to have been particularly high in the navy in 1989. After the suppression,
the navy continued to advocate reform, though more quietly than before, and in 1992-1993, it
played an instrumental role in helping to regain stalled momentum for military and economic
reform.
Liu Huaqing, recently promoted from navy commander to vice chairman of the CMC,
did agree to the use of force. But there is little evidence of his having taken a prominent role
in the decisions that led to the massacre.4 Moreover, there were signs of dissent even at the
highest levels in the navy. Li Yaowen, the navy's political commissar, was among those
482 Rumors had long circulated that Deng was worried about the possibility of an effective coup by the Yang
brothers by 1992. Secret files of the CCP recently smuggled out of China appear to confirm that this was indeed
the case. Although their authenticity cannot be guaranteed, the circumstances of their appearance and the
channels through which they suggest that they are real. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, eds., China's New
Rulers: The Secret Files (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002) 150-54.
483 I found no discussion of the role played by the navy's commander, Zhang Lianzhong, during Tiananmen (or
the position he might have taken) in any Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kong, or U.S. sources. Presumably, since he
was not removed after the event, he signed on for the event, but he certainly did not play a major role. As CMC
vice chairman, Liu Huaqing's official backing for the suppression is better documented, he does not figure
prominently in any accounts. He is mentioned in ten places in the Tiananmen Papers, but nine of those are
simply to record his presence at various meetings. The other vice chairman of the CMC, Yang Shangkun,
appears on 134 pages of the book. One source that departs from other accounts in casting Liu Huaqing as a
major actor in the event - something it explains by his close personal connection to Deng Xiaoping - is Paul
Beaver and Bridget Harney, "Role of the Military in Tiananmen Square," in China in Crisis: The Role of the
Military, ed. Jane's Informaiton Group (Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Information Group).
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purged after the event for actions taken - or more likely not taken - during the troop
mobilization.4 84 Taiwanese military analyst Zheng Yi claims that when Li Peng ordered the
movement of marine troops for suppression activities, Li Yaowen refused. Li, according to
this source, responded in a memo that "the marine brigades are not adequately trained, and it
would be difficult for them to cooperate with other forces involved. I am afraid that they (the
marines) would impair the operation." 485
According to Zheng Yi, "The entire naval high command supported the student
movement. Mid-ranking and lower ranking naval officers participated in demonstrations."4 86
This last contention is supported by other analysts. Michael Swain, who conducted interviews
shortly after the Tiananmen massacre, concludes that members of the navy and air force were
particularly unhappy with the conservative government empowered by the purge.487
The navy's reluctance to go along with the suppression may have been partly a
product of a desire, especially strong among its junior officer corps, to see greater separation
between the military and the Party. Since the 1980s, some PLA officers had been
participating in military "solons" (unofficial - and unauthorized - discussion groups), within
which one of the major topics was the idea of turning the military into a "national army"
(guojiajundui), in contrast to a "Party army." The idea was, in theory, consistent with the
484 Zhang Liang, The Tiananmen Papers, 456.
485 Zheng Yi, Zhongguo Juntou Dianjiang Lu (Taibei: Kaijin Wenhua Shiye Youxian Gongsi, 1995), 235.
486 Ibid.
487 Swain, The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs.
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efforts of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and other party liberals, all of whom
had advocated greater separation between the Party and government administrative
organizations.4 88 Naval officers, air force officers, and army officers from the general staff
were, according to Hong Kong sources, particularly active in these salons.489 The "salons"
and the discussion of a "national army" were later identified by military officials as
contributing to dissent and disobedience within the military before and during the
crackdown.4 90
After the June 4 suppression, surviving naval leaders admitted a need for more
political work and restrained their pro-reform rhetoric, but, unlike many army officers, they
did not criticize reform and opening or call for a return to Maoist values. There is no public
record of either CMC vice chairman Admiral Liu Huaqing or the navy's commander, Zhang
Lianzhong, having called for combating "bourgeois liberalization" or of their having voiced
even veiled criticism of ousted liberals from the Party's inner circle.491 Indeed, even during
the liberal nadir in 1990-1991, Liu Huaqing continued to publicly assert that China "would
488 Deng Xiaoping had attempted to move the CMC, then as now a Party organ, to state control. He was blocked
by conservative army officers, though they apparently allowed him to set up a second CMC with identical
membership.
489 Swain, The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs, 166.
490 See, for example, Zheng Nianqun, "Ping 'Jundui Feizhengzhihua' de Miulun", Jiefangjunbao, August 14
1990.
491 This conclusion is based on a full-text survey of Renminribao, Jiefangjunbao, on-line sources using Chinese
and American search engines, and a review of major statements in naval magazines and other journals. It is, of
course, impossible to know whether a wider survey would have yielded any statements critical of bourgeois
liberalism.
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never abandon reform and opening." 492 The same generally held throughout the navy's ranks.
During the National People's Congress meeting in March 1990, almost half of the army's
delegates attacked "bourgeois liberalization" and others criticized problems in the recent past
with the corruption of senior Party officials (i.e., Zhao Ziyang). None of the naval delegates
did likewise.49 3
When Deng Xiaoping, concerned about his legacy, emerged from retirement in 1992
for a nanxun (Southern tour) designed to halt the conservative tide and restart the reform
process, Liu Huaqing and the navy provided immediate and unequivocal support. Deng
sought to use the dynamic southern coastal cities as a backdrop for a series of pro-reform
addresses. But although Deng began his tour on January 15, conservatives blocked any
explicit mention of his trip in the media until mid-February. Navy propagandist Huang
Caihong, however, published an article on January 19 in Renminribao (People's Daily)
highlighting the navy's role in developing the coastal cities and mirroring Deng's rhetoric
about the positive connection between "reform and opening in the coastal cities" and "social
stability and development."4 94
On January 26, Liu Huaqing delivered a speech in the southernmost Military Region,
Guangzhou, saying that if China wanted to emerge strong and powerful, "then in must put
492 "Mengjialaguo Haijun Sanmouzhang Fanghua Liu Huaqing, Qin Jiwei, Chi Haotian Fenbie Huijian",
Renminribao, October 6 1991.
493 Wang Jianguo, "Jiaqiang Sixiang Jiaoyu, Weihu Wending Daju", Jiefangjunbao, March 24 1990.
494 Huang Caihong, "Haijun Zhiyuan Yanhai Jingji Jianshe 10 Nian Toulao 1,500 Duowange, Chudong Jianting,
Feiji Wanyu Jiaci", Renminribao, January 19 1992.
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great energy into developing its economy; lift the nation's comprehensive national strength;
guarantee, as a critical and glorious responsibility, the orderly progress of reform and
opening; and support reform and opening by, among other things, taking real and proactive
measures to support local economies."495 Over the next year, the public relations battle over
reform continued, and Liu Huaqing continued to provide outspoken support for reform and
opening.496
In late 1992, Deng brought naval officers into a series of key positions in what China
analyst Willy Wo-Lap Lam described as a strategy "to bring in the navy as a counterweight to
the army."49 7 During the preceding year, one of Deng's greatest concerns was the role that
the military might play after his death in blocking reforms or threatening the position of his
designated successor, Jiang Zemin. He was particularly worried about the power base that
generals Yang Shangkun (the first vice chairman of the CMC) and Yang Baibing (the head of
the GPD) had developed within the military. During the November 1992 Party Congress,
Deng removed both from the CMC. In a move that most China-watchers agreed was an effort
to shelter Jiang from military attack, Deng appointed the navy's Liu Huaqing as the CMC's
new first vice chairman and made him a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.498
495 Zheng Guolian, "Liu Huaqing Zai Guangzhou Junqu Yige Huiyishang Qiangdiao Zou Jingbing Zhi Lu Yao
Zhuzhong Zhiliang Jianshe", Renminribao, January 27 1992.
496 See, for example, "Jundui Renda Daibiao Liu Huaqing Zai Fenzu Huishang Fayan Zhichu: Zhichi Baowei
Gaige Kaifang Jiasu Wojun Zhiliang Jianshe", Renminribao, March 26 1992. Wang Yuwen, "Liu Huaqing
Sanjia Jiefangjun Daibiaotuan Taolun Shi Qiangdiao: Anjiao Deng Xiaoping Xinshiqi Jundui Jianshe de Sixiang,
Jianshe Qiangda de Xiandaihua Zhengguihua Geming Jundui", Renminribao, October 16 1992.
497 Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, 221.
498 Mitsubishi Sogo Kenkyujo Hen, Chugoku Saiko Shidosha, 1996 Nenban, 269-71. Baum, Burying Mao:
Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 367.
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Significantly, the appointment of the seventy-six year old Liu ran counter to Deng's policy of
selecting younger individuals for key posts - a policy he had emphasized in countless public
speeches. He also secured the appointment of six naval officers as full or alternate members
of the party's Central Committee - more than from any other military service.49 9
EXPLAINING ARMY-NAVY DIFFERENCES
What explains the consistent difference in outlook between the two services? In chapter 3, I
suggested that several interrelated characteristics related to functional and material interests,
as well as derivative socialized biases, drive differences in the services' domestic outlooks.
Those characteristics include: the technological and industrial, as opposed to human, capital
inputs required by each; consequent differences in officer and enlisted recruiting, as well as
the relationship between officers and men; the location and type of basing; and the degree and
nature of foreign contact.
There is evidence in the Chinese case that differences in each of these areas existed
and that they had a critical role in determining the positions taken by each service. Some of
these - including the connection between capital content and basing location on the one hand
the services positions on the other - have already been treated in the preceding narrative at
some length, and are treated only briefly here. Others, especially manpower and social issues,
are dealt with in more detail.
499 Lam, China After Deng Xiaoping, 221.
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CAPITAL CONTENT AND BASING LOCATION. Since the establishment of the PLAN
in 1950, its leadership has stressed the navy's status within the military as a high-tech
organization. Naval commander Shi Yunsheng's 1997 observation was typical: "A modem
warship is a floating science city or a miniature replica of a modern industrial and
technological strength of the nation."50 0 The Chinese navy openly acknowledges that reform
and opening, and the ability to purchase foreign hardware and technology, have been
instrumental in enabling them to strengthen their capabilities. An article on the development
of frigates, for example, states that little progress was made on rectifying serious deficiencies
in air defense capabilities from the mid- 1960s to the late 1970s. But "since China
implemented its opening policies during the 1980s," the article continues, "the shipbuilding
industry has been able to import foreign naval weapons and electronic systems," as well as
"raise its own scientific and technological standards." 50 1 In 1984 Liu Huaqing argued that
reform and opening would "strengthen the scientific and technological level of the nation,"
and establish "a strong foundation for naval building," - an argument that has since been
echoed by all subsequent PLAN commanders. 50 2
RECRUITMENT AND SOCIAL ISSUES. Different recruiting patterns have been driven
by the technological requirements of each service (as well as geographic considerations), but
the implications of this derivative issue are large enough to warrant separate consideration.
500 Huang Caihong, "Jianfu qi Kuashiji Hancheng de Zhongren", Jianchuan Zhishi, March 6 1997.
501 "Zhongguo Huweijian Guanjian Jishu Yanjiu," Jianchuan Zhishi, December 6 1997.
502 Du Zhongwei et al., "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing". Huang
Caihong, "Jianfu qi Kuashiji Hancheng de Zhongren".
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Reform and opening has had a massive impact on Chinese society, but its effects have been
uneven across geographical, occupational, and, increasingly, class lines. Given that the
services recruit from different segments of the population, then, it is understandable that each
has been effected by - and sees - social change differently.
With the exception of targeted recruiting for technical positions, recruiting (i.e.,
conscription) is done locally in China. Army personnel have been overwhelmingly drawn
from the rural population. The navy tends to recruit from wealthier, urbanized coastal areas.
Reform and opening has brought more investment and faster growth to the coastal areas than
it has to interior regions.503 The GDP per capita of the inland provinces, 56% that of the
coastal provinces in 1983, fell to 40% by 1999.504 Education and other social services, which
had previously been provided largely by now ailing state owned firms and agricultural
communes, have deteriorated in many interior provinces. Along the coast, the provinces'
rising revenues have bettered positioned them to pick up the slack or improve services.
Given the discrepancies in the bases from which they draw, it is not surprising that the
two services frequently described two different realities in their recruiting. During the 1980s,
army officers in many units complained of rising illiteracy, while naval officers heralded an
503 The coastal city of Shanghai (population 16 million), for example, attracted 110 times as much foreign
investment as the inland province of Guizhou (population 36 million) between 1978 and 1999. For the
investment figure, see Dexter Roberts, "China's Wealth Gap," Business Week, May 8 2000. On differential
growth rates, see Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile: China 2003," (London: Economist Intelligence
Unit, 2003). Chuan Hwee and John G. Bauer, The Income Distribution of China: Regional Disparities
[http://www.ntu.edu.sg/nbs/publications/regional_issues in economics/08-chy96.pdf] ([cited August 2 2003]).
504 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 4, 2000.
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increase in educational levels and standards of recruits. 50 5 Army leaders have also
complained more of the difficulty of leading their new "city soldiers" than have naval
officers, perhaps because more of these officers hail from coastal cities and perhaps because
the navy's sailors have always been drawn largely from urban areas.506
A second major difference in manning is that naval enlistments are also longer than
those of the army, and the navy can recruit selectively for many positions. Up until 1999,
naval (and air force) conscription had been for four years, while that of the army was three.
After 1999, standard two-year terms were established, but the navy continued to enlist sailors
for three or four years if the individual was assigned a position that required technical training
courses at the start of the enlistment period.50 7 The navy also uses relatively more long-
505 A thorough survey by two army officers from the Jinan military region between 1986 and 1988 reported
educational standards declined in their region. At the time of the survey, some 15 percent of all soldiers were
functionally illiterate and could not write a letter home. Su Zhenshui Tang Mingcheng, "Zhanshi Wenhua
Shuiping Bugao", Jiefangiunbao, December 24 1988. Officers from the Nanjing region also reported similar
findings, observing that over the last few years the problem of illiteracy had "reemerged" in their ranks. In one
tank unit, which should have been better off then infantry units, 4 percent were said to be illiterate. Yang Xu Li
Changsen, "Mou Tanke Shi de Diaocha Biaoming Bingyuan Wenhua Suzhi Xiajiang Yingxiang Jiaoyu
Shunlian", Jiefangi/unbao, August 24 1988.
506 Both services saw an increase in the number of urban soldiers conscripted into the force. In the army, a
vigorous discussion of the supposed disciplinary problems caused by the induction of city soldiers followed, and
by all accounts, the increase in city soldiers appears to have increased tensions within units. See, for example,
"Yifen Changle Fandiao de Diaocha", Jiefangjunbao, July 8 1986. But several articles by political officers,
appearing in the military's Jiefangiunbao, observed that much of the problem may have lay in the unwillingness
or inability of some officers, many of whom themselves had only rudimentary education and were accustomed to
absolute control over their villager soldiers, to adjust their treatment of their new urban charges. Yang Yuzhen,
"'Bing Nandai' de Shi yu Fei", Jiefangjunbao, December 18 1988. Zhang Zuowu Xiong Xuehui, "Qing Paoqi
Dui Chengshi Bing de Pianjian", Jiefangjunbao, January 9 1987. With a more urbanized officer corps and more
professionals in the enlisted ranks (see text below), these problems had less impact on the navy. The one
exception was during the period immediately after the Tiananmen square massacre, when the navy faced
significant disciplinary problems.
507 Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Anapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 2001), 116.
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service "volunteers" than the army. Volunteers, selected from among conscripted applicants,
serve long terms (up to twenty years) at significantly higher rates of pay than basic
conscripts.508 While only between five and ten percent of army personnel at the division level
are volunteers, some thirty percent of naval enlisted come from the same source, with a higher
percentage onboard submarines and advanced destroyers. 509
The services' attempts to integrate long-service volunteers into their ranks offer
insights into the interests and values of each. Integration in the army was anything but
smooth, especially during the late 1980s but also more recently. Long-service soldiers were
not spread throughout the force, and there appears to have been little attempt to turn them into
a de facto NCO corps. Rather, they were grouped in support units, such as transportation
battalions (serving in those cases in maintenance and driving capacities). Their officers
commonly complained of their having an "iron rice bowl" mentality, with little motivation to
work hard. One division took the radical step of mass punishment: canceling the volunteer
508 During the late 1980s, volunteer pay was about fifteen times higher than that of conscript pay and several
times higher than average rural wages, making this a lucrative career choice for many.
509 These numbers are estimates. A junior army officer suggested the number of volunteers in the ground force
at about 4-5 percent of the total. (Interview, 5.28.98) The high end of this estimate was derived from "a certain
division near Beijing," which was said to have slightly over 1000 volunteers, or about 9 percent of its total
strength. Wang Wuzhang Li Futian, "Mou Shi Qianyu Zhiyuanbing Zhengque Duidai Ping Junxian",
Jiefangiunbao, September 9 1988. The Beijing division (probably part of the elite 38th Army) may well have
had access to a higher number of volunteers than average divisions. The range cited above is also consistent
with anecdotal evidence from several other Jiefangjunbao articles. (See July 27 1990, August 5 1994, November
11 1993, and November 21 1993.) Figures on volunteers in the navy are from discussions with current and
retired naval officers. On the submarine force, one detachment granted long-service volunteer contracts to 84
individuals in the course of three years - a rate that would yield significantly more volunteers than the estimated
30 percent above. Yang Weicheng, "Buzhuli, Buxunsi, Buteshu: Haijun Mou Bu Dangwei Lianjie Qinzheng Ju
Juxin", Jiefangjunbao, November 11 1993. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in 2001 that
in the Chinese army, 800,000 of 1,700,000 personnel (or 47%) were conscripted; in the navy, the figure given
was 40,000 of 220,000 (or 18%). While it is not clear how IISS calculated its figures, and the percentages are
different than my own estimates, the difference between the services is similar to my own calculations -
especially if one were to take officers out of the equation.
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status of thirty-two volunteers in a single subordinate unit and returning them to the
conscripted ranks for punishment.510 The army now appears to have come to understand, in
theory, the need for a professional NCO corps, but it is less clear if it can and will take those
steps necessary to put one in place.5 1 1
The navy welcomed long-service volunteers from the start. Volunteers are spread
throughout the organization and tend to assume leadership and training roles similar to those
performed by NCO's in Western militaries.5 12 Naval officers appear to have been more
secure in their authority than their army colleagues. At the same time, by providing an
additional layer of supervision between conscripted sailors and officers, the NCO corps
further insulates naval officers from direct exposure to whatever negative social effects might
have resulted from economic reform. The relative ease of moving into the long-service ranks
also gives conscripted sailors a greater sense of investment in their training. According to one
account, "entering the Party, going to schools, being decorated, and making the transition to
long-service volunteer are regarded as natural and expected events."513 In contrast, the more
limited expansion of volunteer service in the army caused a significant increase in unit-level
510 Cao Chengfa, "Mou Shi 32 Ming Zhiyuanbing Bei Tingxin Dang Zhanshi", Jiefangiunbao, May 10 1988. As
in the case of dealing with urban soldiers, however, political commissars suggested that faults in volunteer
performance frequently lay more with the inability of officers to deal well with the added pressure of handling
professional soldiers on a more equal status as themselves. See, for example, Yi Ruilin, "Zhongshi Jiejue
Zhiyuanbing Guanlishang de Xin Wenti", Jiefangiunbao, September 6 1984.
511 See David M. Finkelstein, Lookingfor the People in the People's Liberation Army: Who is G.I. Zhou (2000
[cited August 4 2003]); available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ChinaCenter/CMA_ConfOct00/paper2.htm.
512 See, for example, Chen Shungen, "Er Wu San Qianting Junshizhang Quanbu You Zhiyuanbing Danren",
Jiefangjunbao, January 24 1983.
513 Yang Yaoxin, "Xhuixia Jianbing", Renminribao, May 15 1993.
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graft. Peasant conscripts routinely brought money - sometimes a year's worth of income or
more from their families - to bribe junior officers charged with recommending candidates.5 14
For the navy, military reforms that went hand-in-hand with the general monetization
of the economy offered new avenues for obtaining a skilled, professional manpower base, and
the improvement in educational standards in coastal areas enabled them to draw from a better
pool of talent. The army, on the other hand, saw mixed effects on the technical qualities of its
recruiting base and was concerned with the negative effects of free market economics on
discipline within its ranks. Both of the services appealed to these very different realities in
their political statements and positions.
FOREIGN CONTACT. Chinese naval officers and enlisted personnel had and continue to
have more contact with the outside world than do army officers. The contrast is especially true at the
more junior levels. According to a 1991 Chinese report, a single naval base (the Wusong base
in Shanghai) had received 20,000 foreign military visitors from 70 different countries over the
course of thirty years. 51 5 In contrast, most Chinese army bases have little or no contact with
foreigners. In addition to receiving incoming port calls, PLAN ships now routinely make port
calls around East Asia and occasionally beyond (e.g., along the east coast of Africa and west
514 Gao Lihai, "Qing Zhanshi Jiazhang Buyao Gei Ganbu Ji Qian Ji Wu", Jiefang/unbao, April 16 1992. Li
Jiangmao, "Jie Zhuan Zhiyuanbing Zhi Ji Shoushou Huilu, Yingzhang Yang Gongyou Bei Panxing",
Jiefangjunbao, February 11 1991.
515 Guo Yijiang, "Wusong Jungang: Haijun de Chuankou Youyi de Menhu", Jiefang/unbao, April 8 1991.
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coast of North and South America), giving officers and sailors alike to mix with their
counterparts in a variety of settings. 516
This contact has given the navy and its officers and men a better appreciation of
China's relative backwardness and the necessity of importing foreign equipment and ideas, as
well as a more general appreciation of foreign perceptions and cultures. Even the navy's
official propaganda often portrays the United States more as a big brother or model from
which to learn than as an immediate rival.5l 7 (The period immediately following the bombing
of China's Belgrade embassy was an exception to this general rule.) An article about life in a
destroyer detachment describes an "English language corner," established by the chief of an
electrical section on board one of the ships. 518 And the navy does publicize its overseas
516 According to China's 1998 Defense White Paper, the PLAN had made port calls in twenty countries over the
last nineteen years. Two fleet visit between March and May 1997 brought Chinese naval ships to the United
States, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
517 A reflection of this attitude can be found in Hai Zhi Hun (the spirit of the sea), a 1997 novel that was made
into a feature length film and television series in 1998. Within the story, the prize possession of the hero, a naval
ship captain working to master the computer skills necessary for success in the modem navy, is a cigarette
lighter given to him by a U.S. naval officer during a fleet visit. Scenes portraying the visit itself leave no doubt
about the American navy's superiority in size and quality but was, in no way, portrayed as menacing or ugly.
Similarly, an unbridled admiration for U.S. technology is also on display in most issues of Jianchuan Zhishi
(Naval and merchant ships), the most official public naval magazine in China. A distinctive change in attitude is
visible after the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, but even now, the prevailing attitude
appears to be that much remains to be learned, and the United States navy is the best model to study. Some
analysts have put a more competitive spin on these facts, suggesting that the PLAN's study of the U.S. navy is
typical of any navy studying its primary threat, but the preponderance of articles on U.S. subjects do not
approach their subject in that spirit - or even provide details on vulnerabilities that one might expect to find if
that were the purpose.
518 Chen Wanjun and Zhang Zhao, "Weile Sandai Lingdaoren de Zhutuo: Mou Haijun Quzhujian Zhidui
Xiandaihua Jianshe Jishu", Renminribao, April 20 1997.
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"diplomacy" - port calls, etc. - in ways that project both a positive image of engagement and
opening and the navy's role in that process.5 19
STRATEGIC CHANGE
The navy did better than any other service or branch during the 1 980s, the first decade of
reform and opening. During the 1990s, the navy continued to thrive, though given the
expansion of the defense budget in general during that period, it is more difficult to gauge the
expansion of naval resources relative to those of other military organizations. By the late
1990s, the rising prominence of the mainland-Taiwan dispute - a phenomenon that was itself
largely caused by conservative senior army officers -justified the need for a more balanced
force structure compared to one designed for more distant South China Sea contingencies.
NAVALIST PRIORITIES, 1980-1989. Early efforts to modernize and open China's
economy required funds - to, for example, import new steel technology - and the state was
quickly running substantial budget deficits. In part to free funds for other purposes and in part
over frustrations with the political direction of the army, Deng dropped military
modernization from third place to fourth place in the list of the "four modernizations" in
1980.520 He suggested that any significant expansion of funds for that purpose might have to
519 See, for example, "Shouci Hengdu Taipingyang Di Meiguo Bentu Shengdiege Fangwen: Wo Haijun Jianting
Biandui Shoudao Rilie Huanying", Jiefangjunbao, March 23 1997.
520 Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, 88. The four modernizations included
the modernization of(1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) national defense, and (4) science and technology. The term
was first used by Zhou Enlai in 1964 but was quickly dropped at that time. Zhou used it again in 1975, and it
was adopted as a guiding objective by the third plenum of the eleventh Party Congress in 1978. In 1980, Deng
reversed the order of the third and fourth modernization.
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wait until the turn of the century. Deng then cut the budget by 13 percent in 1980. Although
Deng's initial reduction in military spending might be attributable to an adjustment after the
1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, reductions continued throughout the 1980s, ultimately bringing
spending down 21 percent during the decade. While Deng encouraged the military to engage
in business to make up for shortfalls, it is doubtful that these ventures ever contributed much
if anything to procurement or operations budgets, but rather served primarily to provide
sustenance and employment to soldiers who were effectively removed from real military
service. 521
While Chinese sources do not break down the military budget by service, most
indicators suggests that the navy fared far better than the army during this period of military
austerity. Indeed, while overall military budgets fell, the aggregate tonnage of major surface
warships increased by 86 percent during the decade. Foreign currency was made available for
new imported weapons systems. French Crotale SAM systems and their associated radar
systems (Castor-IIJ fire control systems) were, for example, retrofitted on existing ships and
ship frames. Imported and license-produced French Dauphin helicopters were added to the
onboard inventory, significantly increasing at-sea aerial capabilities. An entirely new class of
destroyer, the Luhu, designed and built around imported General Electric engines, provided a
521 According to the General Logistics Department, profits from PLA enterprises during the mid-1990s were
$600-700 million. Foreign estimates put the number several times that high. David Shambaugh, who offers
perhaps the most detailed assessment of the question, concludes that the "vast majority" of that money remained
with the enterprises, rather than going to the operation and maintenance of operational unlits. The primary
function was to offset the hardships to personnel caused by shrinking military budgets and the monetization of
the economy. Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 200-01.
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significantly larger and faster platform than anything previously fielded.5 2 The Luhu also
included, for the first time, an integrated tactical command center imported from France.
Organizational changes in the navy's structure accompanied the material development
of the force and the new willingness to import technology. Shortly after assuming command
of the force in 1982, Liu Huaqing set about recentralizing and revitalizing the force.523 In
1983 he created the Navy Equipment Assessment Research Center (Haijun Zhuangbei
Lunzheng Yanjiu Zhongxin), bringing together eighteen different research organizations from
various components of the navy and substantially strengthening overall design and
development capabilities. 52 4 Nor was the new organization simply a consolidation of existing
units; the center hired new talent (including a variety of individuals with Ph.D.s from top
universities) and became a premier modem research and development center. A history of the
organization by one of its members suggests that the navy's development was resented by
other elements of the military:
"At the time this [the Center's creation] took place, the whole military was
undergoing reduction and revitalization. Some asked 'why should they be
being upgraded, while everyone else is being downgraded or eliminated. But
this development was in fact totally in keeping with the scientific trend in army
building."525
522 Although not commissioned until the early 1 990s, the Luhu class was designed during the early 1980s and the
first two units ordered in 1985. After 1989 and the US embargo on military-use or dual-use equipment, no
subsequent units were ordered.
523 Like other Chinese military organizations, the navy had been decentralized during the Cultural Revolution,
and the naval headquarters had lost much of its ability to integrate disparate functions of the force.
524 The official Chinese naval encyclopedia translates the center as simply the "Naval Research Center."
Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu, 682.
525 Cai Xiaohong, "You Zheyang Yige 'Sixiangku"', Jiefangjunbao, July 8 1985.
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Although the army and air force also managed to import equipment and design new
systems during the 1980s, neither gained nearly as much as the navy in terms of budgets for
these systems or derivative capabilities. In the case of the air force, the much higher
requirement for subsystem integration and integrated design prevented it from capitalizing on
access to foreign technology. 526 In the case of the army, only limited funds were made
available for increased production to equip the newly designated rapid reaction forces.
NAVAL EXPANSION, 1990-2003. In some ways, the navy reached peak influence
during the 1990s. Liu Huaqing acceded to 1 st vice chairman of the CMC in 1992. In the same
year, a record number of naval officers were appointed to the Central Committee. Design
work began in the mid- 1990s on the Luhai, a 6,600-ton destroyer that was one third larger
than anything then in the inventory, and in 1996 the navy signed a contract to purchase two
8,500-ton Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia. Both the first Luhai and the first
Sovremenny were commissioned into the operational forces in 2000.527
But while the navy continued to expand throughout the 1990s, this expansion took
place against the backdrop of a major expansion of the overall defense budget, and navy's
relative position may in fact have slipped during the decade. Between 1980 and 1990,
Chinese defense budgets declined by 21 percent, but naval tonnage increased by 86 percent
(or 55,600 tons); between 1990 and 2000, defense budgets grew by 91 percent, while naval
526 On the difficulties faced by the PLAAF in integrating technologies acquired from foreign sources, see
Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa
Monica: Rand, 1995).
527 China ordered two more Sovremenny-class destroyers in January 2002.
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tonnage increased by only 33 percent (or 39,800 tons). Quality of design and equipment
improved, but new domestically produced destroyers have been built only in very small
numbers, in part because of the diversion of resources to import warships from Russia.
Another change during the mid-1 990s, obscured to some extent by an expanding fleet
but nevertheless both significant and clear on close examination, was the relative shift in
emphasis away from the sea control forces favored by most naval officers to sea denial forces.
The shift was manifested most clearly in the quashing of naval hopes for the early acquisition
of an aircraft carrier and the purchase instead of a small fleet of Russian Kilo submarines. In
1985 Liu Huaqing ordered the establishment of a warship captain's course for pilots, and the
academy's president spoke about both the likelihood of building carriers and the need to
prepare ship captains ahead of time. 528 By the early and mid-1 990s, Chinese naval magazines
and newspapers, especially naval ones, were filled with stories about China's need for aircraft
carriers and optimism about the prospects.529
In the late 1990s, however, the Central Military Commission apparently ruled against
the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, at least in the short term, and urged the navy to pursue
submarines instead, producing a relative shift in thinking from power projection to a doctrine
528 You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 195.
529 The pages of Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and Merchant Ships, the navy's most official outlet for ideas) were
filled with full color spreads of aircraft carriers, as well as articles assessing the relative merits of different types
of designs. According to one analyst, there were more than 55 articles in that magazine devoted to aircraft
carriers. Huang Caihong, Hangkong Mujian [Aircraft carriers] 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0630.
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of denial. 530 An increasing number of military commentaries began to highlight the need for
weapons systems appropriate to China's developmental level, some making the observation
that lifecycle maintenance costs on most naval systems are many times the already
considerable purchase or production price.53 1 After starting to modernize its submarine force
in 1994, with the purchase of its first two kilo submarines (delivered in 1995), the PLAN set
about negotiating for a larger force later in the decade. After several years of negotiations, it
ordered eight additional kilos in 2002, bringing its total orders to a dozen.
The navy may not be happy with this shift in emphasis. Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and
Merchant Ships), the closest thing to an official PLAN magazine, has published the results of
several on-line debates about the wisdom of a submarine-based denial strategy and the
relative merits of submarines and aircraft carriers.532 Many of the contributors, published
openly as reader commentary, have been highly critical of the shift in emphasis. There is
little doubt that the navy's budget is still increasing. Nevertheless, the navy appears to have
lost a clear edge in setting doctrine and defining its own force structure, and it is not clear
whether its access to resources is growing faster than that of the other services.
530 This was more likely a series of debates and decisions about individual choices that coalesced into a more
general set of opinions about priorities. The tenor of the debate began to shift some time in 1997.
531 Gao Chunxiang, "Establish a Scientific View on the Strengths and Weaknesses of Weapons", Jiefangunbao,
December 5 2000, in FBIS-CPP-2000-1205.
532 See, for example, "Wangluo Kuaidi: Tan Hangmu, Lun Guoqing" [Internet dispatches: discussion of aircraft
carriers, the national economic situation], Jianchuan Zhishi, September 2000, pp. 11-12.
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SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The civil-military coalition theory explains much, though not everything, about the positions
of the services since the end of the Cultural Revolution, as well as about changes in force
structure.
Inter-service differences and intra-service differences (especially within the army)
were particularly pronounced during the first decade and a half of this period (roughly 1976 to
1992). The army was deeply divided. Although individual positions depended on a variety of
factors, infantry officers in the military regions and the General Political Department tended
to be more conservative (i.e., integral nationalist) than technical officers from, for example,
the armored branch or the General Staff Department. Despite divisions, however, the army
was, on balance, significantly more conservative than the navy.533 Army officers, working
with like-minded civilians, represented a significant and multifaceted threat to Deng's reform
agenda. The navy proved far more loyal to Deng and his program, and Deng ultimately
secured the promotion of its leaders to key military and political positions. The domestic
threat perception of the central leadership became more complicated after the rise of the
democracy movement in 1989, and both the technical characteristics of and political positions
of the services narrowed throughout the 1990s. But differences persist and could once again
become critically important to the fate of the nation should political circumstances once again
change.
533 I would emphasize once again that these labels are used in relative terms. Many army officers at least
passively supported the arrest of the Gang of Four and the end of chaos that the first stages of reform and
opening brought, but later opposed any significant deepening of reform or any fundamental change in the
organization of society or production.
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Personnel, doctrine, and force structure decisions during this period appear to have
been heavily influenced by political events and the role of the services in those events.
During the 1980s, with Deng pushing reform, the navy in support, and the army pushing back,
the navy's fleet and even its headquarters infrastructure grew rapidly, despite a reduction in
overall military budgets. Promotion of personnel served as an important intervening
mechanism. As a committed and capable backer of both Deng and his reform program, Liu
Huaqing was promoted, despite his advanced age, through the senior military ranks between
1978 and 1992. And Liu, in turn, used his position to promote a navalist ideology, as well as
the growth of the organization itself.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. A variety of threat-based (or opportunity-
based) arguments can and have been advanced to explain the shift in Chinese service
priorities and force structure since 1976. One is that the threat of invasion and military
dismemberment diminished and the threat of conflict around the periphery rose. If the
strategic shift began in the late 1980s, this would be an eminently plausible explanation. But
China's strategic change began during the 1970s and continued as Soviet bellicosity and
military power reached new heights. A second and more persuasive strategic explanation has
less to do with changes in China's threat profile and more to do with the strategic acuity of
individual leaders: China's strategic dilemmas remained largely unchanged, but Deng had a
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better answer about how to deal with it. But while this may help us understand some aspect
of China's evolving military strategy, it provides only a tenuous explanation for the dramatic
expansion of the PLAN, and its apparent freedom in propagating new strategic doctrine. A
third argument has less to do with threats than opportunities: China's strategic reorientation
came in response to new opportunities in the South China Sea and an increasingly severe
energy situation. This explanation accords with much of the Chinese navy's own propaganda,
but a closer look at both the timing and content of this argument demonstrate that this
explanation is highly suspect.
Invasion and subjugation or peripheral war? Shifts in China's position vis-a-vis the
superpowers provide a better explanation for strategic change after the late 1980s than they do
before that time. In June 1985 Deng announced to an expanded session of the CMC that it
was no longer necessary for China to prepare for immanent all-out nuclear war with the
Soviet Union but that the possibility of limited, local war around China's periphery could not
be ruled out. 534 By all accounts, this assessment accelerated a trend already underway in
redistributing budget share from the army to the navy.
China's 1985 reevaluation of its external environment was only the culmination of a
consistent and continuous effort begun ten years earlier. As early as 1975, he began pushing
for a reevaluation of China's external threats. In 1977 he asserted, "The international system
is positive. We can obtain some more time without war.... The Soviets have not yet made
534 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, 126-29.
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dispositions to execute their global strategy."5 35 In 1981, he suggested that China would
enjoy a window of peace lasting "between five and ten years."536
This effort was as much domestically motivated as it was an objective description of
changes in China's strategic environment. Indeed, Deng maintained great continuity in his
strategic evaluations throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, even as a number of
intervening events appeared to increase the peril faced by the Chinese state: the fall of South
Vietnam to Soviet-backed North Vietnamese forces (April 1975), the expansion of the Soviet
presence in the new Vietnam (ongoing throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s), the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (December 1978), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
(December 1979).
Beijing found these developments worrisome enough to solidify its ties with the
United States, but not of sufficient concern to increase its own evaluation of the threat. In
keeping with Deng's consistent admonitions, the public discussion continued to move away
from describing the Soviet Union as an imminent or hegemonic threat. A full-text search of
the Renminribao (People's daily) shows that the number of articles discussing Soviet Union
that also included the word "hegemony" or "hegemonism" (baquan or baquanzhuyi) declined
from 48 percent in 1976 to 10 percent in 1983, and 4 percent in 1985. Declines were even
registered in 1978, 1979, and 1980 - the years before, during, and after China's war with the
Soviet-backed Vietnamese military.
535 Ibid., 77.
536 Deng Xiaoping Guanyu Xinshiqi Jundui Jianshe, (Beijing: Zhongyang Junwei Bangongting, 1993).
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By the mid-1980s there was greater objective cause for optimism in Beijing about the
strategic environment. China's strategic partnership with the United States had become
significantly closer.537 And in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, talking about a major
reevaluation of domestic and foreign priorities, became General Secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party.
But a review of the specialized Chinese journal literature on international relations
literature and the Soviet Union reveals that even Gorbachev's statements on domestic reform
were not taken seriously among specialists until mid-1986 and changes in Soviet international
behavior were not seen as significant until mid-1988. 538 The Soviet Union still deployed
around 50% more of its ground forces in the Far East than it did in Europe, and there were
few tangible signs of diminution in numbers or any relaxation of their posture. China clearly
appreciated U.S. technical assistance and intelligence, but it is unlikely that its leaders could
have expected the U.S. to enter a war in defense of the Chinese homeland. And most
contemporary U.S. analysts gave China little hope of resisting a determined Soviet invasion -
at least not by a conventional military defense.
537 James Mann, About Face: A History ofAmerica's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton
(New York: Random House, 1988), 53-95. This interpretation would be consistent with some of Deng's
statements in the 1985 meeting: "In the past, we drew a strategic line against the Soviet threat of hegemony....
But presently we are simply raising high the banner of opposing hegemony. Whoever tries to gain hegemony -
that is who we will oppose." Deng Xiaoping, DengXiaoping Wenxuan, 128.
538 This assessment is shared by Stephen Goldstein. Goldstein, "Sino-Soviet Relations," 253.
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The specific wording of Deng's 1985 statement on shifting strategy is revealing.
Deng stated, "after the 'gang of four' was crushed, particularly after the Third Plenum of the
Eleventh (CCP) Central Committee, our estimate of the international situation changed." 53 9
Far from referring to a specific recent change in the international environment, Deng referred
to a major political event, the 1978 Plenum that solidified broad support for his reform
program. The strategic reevaluation was consistent with the domestic economic and political
needs of reformers, who sought to free funds for the import of new capital equipment and to
confront domestic conservatives within the military. And it explains the steep drop in public
discussion of Soviet hegemonism noted above, despite continuing border skirmishes with
Vietnam, a Soviet client state.
Strategic (or military) acuity. A variant of the above threat-based theory sees the
longstanding expressed differences between Mao and Deng on issues of threat more as a
reflection of their differing views of military efficacy or, alternatively, differing views of
similar international circumstances (instead of substantial change in the actual environment).
This view accords considerable importance to leadership, and it has considerable merit
as an explanation for some aspects of this particular case. Certainly, Deng's consistent efforts
to shift broad strategic planning assumptions are consistent with this interpretation. Deng had
been - despite his status as a political officer during the Civil War - consistently more willing
than Mao to back conventional force modernization as far back as the 1950s. The dismal
539 Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, 126-29.
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performance of Chinese forces during the 1979 war with Vietnam, to which Deng
subsequently referred in discussions of military restructuring, merely affirmed this preference.
Given that Mao's international and military assessments were transparently politically
motivated (as I have argued above and a majority of the China watching community holds),
one might argue that Deng's military reassessment, whether dated to 1975 or 1985,
represented the rationalization of Chinese strategy. Deng could easily believe that reducing
the military's size could be consistent with both improved military efficiency and the fiscal
demands of economic reform. For example, reductions would, in theory, allow him to
remove aging officers who might be less technically competent than many junior officers.54 0
Some of Deng's other policy initiatives, such as the decision to encourage military units to go
into business, are less consistent with this military logic, but might nevertheless be explained
as necessary or desirable from the broader perspective of national interest or long-term
national security.
Some aspects of Deng's military reorientation, however, are difficult to explain
without reference to domestic politics. The relative shift in resource allocation towards the
navy is perhaps the most prominent example. At a time when China was increasing security
cooperation with the United States to counter a lingering and significant Soviet threat and at a
time when China's own defense budgets were shrinking, Deng effectively took yet more
money from the ground forces to support the navy. Modernization for top priority army units
540 In fact, Deng was forced to rely on relatively trusted comrades from the Civil War to fill the top ranks of the
military hierarchy, resulting in a continuation of the aging trend in at least the most senior ranks. It was not until
the 1990s that the average age of senior officers began to drop.
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lagged. And even air force spending took second place to naval modernization. China did
fight a naval engagement with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in 1974, but its naval
performance in that engagement was significantly better than its ground or air performance
against the same foe in 1979.
There was clearly a need to modernize the navy after the Cultural Revolution, but it is
difficult to argue that that need was any greater than the need to modernize ground or air
capabilities. Indeed, the logic of China's international position had not much from the 1950s,
when Peng Dehuai backed a moderate expansion of the navy but reserved first priority for air,
armor, and artillery assets. Then, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chinese capabilities in
all areas were badly outclassed. Redressing continental capability was arguably more
important for guarding the nation's fundamental sovereignty. And in both eras, the
continental strategy could more viably produce a war-winning capability against major attack
by combining improved conventional elements with guerrilla war.
The Soviet Union could threaten Chinese sovereignty without recourse to naval war,
and if it did choose to use its navy, the PLAN could not possibly build enough ships to resist:
Soviet naval tonnage in the Far East alone was some around 350 percent that of Chinese
tonnage during the mid-1 980s, and its technology was at least two generations more
advanced. It was, after all, the purchase of a handful of Soviet warships some twenty years
later that was said to have given China a quantum jump in its naval capabilities.
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The magnitude of military resource reallocation to the navy during the 1980s only
made sense from a threat perspective if contingencies against the weaker powers of Southeast
Asia were regarded as both important and likely relative to other possible military
contingencies. Both the Chinese navy and outside analysts seeking to explain the PLAN's
prominence after 1978 have, in fact, emphasized the new incentives that ostensibly increased
the probability and importance of conflict in Southeast Asia. These rationales are examined
below and found unpersuasive. The fact that these arguments could be developed and go
unchallenged for many years (at least within the Chinese system) was as much a function of
the navy's privileged political position during the 1980s as they are a function of any
objective reality.
Energy and the South China Sea. Arguments about the rising probability of limited
war in the South China Sea focus on a complex of resource needs (especially energy), new
strategic opportunities in the South China Sea, and competition with relatively weaker
Southeast Asian states.541 Reform and opening and the rapid expansion of Chinese industry
drove energy needs that were forecast to outstrip domestic production. (China became a net
oil importer in 1993.) The South China Sea contained a potentially rich bed of these
resources, and the new Law of the Sea (signed in 1982 and modified in 1994) gave island
owners the right to minerals located nearby.
541 See, for example, Calder, Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize
Asia-Pacific. Ji, The Armed Forces of China, 162.
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As an explanation for China's naval-oriented strategic shift, however, this explanation
is suspect on several grounds. First, the Chinese navy only began to make the argument well
after the shift in military resource allocation had begun. Although there was some mention of
resources prior to 1986, energy did not become a major theme in the PLAN's own rhetoric
until after that date. Second, there is evidence that high estimates on energy reserves in the
area were conjured by the navy to justify its own importance and may not have been widely
believed even by Chinese energy experts.
The navy began receiving relatively more resources during the early 1980s, whereas
the discussion of resources in the South China Sea only began in earnest in November 1986.
The discussion began with a symposium on "The Development of Naval Strategy," a
conference proposed by Guo Zhenkai of the Naval Equipment Research Center and presided
over by Liu Huaqing.54 2 Shortly thereafter, naval writers began to discuss the concept of
China's oceans as an extension of its "living space" (shengcun kongiian). 54 3 The discussion
of possible oil under the South China Sea intensified after 1988, when the PLAN held a
meeting to discuss strategic interests there. In 1989, preliminary geological surveys were
conducted by the navy-affiliated Oceanographic Bureau, and the results, it was announced,
indicated that there might be as much as 196 billion barrels of oil. 54 4 Yet the 1989 survey was
542 Cao Jinping, "Yongbao 'Haiyang Guotu' Diyi Ren", Xiandai Jianchuan, June 1998.
543 Prior to 1987, the only use of this term had been in the context of Hitler's lebensraum - and not in laudatory
terms. The first use of the term by naval writers was in April 1987. Xu Guangyu, "Zhiqiu Heli Sanwei Zhanlue
Bianjiang", Jiefang/unbao, April 3 1987. Thereafter, the use of the term in its original World War II context
disappeared from military sources.
544 On this estimate, announced December 24, 1989, see John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South
China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," The China Quarterly 132 (1992): 1015.
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cursory at best, and its estimate, seventeen times as much as the only previous survey estimate
(made by the Soviet Union), was suspiciously high. Indeed, in 1984 PLAN commander Liu
Huaqing had cited an estimate of 8 billion barrels. 54 5
The later, higher estimates are doubted by energy experts, and they must be seen in the
context of the navy's larger public relations effort. Liu Huaqing has been described as a
Chinese Mahan. 54 6 His role was, however, closer to that of the Soviet Union's Sergei
Gorshkov - i.e., the organizer and promoter of the fleet, rather than as an operations or even
strategic theoretician. As such, he sponsored the creation of new research centers that
functioned as public relations and propaganda arms. These included the Science and
Technology Information Center (Keji Qingbao Shi) established in the Naval Equipment
Assessment Research Center in 1983, and the Naval Military Science Institute (Haijun Junshi
Xueshu Yanjiusuo), created in 1985 and attached to the navy commander's office. 54 7
Officially, the former dealt primarily with translating foreign articles and documents on naval
affairs, while the latter focused on assessing naval doctrine. In fact, much of the work done
by both involved selling the importance of the navy to a broader Chinese audience.
The early literature on the oceans - especially the South China Sea - as China's new
lebensraum was written by researchers at these naval think-tanks, and although Western
analysts have chosen to focus primarily on the issue of energy, the literature on this subject
545 Du Zhongwei et al., "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing", 8.
546 See, for example, Jeffrey B. Goldman, "China's Mahan," Naval Institute Proceedings 122 (1996).
547 The navy's encyclopedia translates the latter as the Naval Research Institute
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was broader and more imaginative in its reach. Food was a primary theme. According to one
frequently repeated formula, the oceans could supply one thousand times as much food as all
of the world's dry land agriculture combined. Algae grown and harvested in the near oceans
alone would represent a food stock twenty times as plentiful as all the wheat grown and
harvested today.54 8 Naval writers describe harvesting the oceans wealth in three dimensions.
And while none went so far as to describe bubble cities below the oceans, there were hints in
that direction: "tunnels under the ocean floor, man-made islands, ocean bridges, and ocean-
top airports and cities will all become hot topics in the next century."549
The point of rehearsing the Chinese navy's version of Waterworld meets Soilent
Green is that there no reason to believe that China's energy planners took the navy's energy
arguments any more seriously than its agricultural planners took its plans for introducing
algae into Chinese cuisine. Western military and strategic analysts have focused
overwhelmingly on the PLAN's arguments about oil because that was the credible element to
those individuals - though not to most Western oil analysts. The navy gained enough
influence within the government during the late 1980s and early 1990s to make the emphasis
on China's rights in the South China Sea a diplomatic priority. But as China's energy
demands actually began to outstrip its own production, reaching accommodation with the
Southeast Asian states began to take precedence over asserting maritime territorial claims.
548 Zhang Zhaozhong and Hu Jie, "Renlei Shengcun de Di'er Kongjian: Haiyang", Jiefangjunbao, September 15
1990.
549 WU Chungguang, Taipingyangshang de Jiaoliang: Dangdai Zhongguo de Haiyang Zhanlue Wenti (Beijing:
1998), 3.
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In other words, at the exact moment that analysts who explained China's naval growth
as a function of resource scarcity might have predicted maximum conflict, the navy's rhetoric
was instead reined in and international cooperation increased. Although China's energy
officials, like those of many other countries, hedge against uncertainty by exploring exclusive
contracts with willing partners, they have tended to emphasize purchase over ownership since
the beginning of reform and opening.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. The material interests of
the services explain some parts of this case, but also present riddles about several aspects of
the services' behavior.
Organizational interests do help explain the army's position during the early 1980s
and the relative silence of the navy immediately after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989. The
army's opposition to Deng and his domestic programs was probably heightened by a
realization, obvious to most after 1975, that Deng was intent on reducing the army's size and
prerogative and by the impression that his political position was vulnerable. The muted
nature of naval support for liberal reform between 1989 and 1992 may also be partly
explained by the navy's consideration of its organizational interests. When Deng Xiaoping
joined military and civilian conservatives in a pact to crush the democracy movement, the
movement's prospects for success edged from slim to almost none, and any open naval
defense of it would have simply damaged the navy's interests.
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But simple calculations of material interest fail to explain much about the services'
positions since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, even the navy's position between
1989 and 1992 cannot be adequately explained without recourse to discussion of a more
deeply rooted set of preferences. With little short-term prospects for the democracy
movement's success even during its best days - or any evidence that the navy would benefit
in any tangible sense from the movement even if it did succeed - individual naval officers
nevertheless participated in the movement. And even the navy's senior leadership proved
reticent in criticizing either the students or prominent liberal political figures like Zhao
Ziyang.
The navy's early support for Deng and his program are also difficult to explain in
terms of material organizational interests. Indeed, the navy's 1984 statement of support for
reform and opening included recognition and affirmation of the need for the navy itself to
undertake belt tightening measures. Expansion of the fleet was relatively slow during the first
several years of reform, and the expansion that did occur took place as other elements of the
organization, especially shore installations and construction units, were reduced dramatically.
Historically based fears of persecution at the hands of leftist radicals almost certainly
encouraged the navy to support liberal reform. But the navy was not substantially rewarded
for its loyalty to liberalism until after its political proclivities became clear.
The army seemed similarly more dogged in opposition to reform than calculations of
its material interests might suggest. Early opposition might have been explained as a response
to force reduction plans ordered by Deng. If so, those calculations backfired when Deng
352
Chapter 5: China
continued to win domestic battles and, exasperated by military intransigence, dropped the
priority on strengthening the military from third to fourth in the list of national tasks. While
this can be chalked up to miscalculation by the leaders involved, the army's continued
opposition to reform after the mid- 1980s raises more significant questions about why the
senior leadership did not make tactical compromises with Deng in exchange for greater access
to resources. Ultimately, army leaders proved far more committed to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
social, economic, and political values than did Deng, and they were not averse to taking
political risks to defend their preferences.
SUMMARY. Some parts of these competing explanations can be dismissed with
relative ease, while others do contribute to the fullest understanding of Chinese strategic
change after 1976. Material interests explain some tactical aspects of the services' behavior,
but they do not explain the services consistent political preferences during the two decades
following the Cultural Revolution. And strategic change cannot be adequately understood
without considering the political activities of the military services. Change did not come, or
at least did not begin, in response to a fundamental change in China's strategic position.
China's new leadership after the Cultural Revolution did have a very different view of
military efficacy than their immediate predecessors. But even their military theories cannot
fully explain the degree of emphasis placed on the navy after 1978. Rather, the navy received
special treatment because, unlike the army, it fully embraced reform.550
550 This thesis uses differences between armies and navies as a lens into the larger issue of differing perspectives
of all kinds of different military organizations. Although the thesis generally avoids discussion of air force
involvement in politics, it is worth speculating in this case on why the navy received priority over the air force.
The answer probably lies in the relatively greater cohesion of the navy after the Cultural Revolution. The air
force had experienced even more contentious politics during the Cultural Revolution than had the navy, and its
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Chapter Summary and Conclusions
Both Chinese cases support the theory. After the Korean War, the navy found common cause
with the relatively moderate technocrats then dominant in the Communist Party hierarchy.
The two groups shared interests in strong relations with the Soviet Union, the rehabilitation of
former Nationalists, and the stable development of industry and agriculture under a planning
system that nevertheless left some room for private production. Leftists in the Communist
Party and the PLA, who were relatively closer to the integral nationalism outlined in the
theory chapter, opposed both the technocratic management of the economy and the military
and sought both to continue the social revolution and to integrate military policy with
domestic social and economic policy. They were deeply suspicious of technocrats in the
military and considered the navy a particularly recalcitrant bastion of opposition to their
ideology.
During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's military lieutenant, led a
sustained leftist attack on the navy's leadership, practices, and values. During 1966, the first
year of the Cultural Revolution, civilian moderates successfully defended the navy. But after
those civilians themselves came under increasingly severe attack, Lin succeeded in
establishing a shadow command within the navy comprised of leftist officers transferred
directly from the army. Senior naval officers, however, remained bitterly opposed to the
leadership was decimated, confused, and disoriented after the experience. In the decade after 1976 it was a
significantly less useful partner to Deng than the navy, though it has since received greater attention from
political authorities. On the air force during and after the Cultural Revolution, see Allen, Krumel, and Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century.
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leftists' agenda, and several of them played prominent roles in the arrest of the Gang of Four
and the subsequent purges of the Gang's stronghold in the city of Shanghai.
Under Deng Xiaoping, the navy proved far more supportive of reform and opening
than most of the army. Army leaders were highly critical of economic reforms that they
argued strengthened bourgeois thinking, especially in China's rapidly developing urban areas,
and damaged the position of peasants in the countryside. Even many of army's leaders who
had opposed the Cultural Revolution - most of whom held technical portfolios - sought a
return to the pre-1966 status quo rather than the dramatic reforms envisioned by Deng. Moral
arguments, critical in Chinese power struggles, were mobilized by conservative army officers
to effectively block confirmation of two of Deng's proposed successors during the 1980s.
The navy supported virtually all aspects of reform and opening. It quickly purged its
ranks of leftist holdouts. Naval commanders published articles praising liberal reforms and
the need for rebuilding the economy before spending additional money on the military. Deng
rewarded the navy by promoting its leaders into key military and Party posts, as well as by
giving the navy priority in resource allocation. The navy was torn by the 1989 democracy
movement between loyalty to Deng and commitment to continued liberal reform. Naval
officers were overrepresented in the military ranks of those who apparently sympathized with
the movement, and the navy's political commissar refused to mobilize units for suppression
duties.
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CHAPTER 6: INDONESIA
Introduction
The domestic preferences of the services in Indonesia have been consistent with the
predictions of the civil-military coalition theory over most of the postwar period. The navy
backed liberal positions whenever there were viable liberal contenders for power, while the
army supported integral nationalist positions, especially those that protected the interests and
stability of the countryside. Regime change (defined by changes in domestic ideology and
structure) brought decisive changes in national military strategy and force structure - changes
that cannot be adequately explained by shifts in the nature or degree of threats facing the state.
This examination of military politics and grand strategy is divided into two cases:
* Case 1 (1949-1978): This case examines the services' preferences during the political
turmoil of the early independence period and the impact of these preferences on
politics and strategy.
* Case 2 (1978-2001): This case examines service positions under Suharto's integral
nationalist regime and the transition to a relatively liberal political order. It focuses
largely on events surrounding Suharto's overthrow and the ousting of Suharto's
Golkar successor, Habibie, as well as events under President Wahid.
The civil-military coalition theory explains much of what happened during both of
these periods (in terms of civil-military relations and strategic outcomes). On balance,
however, it explains more in the second case than the first. During much of the earlier period,
liberalism was an extremely weak force, complicating the task of observation and coding.
Chapter 6: Indonesia
Nevertheless, as the theory predicts, when there were viable liberal leaders contending for
power, naval leaders supported them. The army began the period divided on domestic as well
as military issues but ultimately coalesced around an integral nationalist doctrine that stressed
state-guided economic development and the integration of military and developmental
activities. The second case, which saw resurgent liberal forces contending for power against
an established integral nationalist order, provides a clearer test for the theory. As the theory
predicts, the bulk of the army backed the latter (integral nationalism), while the navy
supported the former (liberalism).
The two competitor theories, especially the services' material interests, help explain
parts of both Indonesian cases. It is, for example, impossible to understand the navy's close
relationship with Sukarno without considering its material interests. And the army's
resistance to liberal reform during the late 1990s was certainly consistent with a defense of its
privileges. On balance, material interests probably explain more aspects of the Indonesian
military's behavior than in the other cases examined in this thesis. But even here, there are an
equal number of instances in which the services acted with little apparent regard for their
budgets or manpower. And there is evidence that many, if not all, officers embraced and
acted according to larger principles, whether or not consistent with their services' material
interests.
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Case 1: From Sukarno to Suharto, 1949-1978
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS
This case looks at civil-military politics and strategic outcomes under parliamentary rule
(1949-1957), during the rise and fall of Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' (1959-1967), and
through Suharto's first two terms as president (1968-1978).
Under parliamentary government, the navy's Dutch-trained officer corps, together
with the handful of Dutch trained army officers, serving mostly in the army's general staff,
supported several liberal prime ministers, while other army officers, including many trained
by the Japanese during World War II, stood with socialists in opposition. As socialists came
to dominate the increasingly fractious parliament after 1953, the navy and Dutch-trained army
officers found themselves with little influence within the military hierarchy.
In 1957 Sukarno, who had been serving as a largely ceremonial president, declared
martial law and established a strong presidential system, justifying his actions primarily on
the ineffectiveness of parliament. Most officers from both the army and navy concurred. But
after Sukarno began pursuing confrontational foreign policies, many in the army began to see
his policies as a threat to the viability and success of their new civic action and development
programs. Although naval officers remained generally loyal to Sukarno, senior officers from
both the army and the navy opposed Sukarno's tilt towards communism in 1964, and after a
small group of communists civilians and military officers (from all three services) launched
an abortive revolt in 1965, the military began a pogrom that killed between 250,000 and
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1,000,000 suspected leftists. (Many Chinese and Islamists were also swept up in the purge.)
After destroying Indonesian communism, the navy favored leaving Sukarno in power with
restricted authority. The army, which had developed a coherent socio-economic ideology,
wanted to remove Sukarno and pursue its own integral nationalist program.
Ultimately, hardline anti-Sukarno army officers led by Suharto won the day and
ousted the President. Suharto became the head of state and established a developmental state
that, while admitting significant room for private enterprise, nevertheless stressed equity and
social stability, especially in the countryside. Notably, the end of Sukarno's confrontational
policies with the Dutch and British, as well as the new focus on development, brought smaller
army and naval budgets and a contraction of manpower and force structure for both. The
army ultimately traded the conventional ambitions of its Dutch-trained officers for the
economic and social roles preferred by its Japanese-trained officers and former militia. The
navy never embraced Suharto's developmental objectives, and Suharto's never trusted the
navy. He limited its strength throughout his thirty-year tenure and maintained force levels
below what even his own 'total people's defense' strategy appeared to require.
DOMESTIC POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Between 1949 and 1957 Indonesian politics operated under a parliamentary system within
which liberal leaders vied with socialist leaders (who shared many beliefs in common with
integral nationalism, as defined in chapter 3) for the direction of the state. Parliamentary
liberals relatively were strong between 1949 and 1953, while the socialists dominated from
1953 to 1957. "Liberal" and "socialist" were, in the contemporary Indonesian context,
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defined in relative terms: One economic historian observed that "Espousal of socialism as the
preferred pattern of economic organization had been an almost universal element in
Indonesian political ideology since independence." 55 1
Nevertheless, politicians associated with the moderate Islamic party, Masjumi, and the
Socialist Party (or PSI) proved relatively commercially minded, and they had the opportunity
to put their ideas into practice between 1949 and 1953.552 With the backing of the Masjumi
and the PSI, prime ministers Hatta (1948-1950), Natsir (1950-51), and Wilopo (1952-1953)
sought to impose fiscal discipline on the government, promote incoming foreign investment,
and, in the case of Natsir and Wilopo, expand the list of items that could be freely
imported.553 Despite the success of these relatively liberal leaders in the economic realm,
however, socialists and populists had won the political battle by late 1953, convincing most
voters that foreigners and Indonesia's own largely ethnic Chinese commercial class was
responsible for the nation's continuing poverty. Parliament was dominated by a shifting
landscape of socialist factions between 1953 and 1957 - none of which was able to solve or
even mitigate Indonesia's continuing economic problems.
551 Lance Castles, "The Fate of the Private Entrepreneur," in Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, ed. T.K. Tan
(Melbourne, Australia: The Jacaranda Press, 1967).
552 This paragraph is based on Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-1957," in The
Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings, ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).
Hal Hill, Foreign Investment andIndustrialization in Indonesia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Bruce Grant, Indonesia (Carlton South, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1964).
553 During this period relatively liberal cabinets alternated with socialist ones, with socialist prime ministers
following both Hatta and Natsir. Hence, Natsir and Wilopo spent much of their time undoing policies that had
been put in place by their predecessors.
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In 1957 Sukarno, the former leader of the Indonesian independence movement and
president from 1945 to 1967, declared martial law, and two years later he established a strong
presidential system under which he took effective power. Politics under Sukarno was more
stable but less democratic than it had been under his immediate parliamentary predecessors.
Defining Sukarno as more or less socialist than those individuals is difficult; he was certainly
more of a socialist than Hatta, Natsir, and Wilopo, but probably no more so than their
successors. 554 On the one hand, he nationalized Dutch enterprises when he took Indonesia to
war against Holland over the control of Irian Jaya in 1957 and did the same to British and
many American businesses during his war against the creation of an independent Malaysia
from 1963 to 1965. On the other hand, he introduced a series of liberalizing reform measures
in 1963, establishing a consultative body of national businessmen, selling some small
government enterprises to private entrepreneurs, and granting a variety of tax holidays and
other tax reductions for business.
Suharto's governing ideology was integral nationalist. Setting himself apart from the
Indonesian liberals, parliamentary socialists, and Sukarno, he made the consolidation of
"national resilience" (i.e., cohesion and unity) his first priority. He believed in strong state
leadership of the economy, but not complete state ownership. Like integral nationalists in
Thailand, Suharto's believed that the government had responsibility for developing the human
and material infrastructure of the countryside and that this should be a, if not the,
554 On Sukamo's economic policies, see T.K. Tan, ed., Sukarno's Guided Indonesia (Brisbane, Australia: The
Jacaranda Press, 1967) especially chapters by Peter Hastings, T.K. Tan, and Lance Castles. Bruce Glassburner,
ed., The Economy ofIndonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971) especially chapters by J.A.C.
Mackie and Ingrid Palmer and Lance Castles.
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government's major priority. Although the percentage of the economy owned by the state
increased under his rule, he was less enamored of large state owned industries (other than oil)
than was Sukarno and more committed to the growth of small industries. Finally, he sought
to reorganize society and government around explicitly corporatist lines, under which
functional groups representing different economic, professional, and religious groups would
received a fixed share of seats within parliament alongside representatives elected at large.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE SERVICES
When Indonesia achieved independence in 1949, its military officers were drawn from three
different sources: the pre-World War II Dutch-trained forces, wartime Japanese-trained units,
and laskar (militia) elements raised during World War II and the war for independence. 555
The services drew in very different proportions from each of these groups. And each group,
whether because of differences in the social class, the type and length of their military
training, or the circumstances in which they fought, approached domestic political issues from
a different vantage.
Most of the army's highest-ranking officers from 1945 to 1953 and from 1957 to 1965
were former officers with the Dutch-trained Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). Most of
these individuals were the sons of Indonesia's prewar aristocracy and, as such, had received
their pre-academy education through the Dutch-organized educational system. They all spoke
Dutch fluently, frequently using it among themselves, and were familiar with Western
555 Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia:
Oxford University Press, 1982). David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-
1983 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).
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political, economic, and social thought. But the KNIL ground force was small (30,000), and
only a small minority of its officers were Indonesian nationals.5 56 Hence its officer corps
could supply only a small fraction of the leaders needed to man the much larger post-
independence army, which numbered some 350,000 regulars and 470,000 irregular laskar
troops by 1949.
A second group of officers, and one that supplied most mid-level officers in the post-
1949 army, was trained by the Japanese during World War II to lead its indigenous Defenders
of the Fatherland (PETA, or Pembela Tanah Air) units. The Japanese had consciously chosen
its PETA officer candidates from families that were not part of the aristocracy or pre-war
Dutch establishment and were thus expected to be more loyal to their Japanese promoters.
(Some, like Suharto, had been KNIL NCOs and received further training and their
commissions from the Japanese; others were new recruits.) These individuals were largely
drawn from small towns and villages and were generally the sons of petty administrators,
clerics, or independent farmers.557 Given the background of these officers, it is not surprising
that they would later embrace the idea of remaking Indonesian society and breaking the hold
of its traditional elites.
556 On the Dutch defense strategy and force structure for Indonesia prior to the Japanese invasion in 1941, see
Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia.
557 In addition to the works by Sundhaussen and Jenkins, see Kurasawa Aiko, Nihon no Senryo-shita no Jawa
Noson no Yenyou (Tokyo: Soshisha, 1992). Shiraishi Takashi, Sukaruno to Suharuto (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho,
1997).
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Finally, the leaders of militia groups, or laskar units, represented the third source of
officers. These individuals tended to be bold young men of no particular social station from
Indonesia's 65,000 villages, and most had only the rudimentary education. Although of low
technical capabilities, this group remained a political force for a decade after the revolution.
But for the most part, this group's activism was limited to a collective effort to prevent
manpower cuts that would take their jobs before those of the other two groups.
What survived of the laskar in the longer term were its revolutionary traditions and
legends. The revolution was, for the most part, a guerrilla war, and the army performed better
than the revolution's civilian leadership, much of whom surrendered to the Dutch without a
fight. Apart from its dogged resistance, the army's leaders also highlighted its close
cooperation with "the people," by which they generally meant villagers who provided cover
and sustenance to guerrilla bands operating in the countryside. Although the army's KNIL
leadership provided much of the organizational and technical horsepower to see the revolution
through to its successful conclusion, the laskar legend lived and prospered. Ultimately, that
legend was inherited by, and rebounded to the benefit of, Japanese trained PETA officers,
many of whom had both wartime guerrilla credentials and the skills to survive in a smaller
and relatively more professional army.
The officer corps of the post-independence navy was more homogenous. The Dutch
had relied primarily on naval and air power for its pre-war defense, and its Indonesian
military establishment included a navy of three light cruisers, six torpedo boats, eleven
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submarines, as well a variety of locally manufactured craft.558 Neither the Japanese-trained
PETA nor the laskar forces included naval elements. Hence, from the time the time the
Republic of Indonesia's navy was mustered in August 1945, it was organized along Dutch
lines.559 And given the large size of the pre-war Dutch colonial naval structure and the very
small size of the postwar Indonesian navy - a few small captured Japanese coastal craft in
1945 with a destroyer and four corvettes added by 1951 - graduates from the Dutch Naval
Academy and Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi (Maritime College) could fill all important positions.
There was rivalry between the graduates of the two institutions, and officers belonging to the
former group tended to be better-trained and more professional in orientation than the latter.
But unlike the difference between the army's KNIL, PETA, and laskar officers, the
differences within the navy's officer corps, which was all KNIL, were of degrees, rather than
fundamental worldview.
SERVICE POSITIONS FROM SUKARNO TO SUHARTO, 1949-1978
The army was deeply divided throughout this period (especially before 1967). Relatively
liberal Dutch-trained army officers, led by Nasution (army chief, 1945-1953 and 1955-1962;
minister of defense, 1962-1965), were pitted against Japanese-trained PETA officers, who
leaned towards integral nationalist ideologies, for control of the organization's political and
military position. The navy was more unified and solidly liberal. The navy's leadership was
558 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia.
559 Global Security.Org, ALRI -- Navy of the Republic of Indonesia
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/alri.htm, [cited October 3 2002]).
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allied closely with Nasution and the army's Dutch-trained elite until the latter were purged
from the army in 1967.
PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS, 1949-1957. Prior to 1957, the army's KNIL leaders and
the navy were closely allied with relatively liberal parties (the Masjumi and PSI). Prime
ministers from or backed by these parties - including Hatta (1948-1950), Natsir (1950-1951),
and Wilopo (1952-1953) - kept the KNIL officer Nasution as the army chief of staff (a
position he had held since 1945) and lent their backing to his efforts to reduce the army's size,
give the military a more conventional orientation, and strengthen professional standards.
Hatta and Wilopo provided the modest resources necessary to gradually expand the navy,
which was led by the former KNIL naval officer and close associate of Nasution, Admiral
Subiyakto (1945-1959).
Former KNIL army and naval officers reciprocated by providing moral support for
these "liberal" leaders in parliament. This allegiance was not simply a quid pro quo
arrangement for material benefits. All of Indonesia's early liberal leaders maintained tighter
budgets, including military budgets, than did their socialist counterparts. And KNIL army
and naval officers backed Wilopo as solidly as they did Hatta and Natsir, despite the fact that
Wilopo cut the defense budget severely, from 2.6 billion rupiahs to 1.9 billion. 560
560 Nasution's biographer documents that this former KNIL general's political position derived largely from his
concerns about economic management. C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: A
Political Biography (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1985). There is, unfortunately, no
available record of Admiral Subiyakto's motivations.
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In contrast to the military's KNIL officers, former PETA and laskar army officers
joined traditional Muslim parties and the PKI in attacking the early liberals, especially Natsir
and Wilopo, as being too "pro-Western." Their most senior representatives also publicly
criticized Nasution for abandoning the military's revolutionary guerrilla tradition in his zeal to
create a professional conventional force. 56 With Nasution having reduced the army's size
from 350,000 in 1949 to 200,000 in 1953, and given his efforts in 1953 to reduce its size
further to 120,000, job security for many in this group was also clearly a consideration.
Nevertheless, criticism was heard from even relatively technically qualified PETA
officers, many of whom had made efforts to continue their military education and whose
positions were not under threat. These PETA officers continued to advocate people's war --
and military civic action programs - long after the KNIL officers were purged from the force,
the size of the force stabilized, and their own positions secured. In other words, they appeared
to be sincerely attached to an unconventional military doctrine based on the unity of the
military and the people, especially the nation's peasant base. Whatever their motivation - and
they were probably mixed - military and civilian leftist criticism forced Wilopo from office
and ushered in a new era of socialist politics.
The army's KNIL officers and the navy opposed the agenda established by
Indonesia's the new brand of politicians between 1953 and 1957, but they had few resources
with which to work. PETA officers were appointed to senior army positions - though
561 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967.
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Nasution, after having been retired in 1953, returned as the army's chief of staff in 1955. And
the navy remained, despite some modest expansion immediately after independence, weak in
both manpower and capabilities. It was primarily the internal divisions among parliamentary
socialists, as well as their inability to manage the economy, that made them vulnerable to
Sukarno's bid for less restricted presidential power.
THE SERVICES AND SUKARNO, 1957-1967. The fact that Sukarno, his immediate
predecessors, and his successor (Suharto) were all more integral nationalist than liberal
complicates the task of coding services preferences during this period. Nevertheless, Sukarno
differed from his predecessors and his successor in several important dimensions. The
services' responses to specific aspects of Sukarno's rule do provide some insight into the
validity of key elements of the civil-military coalition theory. Army officers coalesced during
this period around an ideology that placed the welfare and stability of the countryside above
all else, while the navy demonstrated more concern in this case with parochial interests and,
after 1965, with a defense of civilian political rule against an alternative model of military-led
economic and social development advanced by Suharto and other army officers.
In 1957 General Nasution and Admiral Subiyatko backed President Sukarno's
declaration of martial law - a move which gave Sukarno a decisive advantage in political
disputes with parliament and allowed him to restore a presidential system in 1959.562
Although Nasution had consistently warned against military dictatorship and the rise of Latin
562 The revolutionary government of the Republic of Indonesia had operated under a presidential constitution
between 1945 and 1949, when a new parliamentary constitution was adopted. In 1959 Sukarno restored the
original 1945 constitution.
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American-style strongmen, both Nasution and Subiyatko placed the needs political and
economic stability above a defense of the 1949 constitution. 56 3
But despite the temporary interservice unity among the most senior officers, a new
ideology was emerging among mid-level army officers in 1958 - one that would eventually
result in an open rupture between the army and navy in 1965. Revolts in western Java,
Sulawesi, and Sumatra from 1957 and 1958 strengthened the position of those army officers
who believed that the development of the countryside, especially on the outer (i.e., non-
Javanese) islands, was critical for maintaining Indonesia's cohesion. 56 4 Nasution and his
KNIL subordinates shared the concerns of their PETA colleagues about resource allocation,
development, and stability in the outer islands. But while the former clung to the idea of
simultaneously developing conventional and guerrilla force structures and doctrines, a group
of rising stars among the army's PETA officers turned their full attention to formulating
unconventional doctrines that would integrate developmental and defense objectives. The
intellectual leader of this group was Suwarto, an officer who had experience fighting Muslim
rebels in Western Java and whose ideas heavily influenced the thinking of other senior PETA
officers, including Yani (army chief of staff, 1962-1965) and Suharto (a lieutenant general
and commander of the strategic reserve, 1962-1965). Suwarto, serving as deputy commander
563 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967. There were seventeen cabinets,
one every ten months, between 1948 and 1958. And there were, at one point, forty-three political parties
simultaneously in existence. Grant, Indonesia, 39.
564 There were two major insurgencies. One was the Darul Islam revolt, aimed at establishing an Islamic state
and centered in West Java, Aceh (in northern Sumatra), and South Sulawesi. The second was the Permesta
rebellion (sometimes called the PRRI rebellion), which sought to maintain a federated system against Sukarno's
efforts at centralization and was centered primarily on Sulawesi and Sumatra. The Darul Islam revolt proved the
more difficult to suppress.
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of SESKOAD, the Army Staff and Command School, designed the army's civic action
program in 1961, and his belief in integrating the army and society down to the village level
later served as the basis for the army's doctrine of "total people's defense."
The emergence of this integral nationalist ideology led the army, especially Suwarto
and the adherents to his ideas, into increasingly bitter conflict with Sukarno. After Indonesia
gained its independence, the Dutch had held on to control of mineral-rich Irian Jaya, and in
1960, the president launched a war to recover that territory. After the successful conclusion
of that conflict in 1962, an emboldened Sukarno went to war in 1963 with Britain, Australia,
and Malaysia to incorporate Malaysia, which had just gained its independence from Britain,
into the Republic of Indonesia. Despite the fact that war swelled military budgets and the size
and influence of the army, Suwarto and a majority of army officers strongly opposed these
conflicts since they diverted national resources away from domestic tasks and army resources
away from civic action. During the Malaysian war, the army's leadership obstructed an
aggressive prosecution of the war. 56 5 Most army officers also saw Sukarno's increasingly
close relationship with the PKI after 1964, a move that was largely motivated by the need to
balance army opposition, as a threat to stability in the provinces. Nasution (then defense
minister) was viewed as too pro-Sukamo by most PETA officers despite the fact that his
efforts to represent the army's position led Sukarno to view him as disloyal and potentially
565 For the most part, the army simply refused to fight. The senior command also opened a secret liaison with
their Malaysian counterparts to ensure that few operations resulted in actual combat. Sundhaussen, The Road to
Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967, 173. Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 69-75.
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dangerous. Caught in the middle, he and his fellow KNIL officers were increasingly
marginalized.
The navy, on balance, moved in the opposite direction - towards stronger support for
Sukamo - between 1957 and 1964. The president's confrontational foreign policies and his
largesse towards the military benefited the navy significantly. In 1959 a group of relatively
young former Dutch marine officers (i.e., graduates of the Dutch Maritime College, as
opposed to Dutch Naval Academy), led by Rear Admiral Martadinata, maneuvered the
cautious Admiral Subiyakto (a Dutch Naval Academy graduate) out of his position as naval
chief of staff. 566 The navy's new leadership worked closely with Nasution on questions of
force structure and planning, but unlike the army's leaders, they vigorously pursued military
operations against Dutch Irian Jaya and Malaysia. By 1964, some junior naval officers were
demanding openly that the navy distance itself from Nasution, whom they regarded as an anti-
Sukarno figure.567
But while the navy supported Sukarno, its leadership nevertheless agreed with that of
the army in its anti-communism, and as Sukarno turned towards the PKI in 1964, naval
officers became more ambivalent about their support for the president. The PKI, for its part,
actively recruited within the military, finding some adherents, mostly though not exclusively
among the enlisted and junior officers in the air force, some army divisions, and the marine
corps. On September 30, 1965, a group of communist civilians and military officers, led air
566 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 97.
567 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967, 190.
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force elements and several battalions of army infantry in an attempt to sweep the military of
anti-communists. The group claimed it acted on rumors that a group of anti-communist army
officers were preparing its own coup d'etat against Sukarno. The September 30 group
captured, tortured, and killed six senior army generals and called on other units to join the
revolt. Ultimately, the rebellion failed. Surviving army leaders, together with the navy's
commander, Martadinata, agreed on the need to rid Indonesia of its communist organizations.
Between 250,000 and 1,000,000 suspected leftists were killed in the savage crackdown that
followed.
Having crushed the immediate threat from the left, however, the services differed on
what to do next. The navy favored leaving Sukarno in power with restricted authority. Some
in the army, especially its KNIL officers, agreed. But the army's PETA officers, especially
those associated with Suwarto and Suharto pressed for his replacement. 568 For one year, the
MPR (the congressional body which had replaced parliament in 1959) held effective power
while Sukamo remained as a figurehead president and the army lurked in the background. In
March 1967 when Suharto threatened to upset this new equilibrium by formally deposing the
president, the navy mobilized forces in eastern Java and Jakarta, threatening military action
should Suharto act. Suharto was able to mobilize superior forces, however, and the navy
relented.569
568 Ibid., 227-28.
569 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 217.
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THE SERVICE AND SUHARTO, 1967-1978. Under Suharto's New Order, the army
turned Suwarto's integral nationalist ideology into doctrine and adjusted its command
structure and force deployment patterns accordingly. Suharto also adopted the ideology as a
national doctrine for the economic and social development of the state. The navy did not
embrace the nation's new developmental priorities and found itself starved of funds.
Suharto's regime was clearly integral nationalist. His domestic, military, and foreign
policies were all designed to build what he called 'national resilience' and to minimize the
'primordial loyalties' that he and other army leaders believed threatened to pull the country
apart. 570 The biggest difference between the Suharto and Sukarno governments lay in the
relative balance between industry and agriculture. Sukarno, with Soviet backing, focused on
building heavy industry and largely ignored agriculture. Suharto promoted government-run
development projects designed to improve rural infrastructure. And his industrial policies,
embodied in his first five-year economic plan (1969-1974), emphasized smaller scale projects
and the growth of those industries with forward and backward linkages to agriculture. 571 In
some senses, Suharto pursued more orthodox economic policies than Sukarno. A new foreign
investment law in 1967 loosened restrictions on FDI. But the state sector of the economy
grew under Suharto from 13 percent in 1968 to 41 percent in 1983.572 And after 1974, FDI
570 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia.
571 Hill, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia, 11.
572 Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order (London:
Routledge, 1998), 56. While some of this growth was due to the growth in the oil sector and the rise in oil prices
during the 1970s, oil alone does not explain all of the increase.
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was once again tightly restricted - a policy change undertaken largely in response to pressure
from integral nationalist army officers.573
The army fared much better than the navy under the New Order. The navy and air
force were starved of funds, and their officer corps were disproportionately affected by the
purge that Suharto claimed was designed to eliminate leftists from the force but that was more
obviously meant to eliminate opponents. In 1969 Suharto subordinated all of the services to a
central military command structure dominated by army officers. Service commanders
(renamed "service chiefs of staff') lost their command authority, which was reassigned to the
armed forces general staff and territorial commanders, as well as their ministerial status.
The army's remaining Dutch-trained officers resigned or were pushed from the service
shortly after Suharto's accession. PETA officers, who dominated the military until the 1970s
and 1980s when most retired, were the primary beneficiaries. Under PETA leadership, the
army effectively abandoned the idea, long-cherished by its former KNIL officers, of building
a conventional military. Suwarto's integrated social, political, and military ideology was
elevated to official doctrine, not just for the army, but also for the entire military
establishment. Part of the new doctrine was dwifungsi (dual function), under which the
military would perform social and political functions in addition to its military ones.574
Dwifungsi underpinned the army's expectation that it would have direct representation in the
573 Hill, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia. On the army's role, see Jenkins, Suharto and His
Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983.
574 This was an idea that had gained currency among army leaders after 1958 but did not become espoused as
official doctrine after 1966.
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MPR (congress), but it also gave the army a responsibility to integrate its military doctrine
closely with the government's social and economic policies and undertake extensive civic
action programs.
The military rationale for dwifungsi lay in the concept of the "total people's defense"
doctrine, a guerrilla defense strategy that also became official doctrine in 1966.575 Under total
people's defense, the territorial forces were to be closely integrated with local populations,
upon which they would depend for sustenance during any extended guerrilla campaign
against invaders. The importance of the territorial force was highlighted by promotion
patterns that favored officers with service in the territorial force.576 A social and political
staff, functioning alongside and at an equal level with the general staff and commanded by an
officer of equal rank, was included at each level of the hierarchy down to the Kodim (or sub-
sub-region, of which there were 271 in the archipelago). 5 77 The civic action program was
expanded to include village-level activities by virtually all army units. Military doctrine
dictated that one sergeant and one assistant be posted in every one of Indonesia's 65,000
villages, an ideal that was never fully achieved in practice because of manpower limitations,
but which nevertheless indicated an extraordinary commitment to local presence. 578 In an
effort to promote national unity, the army's also emphasized balanced ethnic representation
575 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 3.
576 The elevation of the territorial forces within the military hierarchy is one of the clearest ways in which pre-
and post-1966 doctrine diverged. Nasution was instrumental in creating the territorial defense structure, but
under his conception, these would be largely irregular forces, while the army's elite would be centered on the
central reserve. Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967, 39.
577 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Ilndonesia, 184-86.
578 Ibid., 167. Throughout most of the New Order period, the army was held to about 180,000 men.
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within its own ranks - even at the expense of maximizing the corps' technical qualifications.
During the Suharto years, Javanese officers never comprised more than 45 to 50 percent of
the senior officer corps, approximately replicating the Javanese share of the general
population. 579
The army embraced integral nationalist doctrines and, broadly speaking, supported
Suharto - despite the fact that Suharto slashed military budgets and the army's force structure
immediately after taking office. Given Suharto's origins in the army and the fact that his own
political thinking was derivative of the army's larger ideology, the general accord between
Suharto and the army is not terribly surprising. Suharto, however, was more a consumer of
the army's new ideology than the intellectual force behind its creation. Many in the army
remained more true to Suwarto's original formulation of integral nationalist doctrine than did
Suharto. In 1974, for example, the army's leaders mobilized Jakarta's poor in a series of anti-
Japanese riots that forced Suharto to back away from the liberalization of foreign direct
investment inflows. The army remained suspicious of foreign direct investment and domestic
market structures, constraining Suharto's room to maneuver throughout his presidency.
The navy never embraced Suwarto's integral nationalist ideology, and its relations
with the regime were strained. It is true that Admiral Sudomo, one of Suharto's close
personal associates since the two served together in 1961, did serve Suharto loyally in the
important post of commander of Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and
579 Approximately 55 percent of the general population is Javanese. Figures are based on semi-annual
compilations of biographical data on Indonesian military elites conducted by the editors of Indonesia (a semi-
annual journal covering Indonesian history and politics published by Cornell University).
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Order (or KOPKAMTIB), one of the highest intelligence organizations in the state.580 But
throughout the New Order period, the navy as an institution continued to appeal for more
conventional military doctrines, failed to embrace civic action, and continued to stress
technical qualifications over balanced ethnic representation in its officer recruitment. The
navy's focus on technical qualifications ensured that the overwhelming majority of senior
naval officers (between 85 and 90 percent) were, in sharp contrast to those of the army, drawn
from Java. 581 And in the late 1970s, naval and marine officers were over represented among
the retired military general officers participating in the dissident Foundation for the Institute
of Constitutional Awareness, a group that called for less military involvement in politics and
other restrictions on the military's dual function. 582
STRATEGIC CHANGE
In 1949, at the end of Indonesia's war for independence, the military consisted of 350,000
regulars and 470,000 laskars (militia), with firearms for only a fraction of the force. Under,
early, relatively liberal prime ministers, the army's force size was cut substantially, while a
navy and an air force were assembled. By the end of 1953 the army's size had been cut to a
total of 200,000 and the foundations laid for transition to more conventional doctrines. The
navy acquired one British destroyer, four Australian corvettes, and a force of forty smaller
580 Sudomo was the commander of naval forces in Suharto's Mandala Command for the liberation of West Irian
in 1961 and the two developed a rapport. Sudomo then road Suharto's coat tails to important posts thereafter
and spearheaded Suharto's purge of the navy after 1967. See Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian
Military Politics, 1975-1983, especially pages 23-27, 147.
581 Editors of Indonesia, various years.
582 The institute included four naval and marine officers, representing 33 percent of the total group of twelve
military figures. At that time, naval officers comprised about 8 percent of the military's officer corps. Jenkins,
Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983, 102-12, 237.
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patrol craft. Under Wilopo (1952-1953), plans were formulated for further reductions in the
army's size and its continued transformation into a more professional and conventional force.
But military cuts left little money for new equipment. Under the socialists who followed
Wilopo, defense budgets were increased, but little went to the navy or the other high-tech
arms. Hence, neither under Wilopo (whom the navy supported) nor under his successors
(whom it did not) did the naval force structure expand.
During Sukarno's wars with Holland over Irian Jaya and with Britain over Malaysia,
defense budgets - and the manpower and equipment inventories of all the services - increased
dramatically. The size of the army ballooned from 200,000 to 290,000, and the navy's
manpower from 10,000 to 40,000. In addition to new fighters and bombers for the air force,
Indonesia purchased a host of warships from Italy and the Soviet Union (mostly the latter).
By 1966, the fleet included one cruiser, eight destroyers, ten frigates, twelve submarines, as
well as numerous smaller craft. Indonesia had deployed anti-ship missiles at sea and was
establishing facilities for the production of anti-aircraft missiles in Eastern Java. The navy's
commander, Admiral Martadinata, apparently expected continued growth and development,
stating in an interview that naval strength was only 40 percent of "that needed for the security
of Indonesian waters."583 But already, in the words of one analyst, "Indonesia was qualified,
at least on paper, as a second-class military power." 584 In the regional context, this was
certainly true. Indonesia's surface fleet was larger, newer, and more coherent than was
China's.
583 "Indonesia's Armoury," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1 1962.
584 Grant, Indonesia, 99.
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Under Suharto's New Order, military budgets were cut sharply. Army manpower was
cut from 290,000 in 1966 to 200,000 in 1974 to 180.000 in 1979. Force planning was
adjusted away from a doctrine that combined conventional and guerrilla defense - but sought
to gradually strengthen conventional forces relative to guerrilla ones - toward a strategy that
gave pride of place to guerrilla forces. The force structure provided an alternative means of
defense to the more conventional force pursued by Sukarno while simultaneously serving the
needs of policing the state and developing the social and material infrastructure in the
countryside. The army's civic action programs were greatly expanded, taking more military
budget away from strictly defense functions but giving it a framework within which it could
participate in building a stronger social and material infrastructure in the countryside.
But while the army was willing and able to refashion itself to serve new political
priorities, the navy was not, and it suffered more severely as a result. The navy's effective
combat strength was more heavily affected than that of the army. Within five years of
Suharto's accession, the cruiser, destroyers, and many of the submarines were paid off, as
were many smaller craft. As one Australian observer remarked, "The fall of [Sukarno's]
instant navy was almost as abrupt as had been its inception." 58 5 By 1979 naval tonnage had
dropped to less than a third of what it had been in 1965. More important from the political
vantage, the marine corps, which had stood at 14,000 in 1965, was reduced to 5,000 by the
mid- 1 970s - a drop that was proportionately much sharper than that suffered by the army.
585 John Moore, "Indonesia's Navy", Defense and Foreign Affairs, February 1989, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
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SUMMARY OF CVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
This case provides modest support for the civil-military coalition theory. The ambiguity of
the case is found primarily in the navy's support for Sukarno, a socialist (and therefore closer
to the ideal type integral nationalist than liberal nationalist). But by the time of Sukarno's rise
there were no liberal choices. The navy did support the liberal option from 1949 to the mid-
1950s, when such an option was available. Later, given a field dominated by integral
nationalists of various stripes, the navy appears to have made the choice for Sukarno based
largely on its material interests. But while the navy backed Sukarno, there is no evidence to
suggest that the navy shared Sukarno's affinity for the PKI - or the PKI's preference for
radical economic and social policies. Overall, the evidence on the navy side is mixed.
The army's political economic preferences between 1949 and 1978, as well as the
internal differences within the army, accord relatively well with the civil-military coalition
theory. The army showed early concern for the unity - or "resilience" - of the state. Its
leaders developed a well-articulated integral nationalist ideology that emphasized the
balanced development of the state. It also acted on this ideology, even though that meant
forgoing the budget increases of the Sukarno years and later swallowing leaner budgets under
Suharto. And although there were no discernable differences between line and staff or
technical officers per se, there were differences between former KNIL officers, who had a
relatively high degree of technical training and who tended to do more technical work
(including staff work), and former PETA officers, with less technical training and tasking.
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Coalitional politics, in which the services were sometimes central actors on opposite
sides, help explain strategic change at critical junctures. Sukarno, in a bid to balance what he
understood was growing opposition to him within the army, threw additional resources at the
navy and air force. And the dramatic and disproportionate downsizing of the air force and the
navy under Suharto, as well as the elimination of former KNIL army officers, were conducted
with an eye towards the effective elimination of threats from within the military, a point on
which contemporary observers and historians agree. 586
EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. It would be difficult to argue that military
policy reflected the objective level and type of military threat facing the state throughout this
period. Domestic separatist movements remained strong until at least 1961 - several years
after Sukarno's conventional (and outwardly oriented) military buildup began. Although
rebellions subsequently occurred in individual regions from time to time (especially during
the mid-1970s), the immediate domestic threat was significantly lower during Suharto's New
Order than it had been during the early years of Sukarno's Guided Democracy - yet doctrine
and force structure became less conventional and more centered on guerrilla defense. Hence,
if the strategic military environment is to explain the timing and direction of strategic change,
it must rely more on major differences in the analytical frameworks used by national leaders
586 See, for example, Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Moore, "Indonesia's Navy".
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to assess threats than on objective conditions. Suharto saw the state as more fragile than did
Sukarno and thus favored more domestically oriented military strategies. 587
But different analytical frameworks and threat perceptions cannot explain all of the
strategic change that took place during this period. The speed with which Suharto moved to
build down the strength of the navy and air force, for example, indicates a likely desire to
limit the domestic military capability of those services. The navy could have been of use
against domestic rebellions; it had been instrumental against domestic revolts during the late
1950s and early 1960s. And even if we assume that Suharto preferred a ground based strategy
because ground forces could be used more readily for civic action, this preference would still
not explain why the marine ground forces were cut substantially more than even the army's
strategic reserve elements.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Parts of this case
offer evidence that material interests influenced the behavior of the services, but material
interest cannot explain important aspects of the services' behavior. Sukarno's largesse
towards the navy almost certainly helped seal the navy's support for him and its subsequent
opposition to his complete removal from office. The material incentives were large,
especially relative to the navy's contemporary size and scale. The navy was given carte
blanche to import major new systems from the Soviet Union. And at the time, there was no
serious ideological alternative. Hence, although the navy ultimately proved itself an enemy of
587 This preference, however, itself provides a measure of support for the civil-military coalition theory, since
both his preferences and his ability to become president derived from his experience in the army.
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the Indonesian Communist Party, it was willing to support Sukarno, despite his ties to the
party. Material interests do a relatively poorer job of explaining the navy's support for early,
liberal governments (which cut aggregate military budgets and afforded only gradual
expansion of the fleet), as well as its refusal to fall in line behind Suharto and his strategic
approach after his consolidation of power (especially given the limited prospects for his
removal).
A simple material interests-based theory explains relatively less of the army's
behavior during this period. The army turned against Sukarno early in his tenure, despite an
expanding army budget and force structure. It was the army's refusal to take Sukarno's
material bait that led Sukarno to offer those same incentives - money, equipment, and power
- to the navy. The army could have gained even more than it already had from the war with
Malaysia. It is difficult to understand the army's position without recourse to its evolving
integral nationalist ideology. In part, that ideology was born of the social origins of the PETA
officers and their experience in revolutionary warfare, but it was reinforced and refined by the
conditions of service in Indonesian army and the types of social issues affecting the army's
soldiers and those in their areas of operation.
Ulf Sundhaussen, one of the most careful historians of the Indonesian military during
the 1950s and 1960s, argues that the army's corporate interests "do not seem to have played a
significant role in the army's gradual widening of its non-military roles.... The overthrow of
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Sukarno led, for the first few years, to savage cuts in the military budget."588 Those cuts
were, he adds, predictable. The army did gain some stability in its political status and position
under Suharto. But interestingly, there was more dissent within the officer corps about having
a formal political role under Suharto's New Order than there was about the army's role in
civic action programs - a considerably less lucrative activity. Parliamentary seats proved
appealing and lucrative to some and were regarded as divisive by others, but the army's social
role was embraced by virtually the entire army's officer corps. 58 9
Case 2: From Suharto to Wahid, 1978-2001
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Although there were few direct challenges to Suharto's rule between 1978 and 1997,
economic and social actors seeking liberal reform grew in size and potential political power
throughout the period. Shortly after the Asian financial crisis struck Indonesia in late 1997,
protesters began demanding political and economic change, setting up a showdown between
liberal interests and entrenched integral nationalist ones.
The army was divided in 1997 and 1998, with some officers providing a stubborn
defense of his regime and others pleased to see him stumble. After Suharto's resignation in
588 Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967, 262.
589 Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983. Much of this debate played out
at SESKOAD, where the army's integral nationalist ideology had originated. Ostensibly, the military's political
role derived from its role within society. As an important social actor, it should also have political voice. The
dissenters within SESKOAD, however, believed that seats in parliament would make the military a partisan
institution. Better, they believed, for it to maintain a latent political force that would only enter politics to
adjudicate disputes that could not be otherwise resolved and then once again withdraw into reserve. None of the
officers in this debate, however, believed the army should end or reduce its social role, however.
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May 1998, some in the army supported changes in the military's dwifungsi (dual fimction)
doctrine. But the army's senior leaders and most of the officer corps sought to preserve the
central elements of the state structure, as well as the military's role within it. In other words,
even most of those in the army who did not want Suharto, nevertheless wanted Suharto's
system with a different man at the top. After Suharto's resignation, the army backed his vice
president and chosen successor, B.J. Habibie. And after Habibie was forced from office by
parliamentary and societal opposition in October 1999, senior army leaders pursued a variety
of strategies to obstruct the passage and implementation of liberal economic and political
reforms under the country's new civilian leadership. Liberal leaders have accused dissatisfied
army officers with throwing in their lot with hardline Islamists in an effort to undermine the
stability of the new regime, and there is at least some evidence that this has in fact taken
place.
The navy, on the other hand, embraced changes in domestic political and economic
structures, as well as military reform. While the army was torn during the anti-Suharto
protests in May 1998, the navy was united - and its marines were sent to march with and
protect student protesters. And unlike most dissidents within the army (of whom there were,
in any case, fewer), the navy did not simply wish to replace the man at the top while leaving
the system in place. In November 1998, when parliamentary opposition to Habibie gained
momentum, naval marines again protected students - this time against a more determined
army assault. Naval officers in parliament defected from the government party to Megawati
Sukarnoputri's liberal Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI). These actions did not go
unrewarded. After Habibie's fall, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's first democratically
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elected president in half a century, selected the navy's chief of staff, Widodo Adisutjipto, to
serve as the nation's first ever non-army commander of the military. The navy's strength,
especially that of the marine corps, was rapidly built-up and used to protect the new civilian
regime, while Widodo and other navy officers spearheaded military reform and lent their
moral support for civilian political and economic reform.
THE DOMESTIC CHOICES
A brief period of liberal reform, between 1983 and 1993, punctuated Suharto's reign. Before
and after this period - and for the most part during it - the government and economy were
organized largely integral nationalist lines. The political structure was explicitly corporatist,
with both social and economic entities grouped into peak organizations and incorporated
systematically into political structures. The concentration of domestic industry in large
conglomerates tied to the government allowed economic bureaucrats to focus available
resources on the development of indigenous technological capabilities. Enormous resources
were devoted to the development of an Indonesian automobile, an Indonesian shipbuilding
industry, and an Indonesian aircraft. The fact that most of these technology projects turned
out to be a colossal waste of public funds does not change the ambition behind them. The
government undertook concerted and only somewhat more successful efforts to break down
the "primordial loyalties" of ethnic groups and foster "national resilience." The army's civic
action programs were part of this effort, as was the promotion of internal migration and the
brutal repression of opposition movements.
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The Suharto regime was, of course, corrupt and self-serving, but it was also, by many
measures, reasonably successful in increasing the welfare of the people. Suharto and his
relatives managed to siphon off billions of dollars, largely through their involvement in state
controlled monopolies. Salaries for government officials, including military officers from all
of the services, were left at almost subsistence levels, with the built-in expectation that these
individuals would have additional sources of income. Corruption was endemic to the system.
Yet at the same time, the regime did produce solid economic growth, in marked contrast to
those of Suharto's predecessors (and to a lesser extent his successors). And it contained,
partly though not entirely through force of arms, the fractious impulses of Indonesia's outer
islands. Many, both at the center of the system and even some outside of it, believed that the
system's integral nationalist principles were correct and functional, even if the application of
those policies was far from perfect.
It was not, however, universally admired, even within Indonesia. During the 1980s
and early 1990s, Suharto was forced to make a number of economic concessions to private
industry and some political concessions to the growing middle class. But economic reforms
were only partial and incomplete, and both political and economic liberalization was largely
reversed by the mid-1 990s. Having tasted political influence and its derivative economic
gains the middle class was restive and moved into active opposition in late 1997 when the
East Asian financial crisis exposed Suharto's vulnerability.
Until the 1980s, oil revenues were used to keep Indonesia's domestic conglomerates
solvent. During the 1980s, however, oil prices collapsed and with them, the government's
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ability to subsidize major heretofore state-backed firms. In the face of rising costs, the
consumers of intermediate goods produced by these conglomerates, mostly smaller private
firms, demanded easier access to foreign parts and materials. Suharto needed the foreign
exchange generated by these downstream producers, and in 1983, he began a series of liberal
economic reforms, relaxing some restrictions on foreign imports of raw materials and capital
goods and, to a lesser extent, foreign investment. 590 During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
liberal economic reforms continued. Some political and social opening also occurred. Under
this "tropical glasnost," press restrictions were partially lifted, new parties were permitted,
and government interference in the affairs of existing parties was lessened.59 l
Reform, however, remained tenuous, and it was ultimately reversed almost
completely. In 1994, with investigative journalists increasingly digging into official
corruption and mismanagement, the most outspoken newspapers and magazines were shut
down, while the remainder faced new restrictions. And since the conglomerates run by or
connected to the state were critical to Suharto's political survival, reforms favoring private
enterprise could not be pushed to the point ofjeopardizing the their survival. By the early
1990s some new economic policies were more anti-liberal than not, making the net direction
590 On the logic and course of economic liberalization between 1983 and 1993, see Richard Robinson,
"Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of
Indonesia," World Politics 41, no. 1 (1988). Rizal Mallarangeng and R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1995: The
Struggle for Power and Policy," Asian Survey 36, no. 2 (1995).
591 See Jacques Bertrand, "False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in
Indonesia," Pacific Affairs 69, no. 3 (1996). Bertrand dates political reform from 1989 to 1994. The phrase
"tropical glasnost" comes from Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia in 1990: A Foreshadow Play," Asian Survey
31, no. 2 (1991): 179.
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of change difficult to ascertain.59 2 The 1997 financial crises forced Suharto to make tough
choices. Although he did, out of necessity, make some concessions to the IMF, his main
impulse was to re-embrace economic nationalism.
Having grown in size and power tfor several decades and having benefited from liberal
reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s, the middle class was loath to retreat. Even after
rapid expansion, Indonesia's middle class was relatively small, representing only four percent
of the population by the early 1 990s. 593 But the middle class was concentrated in Jakarta and
Surabaya and made up a sizable percentage of the population of those cities. The Democratic
Party of Indonesia (PDI) represented middle class interests, and the PDI and its leader,
Megawati Sukarnoputri, were becoming more determined in resisting state intervention in its
party affairs.59 4 The Nahdlathul Ulama (NU), once a traditional Islamic party, was also
592 Habibie was appointed Minister of Technology in 1990, and as his power grew in subsequent years, he
sponsored technology-development projects that cost billions, drained funds away from private enterprise, and
required closing new areas of the economy to protect newly targeted high-tech industries. Mallarangeng and
Liddle suggest that the momentum shifted in 1993. Mallarangeng and Liddle, "Indonesia in 1995: The Struggle
for Power and Policy," I1.
593 Leo Suryadinata, "Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia," Asian Survey 37, no. 3
(1997): 270. The four percent figure cited here includes only "professional and technical" workers and
"managers and administrators." Other, more inclusive, estimates put the figure as high as seven percent.
Whichever is closer, the relatively small size of the middle class is partly a function of Indonesia's poverty.
Indonesian GDP per capita in 1996 was $1,420 (in 1999 dollars), about that of Thailand in 1980. Historically,
the composition of the middle class has compounded the problem of its small size. The commercial class has
traditionally been dominated by ethnic Chinese, who depend on the state for their physical protection. However,
state policy since at least 1974 has favored the development of indigenous capitalists and technicians - even as it
has included an important place for the Chinese - and the ethnic Malay middle class has grown steadily.
594 Although Megawati began her political career echoing her father's concern for the Indonesian downtrodden,
her party became the rallying point for the middle class during the 1990s. When the PDI published its
"Framework for Indonesian Economic Recovery" in 1999, its focus was overwhelmingly liberal: the sale of state
assets, improving transparency and openness, macroeconomic stabilization, anti-inflationary measures, and the
strengthening of independent judicial institutions. "Megawati's Master Plan for Indonesia", United Press
International, July 29 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS. On the PDI's support base, see also "Time for Golkar to be in
Opposition", The Jakarta Post, June 25 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
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transformed by the late 1980s into largely urban and commercial party (along the lines of the
old Masyumi party).595 These two parties, which represented coherent and relatively liberal
alternatives to the governing Golkar party, were well positioned to take advantage of the
national mood of dissatisfaction in late 1997.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY
The rise of a viable opposition and the increased fluidity of politics after late 1997 confronted
Indonesian army and navy leaders with a number of critical domestic choices. Both services
had evolved considerably since they had last been confronted with equally momentous
decisions during the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, most of that evolution had
institutionalized characteristics that already differentiated the two services. Here, I touch
briefly on the characteristics of military organizations that I suggested in Chapter 3 tend to
differ between services and shape contrasting domestic priorities and preferences.
Capital requirements. Ground forces have more choice than navies in how they
calibrate the balance between material and human capital in their force mix (given the same
expectation of effectiveness relative to likely competitors). Suharto's economic strategy,
which required that the lion's share of foreign exchange be devoted to technology and capital
595 Prior to Suharto's overhaul of the political system in 1971, parties representing liberal (abangan) and strict
(santri) Muslim vied with Christian and non-religious parties in parliament. After 1971 these were consolidated
in the United Development Party (PPP), a party that Suharto controlled through largesse and cooptation. In 1984
Wahid became chairman of the Nahdlathul Ulama (NU), a largely rural, traditional (santri) organization, and led
it out of the PPP. Wahid expanded the urban base of the party, which then became known as the only
independent Muslim organization with significant political strength and began to attract a broader range of
Muslim supporters. On these events, see Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the
New Order. Grant, Indonesia. On the number of NGOs, see Suryadinata, "Democratization and Political
Succession in Suharto's Indonesia," 271.
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acquisitions for quasi state-run civilian firms, left very little for weapons acquisition and
affected naval capabilities more than army ones.
Under Suharto, the army made a virtue of necessity by strenuously emphasizing the
importance of human capital in its military doctrine and de-emphasizing the role of weapons
and weapons systems. The extent to which its "human preference" has been incorporated into
a coherent ideology is illustrated by the fact that it has, on occasion, rejected equipment
acquisitions even when it was capable of financing them. For example, helicopter assault
forces, which might be considered extremely desirable for an archipelagic nation facing
insurgent movements, were resisted on ideological grounds. Helicopter forces "symbolized to
some an excessive reliance on technology to overcome what were perceived to be societal and
political problems." 596
Capital limitations - especially limitations on foreign currency spending - have been
far more problematic for the navy. Even when the country was flush with foreign reserves,
Suharto's economic policies made very little available to the military, and the navy had been
forced to coordinate even its limited weapons purchases with the regime's broader program
for national development. For example, the navy was forced to buy used East German
corvettes during the 1990s, instead of purchasing new frigates or destroyers. The navy was to
be allotted $1.1 billion by B.J. Habibie, then ministry for science and technology, for
refurbishing the ships in Indonesia. The government's rationale was that this would allow
596 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 90.
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Indonesia to simultaneously boost both its industrial and naval capabilities. Ultimately,
Habibie diverted much of that money for the development of Indonesia's shipbuilding
infrastructure, and little was spent on upgrading the ships themselves. The corvettes, then,
added little if anything to Indonesia's naval capabilities. 597
Officer origins. The two services continue to draw their officers from very different
sources. The majority of officers in the navy are graduates of Indonesia's four-year military
academy. Only around one fifth of the army's officers are academy graduates, with another
fifth joining through an ROTC-type program and around three fifths promoted from the
ranks.598 This very large group of army officers promoted through the ranks (via an Officer
Candidate School system) represents a broader cross-section of society than any other elite
component of the state. And even the army's academy cadets are drawn from across the
archipelago, effectively requiring affirmative action given the poor educational infrastructure
on many outer islands. This relatively democratic (but only partly meritocratic) approach to
officer selection contributes to the army's sense that it is a "people's army." The navy makes
no such pretensions. Vice Admiral Rudolf Kasenda, who served as the navy's chief from
1986 to 1989 and was fluent in Dutch, English, Russian and had training in several countries,
including the United States, may have been unusual for the breadth of his knowledge and
597 Ibid., 25.
598 Ibid., 118. In 1998, the academy graduated 333 army officers and 200 naval officers. With only 14% as
many personnel as the army and 60% as many academy graduates, the navy has four times as many academy
graduates per capita as the army. For 1998 academy graduate numbers, see "President Habibie: Clear Thinking
to Dampen Social Turmoil", Kompas Online, December 18 1998.
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cosmopolitan background even among his naval colleagues. 599 But he was less unusual in the
navy than he would have been in the army. The navy continued to select its officer candidates
based on math and other aptitude scores, producing an officer corps drawn overwhelmingly
from Java.
Enlisted recruiting and enlisted-officer relations. NCOs and their enlisted
subordinates in the Indonesian military - both army and navy - are professional in the sense
that they all serve long-term, generally on 20-year contracts. Nevertheless, there are
significant differences in the recruitment of those individuals, and those differences have an
effect on how the officers of each service see economic and social problems. The army
recruits its territorial forces locally, ensuring that its enlisted ranks, like its officers, are drawn
from a broader cross-section of Indonesian society than the navy, which worries more about
the technical capability of its enlisted personnel and offers special terms to technically
qualified individuals. 600
Contact with foreign officers. As in the case of many other states, the navy in
Indonesia, despite having only 10 percent of total military manpower (excluding the marines)
has more contact with foreign militaries and military officers than any other service. Its
exercises with both Singapore and Malaysia are primarily naval. Until 1993, only the navy
599 "Leadership Profiles: Vice Admiral Rudolf Kasenda, Navy Chief of Staff, Indonesia," Defense and Foreign
Affairs (1989).
600 "Special terms" include, most prominently, shorter seven-year contracts. Lowry, The Armed Forces of
Indonesia, 119.
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participated in joint exercises with Australia.60 ' After signing of the Mutual Security
Agreement with Australia in 1995, the scope ofjoint exercises expanded to include all
service, but naval cooperation continued to provide the central element. Although tensions
over East Timor caused military-to-military ties to be suspended in late 1999, Indonesian
naval exchange students remained in place there. 60 2 Ties with the United States were also
affected by events in Timor, but before the suspension of official contacts, up to fifteen U.S.
warships a year visited Indonesian ports, providing opportunities for Indonesian and
American naval officers to meet and mix.
SERVICE POSITIONS
The institutional characteristics discussed above helped shape very different domestic
preferences following the series of domestic crises that have unfolded since the Asian
financial crisis of 1997. The current discussion of the service's preferences and behavior is
broken into three sections: a brief review of the services' political positions prior to late 1997;
the period from November 1997 to Indonesia's first free elections in October 1999; and the
period from October 1999 to the present. Together, these cover Indonesia's transition to a
more liberal political and economic system, as well as the years before and immediately after
that shift. During the years covered by this case, especially after 1997, service positions were
clear: the army was resistant to liberal reform, while the navy was far more receptive to it.
601 Ibid., 42.
602 On the navy's call, see "Indonesian Navy Sends Positive Signal to Australia", Mandiri, February 25 2000, in
FBIS-SEP-2000-0225. In addition, the navy's chief of staff, unlike his army counterpart, called the rapid
resumption of ties.
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SERVICE POSITIONS FROM 1978 TO 1997. There was some evidence of naval
dissatisfaction prior to 1997, though there was little to suggest the major gap between the
services' domestic preferences that became apparent after that time. In light of events during
and after 1997, the most important lesson from the immediate preceding period may be that,
in the absence of acute political crises, intra-military differences are frequently difficult to
discern - even when later events prove them substantial.
Well before 1997 the army was divided between those satisfied with the status quo
and those who wanted to distance the military as an institution from Suharto's regime. Much
of the debate within the army revolved around how to define dwifungsi - the military's
doctrine of "dual function." Under dwifungsi, the military had both a military and social
function. The army was, according to the doctrine, a legitimate social actor. It had a right
and responsibility to participate in'development projects, especially in the countryside, and
few in the military questioned its involvement in local administration.
The debate within the army centered on what the implications of dwifungsi were for
the military's national political role. Between 1978 and 1983 reformist officers in the Army
Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) argued that the army should not be involved in day-
to-day political issues. And specifically, it should not be tied to Golkar, the ruling party
controlled by Suharto.60 3 Involvement in Gokar, dissident officers argued, made the military
a partisan force. The army should, rather, sit above the partisan fray and only assert a
603 The most detailed source on this dissident movement is Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian
Military Politics, 1975-1983.
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political role as the arbiter of last resort. But while this pro-reform group within SESKOAD
opposed the idea that dwifungsi should involve them directly and continuously in national
politics - and especially tie the military as an institution to Suharto - they did not question the
idea that the military had a social or even political role.
By 1983 Suharto was able to contain the reformists' momentum within the army by
removing dissident officers from important posts, especially within SESKOAD, but he was
unable to root out all individuals with sympathies towards the group's general agenda.
During the 1990s, Suharto found a new group of supporters within the military by promoting
santri (or strict) Muslim officers, who had hitherto been marginalized within the military
hierarchy and subsequently depended on him for patronage. By the time of Suharto's political
demise in 1997, there were three factions within the army: a "red and white faction" (taking
its name from the colors of the Indonesian flag) of pro-reform nationalist officers; a "green
faction" comprised of santri Muslim officers; and a group of old school Suharto supporters
who had more personal ties to the president.
All of these groups held values that were, to one degree or another, consistent with
integral nationalism. Those officers with the ideology closest to the ideal type position were
members of the "red and white" faction. These officers believed that the state had an
important role in national development and that the army had an important role within the
state and its developmental program. Their complaint with the existing system lay in the
army's active support for the ruling party at the national level. The "green" (Islamist) faction
represents a bastardized form of integral nationalism in which a clerical order would embody
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a national egalitarian order. Its failure to accommodate Indonesia's religious minorities in the
faction's plans was (and remains) potentially divisive rather than unifying and did not,
therefore, fit entirely within the integral nationalist rubric. But their goal was to redefine
Indonesia as a spiritually homogenous society with Islam as a core aspect of the nation. The
faction's thinking may therefore be seen in a larger sense as a corrupted variant of the integral
nationalist ideology. 60 4 Probably the most distant from the integral nationalist ideal type were
the old school Suharto supporters, who appeared to be motivated at least in part by reasons of
personal profit but who nevertheless could and did rationalize their support for him on
ostensibly integral nationalist grounds.
There were several signs of naval dissatisfaction with Suharto prior to 1997. Retired
naval and marine officers were prominent among the reform-minded officers' groups between
1978 and 1983 and were over-represented in the dissident Foundation for the Institute of
Constitutional Awareness, which grew out of the army's SESKOAD-based reform
movement. 60 5 And the navy also continued to push for doctrinal change, suggesting in 1993
604 This kind of sectarian partisanship is not uncommon among those who might otherwise be described as
integral nationalists. The definition of core national values is likely to result in the exclusion of some groups
who might find it more difficult than others to be define their beliefs in ways consistent with those values.
Peron's efforts to include Christianity in core state values resulted in the exclusion or alienation of Jews and
other non-Christians. And Phibun's efforts to emphasize Thai language and values resulted in the
marginalization of Thailand's sizable Chinese minority. In some cases, the exclusion of certain groups may be
the inadvertent but ihevitable result of an effort to define core national values, while in other cases, there may be
a conscious decision to define national values in opposition to some group against which many in the state will
rally. Those efforts may be particularly successful when the excluded group or its religion or ideology can be
portrayed as a foreign implant. In the Indonesian case, Christianity can be attributed to European colonization -
conveniently ignoring the fact that all but animist religions were, at one time or another, brought to Indonesia by
conquering empires.
605 Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983, 102-12, 236-37.
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that an archipelagic defense strategy should be adopted as Indonesia's official doctrine. 606
There was also some evidence that the navy and liberal groups found common cause during
the mid- 1990s. It was the 1994 campaign by Tempo, Jakarta's most outspoken liberal weekly
magazine, to expose corruption by associates of B.J. Habibie in the purchase of the East
German navy's fleet that led Suharto to end his experiment with free press. The navy had
been opposed to the purchase, and the article reflected the navy's dissatisfaction. In 1996,
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, then a prominent member of the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI)
and later a liberal member of parliament, publicly criticized Suharto's grand strategy,
suggesting that more emphasis should be placed on maritime defense.60 7 Given Dewi's
outspoken calls on other occasions for an end to military involvement in politics, her
advocacy of naval strategy may have been as much motivated by politics as by strategic
logic.608 But whatever differences the navy had with Suharto's system - and these differences
were quickly revealed as substantial after 1997 - they were relatively well hidden before the
financial crisis of that year exposed the president's vulnerability.
606 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 30.
607 In a widely publicized seminar on military strategy, she delivered an address in which she quoted a retired
rear admiral whom she suggested might not have felt free to speak out publicly, saying, "Indonesia is a maritime
continent with extensive waters," but "we are virtually naked there." "Threat Seen to Future Access to Markets
and Resources", Antara, November 8 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-1108. Although LIPI was nominally under the
control of Habibie, it had a reputation for independent thought. In February 1998, 19 researchers from LIPI
issued a "statement of concern" over the country's political and economic situation. Habibie condemned their
actions as political and warned them to maintain their "professionalism." "Habibie Warns Researchers Over
Statement", Kompas (Internet), February 11 1998, in FBIS-FTS- 1998-0211.
608 During a conference on democratization hosted by LIPI in August 1998 Dewi called on Indonesians to seize
the moment and reduce the military's involvement in politics. "Expert: Indonesia Has Weak President, Troubled
Economy", The Jakarta Post, August 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS- 1998-0813.
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THE SERVICES FROM 1997 TO 1999. Differences in the domestic preferences of
the army and the navy became more apparent after August 1997, when the East Asian
financial crisis brought new hardships and anti-government rallies to Indonesia. The navy
welcomed the challenge to the existing order, putting marines on the streets to protect student
protesters before and after Suharto's fall and later joining Megawati's PDI in its effbrt to oust
Habibie. The army proved divided but generally resisted change, and it attempted to suppress
student demonstrations both before and, especially, after Suharto's resignation, inflicting
significant casualties on several occasions.
In August 1997 the Indonesian Rupiah began to slip against the dollar, causing rapid
inflation, and in February 1998, students held their first protests in the capital. In March,
retired marine Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, the chairman of the reformist "Petition 50"
group, became the most established figure to call for Suharto's resignation.6 09 On May 12
four student protesters from Jakarta's Trisakti University were shot and killed, sparking riots
that lasted several days. The army appeared undecided about how to respond. Its
commander, General Wiranto, first threatened students with tough action but later sounded
more accommodating. Other army generals continued to threaten students with a "second
Tienanmen." 61 0 Naval and marine officers, on the other hand, took a significantly more
609 The "Petition 50" group was founded in 1980 by fifty'retired senior military and civilian officials. See
Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983, 162. On the activities of Ali
Sadikin and the group in 1998, see "Megawati, Other Political Activists Meet", Kompas (Internet), January 16
1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0115. "Petisi 50 Criticizes Suharto's Speech", JakartaPost, March 7 1998, in FBIS-
FTS-1998-0309. "Indonesian Dissidents Support Protests", Kompas (Internet), May 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-
1998-0512.
610 "'Tienanmen Threat' Halts Rally", The Nation, May 21 1998.
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accommodating line, and marine soldiers escorted student marchers after May 12.611 On May
18, 1998, with student protests growing across the country, a group of sixteen retired military
leaders presented a letter demanding Suharto step down. Of the four general rank officers
who signed the petition in Surabaya, two were naval officers. 6 12 Three days later, with his
government in disarray, Suharto announced his resignation.
In the uncertain weeks and months following Suharto's fall, the navy's support for
reform became stronger, more visible, and increasingly distinct from the army's position.
Vice President Habibie was sworn in to serve out the four years and ten months remaining of
Suharto's five-year term. Student groups continued to protest, now supporting Megawati's
call for Habibie to declare himself a caretaker and call new MPR elections under competitive
rules. Retired marine Lt General Ali Sadikin once again remained active in the democratic
movement, speaking to student groups and lending an aura of respectability and authority to
the student cause.6 13 (He was arrested for sedition in December of 1998 614) In early October
1998, naval and marine officers in parliament defected en masse from the ruling Golkar party
and joined Megawati's DPI, while the majority of the army's delegates remained with
Golkar.6 1 5
611 "Riots Follow Peaceful Jakarta Protest", Washington Post, November 15 1998.
612 "Anti-, Pro-Suharto Protests Reported", Suara Pembaruan, May 19 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0519.
613 "Students Stage 'Largest' Demonstration in Jakarta", Media Indonesia (Internet), September 24 1998, in
FBIS-FTS- 1998-0923.
614 "Two Indonesian Dissidents to Face 'Conspiracy' Charges", Medan Waspada (Internet), December 11 1998,
in FBIS-FTS-1998-1211.
615 "164 ABRI Retirees Join Pro-Megawati PDI Camp", Media Indonesia (Internet), October 4 1998, in FBIS-
FTS-1998-1004.
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In October the standoff between increasingly hardline army elements and recalcitrant
student groups was building to a climax. At the end of September, Habibie rejected
Megawati's demand for early elections and instead called for all military personnel to take
"firm action" against "rioters and looters." While the army, air force, and police chiefs of
staff were all present to hear Habibie's call, as were the commanders of all the major
territorial commands, Naval Chief of Staff Widodo was conspicuously missing, as he was said
to be "preparing for celebrations to mark maritime day."6 16 The army began moving
paramilitary units into Jakarta. Student protesters turned out by the thousands when a special
session of the old, unreconstructed MPR (parliament) was held November 10-13 to determine
the timing and procedures for subsequent elections. Early on the morning of November 13,
after two days of clashes between military units and students, Minister of Defense and
Security, General Wiranto, warned: "Soldiers assisted by civilians will face and take stern
action against anyone or any group which blatantly violates laws or the constitution."6 17
Hours later, army and police units began firing on the crowds, said to number some 50,000.618
At least a dozen students were killed and hundreds injured on November 13 alone.61 9
616 "Habibie Orders ABRI to Take Firm Action Against Rioters", Radio Republik, September 24 1998, in FBIS-
FTS- 1998-0924.
617 "Megawati's Sister Rejects MPR Session", Rajawali Televisi Indonesia, November 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-
1998-1112.
618 Ron Moreau and Dorinda Elliott, "They are Cruel, Cruel," Newsweek, November 23 1998.
619 Over the two days (November 12-13), fourteen people were killed and 448 injured. Almost 200 were still
hospitalized on November 17. "Death Toll From Jakarta Unrest Put at 14", Radio Republik Indonesia,
November 17 1998, in FBIS-FTS- 1998-1117. One of the killed may have been a soldier killed on November 12,
while the remainder were probably all students killed the following day.
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With the democracy movement facing suppression, marine forces once again
intervened to protect prostesting students. The navy had already prepared for this
contingency. In mid-October, it had reinforced its own presence in the capital with ten
additional marine companies (for a total of 41 companies).6 20 On November 14, the day after
army and paramilitary troops fired on the protesters, more than one thousand students,
accompanied by a company of marines, marched on the parliament building. Clearly
indicating prior coordination, the marines marched behind the six student leaders but ahead of
the main student body. On reaching the parliament building, the marines deployed
themselves in a protective shield between the students and other security elements present on
the scene.6 21 The navy also deployed additional aircraft in the capital and warships in the
Jakarta harbor.
On November 18, 1998 Habibie agreed to hold new elections no later than June of the
following year, but the government continued to spar with parliamentary opponents and their
student backers over the terms of the elections, the role of the military, and the structure of the
state. The army remained deeply divided but generally opposed to any compromise on
fundamental issues with the opposition, while the navy and marines appeared to welcome
620 "Marines Chief Denies Issuance of New Operational Order", Televisi Pendidikan, November 15 1998, in
FBIS-FTS- 1998-1115.
621 "Students with 60 Marines Allowed to Reach Parliament", Hong Kong AFP, November 14 1998, in FBIS-
FTS-1998-1114. One marine was shot in the leg by police mobile brigade soldiers, after which the police mobile
brigade (perhaps alarmed at the possible consequences of their own actions) quickly retreated, ceding the field to
the students and their marine escorts. "Marine Shot in Firing, Students Return to Jakarta Streets", Hong Kong
AFP, November 14 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1113. "Wiranto: 'No Order' To Shoot Protesters; Probe Ordered",
Radio Republik Indonesia, November 14 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1114.
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change. The army's commander, General Wiranto, denied that he had issued orders to use
live ammunition on November 13, 1998 and initiated an investigation into the events of that
day. But even if he had not issued the orders (a major unknown), Wiranto's own
pronouncements and actions frequently reflected a deeply ambivalent, and sometimes an
outright hardline, position vis-A-vis the protests. In December 1998 he announced the
creation of a controversial civilian militia - a body likely to be less disciplined even than the
army in the use of force - to help maintain order.622 On February 6, 1999, he held a press
conference to clarify the results of an ABRI (Indonesian military) leadership meeting held two
days earlier. He announced, "The ABRI declares war against all forms of riots."
Thenceforth, he stated, orders to shoot rioters on the spot would be implemented throughout
the Republic of Indonesia.62 3 The vacillation in Wiranto's position between 1997 and 1999
almost certainly reflected deep divisions within the army itself, as well as some degree of
personal ambivalence.
The navy and marines, meanwhile, demonstrated no such ambivalence, reveling
instead in their popularity among students, liberal legislators, and the population at large. The
navy looked for ways to accommodate political pressures for change and maintain order
social simultaneously. According to news reports, easily identifiable marine corps NCOs and
officers, wearing distinctive red berets, crouched over maps with student leaders plotting
622 "Jakarta to Start Recruiting Civilian Militia in January 1999", Media Indonesia (Internet), December 13 1998,
in FBIS-FTS-1998-1213.
623 It is probably true that Wiranto was more ambivalent than reactionary. He was probably pulled towards a
reactionary response by the need to maintain the unity of the armed forces, particularly the army. The press
conference discussed here is reported in "The Armed Forces Declare War", Kompas (Internet), February 7 1999.
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routes of march. 624 In contrast to army officers who faced a hostile press corps and seemed
dazed by the dilemmas in which they found themselves, senior naval and marine commanders
basked in questions about their successful crowd control tactics. In a November 1998 press
conference, Rear Admiral Suyadi thanked the public for its display of goodwill towards the
navy and marines. 625 Ten months later, a full year after their initial reinforced deployment,
marines on the streets of Jakarta still maintained an easy and cordial relationship with the
students - even as those same students occasionally clashed violently with other elements of
the security forces.626
New elections for the MPR were held in June 1999. The governing Golkar was
defeated, and the dominant opposition parties prepared to select a new president on October
22. Even before Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president, however, the navy had become
the unofficial guardians of Indonesia's new democracy. On September 1, the marine corps
announced that it had been tasked by parliamentary leaders with securing the upcoming MPR
general session.627 After Wahid's election, the navy became a major element in the
President's coalition, protecting him from threats emanating from reactionary elements in the
military and providing internal military leverage on constitutional and legal problems related
to the military.
624 Moreau and Elliott, "They are Cruel, Cruel."
625 "Marine Shot in Firing, Students Return to Jakarta Streets". For reporting a similarly upbeat press briefing by
the marine commander, see "Marines Chief Denies Issuance of New Operational Order".
626 "Security Forces Teargas Students in Jakarta", Detik, October 14 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1014.
627 "Marines Being Prepared to Secure MPR General Session", Antara News Agency, September 2 1999, in
FBIS-FTS- 1999-0901.
405
Chapter 6: Indonesia
THE SERVICES UNDER WAHID, OCTOBER 1999 TO JUNE 2001. On October 22,
1999 Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the moderate Islamic party, Nahdlathul Ulama (NU),
was sworn in as president. Several days later he announced his cabinet, which included
Indonesia's first civilian defense minister, Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, a former University of
Indonesia professor of political science. Given the events that led up to the June 1999
elections and Wahid's accession, the new president and his defense minister probably would
have relied disproportionately on the navy for domestic military support and protection even
without further evidence of an army-navy divide on domestic preferences. But Wahid came
to office with an ambitious liberal reform agenda. The army's opposition to these measures
and the navy's support - especially on Wahid's desire to create a federal system from a
unitary one and privatize government businesses - worked to confirm the navy's position as a
potentially valuable ally in reform.
President Wahid promoted naval officers to the top of the military hierarchy. The
short list for the TNI's new commander included two individuals, both naval officers:
Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto (then the military's deputy commander) and Admiral Akhmad
Sucipto (then the navy's commander). 62 8 Widodo was chosen. Widodo and Defense Minister
Sudarsono then engineered the appointment of naval officers and (in lesser numbers) air force
officers to key positions that had been held by army officers throughout Suharto's reign.6 29
Wahid also chose several naval officers as personal aides. Naval officers worked to neutralize
628 "Wahid Likely to Sideline Army", The Australian, October 26 1999, in Lexis-Nexis.
629 Editors, "Changes in Civil-Military Relations Since the Fall of Suharto," Indonesia, no. 10 (2000): 126.
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military opposition on domestic political and economic issues; defend the president against
coups d'etat; maintain order in areas where the army or army elements might allow domestic
disturbances to fester; and lead military reform efforts designed to give the president clearer
legal authority over that institution.
Positions on political and economic reform. After Wahid's accession, the army found
itself at loggerheads with the president on a broad range of issues. Two that were more
domestic than strictly military included the debates over federalism vs. the unitary state and
privatization of the economy. On both issues, the navy was significantly more supportive of
the president's position.
Wahid's preferred plan for resolving the problem of separatism in the outer islands
was to transform the unitary republic into a federal one - though he was cautious about his
use of language in broaching the idea. In a December 1999 interview he stated, "The idea of
giving the people full autonomy, which is not very different from the federal system, can be
accepted.... We need a kind of federal state - in nature, but not in word." 630 Most army
officers were fiercely opposed. General Wiranto (then Coordinating Minister for Politics and
Security) said, "The form of the unitary Republic of Indonesia is final." He suggested that the
Wahid's comments on federalism - and specifically Wahid's plan to hold a referendum in
Aceh on the question of making it a federal state - were the president's personal opinion and
630 "Wahid Gives Insight Into Political Strategy", Yomiuri Shimbun, December 22 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
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did not represent state policy.631 The army's spokesman, Major General Sudrajat, also voiced
opposition, "(We) should not keep mentioning the idea of federalism, because we have
experimented with the idea in the 1950s and it's not in line with our values." He added that
the president's statements in support of federalism were personal and had not been made "as
president." 632 (Wahid himself had made no such distinction.) Lieutenant General Agus
Widjojo, TNI's territorial chief, argued that "a change in the state's system and structure will
only enlarge the problem."6 33
Although naval leaders did not publicly support federalism per se, they did
consistently back the president's softer line on regional issues, including greater autonomy for
areas with long running separatist movements. In November 1999 Admiral Widodo argued,
"The problems of Aceh are interconnected and cannot be solved from the security angle....
The proper way would be through communication to create a more conducive and positive
atmosphere, which will hopefully allow for a dialogue."6 34 In May 2001, he explained that
military measures in Aceh could only be one part of the government's approach, which also
must include "early enactment of the law on special autonomy for Aceh, the supremacy of the
law, [and] the rehabilitation of conflict-affected Aceh."63 5 Rear Admiral Freddy Numbery,
631 "Aceh: Jakarta's Big Headache," Asiaweek, November 26 1999.
632 "Indonesia Armed Forces Warn Against Federalism", AFX, November 17 1999.
633 "Indonesian Military Accepts Federalism", The Straits Times (Singapore), December 7 1999, in LEXIS-
NEXIS.
634 "Indonesia's Widodo Says to Soften Aceh Security Policy, Suggests Dialogue", AFX, November 4 1999, in
LEXIS-NEXIS.
635 "Military Chief Calls for Proportional Measures to Deal with Separatist Movement in Aceh", Antara, May 3
2001, in Lexis-Nexis.
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serving as Wahid's State Minister for State Apparatus Reform, lent support to the president's
conciliatory policies by admitting that the military had been involved in human rights abuses
in Irian Jaya (an unusual admission among military officers) and urging a less heavily military
approach in the future.
The navy was also more inclined to support liberal economic reforms and corporate
privatization than the army, despite the fact that the navy, like the army, was involved in
quasi-state enterprises. After coming to office, Wahid's Finance and Economics Coordinating
Minister, Kwik Kian Gie, strongly supported cooperation with the IMF, and he used the 1998
agreement with that organization as a template for economic reforms designed to steadily
privatize state companies and encourage the return of foreign capital.636 The army was among
those groups most strongly opposed to privatization, and army officers were used to walk in
and intimidate managers at the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).63 7 The
army's self-image provided some rationalization for army opposition, enabling the individuals
involved to believe that more than self-interest was at stake. Army officers justified their
involvement in business as necessary to "indigenize" the economy - i.e., use joint ventures
with ethnic Chinese businessmen to promote the development of indigenous Indonesian
management.63 8 Widodo and the navy, on the other hand, explicitly called for an end to the
636 "Politics Gets in the Way of Indonesian Economy", Straits Times, April 3 2000. Wahid also appointed an
Investment and Privatization Minister.
637 "Indonesia's Hasty Survival Strategy," Business Week, October 16 2000.
638 On this point, see the assessment of the army's self-rationalization for business involvement in "Gus Dur
Struggles to Control TNI", The Jakarta Post, September 28 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
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military's dual function and said that the military should focus exclusively on defense against
foreign threats and phase out internal security duties.6 39
The navy's role in regime protection, domestic stability, and military reform. Both
Wahid and his defense minister, Juwono, were well aware of service differences on domestic
preferences. They set about to use the navy and naval officers to protect the new regime from
the possibility of an army coup d'etat and what they (probably rightly) regarded as the larger
threat of army-engineered instability and a creeping coup d'etat - i.e., the threat that the army
would foster or permit instability in the expectation that civilians would then once again
desire or invite the military to play a larger political role. Juwono also turned to the navy to
promote and implement reforms within the military that they hoped would ultimately modify
the domestic capabilities and preferences of the army.
(1) Deterring a direct seizure of power by the army. Modem Indonesian history
records few military attempts to seize power outright through coups d'etat.640 And if army
officers did plot coups against Wahid during his reign, none moved to action. But, faced with
a military establishment that was used to sharing power, precedent alone offered little comfort
639 "Widodo Wants TNI to Shed Political Role", The Hindu, April 21 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
640 The two cases that might plausibly be defined as attempted or real coups d'etat (as traditionally defined) are
the communist-connected revolt on September 30 1965 and Suharto's seizure of power two years later. In the
former case, however, it was unclear that the rebels intended to assume power themselves or merely eliminate
military opponents they thought might launch a pogrom against Indonesia's communist organizations. And in
the latter case, it was unclear if the troops which frightened an already spooked Sukarno into ceding his power
were deployed as part of conscious plan by Suharto, or whether he simply took advantage of the president's
predicament. (The troops involved wore no insignia and were never identified.) But despite the paucity of
coups d'etat as strictly defined, there have been several groups of officers who have demanded concessions on
specific issues.
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to Indonesia's first democratically elected leader in over forty years. Rumors of military
plotting and coups d'etat spread through Jakarta several times during Wahid's presidency, at
one time becoming serious enough that U.S. and Australian officials publicly warned
potential participants against such a move.6 4 1 The army's attitude, reflected in its public
pronouncements, was not particularly reassuring. When Wahid attempted to remove a pro-
status quo army general, Sudradjat, as TNI spokesman in late December 1999, he refused to
stand down, and army officers explained his refusal on the grounds that it was "not certain yet
whether the President was in the right state of mind" when he made the order. 64 2
Certainly, Wahid and his advisors took the possibility of coups d'etat seriously from
the first days of his presidency, and the navy was an important part of their plans for deterring
a coup. Less than a month after taking office, Defense Minister Juwono appealed to the
political parties to develop mechanisms for civil control of the military and warned of a
Pakistan-style military takeover should they fail.643 Two weeks later, he announced that the
marine corps would be expanded from two brigades to three (six battalions to nine). Marine
manpower would be increased 77%, from 13,000 to 23,000, suggesting that it's support
elements, including both mobility and firepower, would be enhanced far beyond the number
641 "U.S. Warns Indonesian Forces Against Coup", Australian Business Intelligence (ABLI), January 17 2000, in
LEXIS-NEXIS. On rumors of coups, see also "TNI: A Loose Cannon", The Jakarta Post, January 3 2000. Seth
Mydans, "Indonesia Army Chief Says He Opposes a Coup", New York Times, February 5 2000. "Reforming the
Military", The Jakarta Post, October 13 2000. Coup rumors circulated in, at least, January and February 2000,
when Wahid was considering removing Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Security, and in October 2000,
when he was considering making additional personnel changes.
642 "Can the Soldiers Still Call the Shots?" The Straits Times, January 2 2000.
643 "Sudarsono Warns Politicians of Pakistan-Style Takeover", Antara News Agency, November 22 1999, in
FBIS-FTS- 1999-1122.
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of maneuver elements. In keeping with its expanded organization, the marine corps
commander was promoted from two-star rank to three-star rank, putting him on par with the
commander of Kostrad (Central Reserve) and above the two-star commanders of Kopassus
(Special Forces) and the Java Kodam commander.64 4 And, highlighting the fact that marine
corps growth was not simply part of a larger expansion of centrally available reserve forces, it
was announced that Kopassus would be cut from their current level of 6,000 troops to just
over 5,000.645
The marine corps, especially in its expanded form, was a powerful deterrent against a
coup by any military force except perhaps by several major commands acting together. Apart
from the navy's marine corps itself, the three commands with easy access to Jakarta include:
Kopassus (the Special Forces), Kostrad (Central Reserve troops), and the Java Kodam
(Military Area Command).6 46 Counting only maneuver elements (infantry and armor), special
forces command totaled four battalions, central reserve had twenty-three battalions, and the
Java military area command had five. While the central reserve maintains more battalions
than the marines, its personnel strength, 27,000, is not much greater than that of the expanded
644 "TNI AL Marine Corps to be Strengthened by 10,000 Pers", Republika (Internet), December 9 1999, in FBIS-
FTS-1999-1208. A more recent report suggests that the marine corps may actually triple in size over the next
five years. "Indonesian Military Plans to Add Personnel/Arsenal", The Jakarta Post, February 11 2000, in FBIS-
SEP-2000-0211.
645 One report suggests that Kopassus might be reduced to 1,000 men. While not very credible, even the fact that
such rumors may be making the rounds suggests a major reversal of fortune for the Special Forces command.
"Wahid Moves to Seal Power", The Australian Financial Review (Internet), February 29 2000, in FBIS-AFP-
2000-0228. The 5,000-man figure was reported on CNN international, March 9, 2000.
646 Kusnanto Anggoro, of Jakarta's Center for Strategic and International Studies, has also made this point. "Gus
Dur's Statement Does Not Rattle TNI", Kompas (internet), February 9 2000.
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marine corps will be.647 Moreover, much of the central reserve force is on rotation to the
outer islands at any given time. Although the same may be true of the marine corps, the
navy's control of the sea would give the marines an advantage in a fight for Jakarta. And of
course, naval warships and aircraft might provide additional direct support during operations,
especially along the coastal areas of Java.
In addition to expanding the marine corps, Wahid also used navy and air force officers
on his personal staff to provide him with intelligence on domestic military threats. This was
apparent during his final confrontation with Wiranto. Wahid announced Wiranto's removal in
February 2000 while the president was on a 17-day tour of Asian and European capitals.
With coup rumors rife, Wahid made it clear that he was tracking Wiranto's movements and
activities in minute detail.6 48 This information almost certainly came to him via two trusted
officers - one navy and one air force - who accompanied him on his trip.64 9 During Wahid's
stop in Seoul, a Korean daily wrote that "Wahid's place in politics seems firm as his nation's
air force and navy is standing by him, weakening the defiant Indonesian army's power." 650
647 On force strengths and deployments, see Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 85-101.
648 The president, for example, announced the specific house address where Wiranto had met informally with
military supporters and suggested that such meetings were inappropriate. "Indonesia: Wiranto Suspension Poses
Questions", Jawa Pos, February 16 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0216. "Indonesia: Those Behind Wahid", The
Jakarta Post, February 29 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0229.
649 The first of these individuals was a naval intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Juanda, with whom the
president had enjoyed a close relationship for many years. The second was Air Rear Marshal Budy Santoso,
Wahid's military secretary. "Gus Dur Dismisses Reports of Daughters' Influence", The Jakarta Post, February
19 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0219. Santoso's role has been criticized by Islamic politicians and journalists.
"Mounting Criticism of President's Advisers", Republika, February 10 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0210.
650 "Economic Issues Dominate ROK, Indonesian Presidents Summit", Yonhap, February 10 2000, in FBIS-KPP-
2000-0210.
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(2) Defense against a creeping coup d'etat. The navy was also used to help prevent a
slow motion (or creeping) coup d'etat - i.e., to minimize the probability that the army might
be able to selectively exacerbate the security situation in such a way as to create the
conditions for its own return.
Most Indonesian analysts have regarded the danger of a creeping coup as being greater
than a simple seizure of power. While the army had been largely discredited among
significant segments of the population, the commitment by the Indonesian people to civilian
rule may not be as deeply rooted or immutable as it is in many other countries. According to
a 1997 survey of Jakarta's middle class, 81% of respondents opposed the military's dual
function. But fully 57% believed that "in emergency situations such as civil war and
separatist rebellion," the president should be an active military figure.6 51 In an interview in
Jakarta at the end of December 1999, former Army Chief of Staff Rudini said that if the
situation in the country becomes chaotic, "the TNI [military] will take over security
responsibility." A reporter's follow-up question - unanswered by the officer - asked, "What
will happen if the TNI itself creates a chaotic situation?"6 52
There is a long history of manipulated crises in Indonesian civil-military relations,
including several documented and several other suspected examples. Suharto almost certainly
manipulated and supported a broad network of well-organized groups in March 1966
651 "Kompas Opinion Poll on Armed Forces Image", Kompas Online, October 4 1998. The wording of the actual
survey questions was not reproduced in the article itself, so there is some uncertainty about specifics.
652 "Former Indonesian Army Chief Rules Out Military Coup", Detik (Internet), December 31 1999, in FBIS-
FTS-1999-1230.
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pressuring President Sukamo to cede additional powers to the military in the hopes of
securing, among other things, his own personal safety. 653 In 1974 General Sumitro
engineered riots by Jakarta's poor against Japanese investment in part to undermine Suharto
on economic issues around which the army and civilian integral nationalists agreed.6 54
Although the facts of more recent cases remain murky, the anti-Chinese riots across Indonesia
in May 1998 appear to have been orchestrated by army elements, perhaps to discredit liberal
student protests occurring simultaneously. And the material support provided by the
Indonesian special forces for the East Timor militias' depredations in 1999 was probably
calculated as much to send a message to Habibie about making decisions (in this case on
autonomy) without consulting the army as it was to intimidate separatists.
Since early 2000 a new combination of forces has emerged with considerable potential
to affect a creeping coup d'etat. The threat derives from a loose alliance between hardline
Islamic political leaders and dissatisfied army elements. The civilian half of this coalition
coalesced in early January 2000, when the four non-NU Islamic parties (i.e., those not
affiliated with Wahid) announced that they would merge into a single party, the Indonesian
Council of Ulemas (MUI), for the next election. With conflicts pitting Christians against
Muslims in Maluku, Timor, and Lombok, the MUI immediately set about to position the party
as the defender of Muslims throughout the archipelago. 6 55 It supported a call by the Laskar
653 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, 179-96.
654 Ibid., 312-17.
655 "Four Indonesian Islamic Parties Plan to Merge", Antara News Agency, January 7 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-
0107. After the resolution of the East Timor situation, the biggest Christian-Muslim conflict was in the
Malukus, where Christians were fighting the settlement of non-natives onto the island. In mid-January 2000, the
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Jihad, a radical Muslim group, to go to the Maluku Islands and fight Christians - a crusade
that Wahid said represented a threat to the survival of the state and existing social order.6 56 In
a bid to win the support of dissatisfied army elements, it also called on the military to take a
more aggressive stance toward threats to national unity and advocated disbanding the
National Commission on Human Rights.6 57 Even as the MUI sowed the seeds of instability in
the Malukus, however, Amien Rais, one of the party's leaders and chairman of the MPR,
issued an ultimatum to Wahid giving him two weeks to settle the situation there.658
In January 2000 President Wahid accused renegade military officers of cooperating
with radical Muslims in the province in order to perpetuate their authority within the state:
"Those Muslim militants [and] those generals who are not satisfied would like to rule
forever." 659 Suharto had promoted a "green" (i.e., Islamic) faction within the army during the
1990s. The group included Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, the commander of the
strategic reserve in May 1998 and the man widely suspected of having orchestrated the anti-
Chinese riots that swept Indonesia later that month.660
AFP estimated that 1,700 people had been killed and 2,300 injured since clashes began in the Malukus. "800
Said Missing as Spice Island Clashes Continue", AFP, January 12 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0112.
656 "Ulemas Council Backs Muslim Youth Call for Maluku Jihad", Antara, January 15 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-
0115. "Wahid Says Jihad Group Should Be Kept Out of Maluku", Antara, January 11 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-
0111.
657 "Ulemas Council Backs Muslim Youth Call for Maluku Jihad".
658 "Amien Claims Wahid to Solve Ambon Issue in '1-2 Weeks"', Detik (Internet), January 7 2000, in FBIS-FTS-
2000-0106.
659 "Wahid Threatened by New Alliance", Business Times, January 27 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0127.
660 An official government investigation of the rioting, conducted under Habibie's tenure as president, found that
Prabowo "might have been involved in the riots." "Government Promulgates Latest Facts on Rape During
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After Wahid's succession military elements, especially from the army, continued to
take sides in local conflicts.66 1 The leader of the Laskar Jihad stated in May 2000 that the
chief of the Diponegoro regional military command (responsible for eastern Java), Bibit
Waluyo, had given the organization a green light to send its fighters to Maluku - an
accusation the general denied but for which there was circumstantial evidence.66 2 Whether or
not the anny expressly backed the Jihad group's actions, some of its senior officers have
clearly been less than fully proactive in addressing disturbances. Brigadier General Max
Tamaela, the military area commander responsible for Maluku, for example, said in April
2000 that the "planned visit to Maluku by the Jihad group was a positive thing, provided that
the group's intentions were good."663 (At the time, the Jihad was openly running paramilitary
training camps for recruits headed to Maluku.) When sectarian warfare broke out in June,
Tamaela offered excuses for his own soldier's passive stance, twisting the work of
Indonesia's human rights commission in arguing that "soldiers were hesitating in taking firm
action as they fear legal charges may be brought against them in the future if they open fire on
mobs."6 6 4
Rioting", The Jakarta Post, December 22 1998, in Lexis-Nexis. Public opinion and the press see a more certain
connection.
661 "Soldiers Involved in Massacre: General", The Australian, February 1 2000, in Lexis-nexis. "Shooting
Incident in Ambon Involving Security Forces Personnel", Tempo, December 28 2001, in FBIS-SEP-2001-1228.
662 "General Denies Approving Jihad Mission to Ambon", Antara, May 11 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. The two did
meet each other around the time that the Jihad leader said, but the general denied giving permission. According
to Bibit, he suggested the organization provide moral and material contributions.
663 "Officials View Maluku Unrest, Threat of Holy War", Suara Merdeka, April 13 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.
664 "Ambon Now Resembles Battlefield", The Jakarta Post, June 26 2000. In Irian Jaya, attacks on foreigners
have been perpetrated with M- 16s, weapons that the rebels there do not have in any numbers, and the recent
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Wahid and his Defense Minister, Juwono, used the navy and marine corps to minimize
the prospects for military mischief and a creeping coup d'etat. The navy, on its own accord,
worked toward this end during the leadership transition itself. According to one account in
the liberal media, the navy's chief of staff in May 1998, Admiral Arief Kushariadi, bypassed
Central Reserve Commander Lieutenant General Prabowo (the army officer who ostensibly
had operational control over marine units in Jakarta) and personally directed marine units that
suppressed the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta. 6 65 Some speculated that Prabowo had sponsored
the riots to discredit liberal student protesters.
The subsequent expansion of the navy and promotion of its officers to senior TNI
positions allowed the navy to take on more tasks. In line with the more moderate position of
their commanders, marine units appear to have maintained relatively good relations with local
populations in Maluku, Aceh, and elsewhere.66 6 In an interview in August 2000 U.S.
Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Gelbard drew a sharp contrast between the behavior of the
army on the one hand and the navy and air force on the other, and he urged the U.S.
government to rethink its blanket prohibition on military-to-military contacts. He said the
army had had a "clear breakdown in the chain of command" from Aceh in the west to Maluku
bombing in Bali was carried out using C-4 explosives, in both cases raising questions about the origins of the
offending weapons and the motives for the attacks.
665 Is This the Real Story Behind the May 98 Riot?
(http://www.indonesiamedia.com/rubrik/english/english00october-riotstory.htm, 2000 [cited September 18
2002]).
666 In Maluku, Laskar Jihad has accused the marines of taking sides with the Christians - a good indication of
their sensitivity toward the indigenous population. On Aceh, see "Ex Marine Chief Suspects External Forces in
Aceh Killings", Berita Buana (Internet), January 28 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0128.
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in the east. But, he argued, "I think it is useful and important for us to consider relationships
with certain parts of the military under certain circumstances, particularly starting with the
navy, marines and air force."6 67 As of this writing, the United States has generally followed
Gelbard's prescription, restarting its military-to-military contact first with naval and air
exercises while taking a more cautious approach towards engaging the Indonesian army.
While the navy cannot be all places at all times and hence has limits in the degree to
which it could impede a creeping coup d'etat, its utility can nevertheless be seen in the
conflict in the Malukus. Immediately after Laskar Jihad declared war on the Christians on the
island, the navy imposed a blockade on the island, using both warships and Nomad
surveillance aircraft, confiscating weapons from jihad participants, as well as from
professional gunrunners delivering weapons to Christians.6 68 Shortly thereafter, TNI
Commander Admiral Widodo visited the island to stiffen resolve, stating that military units
there must remain "professional, neutral, firm, and impartial."66 9 At the end of February,
Admiral Widodo helped facilitate the replacement of Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant
General Suaidy Marasabessy, a "green" officer favored by the MUI and Laskar Jihad.670 His
replacement, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago, took a more proactive line in confronting
667 Richard S. Ehrlich, "Indonesia's Security Efforts Off Target U.S. Envoy", The Washington Times, August 29
2000.
66s "Indonesian Navy Blockades Ambon Port", Associated Press (AFX), January 7 2000', in Lexis-Nexis. "Navy
Sent in to Halt Maluku Gun Runners", AFP, July 17 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.
669 "TNI Chief Orders Troops in Ambon to be Neutral", Bali Post, January 10 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-01 10.
670 "Subaidy's Dismissal Gets Strong Reaction in Ambon", Antara, February 28 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. After his
removal, the general attended an Islamic congress that was held - with the predictable result of provoking
intense Christian anger - in Maluku in June 2001. "Islamic Congress to Open on Tuesday", The Jakarta Post,
June 19 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.
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the Jihad. Chaniago established a special "mixed battalion" - comprised of troops from the
navy's marine corps, the air force's special troops corps, and the army's special forces for use
in the Malukus. Once there, the battalion conducted aggressive sweeps for weapons among
Laskar Jihad elements that had established themselves on the island and occasionally
engaging in firefights with Jihad members.67 1 The composition of the force, in a theater
where 90 percent of the forces were army, is notable - it was mixed, presumably to avoid
accusations by the MUI against any particular service, but largely non-army. The navy's
perceived reliability in the Malukus was also demonstrated by the fact that the marines
provided security for both TNI Commander Admiral Widodo and Vice President Megawati
during separate visits to the island.67 2
(3) Deflecting army opposition to military reform. The third area of naval support to
Wahid and his reform agenda was in bypassing or defeating army opposition to military
reform. While the 1945 Constitution is vague on the military's legal authority, some military
officers have publicly advanced interpretations of that document that give their institution
powerful legal prerogatives under the rubric of dwifungsi, or the military's "duel function."
The army's defense of prerogative was particular intense in the area of personnel
appointments. In late February 2000, when President Wahid was making military personnel
671 "Elite Indonesian Troops Head to Malukus", Japan Economic Newswire, August 8 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.
"Jihad Legion Urges Government to Withdraw Joint Battalion From Ambon", Antara, January 30 2001, in
Lexis-Nexis.
672 "Two Warships to Secure Megawati's Visit to N. Maluku", Antara, December 21 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. "TNI
Chief Orders Troops in Ambon to be Neutral".
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changes designed to undermine General Wiranto's base of power within the military and
install people loyal to the government, Wiranto and his allies appealed to the sanctity of the
Wanjakti. The Wanjakti, or military's Board of Highest Function, is a collegial body with
responsibility for all senior military personnel appointments. The president could not, they
argued, make personnel changes without the Wanjakti's approval. 673 Given both legal
ambiguity and, more importantly, the military's broad insistence over its prerogatives,
President Wahid did not publicly challenge the military directly over their right to manage its
own personnel issues. Rather, he said, "I [have] never interfered with the military transfers
whether they were in the Indonesian Army, Airforce, or Navy." 674
The broader argument advanced by these army officers to justify their position on
personnel issues was that the president did not, under the constitution, have day-to-day
authority over military management in any area. Even prior to Suharto's fall, the military had
developed a doctrine that emphasized loyalty to the constitution, rather than to the person who
occupied the Presidency.6 7 5 And shortly after Wahid took office, TNI spokesman Major
General Sudrajat stated that the president was not, under the Constitution, the supreme
commander.6 76 Article 10, which specifies the authority of the President, states that "the
673 "Wiranto at Commission I of Parliament: 'No Self-Defense Effort", Kompas Online, March 2 2000.
Although Wahid announced the removal of General Wiranto (as coordinating minister for security) in early
February 2000, the president, under pressure from Wiranto's allies in the army, allowed the general to remain in
office until the commission on human rights completed its investigation of army actions in Timor in 1999.
674 "Wahid Admits 'Interference' in Military Transfers", Detik, March 1 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0301.
675 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 64.
676 "Labor Leader: Hint of Military Coup in Spokesman's Remark", Detik (Internet), December 30 1999, in
FBIS-FTS- 1999-1229.
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President shall hold supreme authority over the Army, Navy and the Air Force." But this was
interpreted by Sudrajat and other status quo army officers as granting the president emergency
authority only, rather than actual authority over the day-to-day management of TNI internal
affairs. Although Sudrajat's statement aroused a great deal of controversy among civilians
and ultimately resulted in his removal, his ideas were widespread throughout the service.
Beyond their questioning of the president's authority over military management, pro-status
quo army officers also fought to maintain their allotted seats in parliament and to defend the
army's territorial system, which gives the army social and political influence at the lowest
societal levels.
As TNI commander, Admiral Widodo helped President Wahid to mitigate some of the
constitutional and legal challenges posed by conservative army officers. On article 10 of the
constitution, dealing with whether or not the president is the commander in chief, he
suggested that if the constitution were ambiguous, an amendment should be passed clarifying
the president's effective control over the military.677 He threw the moral weight of his office
behind a successful effort by liberal parliamentarians to phase out the military's involvement
in parliament, with seats in the lower house eliminated in 2004 and those in the upper house
to be phased out by 2009.678 And Widodo backed less productive efforts to end the territorial
system and the larger system of dwifungsi.6 7 9
677 "TNI to Leave Parliament in 2004", Kompas (Internet), February 26 2000.
678 "Indonesian Military Ready to Withdraw from Parliament by 2004", Agence France Presse, February 25
2000, in Lexis-Nexis. "TNI to Leave Parliament in 2004". While this solution was less proactive in quickly
eliminated the military from politics than some civilian proposals, which called for the military to be completely
phased out in 2004, it was nevertheless more forthcoming than the position maintained by most army officers -
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Of most practical value in the short term, Admiral Widodo, as the chairman of the
Wanjakti (a position always held by the TNI commander), was instrumental in replacing
officers of questionable loyalty to the civilian regime with supporters. Many of the new
appointments went to navy and air force officers, virtually all of whom proved to be firm
supporters of the reform agenda. Two weeks after the comments by TNI spokesman Major
General Sudrajat challenging the president's authority under article 10 of the constitution,
Admiral Widodo replaced Sudrajat with the air force's Air Rear Marshal Graito Husodo.680
He also appointed Vice Air Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusumah as the first non-Army
officer to occupy the politically critical post of Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) chief.681
In addition to placing naval and air force officers, Widodo also reached into the army
officer ranks to promote liberal officers ahead of their peers. For example, he selected Major
General Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had written a book in October 1999 advocating an end
to the territorial system, as the new Kostrad (strategic reserve) chief in January 2000.682 And
one month later he replaced the "green" (Islamic) Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant
that being that the military should remain engaged in both houses of parliament with some reduction in the
number of seats.
679 For a summary of where the territorial system stands now and the lack of progress in its abolition over the last
four years, see John McBeth, "Indonesia: The Military Fans Out," Far Eastern Economic Review (2002).
680 "Labor Leader: Hint of Military Coup in Spokesman's Remark". "Indonesian President Replaces Senior TNI
Spokesman", The Jakarta Post, January 14 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0113. "Indonesia's Wahid Sidelines
Generals", NRC Handelsblad, January 15 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0117.
681 "New Indonesian Intelligence Chief Installed", Detik (Internet), January 21 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0121.
682 "New Kostrad Commander's Biography Profiled", Suara Pembaruan, February 29 2000; "Wahid Moves to
Seal Power". Major General Agus published a book calling for the end of the military dual function in October
1999.
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General Suaidy Marasabessy, who appeared to be stirring up trouble in Maluku, with the
more neutral Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago. These transfers brought criticisms from
army quarters of foul play, specifically of President Wahid's "interference" in army
management. But the fact that the transfers were executed by TNI chief Admiral Widodo and
defended as such by the TNI's new spokesman Air Rear Marshal Graito Usodo dampened the
impact of these accusations.683
Army divisions and alternatives to the navy? As some of Widodo's army
appointments suggest, there were some liberal army officers in the force. Could President
Wahid have used individuals from the army to lead the reform effort, rather than using the
navy and, to a lesser extent, the air force to spearhead reform? The answer is that it would
have been difficult at best. Appointing Admiral Widodo, who was already the deputy
commander of TNI, was significantly less controversial than reaching beyond the army's
chief of staff deep into the army's hierarchy to select a new TNI commander.68 4 There were
few if any good candidates among army three and four star officers. The army's commander
at the time was an unreformed officer from the Suharto era and was on record as being against
most of the military and political reforms sought by Wahid and his civilian defense minister
Juwono.6 85
683 "Strategic TNI Functions Communicated by the TNI Commander to the President", Kompas (Internet),
February 29 2000.
684 When Wahid was contemplating the replacement Widodo with Agus when the former was nearing retirement,
conservative army officers argued that the new replacement would have to be a serving or former service
commander.
685 The army's commander, Subagyo Hadisiwoyo, was pointedly against significant changes to dwifungsi and
the territorial system. He was, he said, against "hasty, aimless, indiscriminate, unconstitutional, radical, or
revolutionary reforms." In the political lexicon of the day (June 1998), the statement clearly placed him among
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Ultimately, with Admiral Widodo in place as the TNI commander, the government
promoted Tyasno Sudarto, the former head of military intelligence and an individual known
to be more sympathetic to reform than his predecessor. But even Tyasno, like most in the
army's "reform faction" prior to 1999, was bent on cleaning the system rather than
transforming it. He offered to make some changes to the territorial system and the
understanding of dwifungsi. But his proposed adjustments were relatively minor, and his
rationale suggested little desire to go much further than he actually did: "We are returning to
our original mission of winning the people's hearts."6 86
The career of General Wiranto is also instructive. General Wiranto became known as
a staunch military conservative and threat to liberal government by the time he was removed
as coordinating minister for security in February 2000. But when he became TNI commander
in February 1998, he was known as a progressive, pro-reform officer associated with the "red
and white" faction. Intense pressure from status quo officers combined with little desire to
those seeking to defend the existing order against liberal challenges. "Indonesian General: Army Against
'Radical' Reform", Media Indonesia, June 22 1998, in FBIS-FTS- 1998-0622. He had also sponsored the creation
of a 40,000 strong civilian militia force during Habibie's tenure. "Indonesia to Start Training 40,000-strong
Militia Next Month", Deutsche Presse-Agentur, January 6 1999, in Lexis-Nexis.
686 "TNI to Study Territorial Function", The Jakarta Post, March 3 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0302. Sudarto's
proposed changes included eliminating territorial commands on Java, while maintaining those on the outer
islands. He also proposed focusing more on social issues than expressly political ones. But he offered little
guidance about how the military would maintain strict separation of social and political policy at the local level.
Also, despite later offers to eliminate the territorial commands on Java, he stepped down from his post in August
2000 having actually created more commands than he eliminated. (He took an instrumental role in expanding
the number from ten to seventeen in December 1999.) "Indonesian Military Chief Responds to Officer's
Criticism", Kompas (Internet), December 16 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1216.
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fundamentally change the ruling system (as opposed to attacking corruption within it)
ultimately made him a major obstacle to Wahid's reform program.687
There were committed liberal officers in the army, but in 1999 they were far enough
down in the hierarchy that they could not rise without outside assistance. The highest-ranking
officer in this category was a major general, Agus Wirahadikusumah, a Harvard educated
officer of thoroughly Western outlook.688 Even with backing from Wahid, Juwono, and
Widodo, however, Agus was twice removed from key assignments and dispatched to less
meaningful posts - once from the army's planning section to the command of the Sulawesi
military region (far from Jakarta) and once from the command of Kostrad (the strategic
reserve) to an over-strength position without title.6 89 He died under mysterious circumstances
in August 2001.690 The existence of liberal officers like Agus indicates that once reform was
firmly on track, it might have been possible for army officers to take the lead in continuing
reform or consolidating gains, but for the first phase, the use of the navy provided critical
leverage for jumpstarting the process.
687 Wiranto's erratic behavior, vacillating between hard and soft positions, during the events from May 1998 to
October 1999, are discussed earlier in this chapter, as is the perceived threat that Wiranto represented to Wahid
during early 2000. For the pre-1998 view of Wiranto as a reformer, see Sander Thoenes, "Voice of Moderation
Who is 'Ready for a Dialogue': Unlike His Predecessor, Wiranto Might Not Threaten to Shoot Demonstrators",
Financial Times, March 14 1998.
688 On Agus' call for reform, see "TNI Officers Call for End to Military's Dual Function", Jakarta Post, October
29 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1029. Note that this Agus is not the same man as Agus Widjojo, a conservative
army officer and one of the former's nemeses.
689 "Indonesian Army Chief Subagyo Defends TNI Reshuffle", The Jakarta Post, November 10 1999, in FBIS-
FTS-1999-1109. Wahid, who clearly favored Agus, probably concurred in these assignments in exchange for
concessions from status quo officers on other assignments.
690 Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 296.
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With or without the navy leading reform, the navy would have been a critical part of
the reform coalition. It offered not only willing reformers of three and four star rank but also
a complete menu of supporting organizations: combat arms, intelligence, and logistics. And
unlike the army, even its mid-ranking and junior officers supported the liberal reform agenda.
Middle Class (and Protestant) Navalism vs. Islamic Militancy. After 1997, and
especially after Wahid's accession in 1999, as differences in the political-economic outlook of
the two services became more apparent, contending social groups became increasingly aware
of those differences and the implications of those differences for their own political and
economic interests.
Newspapers aimed largely at urban middle-class readerships were more active in
reporting on naval developments than were either regional or Islamic newspapers. The
editorial slant of the Protestant newspaper, Suara Pembaruan, was consistently among the
most supportive of maritime strategy. A December 1999 article, for example, argued the need
for naval expansion:
"Everyone knows that as the largest archipelagic nation in the world with
about 17,000 islands and two-thirds of its territory consisting of waters,
Indonesia must in theory have a strong navy. However, the facts show that the
expansion of the ABRI [Indonesia's armed forces] since the establishment of
the republic has focused more on the army only." 691
Middle class media outlets have been quick to highlight the navy's liberal leanings. Media
Indonesia, for example, a website aimed at middle class Javanese, posted a story about
691 "Daily Comments on Lack of Operational Navy Warships", Suara Pembaruan (Internet), December 9 1999,
in FBIS-FTS-1999-1210. Another example of the newspapers editorial leaning is "Indonesian Navy to
Restructure Primary Naval Bases", Suara Pembaruan, February 9 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0210.
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Admiral Arief Kushariadi stepping in to stop anti-Chinese riots in May 1998 - with the
disclaimer that the article was based on "unconfirmed but reliable sources." In September
2000 Jakarta's English language paper, The Jakarta Post, published an editorial under the title
"Send in the Marines," suggesting that the marines lacked the army's ideological baggage and
should be used to disarm the militia elements who had fled from East Timor to West Timor.6 92
The interests of media outlets targeting santri (strict) Muslim audiences highlighted
entirely different aspects of military affairs. The newspaper Republika, affiliated with the
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals Association (ICMI), all but ignored naval issues. On the
other hand, it bemoaned conspiracies to divide the military and to discredit such army
organizations as Kopassus (Special Forces) and Kostrad (Strategic Reserve). The Republika
reported on the general "increasing resentment" within the ranks of the military about the
President's "interference" in military affairs, and decried Wahid's practice of using informal
military advisors to circumvent established channels.6 93 In February 2000, it quoted
Lieutenant General Arie J. Kumaat, the head of the Indonesian Intelligence Coordination
Agency (Bakin) as saying that he did not know where the President got his information: "The
President can get information from anywhere. Anyone can talk to the President now." The
same article warned that given the confused state of the President's information, the "TNI
would eventually become indifferent to the various security and defense issues facing the
nation now and in the future."694
692 "Send in the Marines", Jakarta Post, September 13 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
693 "Indonesian Dailies on Military/Civilian Relations", Republika, January 25 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0125.
694 "Mounting Criticism of President's Advisers".
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STRATEGIC CHANGE
Under Suharto the dominance of the Indonesian army and its continental strategy was never in
doubt. The navy did stabilize its fleet size and add some new capabilities during the 1980s,
after a precipitous decline in fleet size and power after Sukarno's fall in 1967. But the army's
dominance was reconfirmed during the 1990s, when the army's size was expanded but almost
nothing done to strengthen the fleet. Only after Wahid's accession to president in October
1999, was this situation reversed. Under Wahid, doctrine and basing plans changed to reflect
greater weight on maritime defense; a relative shift occurred away from continental and
toward maritime forces; and the navy was able to strengthen its intellectual and public
relations infrastructure by building naval-related think tanks.
THE SERVICES AND TOTAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE (1978-1998). Between 1978 and
1998 "total people's defense" (sishankamrata), a strategy that relied primarily on guerilla
resistance against all but minor incursions, continued to serve as the basis for Indonesian
defense planning.69 5 The navy and air force were, under this strategic conception, relegated to
supporting roles and organized primarily to operate within the archipelago, rather than to fight
at or beyond its maritime frontiers. Nevertheless, there were differences in strategic emphasis
at different times within this period. The navy and air force fared relatively better during the
first decade of this period than they did during the second - despite a better aggregate military
budget picture during the 1990s and the growth of maritime frictions with China.
695 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, xxi.
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Between 1978 and 1988, defense budgets fell from $4.4 billion to around $1.9 billion
in 1999 inflation adjusted dollars (or from about 3.1 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent).
Although much of this reduction can be attributed to the fall in oil prices and consequent loss
to the central budget, it also reflected Suharto's efforts during this period to reach out to other
groups in society and build alternative bases of support - of which economic reform and the
lifting of press restrictions were key components. Army end strength remained unchanged at
around 211,000, falling as a percentage of the population from 0.18 percent to around 0.13
percent. The navy, however, despite tight overall budgets, increased its manpower
marginally, from 39,000 to 43,000, and added seven frigates, bringing the total number of
operational frigates in the force from ten to seventeen. The "new" frigates were, in fact, old.
Six of them were Dutch Van Speijk-class warships built in the late 1960s. They did, however,
add significantly to Indonesia's naval capabilities. The Van Speijk class, at 2,800 tons, was
30 percent larger than the largest ships in the inventory during the 1970s. And their onboard
systems had been updated over the years and included anti-ship missiles, as well as capable
anti-aircraft weapons.
During the 1990s, the army once again took absolute priority, and the relative position
of the navy deteriorated. The twenty-five year plan promulgated in 1993 (covering 1994-
2019) called for a staggering 56 percent increase in army manpower. Ostensibly, the plan was
largely designed to narrow the gap between the doctrine - calling for a sergeant and enlisted
man in every one of Indonesia's villages - and reality. During the first five years of this plan,
the number of army personnel was to increase 15 percent, from 211,000 to 243,000. The
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continuing importance of the "total people's defense" doctrine was highlighted by the fact that
the number of territorial battalions were to increase 11 percent by 1999, from 74 to 82, while
the number of central forces battalions was only raised 4 percent, from 23 to 24.696 The
remainder of the personnel increase was to fill out under strength units, mostly in the
territorial forces. Between 1994 and early 1999, the twenty-five year plan and its heavy
emphasis on army strength was regularly reaffirmed.69 7
The army had long been unable to meet doctrinal demands for personnel in the
villages. There is, therefore, some question as to why Suharto decided to expand its strength
so dramatically in 1993. It is true that the ratio of manpower to population had fallen over
time. But the timing also coincided exactly with Suharto's retrenchments on economic and
social reforms - all of which angered the emerging middle class and weakened Suharto's
political position, especially in urban areas. Suharto reversed his previous efforts to reduce
his reliance on the military for support and fell back once again on that institution for support,
despite his sometimes uncomfortable relationship with it. Hence, although the military's
1993 plan and its implementation were consistent with a guerrilla defense strategy - as well as
with an integral nationalist conception of security - it was also almost certainly formulated
with an eye on regime security. And while other explanations (e.g., declining army
696 Ibid., 86.
697 After the twenty-five year plan was put in place in 1993, statements affirming that expanding the number of
territorial units and fleshing out their manpower was first priority in military budgets were released in November
1995, July 1997, and in January 1999. Leonard C. Sebastian, "Article analyzes Military White Paper", Business
Times, November 25-26 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1125. "Officer Discloses Planned Enlargement of Armed
Forces", Radio Republik Indonesia Network, July 22 1997, in FBIS-FTS- 1997-0722. "Indonesia to Strengthen
ABRI's 'Territorial Presence"', Media Indonesia, January 6 1999, in FBIS-FTS- 1999-0106.
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manpower to population ratios) might be found for parts of the 1993 plan, concerns about
regime security is the only plausible explanation for General Wiranto's announcement in
December 1998 that a new 40,000 member civilian militia, "equipped with cudgels and
handcuffs" would be established. 69 8
Despite substantial new funds for the military during the 1990s, the navy did not fare
well. Between 1988 and 1997, the defense budget increased from $1.9 billion to $4.9 billion
in inflation-adjusted 1999 dollars (or from 1.6 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent). Yet the navy
suffered numerous disappointments during the decade, and arguably ended period weaker in
absolute terms than it was at the beginning of it. The only ships that Indonesia added to its
inventory during the decade were 39 ships and patrol craft of the former East German navy.
As a dramatic wholesale purchase of much of another state's naval force, that deal was taken
by some East Asia observers as support for the idea that an arms race was underway in
Asia.699 But that purchase - a brainchild of the then Minister of Research and Technology
B.J. Habibie - was hardly welcomed by the navy's leadership, which had originally proposed
the purchase of 23 new frigates. 700
698 "Jakarta to Start Recruiting Civilian Militia in January 1999".
699 For example, Kent Calder notes argues under a section entitled "The Drift Towards 'Arms Race Asia"' that
Indonesia is expanding rapidly in terms of defense spending over the 1990-96 period as it began deploying the
entire East German navy. Calder, Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to
Destabilize Asia-Pacific, 140.
700 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 98-99. Although the navy's chief of staff, Admiral Muhammad
Arifin originally supported the East German purchase, he apparently changed his mind before the deal was
finalized. John McBeth, "Techno-Battles: Habibie's Sway Over Weapons Purchases Irks Military," Far Eastern
Economic Review, April 7 1994, 26. Much of the navy's unhappiness with the purchase stems from the fact that
expected funds for refurbishment were slashed by around a third by the Finance Ministry. On taking delivery of
the last two ships, Vice Admiral Arif Kushariadi's comments did not betray unbridled pleasure: he said that the
ships would replace older types in the Indonesian navy and "therefore, our naval strength actually remains the
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The largest and most important of the East German ships, 16 Parchim class corvettes,
had been built between 1981 and 1985. They were similar in design to the Soviet Grisha class
built in 1969 and 1970 and were criticized as being "clearance sale items" incorporating
"worn out 1970s technology."7 0 '1 Unlike frigates acquired by the Indonesian navy during the
1980s, the Parachim lacked anti-ship missiles. There were even questions about whether they
were seaworthy: An article appearing in the German press in 1999 reported, "Some of these
completely outdated ships have already sunk."7 02 The East German ships might have been
suitable for patrolling the archipelago and were arguably consistent with the strategy of "total
people's defense" (although the high cost of maintaining old ships draw even this assertion
into question). But they hardly fulfilled the hopes of naval officers who had visions of
rebuilding a blue water navy and whose minimum expectations included maintaining a navy
built around frigates.
The 1994-2019 twenty-five-year plan did specify that Indonesia's submarine forces
should be strengthened. But even in this area, the navy was sorely disappointed. In 1990 the
Indonesian submarine force was comprised of two German type-209 submarines purchased in
1977. In 1992, Indonesia began negotiations with Germany to purchase two additional new
same." "Navy Chief Commissions Ships Purchased From Germany", Republika, July 15 1996, in FBIS-FTS-
1996-0715.
701 See Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 19. McBeth, "Techno-Battles: Habibie's Sway Over Weapons
Purchases Irks Military," 26-27.
702 "Report Details FRG Armament Deal, Trade with Indonesia", Die Woche, September 17 1999, in FBIS-FTS-
1999-0917. September 17, 1999, Hamburg Die Woche, FBIS-FTS 19990917000708.
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type 209's - to be built at a German shipyard in Kiel. 703 Despite periodic statements of intent,
including an announcement by the naval chief of staff, Vice Admiral Arief Kushariadi that
Indonesia "had bought a new [type 209] submarine from Germany" and "hoped the new
submarine will arrive next year," negotiations were in fact inconclusive. In April 1997, the
decision on the type 209's was reversed entirely - almost certainly by B.J. Habibie - and the
navy announced that Indonesia would instead acquire five used German type 206's.704 The
type 206 is one-third the size of the type 209 (450 tons against 1,390 tons); its range is only
slightly over half (4,500 against 8,200 NM); it has a shallower diving capability (159 against
240 meters); and the newest of the type 206 boats in question had been launched in 1973 and
was already twenty-four years old as the negotiations began. Even this purchase was,
however, cancelled in early 1998.705
Total naval tonnage (including corvettes over 500 tons) increased between 1990 and
1997. But the age of the fleet also increased and the average size of major surface combatants
703 "Germany to Build Submarines for RI [Republic of Indonesia]," Indonesian Observer, February 5, 1993, 1,
cited in Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International
Security 18, no. 3 (1993/94). Richard Sharpe, Jane's Fighting Ships (Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Information Group,
1994), 296.
704 The type 206 negotiation was first revealed in April 1997 by the Navy Information Service Head, Col
Mualimin Santoso, who was responding to questions from reporters about negotiations about submarines with
Germany. "Navy to Purchase Additional Submarines From Germany", Kompas (Internet), April 19 1997, in
FBIS-FTS- 1997-0419. BJ Habibie, however, made the official announcement, immediately after the signing of
the MoU with Germany in September 1997. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology, was acting at that
time as the Chairman of the Procurement Team for Naval Ships. "Navy Decides to Buy Submarines From
Germany", Kompas (Internet), September 9 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0909.
705 In January 1998, Commander Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, announced that the submarine deal would be
postponed. "Jakarta Delays Purchase of Russian Planes, German Subs", Media Indonesia, January 10 1998, in
FBIS-FTS- 1998-0111.
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decreased. The military's emphasis on the army was reflected in the navy's declining share of
total military manpower, which fell from 15.2 percent to 14.4 percent.
NASCENT NAVALISM UNDER WAHID. Military priorities changed dramatically
after Suharto's fall, especially after Wahid's accession to the presidency. The navy was the
primary beneficiary. In addition to the promotion of naval officers to senior military posts, a
subject discussed earlier in this chapter, naval progress under Wahid was manifested in three
areas: (1) naval advocacy by political leaders and the ability to establish naval and maritime
"information" centers, (2) a new, outward looking naval doctrine and basing scheme, and (3)
plans for significant increases to naval (especially marine) manpower and additional funds for
operational readiness.
The navy made some gains immediately after Suharto's fall - a full year before Wahid
took office. During the first month of Habibie's presidency, the navy established a
Foundation for Maritime Services, an organization that has since worked to publicize
maritime strategy and the importance of the navy.706 Admiral Widodo, then the navy's
commander, wasted little time in propagandizing his service's cause: "Maritime natural
resources," he said, "have potential to become the foundation of future national development
if handled well." But, he warned, foreign poachers had stolen many of those resources, and
greater efforts to defend Indonesia's maritime frontier were necessary.7 07
706 "Naval Officer: 6,000 Foreign Ships Catch Fish Illegally", Antara News Agency, November 2 1999, in FBIS-
FTS-1 102.
707 "Habibie Opens New Economic Zones", Suara Pembaruan, September 27 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0930.
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President Wahid's accession provided further opportunities for the navy. The
president's first major policy address after taking office in October 1999 emphasized the need
to strengthen Indonesia's maritime defenses and protect its ocean resources.70 8 In November
1999, the navy's Foundation of Maritime Service announced that "thousands" of foreign
fishing ships had been seized for illegally fishing in Indonesian waters over the preceding two
years. 709 Later in the same month, the navy seized 56 Thai fishing boats and arrested 1,200
crewmembers in one spectacular take.710 Not mentioned in the navy's version of events was
the fact that foreign boat owners had, for many years, illegally purchased fishing licenses
from the Indonesian navy. Given greater latitude in its public statements and a freer and
generally sympathetic press, the navy began to complain of its history of second-class status
and low budgets and to agitate for higher funding. In March 2000, Navy Chief of Staff
Admiral Akhmad Sucipto announced that the navy had only 114 warships but needed 136 to
patrol the archipelago adequately.7 11
The navy also undertook a significant change in its fleet organizing and basing
deployments. On February 9, 2000, Admiral Sutjipto stated that the Navy's Primary Naval
Bases were to be abolished, and Maritime Area Commands would be established in their
place. The old bases had been had been organized under the Eastern Fleet and Western Fleet,
708 "Indonesia: Naval Spending Set to Increase", Radio Australia, October 25 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1025.
709 "Naval Officer: 6,000 Foreign Ships Catch Fish Illegally".
710 "Indonesian Navy Arrests 1,200 Thai Fishermen, Seize Boats", The Nation, November 27 1999.
711 "Navy Chief Urges People to Prevent Unrest", Antara, February 25 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0225.
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with headquarters in Surabaya and Bandung (both on Java), and the preponderance of units
were located on the Java Sea, between Borneo, Java, and Sulawesi - the geographic heart of
the archipelago. Under the new arrangement, bases would be located in three "strategic
regions along the Indonesian border." 712 The navy concluded that a large part of its new
mission is to face the outside world along Indonesia's maritime boundaries, rather than to
patrol the interior of the archipelago. Although this change took place when the navy was
being used more, not less, in domestic missions (especially off the coast of Maluku and
Aceh), the new doctrine positions the navy to purchase larger ships for an ocean-going navy
in the future.
Because the navy must import its major warships and most of their onboard systems, it
was hit particularly hard by the massive slide in the rupiah's value during 1997 and 1998. But
the first military budget proposal developed under President Wahid's administration did
finance a major expansion of the navy's manpower. On February 10, 2000, TNI chief
Admiral Widodo presented the military's budget request, calling for a ten percent rise overall
in the level of spending. According to The Jakarta Post's reporting on that event, "the Navy
has also disclosed a long-term plan to build its troops to 70,000 within five years."7 13 The
plan represented an increase of 49 percent in naval manpower. The same report did not
discuss changes in total manning for the army, but the target number of army recruits for the
coming year (11,500) is exactly expected replacement level for the force and suggests no
712 "Indonesian Navy to Restructure Primary Naval Bases".
713 "TNI Plans to Add Personnel, Weapons", Jakarta Post, February 11 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.
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expansion.7 14 Hence, it appears that total naval manpower (including the marine corps) was
set to rise from around 15 percent of the military's total to around 22 percent.
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY
The data from this case fit predictions consistent with the civil-military coalition theory.
When given a choice between defending the integral nationalist domestic status quo and
supporting liberal reformers, the army chose support for the status quo. Although the army's
defense of Suharto was half-hearted, its determined defense of Habibie and its efforts to limit
reform under Wahid support the conclusion that most army officers wanted the governing
system to remain largely intact. In contrast, the navy quickly threw it support behind liberal
opponents of Suharto when he began to look vulnerable in May 1998. Its cooperation with
liberal opponents of the status quo became even clearer and more open as Habibie's
opponents maneuvered to oust him between May and December 1998. After President Wahid
was inaugurated, the navy offered moral support for the new president's domestic agenda,
provided material support for his defense against coups d'etat, and spearheaded efforts to
reform the military.
Strategic change during this period correlated closely with domestic events, with the
transition from integral nationalist ideology bringing a shift from an overwhelmingly
continental, especially guerrilla, defense to much greater emphasis on maritime strategy.
714 Robert Lowry observes that most soldiers are volunteers and serve sign up for 20-year terms. He writes,
"Only about 5 percent of the force needs to be replaced every year." In 1999, the army had a strength of
230,000. The 11,500 new recruits work out to exactly 5% of the total force. On recruiting, see Lowry, The
Armed Forces of Indonesia, 117-19.
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Although the aftereffects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis limited the amount that could be
spent on new equipment, admirals were promoted to top military positions, the naval force
structure (especially the marine corps) was expanded, the navy was given greater latitude in
doctrinal planning and basing structures, and new maritime think tanks and agencies were
established.
EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES
STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Indonesia's doctrine and force structure,
especially during the 1990s, present an enigma to anyone trying to correlate military policy
with the external strategic environment. During the early and mid-1990s, when we might
have expected relatively greater emphasis than previously on maritime defense, Indonesia
instead embarked on a buildup of its ground forces. And during the late 1990s, when some of
the maritime threats were mitigated and domestic separatist groups were gaining momentum,
the state began to place greater emphasis on naval strengthening and downsized some of the
army's most elite fighting units.
By 1993 there was more than enough cause for Indonesia to reconsider its continental-
based defense strategy - or at a minimum to give relatively greater weight to a naval
component in that strategy. Several other regional states began expanding their naval force
structures during the 1980s. Naval growth in China, which suffered poor relations from
Indonesia throughout Suharto's reign, was particularly notable. Between 1979 and 1993
China's naval tonnage doubled, growing from 57,000 tons to 128,000. In 1988 China
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occupied several islands in the Spratly Islands, more than half way from China to Indonesia,
and began to increase its garrisons and patrolling activities around the islands.715 The
question of Chinese intent began to impinge more directly on Indonesia's security outlook in
1993, when China produced a map of its territorial claims that encompassed the Natuna
Islands, an important source of Indonesia's natural gas production at the northern end of the
archipelago. 716 The following year, China passed a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law,
hardening its position on sovereignty issues over the entire South China Sea area. By
December 1995 Suharto was concerned enough about the foreign threat to abandon his
disinclination to sign bilateral alliances and conclude a mutual security agreement with
Australia.
But despite what would appear to be heightened awareness of a foreign, maritime
based threat, Indonesian military planning in 1993 adopted a plan that called for a major
increase in army manpower, with virtually no increase in naval or air capabilities. Nor can
the apparent anomaly in Indonesian strategic direction during the 1990s be explained by an
increase in domestic unrest or a growth in separatist strength. As in past decades, separatist
movements continued in several provinces, but the scale and frequency of armed revolts in
those areas declined during the late 1980s and early and mid-1990s. 717
715 On the expansion of Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea between 1974 and 1992 see, Garver,
"China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests."
716 "Is the South China Sea Really China's?" Global News Wire, April 26 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.
717 Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, 164-76. In his 1996 book, Lowry summarized the situation in the
three provinces that have historically proved most troublesome to the central government by saying that
resentment continues to smolder because the causes of conflict remained unresolved, but at the same time, "in all
three cases, government forces have defeated or severely subdued the armed resistance." P. 176
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Consistent with their integral nationalist philosophy, Suharto and the generals may
have been trying to assure the long-term stability of the countryside by deepening the army's
roots in the outer islands.718 But the army had long been clamoring for more force structure,
so this explanation does not explain why the army's desires were suddenly met in 1993. The
significant gains made by opposition parties during the 1992 elections and the president's
need to secure his position both among the generals and in the countryside, better explains
Indonesian military policy under Suharto during the early and mid-I 990s than does the degree
of external or domestic military threat posed to the state.7 9
After the fall of the New Order, the navy rose in prominence, even as the domestic
military situation deteriorated (stretching infantry forces thin) and relations with China
improved (easing the imminence of naval threat). Even before Wahid took office, the
confluence of four factors led to a worsening domestic security situation: (1) the 1997-1998
financial crisis, which created rampant inflation and exacerbated unemployment across the
archipelago; (2) generally heightened regional expectations under more democratic politics;
(3) specific promises made by Habibie to leaders in East Timor, which further raised regional
expectations; and (4) willful acts by some military officers to undermine order. Rebel ranks
in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya grew during 1998 and 1999, and rival ethnic groups in
718 This was the explanation provided by the Indonesian military's official white paper.
719 On the results of the 1992 elections, which saw gains for both the official Muslim party and Megawati's
Democratic Party of Indonesia, see "Partial Triumph for Ruling Party in Elections", Agence France Presse, June
11 1992, in Lexis-Nexis.
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other locations, including Maluku and Lombok, began to battle each other, using homemade
weapons at first but subsequently acquiring standard military small arms.
Meanwhile, Indonesia's relations with China improved. Although China did not
formally renounce its claims to the Natuna area, it did so in de facto terms in December 1997,
when it began negotiating with Indonesia to purchase natural gas from the field.720 The
creation of the ASEAN+3 (an organization including the ASEAN states plus South Korea,
Japan, and China) in 1997 facilitated cooperation between China and the Southeast Asian
states, including Indonesia. China extended aid to Indonesia during the latter's currency crisis
in 1998. In July of 1999, Beijing, breaking with past precedent, hinted at a willingness to
engage in multilateral negotiations on "guidelines" for behavior in the South China Sea.72'
President Wahid's inaugural address in October - the same one that called for stronger naval
capabilities - also argued for building a strong relationship with China and pledged that his
first visit as president would be to Beijing. 72 2 The following month, Wahid floated the idea of
creating an informal alliance of Asian middle powers, including India, China, and Indonesia,
720 "Jakarta in Talks with China Over Sale of Gas From Natuna", Agence France Presse, December 29 1997, in
Lexis-Nexis. "Indonesia Talking to China about Possible Sale of Gas From Natuna Field", Chemical Business
Newsbase, February 13 1998, in Lexis-Nexis.
721 "China Willing to Subscribe to 'Guidelines' on Spratly Claims", Agence France Presse, July 27 1999, in
Lexis-Nexis. In July 2000 with discussions under way on an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, China went
one step further indicating a desire to enter into a formal code of conduct for the area - a long-held aspiration of
the ASEAN states "China Ready to Agree 'Code of Conduct' for South China Sea", Agence France Presse, July
13 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.
722 "Canberra Cautious on Wahid", Sydney Morning Herald, October 26 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1025.
"Indonesia: Naval Spending Set to Increase".
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with technical and financial backing from Japan.723 In a more realistic initiative Indonesia
and China, with private investors from South Korea and elsewhere, began negotiating to build
a pipeline between the Natuna natural gas field and Shanghai.7 24
An analysis of foreign and domestic military threat profiles alone would not have led
one to predict that Indonesia would increase its reliance on ground forces during the early and
mid-1 990s and then shift direction in 1999. It is true that military forces are, up to a point,
frequently fungible. Prior to 1999 Indonesia's theory of victory against sea-based threats lay
in guerrilla warfare, and after 1999 national leaders sought to use naval blockade to reduce the
need for ground formations. But both strategies, especially when taken to extremes, danced
around critical problems. As an archipelago, ground-based guerrilla tactics without the
mobility provided by survivable naval units and air cover would be untenable in holding on to
far flung islands against an enemy that might hive off one part of Indonesia's territory and
apply overwhelming force to pacify it. Similarly, naval blockades can never catch all of the
weapons bound for a given destination, and they cannot prevent locals from manufacturing
primitive homemade weapons. Marines, of course, are ground forces, and it is no accident
that this component, both politically reliable and of most immediate relevance to Indonesia's
new strategic problems, grew faster than any other immediately after Habibie's fall.
723 "Gus Dur Seeks Japan Support for 'Informal Alliance"', Media Indonesia, November 9 1999, in FBIS-FTS-
1999-1108.
724 Negotiations began in late 1999. "Asian Gas Grid Will Not Threaten Supply to Southast Asia", Business
Times (Malaysia), October 21 2002, in Lexis-Nexis.
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Indonesian regimes before and after 1999 chose to address military challenges to the
state with those strategies and force structures that best suited their domestic political needs.
Army leaders shared Suharto's integral nationalist philosophy and provided general support
for his New Order. When Suharto's regime was most clearly threatened, he fell back on the
army as one of his core bases of support. Army officers, however, represented an imminent
threat to liberals, who saw the navy as a more reliable partner in their efforts to overhaul the
economic and political structure of the state.
MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Material interests help
explain the services domestic preferences in these cases, but they are less compelling than a
richer variant of organization theory that also takes into account functional considerations and
socialized biases.
Some types of interest-based explanations are more persuasive than others. One
explanation that raises as many questions as it answers is based on personal profit. Since the
early post-independence period, the central government has provided only some 30 percent of
the military's budget, with shortfalls made good by the military's involvement in business.
Extra-budgetary funds have been particularly important in making up shortfalls in personnel
expenses, and access to business income can be highly lucrative for high-ranking
commanders. It is also a well-developed, highly refined system, where one's access to
additional income is closely calibrated to reflect the rank of the individual - regardless of
service. While the protection of perks may be a very plausible explanation for the army's
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general opposition to fundamental reform, it raises the question of why the navy's top officers
were more willing to surrender their privileges than the army's leadership.
Here, self-image and perceptions of functional interest appear important. Army
officers were better able justify their involvement in business as both profitable in a personal
sense and functional in a larger political-military sense. As the Jakarta Post observed: "Many
in the military [here meaning the army] are still living in the romantic revolutionary past,
when troops faced the enemy alongside civilians. This culture and self-image appears to be a
self-imposed restriction for reform."7 25 In theory, the military's involvement in the economy
was necessary not just to raise funds for the military but also to police the activities of
outsiders (i.e., the Chinese) in the economy and to "indigenize" the economy. This function,
however, fit more comfortably with the army's self-image as a revolutionary force than it did
with the navy's self-image as a technical and professional force.
Interest in official military budgets and budget share provides a better material
interest-based explanation for service difference, but even this does not appear sufficient to
explain the breadth or degree of difference in the services' positions. Under the old order, the
army clearly fared better in terms of budget share than the navy relative to what might be
expected of a military belonging to an archipelagic nation. But while the army's budget share
had been high relative to the other services, the overall military budget had been kept
725 "Gus Dur Struggles to Control TNI".
445
Chapter 6: Indonesia
relatively low throughout Suharto's reign. It was just over two percent of GDP when he
resigned from office.
Clearly, regime change would confront the army with major new uncertainties, and it
is not surprising that many top leaders would approach change warily. Yet the breadth and
depth of opposition is somewhat harder to understand without recourse to a consideration of
the army's self-image. There was little reason to believe that military budgets, or even the
army's budget, would decline under parliamentary rule. In fact, Wahid's defense minister,
Juwono, asked for a 60 percent budget increase in his November 1999 budget request and
secured an actual 32 percent increase. 726 While the navy and air force received an expanded
share of the total, the marginal increase was more than sufficient to ensure that the army
would receive substantial new funds.
Budgetary considerations do help explain the navy's position towards political change,
especially during the transitions from Suharto to Habibie, to Wahid. Given that the army held
the lion's share of the military budget, even a small reduction in the army's share could
produce a much larger percentage change in the navy's budget. And both Suharto in late
1997 and Habibie one year later looked eminently vulnerable. On the other hand, the navy's
principled, liberal positions after the inauguration of democratic rule are less easy to explain
in terms of the prospects for immediate gain. The navy supported constitutional reform (and
the elimination of military seats in parliament) and the separation of the military from
726 Damien Kingsbury, The Politics oflndonesia, 2nd ed. (Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2002),
280.
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business. And in May 2001, when Wahid faced parliamentary censure and the imminent
threat of impeachment, the navy refused to sanction the president's threat to impose martial
law, despite his strong support for the navy throughout his tenure.
All of the navy's positions may have been partly motivated by a desire to ensure that
its interests would not be damaged by a return to either Sukarno-style or Suharto-style
authoritarian (and integral nationalist) rule, but they involved considerable sacrifice in terms
of short-term interests. The navy demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice its own seats in
parliament, money from its business ventures, and, most significantly, a privileged political
position as the protector of Wahid's regime.
Summary and Conclusions
The civil-military coalition theory does a better job of explaining the services' domestic
preferences since 1949 than do material interests, and it explains key aspects of Indonesia's
strategy and force planning that explanations based on objective changes in the strategic
military environment cannot.
The navy made common cause with Dutch-trained, technocratic army officers during
the 1950s in supporting relatively liberal parliamentarians against socialist (integral
nationalist) political contenders and their Japanese-trained army allies. In 1998 and 1999 the
navy provided steadfast support to liberal members of the MPR who were then vying to
overthrow the integral nationalist status quo order of Suharto and his once vice president,
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Habibie. During the early 1950s, the army was divided in its loyalties but largely opposed to
the country's liberal prime ministers. During the 1990s, the army was again divided but
largely hostile to liberal social groups and politicians.
The politics surrounding the rise and fall of Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1957-
1965) did not pit integral nationalism against liberalism directly since liberal politicians had
vanished from the scene. But the period nevertheless provides some insight into the services'
domestic preferences. Army officers, especially wartime guerrilla leaders, opposed Sukarno's
policies of confrontation with the West and his courting of communist actors, since all of
those policies impeded opportunities for social action and other grass roots activities designed
to build national unity and resilience. Significantly, the army's resistance to Sukamo came
despite major budget increases and an expansion of the force structure. The navy, with less
interest in social and rural development issues and no real liberal alternatives, was swayed by
the promise of higher budgets and a larger force structure.
The domestic position taken by the services has had a significant impact on strategy
and force planning since at least the early 1960s. In neither 1967 nor 1999 was there any
fundamental shift in external or even military threats faced by the state, yet both of these dates
mark stark changes in Indonesia's strategic posture. To some extent, strategic shifts derived
from the different philosophies, theories, and priorities of national leaders. But even the
different strategic lenses of ruling elites cannot explain either the degree of change or some of
its specific content. Facing stiff army opposition to both his foreign and domestic program,
Sukarno relied heavily on the navy and marine corps to accomplish his foreign objectives.
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Suharto, on the other hand, distrusted the navy and hobbled its power even beyond what his
own focus on domestic missions and tasks would have suggested. During the late 1990s, the
new generation of liberal leaders understood that much of the army would oppose their
policies. Consequently, they used the navy in a variety of domestic capacities and
strengthened it in order to ensure its capacity to ensure it could carry out those tasks.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This chapter reviews the results of the cases considered in this dissertation, assesses the
implications of those findings in greater detail, and addresses the continuing relevance of
these findings in light of shifting domestic political-economic landscapes and the war on
terror.
Summary of Findings
The cases examined in this thesis strongly support the contention that in developing states,
different types of military organizations often have different domestic preferences and
frequently take opposite sides in political conflicts. Armies tend to be more internally divided
on domestic issues than navies, but often support integral nationalist positions. Navies have
backed liberal actors and positions. The liberal way forward is eased when these intra-
military differences are understood by liberal political leaders and when that information is
used to court allies within the military. It is also eased when naval forces are relatively
strong. The thesis demonstrates that the domestic preferences of the services are, in fact,
often understood by political leaders on both sides and that those leaders frequently designed
military policy to advantage their own supporters within the military establishment. The
results of the eight case studies are displayed in chart 7.1.
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In at least seven of the eight cases examined, navies proved significantly more
sympathetic to liberal political-economic positions than did armies. The possible exception is
Indonesia during the mid-1 960s, when the navy backed President Sukarno. But even in this
case, other details, including the navy's support for liberal actors during the 1950s, appear to
support the theory. Apart from the early Indonesian case, there was one other episode in
which the navy explicitly rejected electoral democracy: the Thai navy's support for the
overthrow of democracy in 1976. But in that case, the navy's actions were taken in support of
liberal social and economic values and under the credible threat of economic collapse.
Moreover, in that case naval leaders did promise - and deliver - a quick return to democratic
political rule. And in that case, as in all the other cases (with the possible exception, again, of
the early Indonesian case), naval actors found themselves in league with the preponderance of
the middle class, especially the upper middle class.
In all cases, new political elites brought to power by changes in regime type (from
liberal to integral nationalist or vis-A-vis) affected strategic and military force structure
changes that favored their domestic military supporters. In several cases, these shifts were
dramatic. In all three countries, shifts towards integral nationalist regimes and the political
struggles surrounding them resulted in the gutting of naval and marine corps strength. Liberal
regimes brought greater emphasis on the navy and maritime strategy. Budgetary constraints
sometimes limited the scope of warship construction or purchase. But even in those cases,
doctrines were adjusted, justifying future growth; naval leaders were promoted to top political
positions; and the navy's marine ground forces were rapidly expanded.
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A couple of patterns emerge from longitudinal comparisons across cases that are not
immediately evident from a summary of any single case. First, as a general rule, the theory
explains more about the later cases than the earliest cases. In all three countries, intra-military
differences were evident from the earliest periods examined. But military institutions were
newer, officers manning the force had been trained under different systems, and the domestic
attitudes of the services were relatively underdeveloped. In general, the services also came to
evaluate their interests from longer-term perspectives as their ideologies - and the differences
between army and navy ideologies - sharpened. Hence, the Chinese navy, which supported
moderate (i.e., relatively liberal) political positions both before and after the Cultural
Revolution became relatively more outspoken - and more willing to accept short-term
sacrifices - in its defense of those values.
The Thai military is the exception that proved the rule. Unlike military institutions in
the other two states examined here, the Thai army and navy dated to long before the first case
examined here. And it is the one of the three countries where service preferences were as
distinct, and intra-military battles fought as fiercely, in the first case as they were in later
cases. 727 In both of the other countries, the services had distinct preferences from the early
post-independent period, but those preferences were less distinctly defined, sometimes
overridden by short-term material interests, and not, for the most part, defended as vigorously
as in later cases.
727 An interesting contrast here is the Thai air force, which was detached from the army and established as an
independent service shortly before World War II. A newer service, its political identity was, until at least the
1970s, substantially less distinct from the army than was that of the navy. (Indeed, it provided much of the
firepower the army needed to defeat the navy in 1951.)
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A second pattern, one that has been of shorter duration and is therefore not visible
from the summary table of case coding, is that as armies have downsized and become more
mechanized (especially over the last ten years) the domestic preferences of the services appear
to have experienced some convergence around relatively more liberal positions. Senior Thai
army officers are, for example, considerably more restrained in their anti-democratic and anti-
capitalist rhetoric than they used to be, and many now swear unqualified allegiance to civilian
authorities.
The moderation of integral nationalist sentiment within regional armies (and indeed,
among armies in the developing world more broadly) should ease the task of democratic
consolidation. In part, these attitudinal shifts were consciously designed by the regimes' new
liberal leaders. In other words, liberal leaders adjusted force structures in ways they expected
would shift military values and culture. In part, however, they have also been a byproduct of
the demonstrated effectiveness of high-tech warfare. Repeated defeats of mass armies,
especially at the hands of U.S. forces, has given reformers ample ammunition to use against
those officers who would insist that they can create a force maximized for assisting with grass
roots developmental projects and simultaneously for defense against invaders.
Circumspection in this tentative observation about the moderation of army views is
order. Historically, the services' differences in all three of these countries have remained well
hidden until acute political crises provide the opportunity and incentive for the services to
reveal their domestic positions. Indonesia and, especially, China are likely to endure political
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crises in the years ahead that will severely test civil-military relations. Army leaders in
Indonesia believe that a coup or other forms of military intervention in politics today would
have little support, but some also believe that civilian attitudes will change as the country's
problems worsen. In other words, the actions and public statements of army officers may
reflect their views of what the political market will bear at the present time, rather than a
fundamental shift in their own thinking. Even if attitudes are moderating to some degree,
differences between the various services and branches persist. As the political center
continues to shift in each of these states, relative differences in officers' political views will
remain relevant. Most importantly, as these and other cases demonstrate, even relatively
small factions of junior officers with a clear ideology and purpose - no matter how misguided
- can emerge to dominate the military if the right circumstances present themselves.
Theoretical and Policy Implications
The patterns of intra-military difference and strategic impact summarized here carry four
major implications. First, they affirm that in developing states, military policy is often
influenced decisively by domestic political considerations; any realist theory that seeks to
explain the military behavior of these states must adopt a broad definition of threats to include
domestic threats to regime security alongside threats to state sovereignty as key motivators.
Second, even regional international military trends may be the product of domestic politics;
political change frequently occurs in waves and this may produce similar types of strategic
change in multiple states. Third, a conceptual understanding of intra-military differences and
their causes should allow liberal reformers in developing states to develop a playbook for
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dealing with the military, even without a detailed knowledge of the specific views of hundreds
of individual officers. And fourth, the findings suggest that the United States can, in its war
on terror, engage the militaries of important developing states more closely without
undermining liberal reform (where it is ongoing), but only if it tailors that engagement
appropriately.
REALIST THEORY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Realism provides a powerful framework for understanding the security policies of even small
developing states, but only if it is construed to include the consideration of domestic, as well
as international threats and only if threats are considered in relation to regime security, as well
as state security.
The cases examined here tend to confirm Jack Snyder's proposition that national
leaders react to external or domestic threats, depending on which are more pressing, and they
will design both domestic and international policy accordingly.7 28 In other words, states are
likely to formulate policy (including foreign and military policy) to counter domestic threats
to regime security when those are more immediate than foreign ones, just as they will tend to
formulate domestic policy to better enable them to counter foreign threats when those are
more pressing. Domestic threats are particularly likely to drive national policy in developing
states. The balance of power between social groups (and between social groups and the state)
is likely to shift relatively quickly in these states, and even if there are democratic
728 Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.
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mechanisms for making politics a transparent and iterated game, those mechanisms are likely
to be relatively weak.
Because China is a mid-sized power, it is easy to forget that it is also a relatively poor
developing state. (A large population may give it substantial aggregate resources, but does
little to free it from most of the political, economic, and social dilemmas commonly faced by
developing states.) The Chinese cases examined in this thesis suggest that when domestic
political structures are hotly contested, military forces and strategies are frequently
manipulated to influence outcomes at home. As of this writing, the central leadership is
relatively unified and its various social contradictions are reasonably well in hand. Its
military and strategic planning are, accordingly, less affected by domestic considerations than
at some points in its past. But this could easily change, even in the near future, and in the
longer term, it is safe to say that its political system will almost certainly face severe and
acute tests that will make political considerations critical in force planning and strategy. With
China looming large in U.S. defense planning, it is important to appreciate the domestic
drivers of its military behavior, as well as the international ones.
ILLUSORY 'ARMS RACES' IN EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA
As the comments above suggest, military trends in East Asia and other developing regions -
often taken to reflect the level or nature of conflict between states - may instead be driven
more by domestic events. This, together with the fact that political change in the developed
world tends to occur in waves, can create region-wide shifts in military strategy and weapons
acquisition patterns. If shifts from integral nationalism to liberalism in any given state are
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likely to bring in tow greater emphasis on national maritime forces and doctrines, then a
liberal wave affecting a set of five, ten, or a dozen neighboring states is likely to lead to a
region-wide naval arms buildup. These dynamics may produce the illusion of arms racing
even where little or no strategic interaction is actually occurring. Strategic shifts can,
nevertheless, heighten mutual insecurity about the intentions of potential adversaries and
require careful management regardless of their causes.
In East Asia, the size of naval inventories has increased rapidly over the last two
decades, a phenomenon that some have described as a naval arms race.729 Between 1980 and
2001, the number of major surface warships in East Asian inventories increased from 198 to
300, or 52 percent.7 30 This naval growth is particularly prominent when considered in light of
changes in tank and combat aircraft holdings, which grew 11 percent and -28 percent
respectively. Naval growth was also reflected in manpower figures. Between 1980 and 1997,
East Asian navies' share of total military manpower climbed 25 percent (from 11.4 percent to
14.3 percent), while the armies' dropped by 5 percent (from 75.2 percent to 71.8 percent) and
the air forces' rose by 8 percent (from 12.7 percent to 13.7 percent).
These developments cannot be explained simply in terms of economic growth and the
replacement of manpower with capital. Regional naval forces atrophied during the 1960s and
729 See, for example, Mann, "Arms Races Likely When Asia Recovers." Paul J. Bracken, Fire in the East: the
rise of Asian military power and the second nuclear age, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). Calder,
Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific.
730 Richard Sharpe, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships, 2001-2002 (Alexandria, Va: Jane's Information Group, 2001).
Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980. In this section, ship numbers and aggregate tonnage include ships
over 500 tons. Because the average size of those warships also increased, aggregate tonnage grew even faster,
some 69 percent.
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1970s despite high levels of economic growth. Nor, as the cases examined in this thesis
show, does the decline or rise of naval forces correspond in any simple way with the start or
finish of local insurgencies.
Rather, these cases suggest that the East Asian naval arms buildup was more a
byproduct of the "third wave" of democratic reform than it is a naval arms race. The three
states examined represent three out of four cases that have seen the fastest naval growth, and
in each, shifts in resource allocation were more closely associated with domestic political
change than with shifts in the international environment or any imminent sense of maritime
threat. Naval growth in the fourth of these states, South Korea, also followed closely in the
wake of liberal political reform. An examination of aggregate military data for developing
and developed states tends to support this thesis. The only two regional states that began the
1980s as advanced industrial democracies, Australia and Japan, did not undertake similar
resource reallocation. The combined warship, tank and combat aircraft inventories of these
two states grew by 12 percent, 23 percent, and -7 percent between 1980 and 2001. For the
ten developing states of the region, the figures were 68 percent, 10 percent, and -30 percent.
Variations of this theme can be seen in other places during different historical eras.
In Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, liberal economic policy was, in the 1960s and 1970s,
associated with illiberal government. Faced with a choice, naval officers in all these states
chose traditional liberal economic and social orders over democratic political structures, and
in all, naval officers played leading roles in authoritarian government. The result, in military
force structure terms, was increased spending on naval forces and what some analysts
460
._
Chapter 7: Conclusions
described as a naval arms race in Latin America. Territorial disputes along the Antarctic rim
were, in the case of Argentina and Chile, said to provide motivation. But these disputes
emerged as salient issues only after the navy's involvement in politics, and they were
addressed and resolved through quiet diplomacy shortly after the restoration of democracy.
To conclude that domestic drivers may decisively influence external security policies
does not preclude the possibility of dynamic interaction - real arms races - developing
between states. The rapid expansion of the Wilhelmine German navy was largely
domestically driven but nevertheless triggered an intensive battleship building contest with
Britain, one that hastened Germany's self-encirclement and, ultimately, contributed to World
War I. In contemporary Asia, rapid naval growth in individual states could, and in some
cases has, increased the sense of insecurity in other states. The free hand that liberal leaders
have given national navies in propagandizing their various causes may exacerbate the
problem. To date, however, specific problems that have emerged to threaten working
relationships between regional states have been contained or resolved before they have fatally
damaged those relations.
Some U.S. assessments of the East Asian security environment overstate the levels of
mutual suspicion and insecurity in the region (especially those involving China).
Nevertheless, liberalization does carry some new dangers even as it mitigates others.
Ultimately, consolidating liberal gains will provide the best long-term solution to these
problems, but until this is achieved, new dangers will demand thoughtful management by the
United States and its partners.
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Barring the emergence of a self-sustaining arms race, which at this point does not
appear imminent, naval growth should slow eventually as new liberal regimes are
consolidated - much as naval growth slowed in South America after the domestic
circumstances there changed. In Thailand and China, there are already signs that political
changes have already eroded the privileged political position of their respective navies. 731 But
sub regional and individual national patterns are likely to vary considerably. In those states
where democratic rule and free markets have been largely consolidated (e.g., Thailand), the
speed of military resource reallocation should slow significantly. In those states where liberal
reformers have taken power but are still in the process of consolidating recent gains (e.g.,
Taiwan) liberal political leaders may continue to rebalance service priorities in favor of the
navy. Finally, in those states where leaders are ambivalent about change or facing
particularly complex challenges (e.g., China and Indonesia) both domestic priorities and
strategic direction are likely change repeatedly in step with one another.
A PLAYBOOK FOR LIBERAL POLITICAL LEADERS
For political leaders attempting to begin or consolidate liberal transitions in developing states,
the theory and cases presented above provide a number of broad lessons.
First, Reformers should generally be able to find support within the military if they
look in the right places. Specifically, natural allies are likely to exist in organizations where
731 In the former case, civilians have consolidated their authority and no longer need the navy as much as they
did previously; in the latter, political authorities now see the primary threat to their position as those who want to
push liberal reform faster, rather than those who would seek to derail it.
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officers possess a high degree of technical education and perform technical tasks - including
the navy, the air force, and some portions of the army (e.g., among those army officers
branched in communications or with careers built primarily in staff positions). A rudimentary
knowledge of the relationship between structure and culture will, to a significant extent,
negate the need for a detailed familiarity with the political preferences of specific uniformed
officers. And because institutional military allies can sponsor military reforms that may
minimize the potential for integral nationalist military challenges in the longer-term, this
institutional knowledge underpins a comprehensive, integrated strategy for dealing with
domestic military threats.
Second, even if a core of reform-minded army officers can be found, naval and air
force officers will generally constitute a critical part of any potential pro-reform coalition
during political transitions. Liberal army officers are likely to be subject to intense pressure
from other members of their own service, many of who will almost certainly have strong anti-
liberal biases. Apart from personal pressures that may be brought to bear against pro-
reformer army officers by academy classmates or other acquaintances, opponents will almost
always be heavily represented on the boards and committees that control key policy areas
and/or promotion lists. Naval and air force leaders, on the other hand, will enjoy the broad
support of their own organization, which can provide a layer of insulation against pressure or
intimidation.
Third, the promotion of relatively liberal military officers to top positions tends to
provide only temporary protection to liberal leaders unless those officers are mobilized to
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promote structural military reforms giving civilian authorities legally sanctioned and/or
broadly recognized authority over the details of defense budgeting and senior personnel
appointments. Early in the reform process, conservative integral nationalists officers may be
on the defensive. But as in Thailand, where high-profile veterans of the 1992 coup d'etat
have recently been promoted to senior posts in the army, the system of service committees
that frequently prepare promotion lists or determine other key policy areas may provide
opportunities for the conservative opponents to stage comebacks if clear oversight authority is
not secured by political authorities. If opportunities for structural and legal reform are not
seized, liberal regimes may be challenged by reactionary officers when the former are least
prepared to defend themselves. And although navy and air force leaders are useful allies and
can help sponsor whatever military reform might be undertaken, they may have difficulty
rescuing regimes that fail to prevent military conservatives within the army from regaining the
initiative.
Fourth, in the long-term, the army can and should be restructured in ways that make it
more sympathetic to liberal values. All things being equal, those armies with large high-
technology components, officers with advanced schooling and technical education, long-
service volunteer enlisted soldiers, strong general staffs, and conventional military doctrines
are more likely to support liberal political and economic programs than are armies without
such characteristics. All things are not, of course, always even. The Junker monopoly on
commissions within the army of Wilhelmine Germany made that army a politically reaction
force, despite its being the most technologically advanced in Europe. But in general, making
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armies more closely resemble navies in key organizational features should make their politics
more similar to those of navies.
U.S. EFFORTS TO SUPPORT LIBERAL RULE
How can the United States assist liberal leaders in developing states consolidate recent gains?
Although the U.S. capacity for influencing the domestic behavior of military forces in foreign
states is limited, some measures deserve consideration.
First, the U.S. government, foundations, universities, and think tanks can and should
promote comparative studies of civil-military relations, especially those with an eye towards
distilling practical lessons for liberal leaders in developing states. The case studies presented
in this thesis show remarkable similarities in the tactics employed by those who have been
most successful in dealing with domestic military challenges. Other recent comparative work
has also yielded other clear lessons about tactics that work and those that do not.732 Yet
lessons from this academic work seldom if ever find their way into the popular media where it
might be more accessible. The results of existing case studies should be made as accessible as
possible, and the lessons that derive from them should be distilled for those who need that
information quickly. Testing competing theories also remains critical.
Second, decisions about whether or not the United States should engage in military-to-
military ties with developing states in which "the military" represents a potential threat to
elected leaders should not be considered all-or-nothing choices. In states where military
732 One standout example is Hunter, Eroding military influence in Brazil: politicians against soldiers.
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elements represent a latent threat to liberal leadership, the United States may be able to
achieve multiple aims simultaneously by focusing its military aid on strengthening naval and
air forces. Based on his empirical observations of the Indonesian military, Robert Gelbard,
U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, suggested exactly this approach in August 2000.733 In that
case, his advice has been largely followed. As suggested throughout this thesis, officers from
the navy and other relatively technical military organizations can provide physical protection
for liberal leaders, as well as sponsorship for the institutional reform of the military as a
whole. And because military forces of different kinds are largely fungible, these efforts can
significantly strengthen defensive capabilities against even continental-based external military
threats.
Third, in U.S. dealings with foreign armies, focusing on work with technical officers
and branches would, in the long term, change the dynamics of these organizations. Military
reformers in Thailand emerged from the general staff and the communications branch; in the
Chinese case, they came from the general staff and the military's science and technology
community. In both case, line officers had long dominated the military establishment. In
neither would even most observers have predicted before the fact that technical officers would
emerge to assert strong political and military leadership. Yet those officers proved critical.
Capable individuals from the army's communications, logistics, and general staff should be
encouraged to apply for advanced training in the United States (e.g., for advanced technical
courses), while funding for basic officer courses in the combat arms branches (especially the
733 Ehrlich, "Indonesia's Security Efforts Off Target U.S. Envoy".
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infantry) should be scrutinized more closely. Training young infantry officers may create
more professional officers, but it is also more likely to provide career advantages for officers
who already hold deeply ingrained integral nationalist views.
Intra-Military Differences and the War on Terror
The ideas developed and tested in this thesis were formulated prior to the attacks of 9.1 1 and
the subsequent "war on terror." The cases themselves do not, for the most, deal explicitly
with the relationship between military organizations and religion or religious fundamentalism.
To a significant extent, of course, the behavior of individual officers will depend on the
religious beliefs and upbringing of the individual. Nevertheless, the thesis' findings do permit
some informed speculation on how the military services, in general terms, might differ in the
face of a terrorist or insurgent threat from religious fundamentalists. And although political
Islam in Asia has generally been significantly more moderate than that practiced in the
Middle East, the recent violence perpetrated by the militant wing of Jamaah Islamiah, as well
as social inequality in Indonesia, Malaysia, and other critical countries, increases the salience
of this question.
In states with Islamic minorities (e.g., Thailand, China, and the Philippines) all
military services are likely to be staunchly opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, but they may
nevertheless differ in their specific responses. Integral nationalist officers in the army are
likely to take an extremely hard line against fundamentalism, will be quick to see any
religious political organization as a threat to the state's integrity, and may use the war on
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terror to push an illiberal re-centralization of state power. Naval and air force officers are
likely to be more inclined to support liberal policies, such as federalism and greater
integration with world markets, in an effort to generate economic growth and, hopefully,
ameliorate the conditions that may promote fundamentalism. Unless fundamentalism
threatens the viability of the state in an immediate sense, these officers are unlikely to seek
authoritarian solutions. To operationalize the prediction, navies in these countries will
support authoritarian tactics only when the majority of the middle class backs that approach,
while the army will support such tactics significantly earlier.
In states with preponderantly Muslim populations (e.g., Indonesia), the behavior of the
services, especially the army, may be somewhat different. The navy will still be inclined to
defend liberal economic and social values, but the probability of its coming to view
authoritarian political necessary methods as necessary for the defense of those values will be
higher than in states where Muslim's represent only a fraction of the population. In
Indonesia, the navy remains relatively more committed to political liberalism than other
military organizations, but if the Islamic threat rises, the navy could swing sharply the other
direction. The operative assumption here, however, is not that naval actors will act on
different principles than they will in other cases, but that it will be easier for naval officers
(like much of the middle class) to imagine political Islam as an imminent threat.
Armies in states with Muslim majorities are likely to be beset by particularly sharp
divisions, with multiple factions vying for the ideological high ground. There will be some
officers, primarily from the technical branches, who will continue to embrace liberal
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nationalist ideas similar to those of most naval and air force officers. Other officers will, as
before, continue to adhere largely to some form of integral nationalism. In this case, however,
"integral nationalists" will themselves likely be divided into two camps. On the one hand,
some will embrace a relatively pure form of the doctrine (as it has been described in this
thesis). These officers will reject any idea - including radical Islamic doctrines - that cannot
be embraced by the entire population. This group may hold illiberal, but nevertheless secular,
preferences about the organization of economic, social, and political activity.
Others, who adhere to a bastardized form of the ideology, may see a clerical order as
the embodiment of a national egalitarian order. And they will not be concerned even if
Christian, Hindu, animist or other minorities of the state can never be comfortably included in
that order. These individuals will hold that Islam is a core aspect of the nation. This split
personality between different types of integral nationalism is already visible in the Indonesian
army, where committed secular officers coexist alongside a activist Islamic ones, and some
renegade members of the latter have almost certainly provided weapons and training to, for
example, jihad fighters headed to Malacca. Those officers have received cover from some
key leaders in Islamic political parties, and the factionalization of the army has made it
difficult to police their activities through internal means.
It is of course possible to imagine any military officer, depending on his personal
background or early upbringing, sympathizing with domestic radicals. But long service in
poor regions and extended involvement with local administration - and interaction with
clerics fulfilling minor bureaucratic functions - may reinforce these tendencies. In contrast, a
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life devoted to technical education and the management of complex tasks - including
extended work with other similarly trained individuals - is likely to diminish such tendencies.
Hence, the services are as likely to differ almost as significantly in relation to questions of
state and religion as they are to differ on secular issues of political economy.
These patterns carry several implications for U.S. policy. First, economic and social
variables will probably be more important than military ones in determining political
outcomes. In the face of violent terrorist attacks, few if any military groups will support
liberal political rule if such government appears to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the social
conditions that sustain terrorism. While the United States will have limited leverage over
national economic policies in these states (much less over political variables), it should
nevertheless do what it can to buttress the new liberal regimes of Asia by helping them to
provide the social and economic goods to their populations. It might, for example, support
legal education and exchange programs, keep the doors open to cheap imports from these
states, increase aid projects targeted at particularly poor regions, and support micro-lending
and other innovative approaches to poverty alleviation.
As far as military-to-military engagement is concerned, the United States should resist
the temptation to target assistance exclusively or even primarily to special forces, which may
be most directly engaged in the fight with guerrillas but also often continue to represent the
greatest military threat to liberal government. It should, rather, balance assistance for those
elements (if, indeed, it engages them at all) with a broader effort to improve the
professionalism and efficiency of the entire military organization. This will further the
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objective of winning the military fight against terrorist organizations, while minimizing the
chances of creating the conditions that will lead to the regeneration of radical ranks. Liberal
orders may have many weaknesses, but reactionary government is almost certain to fail to
provide the answers needed to confront today's challenges. Yet without broader military
reform, assistance programs aimed at the most problematic parts of the military structure may
increase the chances that reactionary governments will assume power and may, therefore,
prove counterproductive in the long run.
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APPENDIX 1: DATA ON THAI CASE
APPENDIX 1.1: PEOPLE DISCUSSED IN THE TEXT (THAILAND)
Arthit Kamlangek Helped suppress 1981 coup, then
2nd Army Region Cdr
Army Commander 1982 -
Supreme Cdr 1983
turned against PM Prem.
1982
1986
1986
Chamlong Srimuang (gen.)
Chatichai Choonhavan
Chavalit Yoongchai (gen.)
Young Turk member and proponent for Thai poor.
PM from provincial pro-business party, Chart Thai.
Prime Minister 08.88 - 02.91
Communications officer and member Democratic Soldiers.
Advisor to Prem 1979 - 1986
Supreme Cdr. 1987 - 1990
Defense Minister 1995 - 1997
Prime Minister 11.96 - 11.97
Defense Minister 2001 -
Khuang Aphaiwong
Kriangsak Chomanand (gen.)
Phibun Songgram (general)
Moderate royalist able to work N
Prime Minister 08.44
Prime Minister 01.46
Gen. Staff Officer. Became PM
Supreme Cdr. 1976
Prime Minister 11.77
National socialist
Prime Minister
Prime Minister
vith most Thai pol groups.
- 08.45
- 03.46
with Adm. Sangad's assistance.
- 1977
- 02.80
leader of Thailand during WWII.
12.38 - 07.44
04.48 - 09.57
Prem Tinsulanonda (general)
Pridi Phanomyong
Led Thai transition to democracy during 1980s.
2nd Army Commander 10.74 - 09.77
Dpty Army Chf of Staff 10.77 - 09.78
Minister of Defense 05.79 - 03.80
Army Commander 10.78 - 09.81
Prime Minister 03.80 - 07.88
Privy Councilor 1988 -
Liberal politician; "father of Thai democracy"
Free Thai leader 1942 - 1944
Dominates parliamnt 1944 - 1947
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Saiyud Kerdpol (general)
Samak Sundaravej
Sangad Chaloryu (admiral)
Sarit Thanarat (general)
Seni Pramoj
Suchindra Kaprayoon (gen.)
Sunthorn Kongsompong
Thamrong Nawasawal (adm.)
Thanin Kraivichian
Thanom Kittikachorn (gen.)
Wichitwathakan
Prime Minister 03.46 - 08.46
Staff officer who worked closely with navy.
Supreme Cdr. 1983
Bangkok demagogic populist allied with Gen. Arthit.
Supreme Cdr. 1973 -
Cdr. of the Navy 1973 - 1976
Prime Minister 09.57 - 09.57
Prime Minister 10.58 - 12.63
Free Thai leader 1942 - 1944
Prime Minister 09.45 - 01.46
Prime Minister 02.75 - 03.75
Prime Minister 04.76 - 10.77
Led coup against democratic government in Feb. 1991
Army Commander - 1992
Prime Minister 04.92 - 05.92
Supreme Cdr. during and immediately after the Feb '91 coup
Supreme Commander - 05.92
Prime Minister 08.46 - 09.47
Hard line PM appointed by King, overthrown by Adm. Sangad.
Prime Minister 10.76 - 10.77
PM who followed Sarit (and Sarit's policies).
Prime Minister 12.57 - 10.58
Prime Minister 12.63 - 10.73
National socialist advisor to Phibun during war years.
Advisor to Phibun 1938 - 1944
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APPENDIX 1.2: LEADERSHIP POSTS (THAILAND)
Prime Ministers, 1932-Present
Manopahorn
Phraya Bahol
Phibun Songgram
Khuang Aphaiwong
Thawi Bunjaket (?)
Seni Pramoj
Khuang Aphaiwong (2)
Pridi Phanomyong
Thamrong Nawasawal
Khuang Aphaiwong (3)
Phibun Songgram (2)
Sarit Thanarat
Pote Sarasin
Thanom Kittikachorn
Sarit Thanarat(2)
Thanom Kittikachorn (2)
Sanya Thammasak
Seni Pramoj (2)
Kukrit Pramoj
Seni Pramoj (3)
Thanin Kraivichian
Kriangsak Chomanand
Prem Tinsulanonda
Chatichai Choonhavan
Anand Panyarachun
Suchindra Kaprayoon
Anand Panyarachun
Banhara Silpa-areka
Chavalit Yoongchai Yudh
Chuan Leekpai
1932
11.34
12.38
08.44
08.45
09.45
01.46
03.46
08.46
09.47
04.48
09.57
09.57
12.57
10.58
12.63
10.73
02.75
03.75
04.76
10.76
11.77
03.80
08.88
03.91
04.92
06.92
07.95
11.96
11.97
11.38
12.38
07.44
08.45
09.45
01.46
03.46
08.46
09.47
04.48
09.57
09.57
12.57
10.58
12.63
10.73
02.75
03.75
04.76
10.76
10.77
02.80
07.88
02.91
04.92
05.92
07.95
09.96
11.97
Commanders of the Royal Thai Navy
Phraya Preechacholayudha
Phraya Wichcitcholathai
Sin Kamonnawin
Phraya Wichanworajak
07.32
08.33
01.34
05.34
- 08.33
- 12.33
05.34
- 10.38
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Sin Kamonnawin (2) 10.38
Luang Pholasinthanawat 07.51
Luang Yuthasatkoson 12.51
Luang Chamnanarthayutha 09.57
Sawat Phutianands 10.62
MC Kanchitpon Apakorn 10.64
Charoon Charlermtiarana 04.66
Thawin Rayananonda 10.71
Komon Sitakalin 10.72
Cherdchai Thomya 10.73
Sangad Charloru 11.73
Amon Sirigaya 10.76
Kawee Singha 10.78
Somboon Chuaphiboon 10.81
Prapat Chantawirat 10.83
Niphon Sirithom 10.84
Thada Ditthabanchong 09.86
Prapat Krishnachan 10.87
Vichet Karunyavanij 10.91
Prachet Siridej 10.93
Wichit Chamnankarn 10.96
Suvatchai Kasemsook 10.97
Thira Hao-Charoen 10.98
Prasert Boonsong 10.00
07.51
12.51
09.57
09.62
09.64
02.66
09.71
09.72
09.73
11.73
09.76
09.78
09.81
09.83
09.84
09.86
09.87
09.91
09.93
09.96
09.97
09.98
09.00
Partial List of Supreme Commanders
Sangad Chaloryu (navy)
Kriangsak Chomanand
Saiyud Kerdpol
Arthit Kamlangek
Sup Kotchesenee (navy)
Chavalit Yoongchai
Sunthorn Kongsompong
Mongkhon Amphonphisit
Sampao Chusri
Narong Yuthawong (navy)
Surayud Chulanont
1973
1976
1982
1986
1987
04.90
11.95
2000
12.01
10.02
1977
1982
1986
1987
04.90
05.92
2000
12.01
09.02
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APPENDIX 1.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (THAI)
National Political or
Economic Event
Liberal revolution ends
absolute monarchy,
establishes
constitutional
monarchy.
Constitutional
monarchy established.
Half of assembly
appointed by King and
PM.
General Phibun elected
PM. Begins
establishing national
socialist state; courts
lower and lower middle
class.
State reorganized
along National Socialist
lines. Authoritarian
politics. Corporatist
social structures.
Strategic Military
Event (External or
Insurgent)
Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. (Dec.
7)
War with France to
reclaim provinces in
Laos. Vichy French
government agrees to
return four provinces.
Domestic
Political-Military
Event (including
coup)
Navy significantly
overrepresented in
the liberal revolution.
Free Thai movement
formed to subvert
Phibun and Japanese
alliance. Led by Pridi
and Seni. Heavy
naval participation.
Military Strategy
and Force
Structure
Development
Budgets for all three
services increase
rapidly. Naval budget
increases 21 percent,
but slips from 64 % of
the army's budget to
62.
477
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1944
1941
(Dec.)
1941-
1942
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National Assembly
ousts Phibun (August)
and establishes a
provisional
government.
Government dominated
by liberals associated
with Pridi and his Free
Thai allies. Liberal
order established.
Liberal constitution
adopted. Lower House
entirely elected. Upper
House elected
indirectly by Lower
House. (May)
Admiral Thamrong,
head of the Constitution
Front party, serves as
PM. Aug '46 - Nov '47.
Foreign investment
allowed in mining
sector. Tax rates
reduced. Rice shortage
caused by reparations
to Britain and bad
policy.
Thailand declares war
on the allied powers.
(January)
Peace negotiations
with Britain begin Aug
1945, signed Jan
1946. Reparations
require rice and
mineral to England.
Peace negotiations
with France.
Skirmishes on Laos
border from mid-'46.
Agreement signed
Jan. 1947. Thailand
returns four
provinces.
Naval officers remain
close to Pridi, heavily
represented in liberal
and cabinets parties.
Army hostile to
parliamentary govt.
Naval budgets
increase by 50%;
army budgets decline
by 40% between '44
and'46. Marines
given best ground
forces equipment (eg,
tanks).
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Coup d'etat.
Provisional constitution
adopted. Upper House
transformed into
nominated body.
Phibun brought in as
figurehead PM by 1947
coup leaders. Phibun
subsequently tries to
establish his
independence. (April)
Phibun adopts
economic policies to
help the poor and
promote national
industries. Policies
consistent with integral
nationalism.
Korean War begins.
Thailand provides
one inf. bn., naval
corvettes, and
transport assets.
Major U.S. assistance
to Thailand begins.
Successful coup
d'etat by mid-level
army officers.
(November)
First counter-coup
attempt against 1947
coup group (Oct '48).
Launched by army's
general staff. Naval
officers also
suspected.
Second counter-coup
attempt against 1947
coup group. Navy,
Pridi, and other Free
Thai seize downtown
Bangkok. Defeated.
Third counter-coup
attempt against 1947
coup group. Junior
naval officers seize
Phibun, call for
uprising. Effort
violently suppressed
with heavy losses.
(June)
After counter-coup
failure, navy
"restructured."
Stripped of police and
combat air.
Personnel reduced.
Marines cut from 4
battalions to 1. Fleet
tonnage declines.
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New constitution.
Modeled on 1932
constitution. Elected
and nominated MPs,
with the latter selected
by the govt and military.
Gen. Sarit establishes
developmental state.
Integral nationalist
economic policies (high
tariffs, planning, etc).
Emphasis on basic
education and rural
infrastructure.
PM Sarit dissolves
parliament. Not
reestablished until
1969.
Death of Sarit (1963).
Gen. Thanom takes
charge. Economic and
social policy largely
unchanged.
Vietminh forces
establish first
presence in
Cambodia and Laos.
French forces
defeated at Dien Bien
Phu. (May)
SEATO formed.
Bloodless "Radio
Coup" by members of
the 1947 coup group
against their own
government.
Parliament
suspended.
(November)
Coup d'etat elevates
army General Sarit
Thanarat to power
over his peers from
the 1947 coup group.
Sarit reduces defense
spending.
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Under pressure from
middle class and the
United States, new
constitution put into
effect.
First parliamentary
elections (Feb.) since
'58. Mil. party gains
most seats, but pro-
business Democrat
Party is second.
Business heavily
represented.
200,000 student
protesters demand
Gen. Thanom's
resignation after arrest
of students distributing
political leaflets.
(October)
Armed Thai
communist
insurgency, with PRC
backing, begins.
Focused in Northeast.
Vietnam War
intensifies. U.S.
increases troop
levels.
Sea-Bed Committee
begins work on what
becomes the 1982
UN Law of the Sea
Convention. (Takes
force in 1994.)
Nixon orders first
withdrawals from
Vietnam.
"Vietnamization"
begins. (June)
Vietnam claims 200
nm EEZ off its coast.
Thailand claims 200
nm EEZ. Awards oil
exploration contracts
to US firms, which
quickly abandon work
after protests by
Cambodia, which also
claims area.
Naval officers
believed to vote
preponderantly
Democrat Party in
parliamentary
elections. Army
officers stick with
military party.
PM Gen. Thanom
suspends '68
constitution, dissolves
parliament.
Thanom orders
military to disperse
students. (See
"politics" column.)
Some elements
respond, some do
not. Navy
commander Sangad
opposes suppression.
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With threat of civil war
looming, King orders
Gen. Thanom to go into
exile. Liberal university
head, Sanya, selected
as interim PM.
Liberal parties hold
power in parliament,
but radical leftist
students and labor
leaders hold and use
leverage on economic
and social issues.
General decline in
economic situation.
Inflation increasing.
Labor unrest and strike
activity increases.
Number of communist
insurgents in the
countryside grows
from approximately
6,000 to 8,000 as
economic situation
worsens.
Fall of South
Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos to
communist forces.
Under the new PM,
Sanya, Admiral
Sangad appointed
Supreme
Commander. Air
force officer is made
defense minister.
Young Turks faction
formed. Members
are mid-ranking army
officers. Seek to rid
military of corruption,
but share integral
nationalist values.
Dem. Soldiers group
formed by army staff
officers. Foreswear
coups d'etat. More
liberal than other
army groups, but
share some elements
of integral nationalist
ideology.
Decline in defense
budget as percent of
state budget. Navy
grows. Adds offshore
patrol craft. Marine
corps grows from
4,000 to 10,000.
Army adopts Total
People's Defense
strategy. Expands
paramilitary and
grass-roots orgs in
countryside.
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ruIIuwIIIy orangaas
coup (see "military
politics" column), King(without Sangad's
consultation) appoints
hard line judge, Thanin,
as new PM.
New constitution
established.
Parliament will have
elected and appointed
members, but timetable
established for phasing
out appointed
membership. Elections
scheduled for 1979.
Refugees from
Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos flood
Thailand. Most come
by land but some also
by boat.
Vietnam, backed by
the Soviet Union,
invades Cambodia.
(December)
Nith tensions
between China and
/ietnam rising, China
:uts off funding to
rhai rebels.
Chinese invasion of
/nn /Ckk-.c-_A
Admiral Sangad (the
defense minister)
leads high command
in preemptive coup.
Promises quick return
of democratic rule.
Admiral Sangad, still
defense minister,
leads a coup against
PM Thanin. Criticizes
Thanin's harsh tactics
and long time-horizon
for reestablishing
democracy.
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PM Gen. Prem rules
through liberal coalition
in parliament.
Observes constitution
and overseas transition
to democratic rule.
Thailand signs
separate MOUs with
both Malaysia and
Vietnam to establish
joint authority for
development of
disputed sea areas.
Communist guerrilla
strength, growing
throughout the 1970s,
reaches peak of
11,000.
Mass surrenders of
communist fighters --
the effective end of
the insurgency.
Law of the Sea
Convention,
establishing 200 nm
EEZs, open for
signing. (December)
Enters into force in
November 1994.
Coup attempt by
members of the
Young Turks.
Defeated with
assistance of marine
corps.
Naval manpower
increases from
32,000 to 42,000
(from 7.8% of military
manpower to 8.6%).
Fleet tonnage grows
from 11,000 tons to
13,000 tons.
PM Order No.
66/2523 shifts anti-
guerrilla strategy
away from military-
based approach to
more political one
(e.g., one with
amnesty provisions).
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Parliamentary
elections. Prem fails to
form coalition. Hands
power to Chatichai,
leader of the largest
party.
Democratic era (with
the exception of
February 1991 - May
1992 military
government)
PM Chatichai, of
provincial business
party, weakens state
planning and allows
incoming FDI to expand
dramatically.
Chinese seize several
of the Spratley
Islands in the center
of the South China
Sea.
Army officers attempt
to delay phase out of
military seats in
parliament. Opposed
by most civilian MPs,
Democratic Soldiers,
the navy, and the air
force.
Coup d'etat attempt.
Possible backing from
Gen. Arthit. Marine
corps assists in
suppression.
Gen. Arthit tries to
unify anti-liberal
elements into single
party. Is removed
from post of supreme
commander.
Replaced by navy
cdr, Adm. Sup.
Force structure
announcement: size
of marine corps to be
increased from
13,000 to 20,000.
Contract signed for
four frigates to be
purchased from
China. (July)
Naval manpower
increased from
42,000 to 68,000
(from 16% of mil total
to 22%). Naval
tonnage grows from
13,000 tons to
42,000.
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Following military coup,
some recentralization
and reimposition of
central planning.
General Suchinda
announces that he
himself will serve as
PM.
200,000 civilian
protests, largely middle
class, call for Gen.
Suchinda's resignation.
Gen. Suchinda goes
into exile. Democratic
rule restored.
Democratic Party PM
Chuan Leekpai reduces
state regulation of
economy, further
loosens restrictions on
FDI.
Vietnam pulls the last
of its troops out of
Cambodia (Sept).
(Withdrawals had
been ongoing since
1982.)
Thailand and
Malaysia establish
joint authority for
exploration of oil and
natural gas in shared
area of Gulf of
Thailand.
Coup d'etat by
Academy Class of
1958. Led by Gen.
Suchinda of First
Army Group. (Feb)
Gen. Suchinda orders
suppression of
protesters. Army
units open fire, kill 40,
wound 600. (May 18)
Marines in Bangkok
shelter fleeing
protesters. Some
army elements
outside Bangkok also
rumored to mobilize
in opposition to
Suchinda.
Contract signed for
two frigates from
China, bringing total
of Chinese frigates in
inventory to six.
(Sept.)
Contracts signed for
small aircraft carrier
from Spain and Sea
Harriers to
accompany.
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PM Banharn
establishes Political
Reform Committee,
charged with making
further democratic
reforms to constitution.
UN Law of the Sea
Convention takes
effect. (November)
Prominent active
army officers oppose
democratic
constitutional
revision. Navy
provides public, if
tentative, support.
Effort to transfer
authority over
Defense Council
(responsible for
budgets and
appointments) from
Supreme
Commander to Def
Min's office. Army
)pposes; navy
supports.
-a;vy .VIILILLi LU UU)
10 AV-8 Sea Harriers
18 A-7s, and 6 S-70
Seahawk helicopters.
Three defense policy
planning documents
released, all
emphasize naval
power.
Navy introduces its
first five-year planning
document.
Navy contracts for
two Knox-class
frigates.
Navy substantially
upgrade Advanced
Naval Studies
Institute.
Military white paper
;uggests that the
lavy's missions
nclude SLOC
lefense.
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Thailand adopts new
1997 constitution.
Regarded as most
democratic constitution
in Thailand's history.
East Asian financial
crisis begins with the
devaluation of the
Baht. Baht loses
more than 50 percent
of its value.
Thailand and Vietnam
settle maritime
boundary disputes.
(Signed MOU in '72,
began more serious
discussions in '92.)
Discussions
sponsored by
Democrat Party, two
liberal universities,
and the navy on
Thailand's future.
Advocate embracing
globalization and
knowledge based
economy. Army does
not participate.
Navy squeezed by
financial crisis, which
raises value of its
debt and results in
smaller budgets.
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APPENDIX 2: DATA ON CHINESE CASE
APPENDIX 2.1: PEOPLE DISCUSSED IN THE TEXT (CHINA)
Deng Xiaoping CCP, General Secretary
CMC Vice Chairman
PLA Chief of Staff
CCP Cent. Corn. Vice Chair
Vice Premier
CMC Vice Chairman
CCP Politburo Chairman
CMC Chairman
1954
01/75
01/75
07/77
07/77
07/77
09/82
06/81
1966
- 04/76
- 04/76
- 09/82
- 03/80
- 06/81
11/89
11/89
Minister of Defense
CMC Vice Chairman
CCP General Secretary
10/99
11/02
- present
present
Hu Yaobang CCP Chairman
CCP General Secretary
1981
1980
- 1982
- 01/87
(Post eliminated)
Hua Guofeng CCP Chairman
CMC Chairman
Prime Minister
1976
10/76
02/76
- 1981
- 06/81
09/80
Mao's wife and member of the gang of four
Jiang Zemin
Li Desheng
CCP General Secretary
CMC Chairman
President
Cdr. Shenyang Mil. Region
Deputy Navy Commander
CMC Vice Chairman
Minister of Defense
1962
09/59
09/59
1973
09/71
09/71
Liu Huaqing CMC,
CMC,
PLA
CMC
CMC
Advisor to Deng
full member
Commander
Vice Chairman
Vice Chairman
(2nd)
(1st)
1979
1987
08/82
11/89
10/92
1987
1989
01/88
10/92
09/97
CCP, Vice Chairman 1949
Geng Biao
Hu Jintao
03/81 11/82
Jiang Qing
06/89
11/89
03/93
Li Zuopeng
11/02
Present
Lin Biao
1985
I
I
Liu Shaoqi 1966
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Luo Ruiqing
Mao Zedong
Nie Rongzhen
Peng Dehuai
Xiao Jinguang
Yang Dezhi
Yang Shangkun
Ye Fei
Ye Jianying
Zhang Aiping
Zhang Chunqiao
Zhang Lianzhong
Zhang Wannian
Zhang Zhen
Zhou Enlai
Zhao Ziyang
Zhu De
President
PLA Chief of Staff
CCP, Chairman
President
CMC Chairman
Died
CMC Vice Chairman
Minister of Defense
CMC vice Chairman
PLAN Commander
Deputy Minister of Defense
PLAN Commander
PLA Chief of Staff
CMC Vice Chairman
President
PLAN Commander
CMC Vice Chairman
Minister of Defense
President
Minister of Defense
Politburo, standing committee.
PLAN Commander
PLA Chief of Staff
CMC Vice Chairman (3rd)
CMC Vice Chairman (1st')
CMC Vice Chairman (2 nd)
Prime Minister
Foreign Minister
Prime Minister
CCP General Secretary
CMC Vice Chairman
President
1959 - 1966
09/59 - 03/66
06/45 - 1976
10/49 - 04/59
09/54 - 09/76
09/76
01/66 - 1985
09/54 - 09/59
09/54 - 09/59
01/50 - 01/80
1954
1967
03/80 - 11/87
09/82 - 1992
04/88 - 03/93
01/80 - 08/82
01/66 - 10/85
01/75 - 03/78
03/78 - 06/83
11/82 - 04/88
Member, Gang of Four.
01/88 -
11/92 - 09/95
09/95 - 09/97
09/97 -
10/92 - 09/97
1949 - 1976
09/80 - 11/87
01/87 - 06/89
11/87 - 06/89
01/75 - 07/76
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APPENDIX 2.2. LEADERSHIP POSTS (CHINA)
PARTY POSITIONS
Generations of Chinese Communist Party Leadership*
1 st Mao Zedong
2nd Deng Xiaoping
3rd Jiang Zemin
4th Hu Jintao
* The lexicon of"generations" became common after the mid-1990s, and was applied post hoc to Mao
and Deng. The terms are useful in that they suggest the locus of real power, instead of identifying the
formal occupant of a particular position. For many years during his reign, Deng's only formal position
was president of a bridge club. The primary drawbacks are that they are overly simplistic, and ignore
facts embarrassing to the party - such as the role played by Hua Guofeng after Mao's death.
While Mao and Deng are referred to simply as the first and second generation leaders, identification of
the third and fourth is as follows: "the third generation of leaders, with Jiang Zemin as its core"; "the
fourth generation of leaders, with Hu Jintao as its core." The significance of the latter phrasing is that
it implies greater institutionalization and diffusion of power - though I would note that Mao and Deng
faced many competitors and challengers.
CCP Chairmen
Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
Hu Yaobang
06/45
1976
1981
CCP General Secretary
Deng Xiaoping
Hu Yaobang
Zhao Ziyang
Jiang Zemin
Hu Jintao
09/56
02/80
01/87
06/89
11/02
(Post abolished in 1982)
- 1976
- 1981
- 1982
(Top Party post after 1982)
- 1957
- 01/87
- 06/89
- 11/02
- present
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STATE POSITIONS
Prime Minister
Zhoe Enlai
Hua Guofeng
Zhao Ziyang
Li Peng
Zhu Rongji
10/49 -
02/76 -
09/80 -
11/87 -
03/98 -
01/76
09/80
11/87
03/98
The prime minister heads the state council, a cabinet ostensibly chosen by the NPC and oversees the
work of state commissions and ministries.
State President**
Mao Zedong
Liu Shaoqi
Dong Biwu (acting)
Zhu De
Ye Jianying
Li Xiannian
Yang Shangkun
Jiang Zemin
10/49
04/59
10/68
01/75
03/78
06/83
04/88
03/93
04/59
10/68
01/75
- 07/76
- 06/83
- 04/88
03/93
- 2003
This post carries less authority than that of prime minister (which controls the bureaucracy), but can
and has been used by as an additional post with great status - including some foreign relations
responsibilities. (Some individuals have also been appointed to the post to bestow high nominal
status, while removing them from more posts with more real power.) The name has varied over time,
including (from most recent to most distant) president of the republic, chairman of the standing
committee of the National People's Conference, and chairman of the central people's government.
MILITARY POSITIONS
CMC Chairman
Mao Zedong
Hua Guofeng
Deng Xiaoping
Jiang Zemin
09/54
10/76
06/81
11/89
09/76
- 06/81
- 11/89
- present
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CMC Vice Chairman
Zhu De
Peng Dehuai
Lin Biao
He Long
Nie Rongzhen
Ye Jianying
Xu Xiangqian
Chen Yi
Liu Bocheng
Yang Chengwu
Deng Xiaoping
Wang Hongwen
Deng Xiaoping
Yang Shangkun
Zhao Ziyang
Liu Huaqing
Zhang Zhen
Zhang Wannian
Chi Haotian
Hu Jintao
09/54
09/54
09/59
09/59
09/59
01/66
01/66
01/66
01/66
02/67
01/75
07/75
07/77
09/82
11/87
11/89
10/92
09/95
09/95
10/99
09/59
09/59
09/71
01/67
1985
10/85
1985
01/72
09/82
03/68
04/76
10/76
06/81
10/92
06/89
09/97
09/97
(d. 1992)
(d. 1986)
(d. 1990)
(2nd vice chairman, then 1st after 1992)
(2nd)
(3rd, then 1"st after 09/97)
(4th, then 2nd after 09/97)
Cao Gangchuan and
2002 or 2003.
Guo Boxiong are set to take over from Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian in late
Minister of Defense
Peng Dehuai
Lin Biao
Ye Jianying
Xu Xiangqian
Geng Biao
Zhang Aiping
Qin Jiwei
Chi Haotian
09/54
09/59
01/75
03/78
03/81
11/82
04/88
03/93
09/59
09/71
- 03/78
- 03/81
- 11/82
- 04/88
03/93
Chief of Staff
Xu Xiangqian
Song Yu
Huang Kecheng
Luo Ruiqing
Yang Chengwu
Huang Yongsheng
10/49
11/54
10/58
09/59
08/66
06/68
11/54
10/58
09/59
03/66
03/68
09/71
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Deng Xiaoping 01/75 04/76
Yang Chengwu 07/77 03/80
Yang Dezhi 03/80 11/87
Chi Haotian 11/87 11/92
Zhang Wannian 11/92 09/95
Bo Quanyou 09/95
PLAN Commanders
Xiao Jinguan 01/50 - 01/80
Ye Fei 01/80 - 08/82
Liu Huaqing 08/82 - 01/88
Zhang Lianzhong 01/88
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APPENDIX 2.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (CHINA)
National Political
and Economic
Events
KMT swept from
mainland; PRC
established.
First Five Year Plan:
technocratic and
moderate (by later
standards), with some
room for private
production.
Strategic Military
(external or
insurgent)
Stalin dies in March.
Sino-Soviet relations
improve significantly.
Korean War ends.
(July)
Domestic Pol-Mil
(including coups)
Peng Dehuai, former
commander of
Chinese forces in
Korea, serves China's
first Minister of
Defense and also as
vice chairman of
CMC.
PLAN cdr Xiao
Jinguang serves as
Dpt Min of Def.
Provides strong
support for Peng
Dehuai, as well as for
civilian moderates.
Military Strategy
and Force
Structure
PLAN marine corps
established.
Disbanded, '57.
Reestablished, '80.
Mil budgets cut: 34%
of national budget to
9%. Manpower cut
from 4.8 million to 2.5
mil. Conventional
capabilities improved.
Navy strengthened,
but first priority to air
and armor.
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Mao begins expressing
increasing concerns
about deterioration of
egalitarianism in
Chinese society.
Hundred Flowers
campaign gives more
room to intellectuals.
Sponsored by Mao, who
then leads reaction
against it.
Anti-rightist campaign.
300,000 intellectuals
branded liberals.
Technocrats purged
from govt, universities,
and econ posts. (July)
Great Leap Forward.
Massive communes
created. Private plots
eliminated. Approx. 20
million starve.
Anti-dogmatism
campaign targets those
"slavishly" following
Soviet model --
generally political
moderates
First Straits Crisis
begins (Aug). China
bombards Quemoy
and Matzu. Taiwan
attacks coastal
targets, incl.
Shanghai civilian and
military facilities.
Zhou Enlai says at
Bandung
Conference: war
between great
powers not
inevitable.
Mao's relationship w/
USSR deteriorates
after Khruschev
denounces Stalin
and opens Sov
system more to
intellectuals.
US deploys Matador
missiles into Taiwan.
Can target hundreds
of miles into China
with nukes.
Mao worries that
PLA's technical
orientation
undermining social
egalitarianism more
generally.
PLA changes (see
right-hand column)
explicitly taken to
strengthen it
ideologically -- i.e.
reinforce the left.
China's first destroyer
detachment
established.
Ranks, insignia, and
recruiting regulations
and standards
introduced.
China's first
domestically
produced destroyer,
Chengdu-class,
launched.
Reversals for policies
established by Peng
Dehuai: PLA regular
reserve merged with
militia again; marine
corps disbanded.
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Mao begins using
radical language of
"continuing revolution"
to attack social
problems.
After criticism from
many CCP officials,
Mao stops sitting on
Politburo meetings.
dominates CMC.
Still
Mao steps down as
pres. Liu Shaoqi
consolidates authority
on civilian matters. Mao
remains CMC chair.
(April)
Civilian moderates
begin to ease measures
taken during the Great
Leap.
Moderates control
economic policy. Some
private plots restored.
Communes scaled
back. Former capitalists
and intellectuals
employed.
Second Straits Crisis
provoked by Mao.
China shells islands,
but ops more limited
than during first
crisis.
Khrushchev goes to
the US for talks at
Camp David. Sino-
Soviet relations
continue to
deteriorate.
USSR withdrawals
all 1,300 experts
from China. 343
major contracts and
257 technical
projects canceled.
(September)
Expanded CMC
session: "Struggle
between two military
lines" (revolutionary
and Soviet). Navy
singled out for
criticism.
Lushan Conference:
Peng Dehuai
challenges Mao on
Great Leap. Peng
replaced by Lin Biao
as MoD and CMC
vice chair. (July)
Expanded cession of
CMC: Lin stresses
Mao Zedong thought
in new approach to
military problems.
Militia size expanded
significantly.
Expanded further
after 1962.
Lin Biao accelerates
shift towards guerrilla
doctrines, but keeps
more conventional
capabilities than the
"gang of four" did
later (1973-1976).
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Cultural Revolution.
China lurches left.
PLA performs well
under tough
circumstances in
border war against
India. (fall)
China successfully
tests a nuclear
bomb.
Foreign policy
defeats. US
increasing
involvement in
Vietnam; Pakistan
defeated in war with
India; Chinese-
backed PKI smashed
in Indonesia.
PLA expands role in
CCP affairs. Heads
of mil districts
become secretaries in
regional party
bureaus. First
secretaries of
provinces become
political commissars
in military.
Mao declares: "Leam
from the PLA," holds
PLA as model
revolutionary org.
"Discovery" of Lei
Feng diary. Model
soldier. Used to
attack poor values
displayed by
intellectuals and
writers.
Mao orders the
creation of an
enormous civilian
militia under military
control.
(See "threat" column)
Lin abolishes ranks
and insignia within the
military. (May)
PLA manpower
increased: 2.5 mil to
4.4 mil. Guerrilla
doctrine. PLAN:
"People's war at sea";
small craft and
submarines;
manpower increased;
construction corps
grows 700%.
Standards drop.
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Cultural Revolution (CR)
begins. Civilian
moderates (Liu Shaoqi,
Deng Xiaoping, Chen
Yun, Zhou Enlai)
purged.
Work on "third line"
begins; industry moved
to inaccessible interior
areas
Red guards attack
intellectuals, party
organs.
Mao intervenes to
moderate radicalism.
Revolutionary
committees established
with three-way
representation: the
masses, the PLA, and
party cadre.
Zhou Enlai expands
private plots. Brief
period of more
moderate econ and pol
policy in midst of CR.
PLA fights Soviet
troops on the Ussuri
river. 100 Soviets
and around 800
Chinese killed.
(March)
Nixon orders
withdrawals from
Vietnam.
"Vietnamization"
begins. (June)
Kissinger goes to
Beijing. (July)
PRC gains UN seat;
raiwan forced to
Nithdrawal.
Lin Biao helps enable
CR by giving Jiang
Qing (Mao's wife)
official military post.
(February)
(See "politics"
section.)
Lin Biao dies,
allegedly during flight
to Soviet Union after
coup plot discovered.
(Sept)
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"Gang of Four" all
occupying key political
posts; all in Politburo in
1973. Politics moves to
extreme left again.
Deng Xiaoping made
vice chairman of the
Party.
Tiananmen protests
(Mar-Apr) follow death
of Zhou Enlai (Jan).
Deng purged of all
posts; criticized for
Tiananmen protests.
(Apr)
Death of Mao. Hua
Guofeng becomes CCP
chairman; though weak,
remains in that post until
1981.
Nixon goes to China.
Shanghai
communique signed.
PLAN units evict
Vietnamese from the
Paracel Islands,
occupy islands.
Saigon falls to Sov-
backed NVA. (Apr)
Sov presence in
Vietnam expands
thereafter.
Deng Xiaoping
becomes CMC vice
chairman and PLA
chief of staff.
(January '75)
Deng characterizes
military deficiencies in
five characters: fat,
faction-ridden, proud,
luxury-prone, and
lazy. Pushes for
downsizing.
Gang of Four
prepares Shanghai
militia and other mil
supporters for
showdown after
Mao's death. Ye
Jianying and Xiao
Jinguang plot arrest
of the Gang.
Gang of Four
arrested. (October)
Central mil organs
gutted by gang of
four. Guerrilla
doctrines supreme.
Militia, railway corps
strengthened. Little
work on capital ships.
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Period of "Reform and
Opening." Liberal
economic reform and
the re-institutionalization
of politics.
Deng Xiaoping
rehabilitated;
reappointed to former
posts. (Jul)
Third Plenum of
Eleventh Party
Congress. Reform and
opening affirmed as
policy. Deng Xiaoping
emerges as leading
political figure. (Dec)
Experiments in two
southern provinces with
private agricultural plots
and the "family
responsibility system."
Soviet client state
Vietnam invades
Cambodia. (Dec)
Navy Pol Commissar,
Su Zhenhua,
assigned to purge
Gang of Four
supporters from
Shanghai stronghold.
Deng restored as vice
chairman of CMC.
Acting navy cdr Liu
Daosheng launches
effort involving 6,000
political officers in
700 teams to
investigate and
remove leftists from
navy.
Deng orders reduced
troop strength, but
manpower continues
to climb until '81.
Does not reach 1978
level again until 1986.
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Four "special economic
zones" (SEZs)
established, foreign
firms establish
operations. (Jul)
Hu Yaobang, Deng's
liberal protoge,
becomes Party General
Secretary.
China invades
Vietnam. (Feb) Lose
40,000 men in four
months of combat.
Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. (Dec)
China encircled by
Soviet power.
Liu Huaqing becomes
Deng's personal
advisor within CMC.
Army Marshal Ye
Jianying introduces
"four cardinal
principles," arguing
absolute authority of
Party. Criticizes
liberals for departing
from Party
consensus. (Sep)
PLA GPD chief Wei
Guoqing cooperates
with Party Chairman
Hua Guofeng to
"eliminate bourgeois
ideology," undermine
Deng's position.
Wei Guoqing and
Hua Guofeng bring
conservative army
general, Ye Fei, in to
command the navy.
Deng faces
continuing problems
in the military. Four
of eight division
commanders slated
for transfers from
Nanjing MR refuse
orders.
Deng Xiaoping drops
"military
modernization" from
third to fourth (and
last) place among the
four national priorities.
Defense budget for
1981 cut by 13
percent.
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Hu Yaobang replaces
Hua Guofeng as Party
Chairman. Hu expected
to replace Deng as
paramount leader after
the latter's retirement in
1987.
High inflation puts Deng
and liberals on the
defensive. Some
retrenchment.
UN Law of the Sea
Convention of 1982
ready for signing.
Takes effect in 1994.
Zhang Aiping, a
member of the
military's science and
technology
community, appointed
Min. of Defense.
PLA GPD chief Wei
Guoqing fired
(September) after
PLA article attacking
liberalization and Hu
Yaobang. Replaced
by Yu Qiuli, who
proved an equally
tough critic.
Navy admiral Liu
Huaqing becomes
navy cdr, replaces Ye
Fei. (Sept)
Military reductions;
emphasis on navy.
Def budget shrink
21%. Naval tonnage
grows 86%. New
warships; naval
systems imported.
Army modernization
slow: army unwilling
to downsize and lacks
funds.
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Major new economic
liberalization initiative.
Special economic zones
established in fourteen
additional cities (brining
total to 16).
Navy cdr Liu Huaqing
publishes article:
navy's first priority
"combating leftism,"
places econ
rebuilding ahead of
mil spending.
PLA's GPD launches
anti-liberal
campaigns, including
"theory of soldiers'
gains and losses."
Uses these to attack
Deng's liberal allies,
especially Hu
Yaobang.
Army officers attack
liberal Deng protoge
Hu Yaobang, prevent
him from becoming
CMC chairman --
critically damaging his
candidacy to succeed
Deng. (July-Aug)
Li Desheng, leftist
military holdout,
finally removed from
his post as cdr of
Shenyang military
region.
Navy cdr Liu Huaqing
establishes Navy
Equipment
Assessment
Research Center,
improving design
capabilities, think-tank
/ naval propaganda
capability.
At CMC meeting,
Deng announces no
longer necessary to
prepare for imminent
world war. Limited,
local war around
Chinese periphery
cannot be ruled out.
(Jun)
Adm Liu Huaqing
establishes warship
captain's course for
pilots. Early
acquisition of an AC
carrier widely
discussed.
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Hu Yaobang, weakened
by conservative attacks,
forced to resign all
posts. (January)
Zhao Ziyang becomes
CCP General Secretary.
(January)
Tiananmen Square
massacre. (June 4)
Zhao Ziyang purged.
Jiang Zemin, relatively
obscure mayor of
Shanghai, becomes
new Party general
secretary.
Navy's discussion of
resources under the
SC Sea begins w/
symposium
sponsored by Naval
Equipment Research
Center. (Nov)
PLAN analysis: First
use of term
lebensraum ("living
space" or "shengcun
kongjian") in
reference to ocean
and ocean
resources. (April)
China begins to
establish permanent
structures and
permanent presence
on Spratley Islands.
Chinese analysts
begin to see
changes in Soviet
behavior as
significant.
Chinese naval and
maritime forces seize
several of the
Spratley Islands in
the center of the
South China Sea.
U.S. and other states
embargo weapons-
related sales to
China. Disrupts
ongoing R&D, supply
of spare parts.
PLAN-affiliated
Oceanographic
Bureau surveys SC
Sea; "finds" 196
billion barrels of oil --
2400% of Liu
Huaqing's '84
estimate.
Mil allows Deng
protoge Zhao Ziyang
to become CMC vice
chair, but only on
condition he reports
to General Yang
Shangkun, CMC First
Vice Chair.
(November)
Liu Huaqing made full
member of CMC;
delivers outspoken
speech for reform and
opening during Party
plenum. (Nov)
Ranks and insignia
restored to the PLA
(established in 1955;
abolished in 1965).
505
1986
1987
1988
1989
Appendix 2: China
Army conservatives
lead reaction, threaten
to derail reform
permanently.
Retrenchment in all
areas: econ, social, and
political.
Deng Xiaoping
undertakes his "nanxun"
(southern tour)
designed to halt the
conservative tide and
restart the reform
process. Begins
January 15.
National media does not
report on Deng's
southern trip until mid-
February.
China becomes a net
oil importer.
China publishes
map; appears to
claim gas-rich
Natuna Islands, long
claimed (and
occupied) by
Indonesia.
Navy's Huang
Caihong publishes
article echoing all
main themes from
Deng's nanxun. (Jan
19) On Jan 26,
Admiral Liu Huaqing
delivers speech doing
the same.
Deng removes army
generals (and
brothers) Yang
Shangkun and Yang
Baibing from key
military posts.
Admiral Liu Huaqing
becomes first vice
chairman of the CMC.
Record number of
naval officers in
politburo.
Defense budgets
grow rapidly -- 91
percent over ten
years. Navy continues
growing, but at slower
rate.
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Hu replaces Jiang as
Party Gen Secretary.
Jiang remains CMC
chairman.
China passes
Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone
Law.
China begins
building structures
on Mischief Reef,
close to major
islands of the
Philippines.
China begins
negotiating purchase
of gas from Natuna
Island fields, tacitly
recognizing
Indonesian
sovereignty.
ASEAN+3 formed:
ASEAN states plus
China, Japan, and
ROK.
Obstacles to China's
joining WTO begin to
fall. Serious
negotiations with
major parties.
China agrees to
multilateral
negotiations over SC
Sea code of conduct.
(Nov)
Zhu Rongji proposes
ASEAN-China free
trade agreement.
Nonbinding code of
conduct signed on
behavior in the SC
Sea.
Admiral Liu Huaqing
(age 81) retires.
Hu Jintao becomes
CMC vice chairman in
preparation for
political transition in
2002-2003.
PLAN shifts emphasis
to sea denial systems
like submarines.
Indefinitely delays
acquisition of AC
carrier.
PLAN signs contract
for eight Kilo-class
submarines from
Russia.
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APPENDIX 3: DATA ON INDONESIAN CASE
APPENDIX 3.1: INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT (INDONESIA)
Agus Wirahadikusumah
Agus Widjojo
Habibie
Hatta
Martadinata
Nasution, Abdul Haris
Natsir
Prabowo Subianto
Subagyo Hadisiswoyo
Subiyakto
Sucipto, Akhmad
(or Sutjipto)
Tyasno Sudarto
Suharto
Sukarno
Ast. For TNI planning
Wirabuana Military Cmd.
Kostrad commander
Overstrength officer
Died
TNI Territorial Chief
Science and Tech Minister
Vice President
President
Vice President
Prime Minister
Navy Chief of Staff
Army Chief
Army Chief
TNI Commander
Prime Minister
Special Forces Commander
Cdr of Central Reserve
Army Commander
Head of BAIS (Mil. Intel.)
Commander of the navy
TNI academy commander
Dept. Navy commander 9/98
Navy commander
Army Commander
Cdr Strategic Reserve
President
President
01/99
11/99
02/00
07/00
08/01 (;
1999
1990
05/98
1945
1948
1959
1945
1955
1962
1950
02/98
1945
07/99
11/99
1962
1968
1945
11/99
02/00
07/00
08/01
e 49)
05/98
-10/99
1950
1953
1962
1965
1951
11/99
02/98
1959
09/98
07/99
10/00
08/00
1965
05/98
1967
Igi
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Dpty Cdr of SESKOAD
President
1961
10/99
Navy commander
Dept TNI commander
TNI commander
Prime Minister
Army commander
TNI commander
Coordinating Min.
07/99
07/99 - 10/99
10/99 - 06/02
1952 - 1953
02/98
02/98 - 10/99
10/99 - 02/00
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Suwarto
Wahid
Widodo
Wilopo
Wiranto
06/01
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APPENDIX 3.2: ABBREVIATIONS AND FOREIGN TERMS (INDONESIA)
ABRI Indonesian military (as it was known 1968-1999)
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia
Dwifungsi Dual function - the military's dual military and socio-economic function
Guided Democracy Name of state system established by Sukarno, 1959-1966
KNIL Royal Netherlands Indies Army (indigenous forces)
Komkamtib Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (an intel.
organization)
Kopassus
Kostrad
Laskar
Laskar Jihad
MPR
MUI
New Order
NU
PETA
PKI
PSI
SESKOAD
TNI
Special Forces Command
Komando Pasukan Khusus
Army Strategic Command (or Indonesia's strategic reserve)
Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat
Militia forces (used during WWII and revolutionary)
Islamic organization formed in 1999 to fight against Christians in Maluku
People's Consultative Assembly (after 1959)
Indonesian Council of Ulemas, party formed in 2000 from non-NU Islamic parties
Name of the state system led by Suharto after 1968
Wahid's Islamic Party
Nahdlathul Ulama
Defenders of the Fatherland, WWII Japanese-trained forces
Pembela Tanah Air
Communist Party of Indonesia
Socialist Party of Indonesia
Army Staff and Command School
Indonesian military (as it was known 1945-1968, 1999-present)
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APPENDIX 3.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (INDONESIA)
Political or
Economic Event
Japanese military
government begins.
Republic of Indonesia
declares
independence.
(August 17)
Constitution adopted,
establishing a
presidential political
system. (August 29)
New constitution (with
parliamentary system)
adopted.
Liberal politicians hold
sway in parliament.
Strategic Military
(external or
insurgent)
Occupation of Dutch
East Indies by
Japanese military.
Indonesian
Revolution.
Dutch concede
Indonesian
independence. Do
not cede Irian Jaya.
(December 27)
Darul Islam revolt
aimed at creating
Islamic state. (Peak
intensity: '57 to '61)
Domestic
Political-Military
(incl. coups)
Former KNIL army
officers and the navy
support parliamentary
liberals. Former Peta
army officers
opposed.
Military Strategy
and Force
Structure
Army reduced from
350,000 to 200,000,
conventional
capabilities
strengthened. Navy
grows from 0 to 4,200
tons.
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1945-
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1949
1949-
1953
1949-
1962
----
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1953-
1957
1957-
1963
1957-
1963
1958
1958-
1961
1959 S
cc
1961
1963-
1966
1965
Socialist politicians
hold sway in
parliament, but politics
highly unstable;
economic turmoil.
President Sukarno
declares martial law(March 14). Era of
"guided democracy"
follows.
Navy supports
Sukarno; army begini
period in support, but
opposition steadily
grows.
Successful war with
Holland over control
of Irian Jaya.
ukarno restores the
945 (presidential)
onstitution,
nsolidates control.
PRRI/Permesta revolt
to preserve federal
system against
Sukarno's efforts to
centralize.
War with Malaysia,
United Kingdom, and
Australia over
Malaysia.
Navy participates in
Malaysia war
willingly; army
opposed to war.
Failed communist
uprising backed by
nil elements,
especially in the air
force. (September
30)
S
Navy grows from
4,200 to 56,000 tons.
Army's size expands
from 200,000 to
290,000.
Army advances the
idea of dwifungsi:
military to serve "dual(military and social)
function."
Army begins civic
action program in
countryside.
War brings large
budgets, force
structures for all
services.
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Army, especially
General Suharto,
gradually limit
President Sukarno's
effective political
power.
Suharto elected
President by the MPR
(congress). Suharto's
"New Order" lasts until
1998.
Indonesia invades
and occupies East
Timor. Insurgency
follows.
Military purge of
communist political
and social
organizations.
Between 250,000 and
1,000,000 killed.
Army's General
Suharto, after facing
down protests by
navy, removes
Sukarno from power.
(March)
Anti-Japanese riots,
orchestrated by
dissident army
officers, results in
stricter laws on FDI.
Officers at SESKOAD
seek to reduce
corruption in the army
and qualify dwifungsi
(the "dual function"
doctrine).
Army moves to a
doctrine of "Total
People's Defense,"
later expanded to
become doctrine for
entire military. Civic-
action programs
expanded.
Naval tonnage
declines from 56,000
to 15,000 tons.
Marine Corps
reduced from 14,000
to 5,000. Army
reduced from 290,000
to 180,000.
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1975
1978-
1983
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Some liberalizing
economic reforms
undertaken, continue
until the early 1990s,
when most are
reversed.
Tempo (weekly
magazine) runs story
criticizing VP Habibie's
role in the purchase of
East German naval
corvettes.
East Asian Financial
Crisis hits Indonesia,
rapid inflation follows.
(Aug)
Students hold first,
tentative protest rallies
against Suharto's
continuing rule.
(February)
Chinese naval and
marine forces seize
several of the
Spratley Islands in
the center of the
South China Sea.
China appears to
claim the gas-rich
Natuna Islands, long
claimed by Indonesia.
Treaty of Mutual
Security signed with
Australia
Ties with China
improve. Negotiations
to sell LNG from
Natuna Islands to
China. (Dec)
Foundation for the
Institute of
Constitutional
Awareness (YLKB)
active.
Ali Sadikin, former
marine cdr, sponsors
petition demanding
Suharto's resignation.
(Mar)
New 25-year (1994-
2019) force structure
plan: Army to grow by
54 percent; little naval
growth planned.
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1995
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(Feb-
Mar)
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Four protesting
students shot and
killed. Protests grow
larger. (May)
President Suharto
resigns. VP Habibie
sworn in as new
President. (May 21)
Student protests grow
after Habibie rejects
demands for new
elections under freer
rules.
Pres Habibie agrees to
hold elections no later
than June '99. (Nov
18)
Elections for MPR held.
Process for selecting
new president begins.
Sectarian violence
erupts in Malacca in
January 1999. 2,500
killed by June 2000.
Revolt in Aceh. 100
killed between May
and June 1999.
Elections held in East
Timor. Army-backed
militia attack pro-
ndependence
groups.
After protesters killed,
marine units escort
student
demonstrators.
Naval and marine
officers quit ruling
Golkar party, join
Megawati's liberal
DPI party. (October
3)
Gen. Wiranto warns
students. Army fires
on students, kills a
dozen, wounds
hundreds. (Nov 13)
Marines resume
escort of student
protesters.
(November 14)
Marines in charge of
protecting MPR.
Naval warships on
alert.
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(Nov)
1999-
2000
1999-
2002
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1999
(Aug)
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1999 Wahid selected and(Oct) sworn in as new Pres,
Megawati as VP. (Oct
22)
1999
(Nov)
1999
(Dec)
2000
(Jan)
2000
(Feb)
2000
(Feb)
5,000 pro-
independence natives
gather in Irian Jaya,
begin to agitate for
independence.
I 110L LVIIIll [JUWUIIU)
as Def Min. First
naval officer (Adm
Widodo) as mil cdr.
(October 25)
Wahid replaces TNI
spokesman Army
Maj. Gen. Sudrajat
with AF officer, after
Sudrajat challenges
President's authority
as CinC; AF officer
also appointed as first
non-army head of
Strategic Intelligence
Agency (BAIS).
Wahid fires
Coordinating Minister
for Security army Gen
Wiranto. Coup
rumors sweep
Jakarta.
Force structure
announcement:
Marine strength to
rise from 13,000 to
23,000.
Force structure
announcements:
Army SOF to be cut
from 6,000 to 5,000,
possibly further.
Navy announces
new, outwardly
riented basing
structure, plans for
expansion.
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Megawati inaugurated
as President.
People's Congress in
Irian Jaya approves
resolution for
independence.
Rejected by national
government.
UN begins operations
in E. Timor in
preparation for
independence.
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